ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror (28 page)

 23 
To distinguish the latter from disfigured veterans: Brian Owsley, “Iraq’s Brutal Decrees Amputation, Branding and the Death Penalty,” Human Rights Watch/Middle East, June 1995,
www.hrw.org/reports/1995/IRAQ955.htm
.

 23 
The regime thus introduced a proscription: Napoleoni,
Insurgent Iraq
, 146.

 23 
Some of Iraq’s new-minted faithful: Joel Rayburn,
Iraq After America: Strongmen, Sectarians, Resistance
(Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 2014) 101.

 23 
Most of the officers who were sent to the mosques: Rayburn,
Iraq After America
, 102.

 24 
Many graduates of the program, Rayburn notes: Ibid.

 24 
One such person was Khalaf al-Olayan: Rayburn,
Iraq After America
, 113.

 24 
Mahmoud al-Mashhadani showed the folly: Rayburn,
Iraq After America
, 114.

 25 
“If you talk to the Shiites, they understand . . .”: Interview with one of the authors, October 2014.

 25 
It was for this reason that George H. W. Bush: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 5.

 26 
The elder Bush had hoped: Ibid.

 26 
The violent implementation of democracy: Rayburn,
Iraq After America
, 105.

 26 
It was carried out by a twenty-siex-year-old Moroccan man: Carolina Larriera, “Remembering Sergio Vieria de Mello Ten Years After the Attack on the UN in Baghdad,”
The Huffington Post
, October 19, 2013,
www.huffingtonpost.com/carolina-larriera/remembering-sergio-vieira_b_3779106.html
.

 27 
This “embellishment” evidently included the diplomat’s role: Christopher Hitchens, “Why Ask Why?: Terrorists Attacks Aren’t Caused by Any Policy Except That of the Bombers Themselves,”
Slate
, October 3, 2005,
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/fighting_words/2005/10/why_ask_why.html
.

 27 
“According to Harvey, it provided Zarqawi’s men the cars SSO provided the vehicles . . .”: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 22; “Iraq’s Security Services: Regime Strategic Intent—Annex C,” Central Intelligence Agency, April 23, 2007,
www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/chap1_annxC.html
; “Special Security Organisation—SSO: Al Amn al-Khas,”
GlobalSecurity.org
, last modified July 28, 2011,
www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iraq/khas.htm
.

 27 
The idea was, if you understood who the terrorists were: Derek Harvey interview with one of the authors, October 2014.

 28 
According to a study conducted by the Jamestown Foundation: Murad Batal al-Shishani, “Al-Zarqawi’s Rise to Power: Analyzing Tactics and Targets,”
Terrorism Monitor
Vol. 3 No. 22, The Jamestown Foundation, November 18, 2005,
www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=610&no_cache=1#.VIk1cDHF8ei
.

 28 
The same month Tawhid wal-Jihad bombed the Jordanian embassy: Riedel,
The Search for Al Qaeda
, 100, 105; Lawrence Joffe, “Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim,” obituary,
The Guardian
, August 29, 2003,
www.theguardian.com/news/2003/aug/30/guardianobituaries.iraq
.

 28 
In fact, it was al-Zarqawi’s father-in-law, Yassin Jarrad: Napoleoni,
Insurgent Iraq
, 108, 160–161; “Imam Ali Mosque,”
GlobalSecurity.org
, last modified July 9, 2011,
www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/an-najaf-imam-ali.htm
; Bassem Mroue, “Alleged Al Qaeda Militant Is Hanged,”
The New York Sun
via The Associated Press, July 6, 2007,
www.nysun.com/foreign/alleged-al-qaeda-militant-is-hanged/57989
; Ben Wedemean, “FBI to Join Mosque Bombing Probe,”
CNN.com
, September 1, 2003,
www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/08/31/sprj.irq.main
.

 29 
It went on to state, “The unhurried observer . . .”: Musab Al-Zarqawi, “Letter from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to Osama bin Laden,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 1, 2004,
www.cfr.org/iraq/letter-abu-musab-al-zarqawi-osama-bin-laden/p9863
.

 29 
nemeses was the Badr Corps: For the sake of consistency, we have chosen to use Badr Corps throughout, however, it was eventually renamed the Badr Organization.

 29 
“[T]he Badr Brigade . . . has shed its Shi’a garb . . .”: Ibid.

 29 
If we succeed in dragging them into the arena of sectarian war: Ibid.

 30 
That figure may have been exaggerated: “Iraq: Islamic State Executions in Tikrit,” Human Rights Watch, September 2, 2014,
www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/02/iraq-islamic-state-executions-tikrit
.

 30 
Members of the first two categories were then carted away elsewhere: “Iraq: ISIS Executed Hundreds of Prison Inmates,” Human Rights Watch, October 30, 2014,
www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/30/iraq-isis-executed-hundreds-prison-inmates
.

 30 
Al-Zarqawi proved a dire pioneer: Brisard,
Zarqawi
, 142–43.

 30 
An imprecation was then recited by his captors: Brisard,
Zarqawi
, 131.

 31 
Though Al-Zarqawi retained an audiovisual squad: Brisard,
Zarqawi
, 143.

 31 
Writing to his former protégé: Riedel,
The Search for Al Qaeda
, 103.

 31 
However, as former CIA analyst Bruce Riedel has observed: Riedel,
The Search for Al Qaeda
, 102–03.

 32 
As scholar Michael W. S. Ryan has noted: Michael W. S. Ryan, “Dabiq: What Islamic State’s New Maga
www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=42702&cHash=0efbd71af77fb92c064b9403dc8ea838#.VLGK7caJnzL

 32 
Before Blackwater attained international notoriety: “Four Blackwater Agents Hung in Fallujah Iraq March 31, 2004,” YouTube video of ABC broadcast, 2:41, posted by WARLORDSMEDIUM, December 11, 2011,
www.youtube.com/watch?v=bln0q8E5onE
.

 32 
The failure of foresight seems staggering: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 23, 56–57.

 33 
According to Wael Essam, a Palestinian journalist: Interview with the authors, November 2014.

 33 
The beheading of Nicholas Berg: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 113.

 33 
The main American weapon against Zarqawists: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 114.

 33 
McChrystal assessed that the threat posed: Ibid.

 34 
By then adept at the uses of psychological warfare: Bergen,
The Osama bin Laden I Know
, 364.

 34 
It would be the Saudi billionaire’s enterprise: Riedel,
The Search for Al Qaeda
, 105.

 34 
It was also accompanied by F/A-18 Hornet jets: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 117–18.

 34 
In total, three “torture houses” were uncovered in the city: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 119.

 35 
Roughly a quarter of all insurgents killed: Lt. Colonel Kenneth Estes,
US Marine Corps Operations in Iraq, 203-2006
(Marine Corps History Divistion), 66; CQ Researcher,
Global Issues: Selections from CQ Researcher
(CQ Press, 2014), ebook.

 35 
America was waging a “total war against Islam,”: Napoleoni,
Insurgent Iraq
, 183.

 36 
In December 2004 bin Laden answered al-Zarqawi’s bayat: Ibid.

 36 
The title was somewhat deceptive: Riedel,
The Search for Al Qaeda
, 105.

 36 
As Bruce Riedel recounts, some al-Qaeda ideologues: Riedel,
The Search for Al Qaeda
, 12–13.

 36 
Here the thirteenth-century Islamic theologian: Riedel,
The Search for Al Qaeda
, 100.

 36 
Al-Zarqawi was thus seen as upholding: Riedel,
The Search for Al Qaeda
, 105; Napoleoni,
Insurgent Iraq
, 150–53.

 36 
As Riedel puts it: Riedel,
The Search for Al Qaeda
, 106.

 36 
He had the United States and its European allies: Riedel,
The Search for Al Qaeda
, 106.; “Mapping the Global Muslim Population,” PewResearch, October 7, 2009,
www.pewforum.org/2009/10/07/mapping-the-global-muslim-population
.

 37 
He had, according to his Saudi admirer: Riedel,
The Search for Al Qaeda
, 105.

 37 
One insurgent stronghold was Haifa Street: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 123; “Haifa St, Baghdad, Iraq,” Google Maps, accessed January 17, 2015,
www.google.com/maps/place/Haifa+St,+Baghdad,+Iraq/@33.3263295,44.3705687,12z/data=!4m2!3m1!1s0x15577f4a7ecb0a21:0x808bf83e3e9c97e9
.

 37 
Haifa Street in particular was a totem: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 123.

 38 
In Dora [yet another district of Baghdad infiltrated by insurgents]: Ibid.

 39 
The ease with which Mosul collapsed: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 124.

 39 
They were especially brutal to any Iraqi soldier: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 126.

CHAPTER 3

 40 
Al-Zarqawi’s sinister strategy hewed closely: Translation of
The Management of Savagery
by William McCants. Abu Bakr Najri,
The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass,
May 23, 2006,
azelin.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/abu-bakr-naji-the-management-of-savagery-the-most-critical-stage-through-which-the-umma-will-pass.pdf
.

 42 
On February 28, 2005, a suicide bomb killed: Warzer Jaff and Robert E. Worth, “Deadliest Single Attack Since Fall of Hussein Kills More Than 120,”
New York Times
, February 28, 2005,
www.nytimes.com/2005/02/28/international/middleeast/28cnd-iraq.html
.

 42 
In one horrifying instance: “Interview Col. H.R. McMaster,” Frontline End Game, June 19, 2007,
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/endgame/interviews/mcmaster.html
.

 43 
“If they perceive failure, they may take other actions . . .”: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 36.

 43 
“[Al-]Zarqawi, or the Iraqis he had working for him . . .”: Interview with one of the authors, December 2014.

 44 
It also contains the largest phosphate mines in the Middle East: Napoleoni,
Insurgent Iraq
, 190.

 44 
Building on Adam Such’s experience in Hit: “Anbar Before and After The Awakening Pt. IX: Sheik Sabah Aziz of the Albu Mahal,” Musings on Iraq blog, January 23, 2014,
musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/01/anbar-before-and-after-awakening-pt-ix.html
.

 45 
In the Albu Mahal’s Hamza Battalion: Hannah Allam and Mohammed al Dulaimy, “Marine-led Campaign Kill Friends and Foes, Iraqi Leaders Say,” McClatchy DC via Knight Ridder Newspapers, May 16, 2005,
www.mcclatchydc.com/2005/05/16/11656_marine-led-campaign-killed-friends.html
.

 45 
The graduates of the Qa’im program: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 172; Rayburn,
Iraq After America
, 110–11.

 45 
A third of the Desert Protectors’ members quit: Ibid.

 45 
Appalled by how the Sunni boycott: Col. Gary W. Montgomery and Timothy S. McWilliams, eds.,
Al-Anbar Awakening: From Insurgency to Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004–2009
, Vol. 2, Marine Corps University Press, 2009,
www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/Al-Anbar%20Awakening%20Vol%20II_Iraqi%20Perspectives%20%20PCN%2010600001200_1.pdf
.

 46 
Its first initiative was to encourage Sunnis: Monte Morin, “Officer Killed by Suicide Bomb Had High Hopes for Ramadi,”
Stars and Stripes
, January 9, 2006,
www.stripes.com/news/officer-killed-by-suicide-bomb-had-high-hopes-for-ramadi-1.43384
.

 46 
On the fourth day of the glass factory drive: Monte Morin, “Suicide Bomb Kills Dozens of Iraqi Police Recruits, Two Americans,” Stars and Stripes, January 6, 2006,
www.stripes.com/news/suicide-bomb-kills-dozens-of-iraqi-police-recruits-two-americans-1.43269
.

 46 
Still too vulnerable to al-Zarqawi’s strong-arm tactics: Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey A. Friedman, and Jacob N. Shapiro, “Testing the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?”
International Security
, Vol. 37, No. 1, Summer 2012, 20.

CHAPTER 4

 48 
Sunni voter turnout was around 80 percent: Rayburn,
Iraq After America
, 119.

 49 
Additionally, less moderate non-AQI insurgents: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 191–92.

 49 
Kanan Makiya, a scholar of Baathist Iraq: Kanan Makiya,
Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising, and the Arab World
(New York: Jonathan Cape, 1993).