Living Silence in Burma (19 page)

When the National Convention met again from mid-February until the end of March 2005, the Shan ceasefire group representatives boycotted because of the arrest of the other Shan leaders. The National Convention held another session from early December 2005 to 31 January 2006. From this session on, the New Mon State Party sent only observers, as it was frustrated with the regime’s unwillingness to discuss the political rights of the ethnic minority groups.
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Meanwhile, the regime continued to tell the international community to give it time as it worked on the principles for the new constitution. But given the long breaks between sessions, it was clear that the top generals were in no hurry to finish the convention.

Khin Nyunt sacked

In the mid- and late 1990s power seemed to be shared between Generals Than Shwe, Maung Aye and Khin Nyunt, but by the early 2000s it was clear that Than Shwe was in command. Tensions were often reported between the three, with Than Shwe worried that Maung Aye or Khin Nyunt might try to unseat him. In addition, Maung Aye, who was a pure military man, didn’t like the way that Khin Nyunt, an intelligence officer, had
expanded the intelligence’s role into so many spheres. In October 2004, Than Shwe decided that Khin Nyunt had become too powerful, and had him sacked from his positions of prime minister and head of military intelligence (see
Chapter 8
). After Khin Nyunt was removed, tensions were noted between Generals Than Shwe and Maung Aye regarding who would succeed Than Shwe, who was already in his seventies, and whose trusted men would receive which appointments during the annual reshuffles.
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Meanwhile, the military intelligence service was disbanded, and a new intelligence agency, called Military Affairs Security, was set up with much narrower jurisdiction. In addition, the national intelligence bureau, which had previously coordinated all intelligence-gathering, was dissolved. To dilute the power of the intelligence services, each branch of intelligence now reports to different government agencies.

The 88 Generation Students Group

In 2006, a number of former student activists formed the 88 Generation Students Group. Leaders of the network included Min Ko Naing, who had spent sixteen years in solitary confinement, and other former long-term political prisoners such as Ko Ko Gyi, Pyone Cho, Min Zeya and Htay Kywe. Focused on developing a grassroots movement, they sought to involve the general public in politics through the initiation of relatively low-risk activities.

In October 2006, they travelled all over the country dressed in white asking citizens to sign a petition calling for the release of all political prisoners and the beginning of a process of national reconciliation. They reportedly received over 500,000 signatures.
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The next month, they initiated a multi-religious week of prayer, with tens of thousands of people heeding the call. Buddhists, Christians, Muslims and Hindus held candlelit vigils or prayed in their own ways for the release of political prisoners and national reconciliation, as well as relief for the victims of floods that had hit many parts of the country.
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This campaign reflected the broad-mindedness of the organizers as they reached beyond the Buddhist majority to citizens of all faiths. Moreover, it encouraged participation from people who were normally too afraid to engage in political activities.

In January 2007, the 88 Generation Students Group launched the Open Heart Campaign. Citizens were asked to write letters expressing their social and political grievances. The group would then send the letters to General Than Shwe. A month later, Min Ko Naing told
The Irrawaddy
that his group had received over eight thousand letters from monks, retired
civil servants, students and others.
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The letter writers complained about political repression, corruption, problems in the educational system, poor healthcare and
tatmadaw
abuses in rural areas.

In March 2007, the group initiated the ‘White Sunday’ campaign. They would go and visit the families of political prisoners on Sundays to give them moral support, but they were often harassed by local authorities.

These campaigns awakened people’s hopes at a time when the NLD seemed to be able to offer no guidance. The elderly NLD leaders insisted on sticking to a strategy of refraining from provocative actions in order to keep the party legal. Many of the NLD’s youth members were frustrated with the party leadership’s approach, feeling that it was far more important to try to build a grassroots movement for change. The combination of military pressure on NLD members and differences of opinion within the party led to a weakening of the party. Some NLD youths formed links with the 88 Students Generation Group while other young activists joined new groups such as the Human Rights Defenders and Promoters, which focused on educating people about human rights.

The ‘royal abode’

Senior General Than Shwe’s national funding priorities were revealed when in November 2005 he moved the capital to a formerly undeveloped area in central Burma. According to Sean Turnell, an expert on the Burmese economy, the cost of building the new capital was approximately four to five billion US dollars.
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Meanwhile, in 2004/05, the regime spent only 458 kyat per person on healthcare, which works out at less than half a dollar per person.
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Concerns about a potential US invasion were cited as one of the likely reasons for the move. US ships could easily reach the port-city of Rangoon, but the regime could better protect itself by moving to an area surrounded by mountains in which underground tunnels could be dug. Nevertheless, the likelihood of a US attack seemed hard to imagine in the first years of the twenty-first century, when the USA was embroiled in conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Other reasons have also been suggested. By moving away from Rangoon, any further demonstrations there would not directly threaten the regime’s security. Than Shwe may also have wanted to create a legacy for himself by establishing a new capital in the part of the country where Burmese kings had traditionally reigned. He had the new capital named Naypyidaw (also spelled Nay Pyi Taw), which means ‘royal abode’.

While the move was probably due to a combination of factors, the impact was to further isolate the regime from the civilian population and
from foreign governments. When the regime first moved, diplomats in Rangoon were told that if they needed something, they could get in touch with the Foreign Ministry not in person or by phone but by fax. In 2007, embassies and UN agencies were informed that land had been allocated for them to build new missions in Naypyidaw starting in 2008, but none immediately accepted.
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With Rangoon remaining the country’s centre for business, culture and development work, most diplomats preferred to stay put.

The vast majority of the civil servants and military officers who were ordered to move to Naypyidaw would also have preferred to remain in Rangoon, but they were given no choice. Most left their families in Rangoon and tried to get back when they could. When they wanted to call home, they had to do so from a public phone, as there is purposely no cell-phone coverage in Naypyidaw, and few apartments are allowed to have private landlines.
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Although the top generals depend on lower-ranking officers and bureaucrats to provide security and implement government policies, they apparently do not completely trust them.

In July 2006, Than Shwe threw a lavish wedding party for his youngest daughter, Thandar Shwe, who married an army major named Zaw Phyo Win. Dripping in jewels, she was reportedly presented with $50 million worth of gifts, including jewellery, cars and even houses.
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A leaked ten-minute clip of a video taken during the wedding reception appeared three months later. Posted on YouTube, copies were also secretly distributed inside the country. Those who saw the footage were outraged by the carefree extravagance of the participants when so many people in Burma were living in abject poverty.

Economic policy, business and corruption

Unwilling to give away any power, the top generals have insisted on dictating economic policy as they see fit rather than relying on civilian experts. By being able to grant and take away lucrative business permits, the top generals can ensure the cooperation of leading businessmen. The generals tend to work out business deals on the basis of understandings between individuals, which can be altered at any time.

Small and large business owners alike face numerous constraints in running their businesses. Regulations regarding imports and exports are frequently changed, making the import–export business itself quite difficult, while companies that need imported goods can’t be sure of their availability or price. The transportation infrastructure is also still extremely underdeveloped. According to one businessman, businesses that
use trucks to transport goods long distances face problems because of the bad roads, which increase transport times, and the trucks require more frequent repairs. Because the import of spare parts for cars and trucks is highly restricted, such parts are expensive and sometimes difficult to find. Since electricity is provided for only five or six hours a day even in Rangoon, businesses must run their own generators in order to keep the lights on and factories running. Meanwhile uncertainties about regulations and the lack of impartial courts that could enforce contracts make investing large amounts of capital a big risk. All of these factors make it difficult for business people to operate successful enterprises, as do economic sanctions for those companies that seek to export goods.

Some entrepreneurs have made handsome profits, but others have not been so lucky. Those without the right connections can run into serious trouble. In 1996, a car importer learned this the hard way. He wasn’t very well connected to the senior generals, but he was managing to bring in small shipments of cars without any serious problems, so he decided to expand. When he went to collect his latest shipment of cars at the port, he learned that all 140 had been confiscated. The reason given was that some of the models had been updated and weren’t exactly the same as those listed on the original permission request. All his appeals to the customs department were in vain. He was told that military intelligence had taken over the case. Later he found out that the cars had all been sold at low prices to senior military officers, for their personal use or resale at their actual price.

Distraught, the importer wrote a letter to Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt, suggesting that if the military routinely confiscated legitimate companies’ goods, no one would want to do business in Burma any more. The military intelligence accused him of writing the letter at the request of anti-regime politicians. In fact, he had had no contact with the pro-democracy movement and was interested only in making money, but his safety was in jeopardy, so he decided he had to leave the country.

Another problem business people face is that their companies may be taken over by the regime or by relatives of top generals. Win Win Nu, a businesswoman who ran Mandalay Brewery as a joint venture with the Ministry of Industry, had this experience. After she was able to dramatically increase the profits of the brewery, the regime decided they didn’t want to split the money with her any more. One day in November 1998, a lieutenant colonel and sixty soldiers stormed into her office and told her to get out. Following that, the business was nationalized.
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All her attempts to obtain justice were futile.

Companies with close ties to particular generals have more opportunities to expand, but they also must continually curry favour. For instance, the wives of the businessmen must regularly go and pay their respects and give gifts to the wives of the generals their husbands work with. According to one businessman, as rich as some of the businessmen may be, the top generals do not hesitate to order them around. If they want to continue to run their business activities smoothly, they are expected to do the generals’ bidding.

It is also true that if a general loses power, the business people close to that person may suffer as well. After Khin Nyunt was sacked, the deputy chief executive officer of the
Myanmar Times
, Sonny Swe, was sentenced to fourteen years in prison for supposedly violating the censorship laws.
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The newspaper had had a good relationship with the intelligence branch, and Sonny’s father, Brigadier General Thein Swe, had worked closely with Khin Nyunt. Sonny’s father was sentenced to 152 years in prison.

Meanwhile, in the agricultural sector, while the authorities have tried to introduce some improvements, they have also made life difficult for many farmers by issuing orders to grow certain crops. Since mid-2006, farmers all over Burma have been ordered to grow
kyet su
plants or physic nuts (also called jatropha). Each farmer was required to buy the seeds from the authorities and plant 200 seeds around the edge of their fields.
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Once the trees grew, the nuts were supposed to be processed into biofuel. Two years after the project began, however, the regime still had no facilities for refining the nuts into fuel that could actually be used. It is likely that the project was the product of an ill-conceived order from above which lower officials were afraid to question. Nevertheless, some people wondered whether there wasn’t a second motive: namely, a desire to contain Aung San Suu Kyi’s power by using
yadaya
, a magical technique.
Kyet su
sounds similar to Suu Kyi backwards, so by blanketing the country in
kyet su
trees, the generals were perhaps trying to negate Aung San Suu Kyi’s influence.