ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror (29 page)

 50 
He founded his own paramilitary organization: Nada Bakri, “In Lebanon, New Cabinet Is Influenced by Hezbollah,”
New York Times
, June 13, 2011,
www.nytimes.com/2011/06/14/world/middleeast/14lebanon.html
.

 50 
The Battle of Najaf in August 2004: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 101.

 51 
Ansari worked for the Quds Force’s Department 1000: Ibid.

 51 
The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI): Rayburn,
Iraq After America
, 15–17.

 51 
SCIRI’s armed wing: “Iraqi Miniser’s Son Misses Flight, Forces Plane Back: Airline,”
Reuters, March 6, 2014,
www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/06/us-lebanon-iraq-plane-idUSBREA2519B20140306
; Rayburn, Iraq After America, 73–75.

 51 
“The mullahs ran a very subversive campaign”: Interview with one of the authors, June 2014.

 51 
A former CIA officer not long ago described Suleimani: Dexter Filkins, “The Shadow Commander,”
The New Yorker
, September 30, 2013,
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/09/30/the-shadow-commander
.

 52 
For Petraeus, Iran had: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 423.

 52 
Not only had the Quds Force officer: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 313, 351–52.

 52 
Al-Muhandis was selected to oversee: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 151, 159; Filkins, 2013.

 52 
When detonated, the heat from the EFP: David Axe, “Real E.F.P.: Pocket-Sized Tank Killer,” Defense Tech, February 14, 2007,
defensetech.org/2007/02/14/real-e-f-p-pocket-sized-tank-killer
.

 53 
Another JSOC raid in Erbil: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 324–25.

 53 
“By exposing Iran’s secret deal”: “Treasury Targets Key Al-Qa’ida Fuding and Support Network Using Iran as a Critical Transit Point,” US Department of the Treasury, July 28, 2011,
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1261.aspx
.

 54 
“They were there, under Iranian protection, planning operations,”: Filkins, 2013.

 54 
After December 2005 SCIRI was placed: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 140.

 55 
“We either stop them or give Iraq to Iran”: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 141.

 55 
But, by way of trying to limit the damage: Ibid.

 55 
The counterpart brigade in charge of West Baghdad: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 146.

 55 
According to a State Department cable: “Islamic Human Rights Organization Alleges Iraqi Forces Detainee Abuse in Ninewa,” Wikileaks, June 16, 2005,
wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05BAGHDAD2547_a.html
.

 55 
Other Iraqi government institutions: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 222.

 56 
Hospitals, meanwhile, were refashioned: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 221–222.

 56 
It also had ready access: Ibid.

 56 
When US soldiers finally opened the door: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 185–86.

 57 
Only the “most criminal terrorists” were detained: Ibid.

 57 
Testifying to the grim cooperation: Edward Wong and John F. Burns, “Iraqi Rift Grows After Discover of Prison,
New York Times
, November 17, 2005,
www.nytimes.com/2005/11/17/international/middleeast/17iraq.html
.

 57 
In 2006 the US government found: “Testimony of Dr. Matthew Levitt, Fromer-Wexler fellow and director of the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,” US House Financial Services Committee, November 13, 2014,
financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-113-ba00-wstate-mlevitt-20141113.pdf
.

 57 
According to Laith Alkhouri: Interview with one of the authors, November 2014.

 58 
From 2005 to 2010 subsidies from Gulf Arab donors: US House Financial Services Committee, 2014.

 58 
Oil smuggling from the Bayji Oil Refinery: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 231; Benjamin Bahney, Howard J. Shatz, Carroll Ganier, Renny McPherson, and Barbara Sude,
An Economic Analysis of the Financial Records of al-Qa’ida in Iraq
(National Defense Research Institute, 2010) e-book.

 58 
A Defense Intelligence Agency assessment: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 231.

 58 
AQI’s resources had by then eclipsed: US House Financial Services Committee, 2014.

 58 
In July 2005 al-Zawahiri sent him a letter: “Zawahiri’s Letter to Zarqawi (English Translation),” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, October 2013,
www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/zawahiris-letter-to-zarqawi-english-translation-2
.

 58 
Al-Zawahiri counseled al-Zarqawi to avoid the “mistakes of the Taliban,”: Riedel,
The Search for Al Qaeda
, 104.

 58 
There was one enemy: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2013.

 59 
Fearing that the Islamic Republic’s response: Riedel,
The Search for Al Qaeda
, 104.

 59 
The CIA leaked the critical missive: Riedel,
The Search for Al Qaeda
, 103.

 59 
The day of the bombing: Ellen Knickmeyer and K.I. Ibrahim, “Bombing Shatters Mosque in Iraq,”
Washington Post
, February 23, 2006,
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/22/AR2006022200454.html
.

 59 
Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani called for peaceful protests: Ibid.

 59 
One of Iraq’s NGOs found: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 194.

 59 
The al-Askari Mosque bombing accomplished: Ellen Knickmeyer and Muhanned Saif Aldin, “Tense Calm Prevails as Iraqi Forces Seal Off River Town,”
Washington Post
, October 18, 2006,
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/17/AR2006101700254.html
; Rayburn,
Iraq After America
, 120.

 60 
Bodies were dumped in the Tigris River: Joshua Partlow and Saad al-Izzi, “Scores of Sunnis Killed in Baghdad,”
Washington Post
, July 10, 2006,
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/09/AR2006070900139.html
; Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 214.

 60 
The Mahdi Army also set up checkpoints: Jon Lee Anderson, “Inside the Surge,”
The New Yorker
, November 19, 2007,
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/11/19/inside-the-surge
; “Ghazaliya, Baghdad, Iraq,” Google Maps, accessed January 17, 2015,
www.google.com/maps/place/Ghazaliyah
,+Baghdad,+Iraq/@34.0092759,43.8541015,9z/data=!4m2!3m1!1s0x15577d6b25af61b3:0x1c37973c4265e31e; Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 213–14.

 60 
Uniformed Iraqi policemen were enlisted: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 213–14.

 60 
Sunni insurgents paid the Shia back: Rayburn,
Iraq After America
, 87–88.

 60 
AQI and other Islamist insurgent groups: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 213–14.

 60 
This was the issue put forth in a classified memo: “Text of U.S. Security Adviser’s Iraq Memo,”
New York Times
, November 29, 2006,
www.nytimes.com/2006/11/29/world/middleeast/29mtext.html
.

 60 
“Reports of nondelivery of services to Sunni areas”: Ibid.

 61 
He may even have once escaped: Riedel,
The Search for Al Qaeda
, 106.

 61 
To find al-Zarqawi through his underlings: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 206.

 61 
US forces discovered that their target: Ibid.

 61 
Iraqi soldiers found al-Zarqawi first: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 207.

 61 
Jordanian intelligence, which had claimed: Dexter Filkins, Mark Mazzetti and Richard A. Oppel Jr., “How Surveillance and Betrayal Led to a Hunt’s End,”
New York Times
, June 9, 2006,
www.nytimes.com/2006/06/09/world/middleeast/09raid.html
.

 61 
All foregoing words of caution to the contrary: Riedel,
The Search for Al Qaeda
, 106.

 62 
The Mujahidin Advisory Council he installed: Eben Kaplan, “Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, Zarqawi’s Mysterious Successor (aka Abu Ayub al-Masri),” Council on Foreign Relations, June 13, 2006,
www.cfr.org/iraq/abu-hamza-al-muhajir-zarqawis-mysterious-successor-aka-abu-ayub-al-masri/p10894
.

 62 
Al-Masri had belonged to: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 230.

 62 
For one thing, he took the Iraqization program further: Rayburn,
Iraq After America
, 121; Ahmed S. Hashim, “The Islamic State: From al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate,” Middle East Policy Council, Vol. 21, No. 4, Winter 2014,
www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/islamic-state-al-qaeda-affiliate-caliphate
.

 62 
Its demesne was Ninewah, Anbar, and Salah ad Din provinces: Rayburn,
Iraq After America
, 121, 136.

 62 
ISI’s appointed leader, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 230; Rayburn,
Iraq After America
, 128.

 63 
After his succession became public, US forces captured: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 230.

 63 
Al-Zarqawi, he said, saw himself in messianic terms: Ibid.

 63 
“He came from outside . . .”: Interview with one of the authors, October 2014.

 63 
Both men wanted to establish: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 230; Hashim, 2014.

 63 
Most of the Sunni groups that joined ISI protested: Hashim, 2014.

 63 
Ultimately, they resorted to killing jihadists: Interview with one of the authors, November 2014.

 64 
In May 2014 he issued a statement: Price et al., 2014.

 65 
Digital intelligence on ISI: Bill Roggio, “Iraqi Troops Kill Senior al Qaeda in Iraq Leader,” The Long War Journal, November 7, 2008
www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/11/iraqi_troops_kill_se.php
.

 65 
The
Wall Street Journal
reported: Greg Jaffe, “At Lonely Iraq Outpost, GIs Stay as Hope Fades,”
Wall Street Journal
, May 3, 2007,
www.wsj.com/articles/SB117813340417889827
.

 66 
Abu Ghazwan’s overview: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 233.

 66 
He had once been a detainee of the coalition: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 233; “Fire Marshal Ronald P. Bucca,” Officer Down Memorial Page, accessed January 17, 2015,
www.odmp.org/officer/16195-fire-marshal-ronald-p-bucca
.

 66 
In Bucca, al-Rahman not only learned: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 32–33, 233–34.

 66 
As Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor recount: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 234.

CHAPTER 5

 68 
“The history of the Anbar Awakening is very bitter . . .”a former high-ranking official: Interview with the authors, August 2014.

 69 
Barrels of purloined crude were imported: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 244.

 69 
Two sheikhs from the Albu Aetha and Albu Dhiyab tribes: Myriam Benraad, “Iraq’s Tribal ‘Sahwa’: Its Rise and Fall,” Middle East Policy Council, Vol. 18, No. 1, Spring 2011,
www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/iraqs-tribal-sahwa-its-rise-and-fall
.

 69 
Nighttime vigilantism gained: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 244.

 70 
What made Ramadi different: Kirk Semple, “Uneasy Alliance Is Taming One Insurgent Bastion,”
New York Times
, April 29, 2007,
www.nytimes.com/2007/04/29/world/middleeast/29ramadi.html
.

 70 
al-Rishawi was ready to cut a new deal: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 250.

 70 
“People with ties to the insurgents . . .”a US lieutenant had told the journalist George Packer: George Packer, “The Lesson of Tal Afar,”
The New Yorker
, April 10, 2006,
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/04/10/the-lesson-of-tal-afar
.

 70 
The council quickly expanded: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 252.

 71 
Just before New Year 2007: Gordon & Trainor,
The Endgame
, 253.

 71 
Abdul al-Rishawi’s general success: Ibid.