Legacy of Secrecy (66 page)

stein points out that during “the Church Committee hearings, McCone

testified that his subordinates failed to tell him about domestic surveil-

lance activities or that they were working on plans to assassinate Fidel

Castro.”13

The vast majority of Hunt’s CIA files from 1963 onward have never

been released, and most were withheld from Congress. However, his

position shows that he would have been involved in one high-profile

attempt by Helms and the CIA to quash what they considered damag-

ing information. The impending publication, in 1964, of
The Invisible

Government
, by journalists David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, would have

alarmed the CIA in general, but Helms and Hunt in particular. The book

was the first objective look at the CIA that delved into topics like the

CIA’s 1954 coup against the president of Guatemala. It covered the Bay

of Pigs operation extensively, including the roles of Manuel Artime,

Tony Varona, Manolo Ray, and especially the Hunt-created Cuban Revo-

lutionary Council. The book noted the training of some Cuban exiles in

Louisiana, and even detailed the efforts of JFK’s personal emissary to

free three CIA agents from a Cuban prison in April 1963.

The Invisible Government
covered too many sensitive subjects at a time

when the Warren Commission had not yet issued its report. Helms had

successfully kept the Warren Commission from questioning or investi-

gating Artime, Ray, or Varona, or delving into the New Orleans branch

of the Cuban Revolutionary Council that involved David Ferrie, so he

would not have wanted a book drawing attention to those matters.

According to noted historian Thomas Powers, the CIA persuaded

Time
magazine’s “bureau chief in Washington to” kill a cover story

on
The
Invisible Government
. According to one report, the CIA actually

considered purchasing all copies of the book, until it realized that would

simply cause the publisher to release a second printing. The book was

published, but the CIA was able to suppress some of its publicity. The

CIA’s effort in 1964 set a pattern for what would happen in 1966, after

the mainstream press finally started to question the Warren Report.14

In the fall of 1964, Bantam Books rushed more than a million copies

of its paperback version of the Warren Report into print just after its

release, while two books criticizing the “lone nut” theory of JFK’s assas-

sination were available only in small quantities from tiny publishers.15

Both were of concern to the CIA, one in particular. The first critical book

about the JFK assassination, Thomas Buchanan’s
Who Killed Kennedy?
,

was published in the US in 1964 after its British release, but it contained

mainly speculation based on newspaper reports. The next critical book,

Oswald: Assassin or Fall Guy
, by Joachim Joesten, a left-wing European

journalist and concentration-camp survivor, was of more concern to the

CIA because Joesten had included an entire chapter entitled “Oswald

and the CIA.” It said Oswald may have been involved with US intel-

ligence because the fact “that in the McCarthy era a young private in

the Marines could study Marxism, learn Russian, and read Soviet news-

papers without any adverse repercussions is a little too much for even

the most naive person to accept.” Joesten’s book was quickly updated

with an additional critique of the Warren Report that set the pattern

for many books to come, by using information in the Report and its

twenty-six supporting volumes to attack the Report’s own “lone nut”

conclusion.16

Both Joesten’s and Buchanan’s books first appeared in Europe, so

the CIA and Helms could justify their actions because the books might

negatively influence foreign opinion. The CIA even dug up Nazi files

to use against Joesten, foreshadowing the more extensive efforts Helms

and the CIA would launch against Warren Report critics just two years

later.

In addition to his work with publishers and the press, E. Howard Hunt

continued to work on Cuban operations in 1964. Hunt’s long-standing

experience with coups, starting with overthrowing the Guatemalan

president in 1954, made him valuable to Helms. After that successful

coup, Hunt tried to help foment a 1959 CIA coup in Uruguay, where

Hunt was Chief of Station. However, Hunt angered the US ambassador

and had to be reassigned. Hunt was made an early leader of the CIA’s

anti-Castro operations and became one of the first to press for Fidel’s

assassination.

Hunt worked extensively with Tony Varona, Manuel Artime, and

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LEGACY OF SECRECY

other exile leaders on what became the Bay of Pigs operation. Hunt likely

knew about, and may have played a part in, the CIA-Mafia plots, prior to

the invasion. Shortly after Hunt’s abrupt withdrawal over Manolo Ray,

a never explained, last-minute miscommunication between the CIA and

Tony Varona caused the CIA-Mafia assassination plot to fail just before

the invasion, ensuring its defeat. The CIA has never acknowledged that

Hunt had any role in the CIA-Mafia plots, but the same was also true for

his best friend, Manuel Artime—until one CIA memo slipped through

showing Artime was involved. Just weeks after the Bay of Pigs, Domini-

can dictator Trujillo’s chief of security alleged that Hunt had visited

that country with Johnny Rosselli, just before US-backed plotters assas-

sinated Trujillo. In addition, two of Hunt’s associates were working for

Trafficante at the time of the CIA-Mafia plots.17

Hunt’s experience with Cuban operations and coups led Helms and

FitzGerald to assign Hunt to work with Harry Williams on the JFK-

Almeida coup plan. The CIA claims that Hunt didn’t officially have a

role with Artime, though the Agency admits that the two close friends

remained in contact. However, Hunt’s work with Almeida and several

Artime associates make it almost certain that Hunt did have a covert

role with Artime, possibly involving Artime’s work in the CIA-Mafia

plots.

After President Johnson scaled back Cuban operations in 1964, Hunt

seems to have continued those roles. Hunt likely maintained a role in

providing CIA support for Almeida’s family, but with Almeida himself

no longer actively involved in the coup plan, the focus shifted to Cubela.

As noted earlier, the CIA’s goal was to persuade Cubela and Artime

to work together, and Spain was one of the key countries where those

meetings could take place. According to Tad Szulc, after JFK’s death,

Helms had tried to appoint Hunt as the CIA’s Deputy Chief of Station

in Madrid. However, the US ambassador at that time was the same

one Hunt had clashed with in Uruguay in 1959, and, in a rare move, he

vetoed Hunt’s appointment.18 That meant that Hunt’s role with Artime

in Spain would have to be under very deep cover, which would set a

pattern that Hunt would repeat during Watergate.

After almost a year of pain, the fall of 1964 brought good news for Bobby

Kennedy. A month before Bobby’s September 2, 1964, resignation as

Attorney General to run for the Senate, Bobby heard that a key juror in

the November 1963 Marcello trial had been bribed. Marcello initially

refused to pay the juror he had arranged to bribe, since it would be

suspicious if a leading juror suddenly had lots of money just after acquit-

ting the godfather. After Marcello eventually paid the juror only $1,000

instead of a promised $25,000, the man went to the authorities. Shortly

after that, the US Attorney in New Orleans learned that Marcello “had

threatened to kill” the government’s main witness during the same

trial.

Bobby had left the Justice Department in the hands of his trusted

deputy, Nicholas Katzenbach, who announced on October 6, 1964, that

Carlos Marcello had been indicted for a conspiracy and obstruction of

justice, including “seeking the murder of a government witness.”19 Four

weeks later, Bobby won his race to become a New York senator. The first

anniversary of JFK’s death was no doubt full of anguish for Bobby, but

it looked as if he might be able to find at least some measure of justice

in the future.

Just over a year after JFK’s murder, on November 30, 1964, the heroin

network Carlos Marcello shared with Santo Trafficante and Michel Vic-

tor Mertz experienced a rare and very unusual setback. One of Mertz’s

trusted couriers had parked a Citroen car, loaded with heroin in hid-

den compartments, on the street near Mertz’s townhouse on Boulevard

Suchet in Paris. Mertz had lived well since JFK’s murder, and this was

one of the finer districts of Paris, home to the Duke and Duchess of

Windsor. Since the car was filled with a million dollars’ worth of heroin

(street value), the courier was careful to disconnect the spark-plug leads

and take the car’s distributor cap with him, to make sure nothing hap-

pened to it overnight. The following day, the automobile would begin its

journey to America, crossing the Atlantic on an ocean liner, as depicted

in the classic book and film
The
French Connection
. Mertz’s other routes

involved transport ships, or riskier border crossings into the US from

Canada or Mexico.20

Mertz’s Paris courier was stunned the next morning to find that

Mertz’s heroin-laden car had vanished. The street had been lined with

cars, some more expensive than the Citroen, and thus more attractive

to an ordinary thief. In addition, someone had gone to extra trouble to

steal a car whose engine wouldn’t start because of its missing distributor

cap. Mertz’s car had clearly been targeted, but by whom? The missing

heroin never turned up, since French heroin distributors—like American

law enforcement—were able to distinguish the output of the different

French heroin labs. Mertz’s deadly reputation in the French underworld

was such that anyone familiar with his heroin network would know that

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LEGACY OF SECRECY

stealing Mertz’s heroin was tantamount to a death sentence. There were

no warring factions in the French heroin trade at that time—Mertz and

his allies reigned supreme. Mertz was also known for his ties to French

Intelligence, which were yet another reason criminals in France didn’t

challenge him.21

Only weeks before the unusual theft of Mertz’s heroin, CIA Direc-

tor John McCone had shown a sudden interest in European assassin

recruiter QJWIN, the former agent with so many parallels to Mertz.

QJWIN had been paid through the Paris CIA station, and McCone

requested they provide a “roundup of QJWIN Project and activities .

. . and any knowledge you have of him” since his termination in April

1964 (after the CIA learned that Mertz had been deported from Dal-

las after JFK’s assassination). McCone’s October 1964 inquiry about

QJWIN was sent within days of Mertz’s obtaining a new US visa in

Brussels, Belgium, where QJWIN had been living. However, for some

reason, McCone quickly changed his mind and cabled Europe to “please

destroy” his original request.22 It might be relevant that one of Harry

Williams’s CIA contacts—a man who Harry felt was honest and tried to

do the right thing—had been stationed in Europe just prior to his work

on the JFK-Almeida coup plan, and was back in Europe at that time.

Had McCone, Helms, or that CIA official learned that Mertz had been

part of JFK’s assassination, possibly through the QJWIN operation or

the CIA’s efforts to assassinate Castro?

Whether coincidental or not, Mertz’s loss of a million dollars’ worth

of heroin just after the anniversary of his deportation from Dallas and

JFK’s murder was certainly poetic justice. It also put a brief dent in Traf-

ficante and Marcello’s heroin network, though it was only a foretaste of

the disruption the two godfathers and Mertz would face the following

year.

Phillips, and E. Howard Hunt were close to having their own coup

plan, this time under the complete control of the CIA and not the Ken-

nedys. By combining some of the remnants of JFK’s original coup plan

(Manolo Ray, Eloy Menoyo) with Artime’s AMWORLD, AMTRUNK,

and especially AMLASH (Rolando Cubela), they hoped to have a viable

operation without the participation of Almeida, Harry Williams, or

Bobby. The CIA officials also lacked the full support of President John-

son and even their own Director, John McCone, neither of whom was

fully informed about the new scheme. But the ensuing actions of Artime,

Menoyo, Cubela, and Che Guevara would soon result in three of the four

losing their freedom, and would bring an end to massive US support

for covert anti-Castro paramilitary operations.

While on a highly publicized trip to the UN in New York, Che Gue-

vara had a private meeting on December 13, 1964, with
New York Times