Legacy of Secrecy (67 page)

journalist Tad Szulc, who had helped to originate the AMTRUNK opera-

tion. That was followed by Che’s private meeting with former ABC

newscaster Lisa Howard, who had lost her network job because of her

outspoken opposition to Bobby Kennedy’s Senate run. Lisa Howard

had been frustrated in her efforts to get LBJ to continue JFK’s attempts

at secret peace negotiations, so she had arranged for Senator Eugene

McCarthy to meet with Che at her apartment. However, a long-secret

report about the meeting shows that McCarthy was clueless about what

he was supposed to do with Che. After that meeting, Che left New York

for an extended three-month trip overseas—and when Che returned to

Cuba in March, he would be put under house arrest.1

On December 23, 1964, five days after Che left New York, CIA files

say exile leader Eloy Menoyo was preparing to slip into Cuba, as part of

a “[Castro] assassination plot.” At the time, Menoyo was still working

closely with Antonio Veciana, who Congressional investigators believe

was carrying out the orders of David Atlee Phillips. Less than two weeks

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later, in early January, Fidel’s forces captured Menoyo inside Cuba and

charged him with conspiring “to kill Castro.”2

In late December 1964, while Menoyo was getting ready for his

mission into Cuba, Manuel Artime finally met in Spain with Rolando

Cubela, officially merging the AMLASH operation with what was

left of AMWORLD. They had two meetings, the last on December 30,

1964. Officially, Artime was being supervised by Henry Heckscher and

another case officer, but Tad Szulc later wrote that Artime’s old friend

E. Howard Hunt was also involved with the Cubela plot at that time.

CIA files confirm that Artime’s deputy, “Chi Chi” Quintero, was fully

knowledgeable about the new joint operation. At Artime’s second meet-

ing with Cubela they discussed an array of Cuban officials who Cubela

thought might help stage a coup, or support one after they had elimi-

nated Fidel. It’s clear from the notes of their talk that Almeida was not

actively plotting with Cubela, and Cubela didn’t realize that Almeida

had been ready to lead a coup the previous year.

Artime later told a CIA associate that Cubela was incapable of leading

a coup himself, so Helms and FitzGerald may have hoped that Almeida

would join their plan at some point. The CIA had some leverage over

Almeida, since his family was still outside Cuba and under covert CIA

support and surveillance, likely with the assistance of Hunt, who had

helped to arrange their original exit from Cuba. If the CIA needed to

convince Almeida to support or participate in a coup, they could have

threatened to reveal Almeida’s work for JFK unless he cooperated. But

the situation never reached that point, and Almeida never joined the

new plots, a fact that allowed him to escape the fates of Che, Menoyo,

and others. Besides, Almeida’s own position and power had eroded over

the past year, as had those of every high-ranking Cuban official except

for Fidel and his brother Raul. Even if Almeida had wanted to stage a

coup, it would have been far more difficult and risky by 1965 than it

would have been under JFK.3

In early 1965, the CIA’s support for Artime’s camps in Central America

was still a multimillion-dollar effort that CIA Miami Chief Ted Shackley

described as “a fantastically large operation involving lots of people

[and] substantial amounts of money.” It was also incredibly insecure,

since Castro’s agent in Artime’s security force and several of Santo Traf-

ficante’s men knew about much that was going on. Artime was friends

with Trafficante operative Frank Fiorini, who gave the exile leader a

powerful Magnum rifle with Artime’s CIA code name engraved on it.

The inscription called Artime “leader of [the] revolution” and was fol-

lowed by Fiorini’s name.4

In February 1965, Bernard Barker reported to the CIA that the “high-

powered .300 Magnum rifle with telescopic lens that” Fiorini had given

to Artime had been stolen from Artime’s Miami home, along with “jew-

elry [and] documents.” This security breach was coupled with CIA and

FBI reports of two other Trafficante associates who knew about Artime’s

meetings with Cubela. One Trafficante associate tried to link Almeida’s

name to the Artime/Cubela plot, but it’s clear from other files this wasn’t

true. The bottom line was that Trafficante was still in position to use

Artime’s covert work to achieve his own ends.5

Artime’s initial plans with Cubela were not unrealistic. While Cubela

had no real power in Cuba, he still owned his Varadero beach house

near Fidel’s seaside retreat, so a CIA memo discussed killing Castro

“when he goes to Varadero.” Cubela gave Artime “the details and

exact locations where Fidel spends every Saturday and Sunday . . . at

Varadero.”6 However, Artime and his deputy Quintero soon expanded

the plans to grandiose proportions, envisioning a huge operation that

involved not just assassinating Fidel at Varadero, but also having exile

commandos storm ashore at the same moment to take the entire Cuban

cabinet hostage. It was all slated for Cuba’s annual July 26 holiday, and

Artime made no provisions for dealing with the heavy Cuban secu-

rity that always accompanied official celebrations. The plans were so

over the top that they give credence to allegations that Artime was now

simply milking the CIA for all he could get. From Central America

came other reports of Artime’s lavish lifestyle, huge sums spent on

drinking and other recreational pursuits, profiteering, and outright

theft.7

By this time, Artime was also reportedly getting involved in the drug

trade.8 Artime’s activity paralleled what happened two decades later

with some of Artime’s associates like Quintero during Iran-Contra,

when Congressional investigators and eventually the CIA’s own Inspec-

tor General found that some CIA-backed Cuban exiles were involved

with drug smugglers. The temptations were the same in 1965 as in 1985:

When you have US intelligence assets and material covertly going

back and forth between the US and Central America, the potential for

transporting drugs is obvious. What investigators didn’t realize in the

1980s and ’90s was that some of Artime’s men were not succumbing

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to a new temptation, but were continuing a pattern that had begun

by 1965. According to some evidence, it had never really stopped, and

continued into the 1970s and beyond, aided by associates of Artime and

Santo Trafficante.9

In 1965, people working for Trafficante (or Fidel Castro) weren’t the

only ones able to develop contacts inside Artime’s supposedly covert

operation. Richard Helms was no doubt livid when he saw a January

25, 1965, article in the
Nation
that gave an all-too-accurate description

of Artime’s operation. Written by the
Miami Herald
’s Al Burt, the story

even evoked aspects of the JFK-Almeida coup plan when it said that

Artime’s operation in Central America hoped “a coup could be engen-

dered inside Cuba [and] that Castro might be assassinated.” Burt even

pointed out that JFK’s November 18, 1963, Miami speech was “obvi-

ously intended for Cubans inside Cuba” who were part of Artime’s

operation. Official US support for Artime was documented when Burt

detailed secret monetary transactions, including one for “$167,784 in a

plain white envelope . . . issued on November 19, 1963” for Artime to

buy “two World War II torpedo boats.” These could have been used to

get Artime into Cuba after the coup.

That publicity, the reported problems with Artime, and the insecurity

of Cubela’s involvement proved too much for Helms, and he began the

gradual process of shutting down Artime’s operation. Helms probably

hoped that as long as Almeida was still in place and unexposed, the

Cuban Commander might be willing to help the US at some point in

the future.

On March 15, 1965, Che returned to Cuba from his three-month

sojourn abroad, his first time back on the island since his secret meetings

in New York with Szulc, Howard, and McCarthy. Che was reportedly

placed under house arrest; some accounts even said that Che had been

executed. It’s not hard to see why Fidel would have been suspicious

of Che, given Menoyo’s capture on his assassination mission just after

Guevara’s unusual meetings in New York, plus the information from

Fidel’s undercover agent about Artime’s meetings with Cubela to plan

a coup.10

Unlike in late November 1963, this time Che Guevara would not

return quickly to the limelight—instead, he would never be seen in

public in Cuba again. Che wrote what was essentially his last will and

testament, giving away all of his possessions and renouncing his govern-

ment posts and power. Fidel Castro promised Che that the document

would be read only after his death. Che was then exiled to Africa, as part

of a doomed effort to aid rebels in the Congo who faced overwhelming

odds. When Che was at his lowest point in Africa, Fidel staged a huge

ceremony in Havana, and with Che’s wife dressed in black sharing the

stage, Fidel read Che’s final statement. Rumors of Che’s death were

again rampant, and Che’s compatriots say he was crushed when he

heard of Fidel’s betrayal. Che eventually returned to Cuba, but was kept

away from the public until he left for his final exile to Bolivia, where he

would meet his death in the fall of 1967 amidst Artime’s AMWORLD

associates.11

In 1965, as Harry Williams was readjusting to a normal life as a fam-

ily man and mining engineer, he had an unexpected encounter with

E. Howard Hunt, Manuel Artime, and a Trafficante associate. Harry still

occasionally saw or spoke with Bobby Kennedy, but he stayed away

from anti-Castro activities, even though he was still revered by many

exiles. Harry still avoided joining any of the exile groups, which helped

him evade the infighting that plagued the exile community and would

soon become explosive. But when Harry dropped by an exile’s house

in 1965 on an impromptu social visit, he found himself in the middle of

a potentially deadly situation.

Harry’s host welcomed him, believing Harry was there for a small

meeting that was just starting. In the living room, Harry saw several

AMWORLD veterans, including Hunt, Artime, and two exiles. Also

present was a CIA operative who worked for Santo Trafficante. The men

were getting ready to sell off the arms and equipment from Artime’s

huge program, which was being shut down. Harry told us in a later

interview that he hadn’t known anything about their plan, and that he

advised them not to sell the armaments. He argued that the arms should

be kept secure, in case the situation in Cuba changed and the weaponry

was needed again.

Hunt, Artime, and the others wouldn’t listen, because they wanted

to keep all the money for themselves. They offered to cut Harry in for

a share, but he declined. After that, the attitude of the men, except for

Harry’s friend, turned menacing. The situation was very tense as Harry

excused himself, to leave. Harry told us that he felt glad to make it out

the door alive. The arms and equipment were sold off, possibly through

the connections of Trafficante’s CIA associate at the meeting—the same

man who had helped Trafficante assassinate JFK.12

CIA files say the total amount spent on AMWORLD was just over

$7 million (over $35 million in today’s dollars), though one former CIA

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LEGACY OF SECRECY

official told
Newsweek
editor Evan Thomas that the total was $50 mil-

lion.13 Even if much of the material was sold or fenced for pennies on the

dollar, that still would have been a substantial sum for Hunt, Artime,

and the others. As detailed in Chapter 27, journalists have observed

that by the following year, Hunt and his family appeared to be living

well beyond the means of an ordinary CIA officer. Hunt ascribed his

lavish lifestyle to money from his hack spy novels, but they never sold

that well.

Helms or FitzGerald may have ordered Hunt to help liquidate the

AMWORLD supplies, though it’s unclear whether Helms knew that

his protégé Hunt was pocketing some of the money. Helms might have

felt that it was better for Hunt to dispose of the material quietly, rather

than doing it openly, in a way that might reveal the CIA’s massive sup-

port for Artime. If the Mafia were involved in selling the material, that

might not have concerned Helms, since memos show that the CIA had

considered using the Mafia as a cover for providing supplies to Artime

the previous year. Plus, Artime had been part of the CIA-Mafia plots, so

he already had a connection to the mob. Even if Helms knew that Artime

and some of his associates were pocketing the money, Helms might have

seen it as an appropriate reward, both for Artime’s years of service to