Living Silence in Burma (44 page)

Before the military took over, monks say that they were often able to intervene if certain authorities were treating people unjustly. But now the army refuses to honour this role. Villagers and townspeople still complain to monks about their sufferings, such as having to do forced labour or pay monthly porter fees, but they know the monks cannot persuade the authorities to stop such abuses. There have even been instances of military commanders telling abbots to call on people to build feeder roads so that it will appear as if the work is a religious donation rather than forced labour.

Some monks have decided that given the country’s current socio-economic crisis, they must help their communities both spiritually and materially. Some donate part of the food they receive to the very poor. A number of other monks have opened up primary schools for poor children. A few monasteries have also provided sanctuary for AIDS sufferers, who get little support from the state. All of these activities help address the day-to-day needs of the poor and sick, but the monks cannot tackle the root causes of these problems, which largely stem from misguided government policies and neglect.

Although monks are supposed to live simple lives with only a few necessary possessions, many have found it hard to reject the luxuries offered by generals and other benefactors. Lavish gifts to senior monks include TVs, VCRs and fancy cars, all of which are technically prohibited by the monks’ code of discipline. The junta has also built special hospitals solely for monks, with equipment and treatment far superior to what is found in public hospitals. Those senior monks who are well supported by the authorities and rich people can lose touch with the day-to-day reality for ordinary people. According to one scholarly monk, some senior monks did not know how badly poorer people had been affected by inflation and the gas price hikes in 2007, and when they saw video footage of the violence used against the monks and other demonstrators, they thought that anti-government people had doctored the images on a computer.

The regime rewards supportive monks with large donations and religious titles. Meant to be bestowed on those who show a superior mastery of Buddhist doctrine, the titles instead often go to monks who are loyal to
the regime. In some cases, they are given to senior monks whose loyalty may be in doubt, but whom the regime hopes to co-opt. Even if the monk himself continues to view the regime with distaste, others may see him as tainted by having accepted the title.

Successive military regimes have also secretly placed intelligence agents in the monasteries, so if any monks are discussing politics or meeting with political activists, their activities will be reported. The planted monks can also urge other monks to stay out of politics. In some cases, military authorities have tried to obtain representation on monastery committees as well, so that they can keep an eye on the goings-on at the monasteries.

U Nandiya described some of the other methods successive regimes have used to rein in the country’s monks, who numbered about 400,000 before the September 2007 crackdown. They abolished religious associations outside the government’s control and, through the state-controlled media, defamed respected monks who took anti-regime stands. ‘For instance,’ U Nandiya said, ‘they publish “news” that the monk has drunk liquor or slept with a woman. They don’t bother with ordinary monks, even if they are doing bad things.’ At the same time, the senior generals look for loyal monks to promote to leadership positions on the state-controlled supreme council of monks. They rely on such monks to keep younger monks in line, although some members of the supreme council refused to be used this way during the 2007 demonstrations.

In Burma there has always been a tension between the belief that every government is bad and best avoided and the idea that the government is the defender of the Buddhist faith. As noted earlier, the legitimacy of kings in Burma and throughout South-East Asia rested in part on their fulfilling their duties as religious patrons. Over the last twenty years, the top generals and their wives have invested much of their time in the building of new monasteries, the restoration of important pagodas, and the presentation of donations to monks. In many cases, this has probably been done as a genuine expression of their faith, but there are also political motivations. The generals recognize that there is still credibility to be gained from such activities, because they are taking the lead in restoring or enhancing the greatness of Burma as a Buddhist land. At the same time, as Schober has argued, citizens become linked to the regime as participants in the rituals, and they may even feel that they owe the generals a debt of gratitude for providing the opportunity to make merit.
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For example, in April 1999 the military regime oversaw the completion of the restoration of the Shwedagon Pagoda, the most revered pagoda in
the country. Many civil servants and others were ordered to make donations of cash and labour for the restoration project, but few resented it. They are intensely attached to this stunning pagoda, which symbolizes the spiritual soul of the nation. In addition, they believe their donations will help them achieve a higher status in their next lives, leading them closer to their ultimate goal of nirvana. The pagoda is believed to contain eight hairs of the Buddha which were brought to what was then a Mon kingdom by two merchant disciples of the Buddha. Over the centuries, the pagoda has been expanded and restored several times. According to the regime’s figures, by the end of March 1999 the call for donations had brought in 94 pounds of gold, the equivalent of $2 million in cash, and nearly 68,000 pieces of jewellery, which could be broken up and used to decorate the bejewelled umbrella at the top of the pagoda.
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Similarly, in 1996 the military regime negotiated a lease with the Chinese government to have a tooth relic of the Buddha flown from China to Burma for a few months. Many people in Burma were grateful to the regime for arranging this, because they believe that the tooth relic has tremendous power and significance. The junta also oversaw the construction of tooth-relic pagodas in Rangoon and Mandalay to house replicas of the tooth relic, imbued through a ritual with the potency of the original.
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Still, many people realize that the regime has tried to use its highly publicized religious activities to gain political legitimacy. One common joke in Burma is that a disgruntled customer complains to the shop where he bought his TV, ‘This is supposed to be a multicolour TV but all I ever see is green and yellow.’ The meaning: the news on government-controlled TV consists largely of military personnel, in their green uniforms, giving donations to monks, in their yellow robes.

The disappearing jewels

Despite the authorities’ apparent devotion to Buddhism, there have been reports of military men engaged in the plunder of Buddha images and old pagodas. When pagodas are built, the patrons and well-wishers place gems and other valuables in a sealed treasury located under the centre of the pagoda. The landscape of Upper Burma is dotted with old pagodas which have fallen into disrepair. These pagodas have become prime hunting grounds for fortune-seekers in green uniforms. In one case in Sagaing Division, villagers were forced to dig up the treasury under military orders. When they reached the treasury, the soldiers ordered them to leave the area. According to one of the villagers, the soldiers then cordoned off the pagoda, removed the valuables and took them away.
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A much more dramatic incident took place in Mandalay in 1997, when one of the most sacred Buddha images in Burma was mysteriously damaged. After King Bodawpaya conquered Arakan in 1784, he had the huge bronze Mahamuni Buddha image split into pieces and brought up to a site just outside Mandalay, where it was reconstructed and housed in a new temple. This image, which has become the symbol of Arakanese national identity, was revered by Arakanese, Mon and Burmans alike for centuries. It was also believed to contain a precious stone in its navel, which would give miraculous powers to its possessor.

In 1996, some Mandalay authorities insisted that it was time for a renovation. During the renovation, a mysterious hole appeared in the belly of the statue, where the gem was thought to be located. As senior monks began to investigate the case, rumours quickly spread that one of the two monks who possessed a key to the building had been forced by a military officer to open the building at night. As a result, a senior monk called monks from all the major monasteries in Mandalay to a meeting to discuss the issue. During the course of the all-day meeting, in which answers about what had happened were not forthcoming, a monk and another man suddenly came into the room to announce that a Muslim man had raped a Buddhist girl.
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Some of the already frustrated monks decided to take action, and headed to the Muslim man’s house, which they ransacked, and went on to damage a nearby mosque. As the news spread, a frenzy of attacks on mosques broke out in Mandalay and other cities. Over the next few days, monks could be seen wielding long sticks and desecrating mosques, often while riot police passively watched the scene from a distance. There were also several reports of people seeing monks with walkie-talkies under their robes, and a few had very shiny heads, indicating they had just been shaved. In other words, it was widely believed that military men dressed as monks were involved, although many real monks also participated. In the meantime, the hype surrounding the damage done to the Mahamuni image was forgotten, and its belly was patched up. Later, it turned out that the girl had not been raped after all. As for the precious stone, no one knows whether it really was in the stomach of the Buddha, and whether or not the thieves managed to extract it.
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The Mahamuni incident occurred just before the annual monks’ exams were scheduled to take place. Rather than provide a gathering place where the monks could discuss taking action against the regime, the authorities postponed the exams. When they were finally held a year later, the monks had to pair off and take responsibility for each other. If one monk were
to engage in anti-government activities, the other one would also be in trouble. As they have done in other communities, the authorities imposed a policy of communal punishment for the acts of individuals in order to reduce the possibility of unrest.

Buddhism and the NLD

While monasteries are supposed to be neutral places, certain abbots and monasteries are perceived as being either in the SPDC or the pro-democracy camp. The monks who have been labelled as pro-regime are often seen as beholden to one or more of the generals, although perhaps the generals can draw on their power as well. The relationship between the monks who are labelled as pro-democracy and the NLD is different. The NLD cannot co-opt monks; its members can only seek guidance or solace from monks whom they respect. Aung San Suu Kyi and intellectual members of the NLD have tended to look to Buddhist insight meditation techniques as a way to develop themselves, and have sought out meditation teachers in the temples. In addition, the NLD leaders have routinely drawn on Buddhist teachings to explain their political points. Some NLD members have also been attracted to a more socially engaged form of Buddhism, and have had good relations with monks who are active in social welfare activities.
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NLD members also hold donation ceremonies at temples, and some have made going to temples to pray for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners a regular event. Supporters of Aung San Suu Kyi are known to have put her photograph on their Buddhist altars in their homes, signifying both their respect for her and their wish that she be protected by higher powers so that she can continue to lead the struggle on their behalf.

The regime has sought to prevent the NLD from gaining support among the monastic community in various ways. In late September 1996, the SLORC issued a decree forbidding NLD members from becoming ordained as monks. Monks were also told to be wary of NLD members frequenting monasteries, because the NLD was supposedly trying to encourage monks to join the anti-government movement. Lieutenant General Myo Nyunt, the then Minister of Religious Affairs, claimed: ‘Although [the NLD members] are Buddhists, they are unaware of the sin of dividing the monks.’
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This order contravened Buddhist doctrine and was generally ignored by monks. It can be seen, however, as an attempt to reverse the 1990 monks’ boycott of the military, when they refused to accept offerings from or carry out ceremonies for members of the military and their families. The aim seems to have been to put a
distance between the monks and the NLD, to demoralize NLD members, and perhaps to turn ordinary citizens against the NLD for purportedly politicizing the monkhood. The NLD has not directly encouraged monks to come out on its side but, as noted earlier, ordinary people have tried to ascertain the political sympathies of venerated monks.

Stories about Aung San Suu Kyi’s and Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt’s visits to the Thamanya abbot in the mid-1990s indicate the extent to which people are looking to the monks to support their political ideals, even if only symbolically. A devout, elderly monk from the Pa’o ethnic minority group, U Vinaya, set up a monastery on Thamanya hill 20 miles outside Pa’an, the capital of Karen State, in 1980. Over the years, he built up a large following with devotees throughout the country. A vegetarian, he was famous for his strict practice, and people believed that he had magical powers. On weekends, up to three thousand people would go to see him, including large numbers of businessmen and students from Rangoon, who hoped his blessing would guarantee success in their endeavours.

The Thamanya abbot also generously allowed Karen villagers fleeing from the civil war between the
tatmadaw
and the KNU to build huts on monastery land around the foot of the mountain. In 1996, there were several thousand Karen villagers living there, free from the food and labour demands of both the
tatmadaw
and the KNU. Some of the villagers farmed, but many worked at the monastery, preparing enormous amounts of food for the endless stream of visitors.