ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror (27 page)

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

x
 Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham: Technically “ISIS” no longer exists. The official name for the organization is now the Islamic State. We have stuck with “ISIS” purely for the sake of convenience, realizing that there’s an intense debate on nomenclature. 
Daesh,
which many of our interviewees use, is the Arabic acronym for “Dawla al-Islamiya fil Eraq wa Sham,” or the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham. Although the acronym doesn’t have a specific meaning, it is considered pejorative because of the hard sound of its pronunciation. The combination of letters in Arabic connotes thuggishness, harshness, and obtuseness. 

CHAPTER 1

 2 
Zarqa was the biblical staging ground: Loretta Napoleoni,
Insurgent Iraq: Al-Zarqawi and the New Generation
(New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005) 29–30.

 2 
Zarqawi was an unpromising student: Napoleoni,
Insurgent Iraq
, 260.

 2 
He drank and bootlegged alcohol: Mary Anne Weaver, “The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,”
The Atlantic
, July 1, 2006,
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/07/the-short-violent-life-of-abu-musab-al-zarqawi/4983
.

 2 
His first stint in prison: Loretta Napoleoni, “Profile of a Killer,”
Foreign Policy
, October 20, 2009,
foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/20/profile-of-a-killer
.

 2 
Worried that her son was descending: Weaver, 2006.

 3 
It was a city of perpetual waiting: Jean-Charles Brisard,
Zarqawi: The New Face of Al-Qaeda
(New York: Other Press, 2005)
16.

 4 
If Azzam was the Marx: Fawaz A. Gerges,
The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 135.

 4 
Untold millions of dollars passed through: Lawrence Wright,
The Looming Tower
(New York: Vintage, 2007); Gerges,
The Far Enemy
, 134.

 4 
Some of the world’s most notorious: Gerges,
The Far Enemy
, 76.

 5 
By the end of the decade: Peter L. Bergen,
The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda’s Leader
(New York: Free Press, 2006), 64–65.

 5 
He had been the emir: Bergen,
The Osama bin Laden I Know
, 63, 66–67.

 5 
In late November 1989: Napoleoni,
Insurgent Iraq,
52–53.

 5 
Theories as to the likely culprits: Bergen,
The Osama bin Laden I Know
, 93.

 5 
One of the arrivals: Weaver, 2006.

 5 
In the spring of 1989: Brisard,
Zarqawi
, 17.

6
 Rather than return to Jordan: Ibid.

 6 
Among those were the brother of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed: Brisard,
Zarqawi
, 21.

 6 
Despite his remedial Arabic: Ibid.

 6 
He also met his future brother-in-law: Brisard,
Zarqawi
, 21; Bergen,
The Osama bin Laden I Know
, 32.

 6 
Al-Hami had lost a leg to a land mine: Weaver, 2006.

 6 
She traveled to Peshawar for the wedding: “
,
يواقرزلا
بعصم
وبأ
ـ
سانلل
نايب
اذه
,
” YouTube video, 34:05, posted by
ةا
ansaralshari3a, March 25, 2012,
www.youtube.com/watch?v=EUrLMFautCI
.

 6 
According to al-Hami: Brisard, Zarqawi, 22.

 6 
Al-Hami returned to Jordan: Brisard,
Zarqawi
, 23–24.

 6 
He cast his lot with the Pashtun warlord: Brisard,
Zarqawi
, 24.

 7 
It graduated the masterminds: “KSM trains at Sada camp,”
GlobalSecurity.org
, last modified January 11, 2006,
www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/ksm_trains_at_sada_camp.htm
; “Hambali trains at Sada camp,”
GlobalSecurity.org
, last modified January 11, 2006,
www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/hambali_trains_at_sada_camp.htm
.

 7 
As recounted by Loretta Napoleoni: Napoleoni,
Insurgent Iraq
, 55.

 7 
The first was “the days of experimentation,”: Ibid.

 7 
The second was the “military preparation period,”: Ibid.

 7 
Clausewitz for terrorists: Ibid.

 7 
Al-Zarqawi returned to Jordan in 1992: Brisard,
Zarqawi
, 28.

 7 
Their fears were proven out in 1993: Brisard,
Zarqawi
, 29.

 8 
Together, in a Levantine shadow play: Brisard,
Zarqawi
, 36.

 8 
Al-Maqdisi was a pedantic scholar: Brisard,
Zarqawi
, 37.

 8 
“He never struck me as intelligent”: Jeffrey Gettleman, “Zarqawi’s Journey: From Droupout to Prisoner to Insurgent Leader,”
New York Times
, July 13, 2004,
www.nytimes.com/2004/07/13/international/middleeast/13zarq.html

 8 
Al-Maqdisi first gave al-Zarqawi: Brisard,
Zarqawi
, 226–27.

 8 
Aware that the GID was tracking: Brisard,
Zarqawi
, 39.

 8 
He was charged and convicted: Weaver, 2006.

 9 
Amin was further instructed: Napoleoni,
Insurgent Iraq
, 64–65.

 9 
Both were sentenced in 1994: Brisard,
Zarqawi
, 43.

 9 
Time in prison made al-Zarqawi more focused: Weaver, 2006.

 9 
He got his underlings: Brisard,
Zarqawi
, 48.

 9 
“He could order his followers”: Gettleman, 2004.

 9 
By means of coercion or persuasion: Brisard,
Zarqawi
, 48.

 9 
He beat up those he didn’t like: Ibid.

 10 
“The note was full of bad Arabic, like a child wrote it”: Gettleman, 2004.

 10 
Unable to develop arguments: Ibid.

 10 
At one point, he was thrown into: Napoleoni,
Insurgent Iraq
, 70.

 10 
It was in prison that al-Zarqawi: Napoleoni,
Insurgent Iraq,
75–76.

 10 
The mentor-scholar helped: Weaver, 2006.

 10 
A few of these even caught the attention of bin Laden: Bruce Riedel,
The Search for Al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010) 93–94.

 10 
According to “Richard,” a former top-ranking counterterrorism official: Interview with former top-ranking counterterrorism official, December 2014.

 11 
Many Islamists who hadn’t actually committed terrorism: Brisard,
Zarqawi
, 57.

 11 
Al-Zarqawi left Jordan in the summer of 1999: Brisard,
Zarqawi
, 59.

 11 
Al-Zarqawi was arrested briefly in Peshawar: Napoleoni,
Insurgent Iraq
, 97.

 11 
Told that he would only receive his passport back: Brisard,
Zarqawi
, 67.

 11 
Al-Zawahiri was present at the meeting: Bryan Price, Dan Milton, Muhammad al-Ubaydi, and Nelly Lahoud, “The Group That Calls Itself a State: Understanding the Evolution and Challenges of the Islamic State,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, December 16, 2014,
www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-group-that-calls-itself-a-state-understanding-the-evolution-and-challenges-of-the-islamic-state
.

 12 
In the early 1990s al-Qaeda had targeted: Bergen,
The Osama bin Laden I Know
, 197.

 12 
One of these contacts was Abu Muhammad al-Adnani: Price et al., 2014.

 13 
The camp was built with al-Qaeda start-up money: Brisard,
Zarqawi
, 71–72.

 13 
According to former CIA analyst Nada Bakos: “Tracking Al Qaeda in Iraq’s Zarqawi Interview With Ex-CIA Analyst Nada Bakos,” Musings on Iraq blog, June 30, 2014,
musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/06/tracking-al-qaeda-in-iraqs-zarqawi.html
.

 13 
The physical activity at Heart: Interview with former top-ranking counterterrorism official, December 2014.

 13 
Al-Zarqawi fielded mainly Palestinian and Jordanian recruits: Brisard,
Zarqawi
, 72.

 13 
As the name implied, the Soldiers of the Levant were: Weaver, 2006.

 13 
Some of the camp’s graduates: Napoleoni,
Insurgent Iraq
, 125–26; Brisard,
Zarqawi
, 88.

 13 
The Jordanian authorities claimed: Napoleoni,
Insurgent Iraq
, 125–26; Weaver, 2006.

 13 
Jund al-Sham grew exponentially: Weaver, 2006.

 14 
Repeatedly between 2000 and 2001: Ibid.

 14 
Repeatedly al-Zarqawi refused: Napoleoni,
Insurgent Iraq
, 98–99; Weaver, 2006.

 14 
“I never heard him praise anyone apart from the Prophet”: Napoleoni,
Insurgent Iraq
, 98–99.

 14 
Whether owing to his arrogance: Weaver, 2006.

 14 
One of al-Zarqawi’s lieutenants at Heart: Brisard,
Zarqawi
, 77.

 14 
After the September 11 attacks: Brisard,
Zarqawi
, 115.

 14 
The targets of this conglomerate were two: Napoleoni,
Insurgent Iraq
, 106–07; Brisard,
Zarqawi
, 115–16, 122.

 14 
On February 3, 2003: Napoleoni,
Insurgent Iraq
, 116–17.

 15 
“We first knew of Zarqawi . . .Interview with one of the authors, December 2014.

 15 
“Jihadists gain more from friendships . . .”: Interview with one of the authors, December 2014.

 16 
Al-Zarqawi and his convoy: Napoleoni,
Insurgent Iraq
, 109.

 16 
According to a member of al-Zarqawi’s entourage: Ibid.

 16 
Saif al-Adel, the al-Qaeda security chief: Price et al., 2014.

 17 
He visited a Palestinian refugee camp: Brisard,
Zarqawi
, 96, 99–100.

 17 
Shadi Abdalla, bin Laden’s former bodyguard: Brisard,
Zarqawi
, 95.

 17 
Al-Zarqawi also went to Syria: Brisard,
Zarqawi
, 96.

 17 
A high-level GID source told: Weaver, 2006.

 18 
It was in deference to al-Zawahiri: Bill Roggio, Threat Matrix: A Blog of the Long War Journal, May 12, 2014,
www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2014/05/iran_owes_al_qaeda_invaluably.php

 19 
As early as October 2002: Riedel,
The Search for Al Qaeda
, 87–88; Gerges,
The Far Enemy
, 252.

 19 
A year later, bin Laden wrote a letter: Riedel,
The Search for Al Qaeda
, 88.

 19 
In opposition bin Laden advocated: Ibid.

 19 
He put out a global casting call: Riedel,
The Search for Al Qaeda
, 10–11, 87–89, 132.

 19 
To hurt the “far enemy,”: Riedel,
The Search for Al Qaeda
, 88.

CHAPTER 2

 20 
Bin Laden’s injunction was fully realized: Kevin Woods, James Lacy, and Williamson Murray, “Saddam’s Delusions,”
Foreign Affairs
, May/June 2006,
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61701/kevin-woods-james-lacey-and-williamson-murray/saddams-delusions
.

 21 
But he had very much prepared: Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor,
The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama
(New York: Vintage Books, 2013) 20–21.

 21 
He beefed up one of his praetorian divisions: Ibid.

 21 
In their magisterial history of the Second Gulf War: Ibid.

 21 
The man who anatomized this strategy: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 18–20.

 22 
Added to their ranks were more disaffected Iraqis: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 14;
“Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 1: De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society,” The Coalition Provisional Authority, May 16, 2003,
www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030516_CPAORD_1_De-Ba_athification_of_Iraqi_Society_.pdf
; Sharon Otterman, “IRAQ: Debaathification,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 7, 2005,
www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-debaathification/p7853#p9
.