Living Silence in Burma (45 page)

The Thamanya abbot never talked openly about politics, but the authorities certainly perceived him as a possible threat because of his ability to attract people. Members of the military regime, including Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt, visited him, and so did Aung San Suu Kyi. In her first trip outside Rangoon after she was released from house arrest in 1995, she headed directly to Karen State to pay her respects to the Thamanya abbot. During her visit, a picture was taken of her sitting at his feet. This picture was later copied, laminated and widely distributed by her supporters, who took it as a sign of the abbot’s tacit support for her and the democracy movement. To this the abbot merely said that anyone could have their picture taken with him.

When I was travelling in Burma in 1996, I heard several apocryphal stories comparing Aung San Suu Kyi’s and Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt’s visits to the monastery. One version claimed that when Aung San Suu Kyi arrived at the foot of the long stairway up to the monastery, the abbot came down to welcome her. But when Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt arrived, the abbot did not descend. The abbot invited Aung
San Suu Kyi to visit again, but he did not extend the same invitation to Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt. When the general tried to give the abbot a van, he refused the gift, saying, ‘Monks don’t need vans. Take it back.’ In another variation, it was said that when Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt got in his car to leave, it wouldn’t start. He had to go back up to the abbot, who told him that only after he had got rid of his anger would the car start. Probably not one of these details is true, but they reflect people’s desires for a different reality.

The military regime courted the Thamanya abbot for two reasons. Besides wanting to rein him in, they also hoped to garner more support from the Burmese populace by showing respect to a monk whom the people adored. The regime encouraged the abbot to move to Rangoon, where they could have more contact with him. He rejected the offer, saying he was perfectly happy where he was.

Still, the regime kept a close eye on him. Although guns are not supposed to be brought into any monastery, on the day I visited, armed
tatmadaw
soldiers were patrolling the nearby monastery-sponsored primary school, where an award ceremony was taking place. When I asked why there needed to be armed soldiers at a school during daylight hours, I was told that it was for the children’s security. I couldn’t help but wonder whether it had more to do with demonstrating that, ultimately, this territory was under the regime’s rather than the abbot’s control.

Later, when the abbot was hospitalized in Rangoon, he allowed the authorities to pay his medical bill, but they were infuriated when he visited Aung San Suu Kyi after he recovered.

In late 1999, the junta was caught off balance by the publicized demands of two venerated monks, U Zawtipala, the abbot of Kyakhatwaing monastery in Pegu, and U Kundalabiwuntha of Mahaghandharon monastery in Mandalay. Issuing separate appeals to both the regime and the NLD, the senior monks urged them to work together for national reconciliation. U Zawtipala, who had never been involved in politics, even offered to act as a mediator in talks between the NLD and the regime. He asked both sides to be flexible but also suggested that the government should not go against the will of the people.
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While the NLD issued a statement declaring the party’s willingness to accept the abbots’ guidance, the regime suggested that the senior monks had been used by the opposition. In a written response to the appeals, the regime insisted that ‘The National League for Democracy should be willing to adopt a more realistic and flexible policy.’
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The generals ignored the call for dialogue.

During the September 2007 demonstrations, when a group of monks
and civilians marched down University Avenue and stopped briefly in front of Aung San Suu Kyi’s house, the top generals were very upset. The All Burma Monks’ Alliance had already included political demands – namely the release of all political prisoners and a call for national reconciliation – in its statements, and, as became clear later, some of the key participants in the marches had warm relations with NLD members. The regime did not want to see an alliance emerge between the monks and the NLD and quickly took action to end the growing demonstrations. Nevertheless, the generals cannot stop thoughtful monks from recognizing that health, education, religion and politics are all linked. As one well-known monk put it, ‘you can’t separate them’.

Repression of Christians

Besides cultivating loyal Buddhist monks, the regime has sought to win the support of the majority Burmans by encouraging the promotion of Buddhism among non-Buddhist peoples. Throughout military rule, foreigners have been able to come to Burma to study Vipassana meditation at monasteries and meditation centres. This is a source of pride for Burmese citizens, who generally view Burmese Buddhism as the most pure form of Buddhism being practised today. With regard to the ethnic minorities in Burma, some Burman Buddhists share the military regime’s perception that if all the ethnic minorities ‘became’ Buddhists, it would be beneficial for them personally and the country would be more unified.

While personal relations between Buddhists and Christians have generally been quite good, nationalist propaganda has negatively characterized Christians as supporters of British colonial rule. Given that large numbers among some of the ethnic resistance armies are also Christian, higher-ranking
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officers in particular tend to mistrust Christians and see them as a problem. Some Christians assert they have been discriminated against in obtaining promotions in government service, and particularly in the army.

Although Christians in the cities and towns in central Burma have not faced physical persecution, they have been obstructed in the practice of their religion in various ways. Endless delays in approving building permits for new religious structures are common, and there have been cases of newly built churches being pulled down even after the proper permit has been obtained.

Seemingly arbitrary forms of harassment have also been used. A member of the Myanmar Council of Churches (MCC), which represents twelve
Protestant denominations, described some of the challenges they faced in the mid-1990s. Lieutenant General Myo Nyunt, the Minister of Religious Affairs at the time, informed the council that they could no longer use the word
thoukdan kyan
for ‘Proverbs’, even though it had been used since the first translation of the Bible into Burmese more than one hundred years ago. The general did not want them to use this word because Buddhists used it in their doctrinal texts. The council member explained:

    Not long after, the Christians invited [Lieutenant] General Myo Nyunt to a Christmas Eve dinner in Rangoon. He gave a long speech which had been written for him and included quotes from the Bible, including sections from Proverbs. Then the MCC elders wrote a letter to the government saying that since [Lieutenant] General Myo Nyunt himself had used the word
thoukdan kyan
for Proverbs, why can’t we? So then the Ministry of Religious Affairs dropped the issue.

The council member also talked about how, in 1995, the SLORC sent a letter to the Myanmar Christian Council saying that secular colleges used caps and gowns at their graduation ceremonies, so divinity colleges would have to choose some other form of attire. He said that the MCC wrote back explaining that, from medieval days in Europe, when colleges were religious institutions, gowns had been used. Secular institutions had only come later. After that, the Ministry of Religious Affairs said nothing.

In the ethnic states and remote areas, many of the authorities take a more aggressive approach. In particular, Christians in Karen and Karenni states on the eastern border and in Chin State and Sagaing Division on the western border have seen their churches burned down, their pastors arrested and
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soldiers disrupt services. One Chin pastor explained:

    On Sundays we can’t have a full service, because they take porters that day, too. They refuse to make an exception. Sometimes they also take porters during the church service. We can’t do anything. Sometimes we intercede on behalf of villagers. We say, ‘Let that man be a porter two days from now.’ But they never listen. They always say, ‘These are orders from above.’ They never understand the villagers.

In the remote Naga hills, in the late 1990s, some parents allowed their children to accompany authorities to what they were told were secular schools, only to find out later that their children had been sent to Buddhist monasteries and inducted as novice monks.

Particularly in Chin State, the authorities were upset by an evangelical
Chin group’s plans to convert all Chin to Christianity by the year 2000, as part of an international Christian campaign. Since then, the authorities in some townships tried to lure Christians into becoming Buddhists by offering them exemption from forced labour as well as food allowances or money.
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Another Chin pastor told about a Christian village of two hundred houses in Tamu township, Chin State, where the authorities went even farther. He said that besides offering food and money, some villagers were also given buffaloes and land for cultivating rice. As a result, fifty households converted, and one of the converts was then appointed by the military as the headman.

Such activities are also aimed at creating splits among the ethnic minority communities, with some people agreeing to convert – at least in name – and others refusing. As with artists and writers, conflicts develop within religious communities over what degree of cooperation is acceptable and who has gone too far. People within the community begin to view each other with suspicion, and bonds of trust are broken down. To some extent, however, the Christian community has been able to counter these pressures and maintain its vitality by putting much of its energy into church activities and social welfare work.

As in the Buddhist community, there has been an ongoing debate in the Christian community about whether the current sorry state of affairs is ‘God’s will’ or demands action. Those pastors and church members who attribute current suffering to God’s will believe that they are being punished, usually because of moral laxity in the community. For them, more disciplined behaviour and more fervent prayer are the keys to a better future. Other Christians reject this position as too passive and insist that God rewards only those who act. But because action usually means coming into confrontation with hostile authorities, following through requires strong commitment.

As a minority population, Christians have been reluctant to take a prominent role in politics in the heartland of Burma; some Christian leaders, however, have played a role aiming to make peace between the regime and the ethnic resistance armies. Church leaders in predominantly Christian ethnic minority areas have, in some cases, been outspoken. Among the armed ethnic nationalist groups where Christians are in the majority, many members have viewed their struggles as necessary to protect not only their ethnic rights but also their religion. Christian communities based in central Burma and the government-controlled parts of the ethnic states have focused on redressing social problems and encouraging personal development, somewhat along the lines of the
self-actualization writers. Pastors and priests, church staff and motivated church members have worked together to organize English classes, youth leadership courses, drug rehabilitation programmes, free healthcare for the poor, and summer conferences that bring together people from various parts of the country. These activities have provided an alternative arena for the development of ideas and skills and have helped to create mutual understanding among people from different ethnic groups.

Foreign missionaries have been banned from living in Burma since the mid-1960s, but Protestant and Catholic teachers and development workers have continued to visit Burma, and a number of Burmese Christians have attended conferences and courses at religious institutions outside the country. As a result, they have been able to appeal for some financial assistance from abroad and to learn about the role of the Christian community in political movements and development programmes in other countries. Such links with the outside world have also made them feel less isolated. Some young Buddhists have observed with interest the successes of the Christians’ social programmes, and there have been instances of interfaith cooperation on social welfare projects.

Exploitation of Muslims

Like the Christian community, the Muslim community is well aware of its minority status. The largest concentration of Muslims is in Northern Arakan State. Smaller Muslim populations are scattered throughout the cities, towns and rural areas of Burma, and mostly consist of the descendants of farmers, clerks and traders who came during the colonial period. While many Buddhists have Muslim friends, nationalist propaganda regarding the colonial period and the Muslim religion have been used to instil prejudice towards Muslims. Burmese have been taught to see Indians and Bengalis as having taken advantage of Burma’s colonization by the British to make money and rise to positions of influence in the colonial government. At the same time, according to Islamic practice, non-Muslims who marry Muslims are expected to convert to Islam.

Throughout military rule in Burma, successive regimes have used the spectre of a Muslim takeover to whip up nationalist sentiment. In particular, when anti-regime tensions are running high, incidents of intolerable behaviour by Muslims, whether real or invented, always seem to pop up and are used to channel anger into communal conflicts.

In July 1988, pamphlets supposedly written by Muslims encouraging fellow Muslims to marry Burmese women suddenly appeared in Taunggyi and other towns where anti-military feelings were growing after the
student demonstrations in Rangoon. As expected, Muslim–Buddhist conflicts broke out, and the shops and homes of Muslims were attacked and looted. Such pamphlets have shown up several times in Burma over the past ten years, including in October 1996 in Rangoon, when pamphlets appeared saying in part: