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Authors: Mark M. Lowenthal

Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (65 page)

BOOK: Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy
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Assassination also raises the specter of reprisal. An absence of rules cuts both ways.
 
RENDITIONS AND TORTURE. The war on terrorism has seen an increase in renditions, the seizure of foreign nationals overseas and, in many cases, transportation to their country of origin for incarceration and interrogation (see chap. 5). Although the United States has obtained pledges from these countries about the manner in which rendered suspects are treated, allegations have been made that some of them have been tortured and that the United States is at least complicit in this torture.
Most countries have a legal sanction against torture, whether it is enforced or not. Within U.S. law, at least, torture is specifically forbidden by the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, which bans “cruel and unusual punishment.” But the war on terrorism has given rise to a debate over what constitutes torture (as opposed to harsh and even degrading treatment) and whether or not this is acceptable. The debate is also colored by the treatment of Iraqi prisoners held by the U.S. military at Abu Ghraib, where U.S. military personnel did mistreat prisoners, although Abu Ghraib was an issue of the breakdown of military discipline and command and not an agreed U.S. policy on how to treat detainees. Several moral and ethical questions arise. First, if one were convinced that a detainee had knowledge of a proximate terrorist attack, what limits should be imposed—if any—to obtain the information he or she has? Does the possibility of preventing the attack and saving many lives make a harsher interrogation permissible? Second, how much transparency is desired into how these terrorist suspects are treated? The question raises an ends-and-means issue. Some have argued that there is a vast difference in discussing these first two questions in the abstract and facing the reality of capturing a terrorist who one knows is likely to have been involved in future attacks. Third, what effect does harsh treatment or torture have on the United States and the ethical purposes for which it says it is fighting terrorism?
The development of U.S. policy in this area has been extremely difficult. There has been much debate and legal dispute about the status of captured terrorists and whether they have combatant rights under the Geneva Convention, which would preclude torture and humiliating treatment. By mid-2008, there were several official and conflicting views, including a Supreme Court decision ruling that detainees had Geneva Convention rights and a new executive order that would allow the resumption of detention and interrogation as defined by the DCIA and compliant with the convention. The nature of these aspects of the U.S. campaign against terrorism is likely to remain controversial and subject to both redefinition and litigation as long as the campaign persists.
A related issue is the ultimate fate of the senior terrorists who have been captured by the United States, including some of al Qaeda’s senior planners for the 2001 attacks. Although concern is voiced about releasing them, questions arise about how long they can be held, especially without some sort of judicial proceedings. After a certain point they have no intelligence value as they have either told what they know or their information is dated. These terrorists are currently being treated as enemy combatants and therefore can be held for the duration of the conflict. But in a conflict that may have no definite end, does a time come when they have to be put on trial or released?
 
A FINAL LOOK AT OPERATIONAL ETHICS. Author James Barry (“Covert Action Can Be Just”) has argued that criteria can be established for making morally guided decisions about intelligence operations. Barry suggests the following.
• Just cause
• Just intention
• Proper authority
• Last resort
• Probability of success
• Proportionality
• Discrimination and control
 
In the abstract, this is a compelling list of checkpoints for policy makers to consider before launching an operation. But policy makers do not act in the abstract. And once they have decided upon the necessity for an operation, they can find ways to rationalize each of the succeeding steps.
ANALYSIS-RELATED ISSUES
 
The ethical and moral issues surrounding analysis largely center on the many compromises that analysts must make as they prepare their product and deal with policy makers.
 
Is INTELLIGENCE TRUTH-TELLING? One of the common descriptions of intelligence is that it is the job of“telling truth to power.” (This sounds fairly noble, although it is important to recall that court jesters once had the same function.) Intelligence, however, is not about truth. (If something is known to be true then we do not need intelligence services to find it out.) Yet the image persists and carries with it some important ethical implications. If truth were the objective of intelligence, does that raise the stakes for analysis? Are analysts working on more than a well-informed and, they hope, successful policy than their policy customers? Moreover, does a goal of truth allow them greater latitude to pursue and defend their views of likely outcomes?
A problem with setting truth as a goal is that it has a relentless quality. Most individuals understand the importance of being honest most of the time (and acknowledge the occasional need to at least shade the truth). But ifan analyst’s goal is to tell the truth—especially to those in power who might not want to hear it—then there is no room for compromise, no possible admission of alternative views. After all, if one has the truth, those who disagree must have falsehood. Thus, an analyst cannot compromise with other analysts whose views may differ, even slightly. Moreover, what should a truth-teller do if the powerful reject his or her analysis, as they are free to do? Once the powerful have failed to accept the truth, is their legitimacy at stake?
These questions may seem far-fetched, but they underscore the problems raised by truth-telling as a job description. As noble as it may be as a goal, as a practical matter, truth-telling raises many problems in an already complex intelligence and policy process.
 
ANALYTIC PRESSURES. Assume that the role of intelligence is not to tell the truth but to provide informed analysis to policy makers to aid their decision making.
Even with this less demanding role, analysts can reach judgments that are based on deep and strongly held beliefs. They may be convinced not only of the conclusions they have reached but also of the importance of the issue for the nation. What should they do if their views are rejected, disregarded, or ignored by their policy clients?
• Accept the situation as the policy maker’s prerogative and move on to the next issue?
• Attempt to raise the issue again with the policy maker, based on the possibility that the policy maker misunderstood the importance of the issue and the analysis? How often can analysts do this, either on one particular issue or as a regular practice? How does this behavior affect their credibility?
• Try to take their analysis to other policy makers, either going over the head of their original client or elsewhere in the policy process? Even if this ploy is successful, what is the cost to the analysts’ relationship with the original and all other policy clients?
• Threaten to quit? Is the issue that important? Are the analysts willing to carry out the threat or risk the loss of credibility? What does quitting accomplish beyond a protest?
 
The multioffice or multiagency nature of intelligence analysis raises many issues of group dynamics (see chap. 6). Analyses are often the product of negotiation and compromise among several analysts with differing views. An analyst needs to consider a number of questions.
• To what extent should an analyst be willing to compromise with other analysts? Which types of trades are acceptable and which are not?
• At what point do the compromises affect the integrity of the document? If the compromises appear to have jeopardized its utility or integrity, can an analyst go back on previous compromises?
• Can an analyst warn policy makers that, in her view, the analysis has been overly compromised? In other words, at what point should an analyst feel obligated to break free of the procedural constraints of the multiagency process and venture out as a lone wolf? What types of issues merit this behavior? What is the likelihood of efficacy? What are the costs in terms of future working relationships within this process, even if one wins his or her point? Will there be an inevitable and irreplaceable loss of trust that makes all future interactions difficult at best?
 
Finally, the nature of the relationship between the intelligence officer and the policy maker is an issue. When Sherman Kent stated that the analyst wants to be believed or listened to, he was mainly referring to the quality of the analysis. However, an analyst’s access also depends on the nature of the relationship itself.
• How great a concern, if any, should the relationship be for an analyst? Should an analyst avoid stands that would alienate policy makers to keep open the best lines of communication?
• What if the analyst strongly believes that he or she must take a stand? Again, should the stand be tempered for the sake of the long-term relationship with policy makers?
• Alternatively, what should an analyst do in the face of pressure to produce intelligence that is perhaps more supportive of policy? Such a request may be subtle, not overt. Can, and should, the intelligence officer resist outright? How many small compromises add up to large ones that politicize the product? What if the analyst knows that the policy maker will write a memo with contrary views and will ultimately prevail? Is it still worth resisting blandishments, knowing she will lose both the argument and perhaps access to a key policy client as well?
 
Many games are being played simultaneously: the intelligence process itself, the policy process, and the desire of the intelligence officers to have access to policy makers and to keep their funding levels safe and preferably growing. It is easy, in the abstract, to declare that the integrity of the intelligence process is primary. In the trenches, however, such a declaration is not always so obvious or so appealing.
 
ANALYSTS’ OPTIONS. An intelligence analyst may believe that something fundamental is at stake, that neither compromise nor silence is possible. What are the analyst’s options then? They boil down to two: continue the struggle from within the system or quit.
(See box, “Analysts’ Options: A Cultural Difference.
Continuing the struggle from within is appealing in that one’s professional standards are preserved. But is it a realistic choice or a rationalization? Are there real prospects of continuing to fight for that viewpoint from within the bureaucratic system? For whatever reason, the viewpoint did not prevail either in the intelligence community or with policy makers. Short of capitulation, the analyst is now tagged with a certain view that has been found wanting. How influential will he or she be on this issue in the future? Or is the analyst, not wishing to abandon a chosen career, simply putting the best gloss on having lost? If such choices must be made, the analyst can only hope to make them over an issue of some significance. Not every issue is worth engaging at this level.
ANALYSTS’ OPTIONS: A CULTURAL DIFFERENCE
 
The two options for analysts who find they cannot compromise-fighting from within or quoting-tend to play out differently in the bureaucracies of Britain and the United States. In Britain, a strong tradition exists of quitting in protest To cite a high-level example, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden resigned in February 1958 when he disagreed with Neville Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement toward Nazi Germany. In the United States resignation is rarer, with individuals opting instead to fight from within Nothing definitive accounts for the difference Several U.S. civil servants did resign, however, during the early stages of the civil war in Bosnia to protest the lack of action by the United States
 
Alternatively, the analyst can quit. Honor and professional standards are preserved intact. But by quitting, the analyst abandons all hope of further influencing the process. Yes, one can attempt to influence policy from outside the government, but such attempts are rarely effective. The analyst who quits has, in effect, conceded the field to those with a different viewpoint.
OVERSIGHT-RELATED ISSUES
 
The demands of oversight raise ethical issues for witnesses before Congress and for the members and staff as well.
 
THE HELMS DILEMMA. In 1973, while testifying first before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in executive session and then before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations in an open session, DCI Richard Helms (1966-1973) was asked if the CIA had been involved in operations to overthrow the Allende government in Chile. Helms said that the CIA had not been involved. In 1977, the justice Department considered a charge of perjury against Helms for his false testimony. After negotiations, Helms agreed to plead guilty to a misdemeanor and was fined $2,000 and given a suspended two-year prison sentence.
BOOK: Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy
4.91Mb size Format: txt, pdf, ePub
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