Living Silence in Burma (51 page)

The depth of opposition to military rule became clear during the 1988 pro-democracy demonstrations and the 1990 election. The large crowds that greeted Aung San Suu Kyi wherever she travelled in 2002 and 2003, and the 2007 monks’ demonstrations for economic reform and national reconciliation, reflected people’s continued desire for change. But the generals ignored their citizens’ and the international community’s appeals for a genuine political transition. They opted instead for a new constitution that institutionalizes the military’s leading role in politics and ensures centralized decision-making.

It seems that the more the regime feels cornered, the more defensive it becomes. And yet when the generals feel that their control is secure, they see no need to compromise with their opponents. Thus, if the NLD and other democracy activists do nothing, they are ignored, but when they take action in order to spur the junta to make concessions, they are brutally punished. Likewise, the ethnic nationalists have found that no matter how they struggle for their political rights, whether through party politics, the National Convention or armed resistance, the regime has sought to disregard their demands and weaken their organizations whenever possible.

If large numbers of Burmese people could engage in sustained non-violent resistance activities, and if the Burmese pro-democracy groups and the ethnic nationalist organizations could adopt a shared programme of action, it is possible that the regime would find itself in a position where it had to make compromises. But since 1990, the generals have managed to isolate political activists and sow enough fear into the general population that people largely police themselves. Moreover, the generals have used threats and arrests to limit contact between the ethnic political leaders and pro-democracy leaders in Burma, making it hard for them to work closely together.

Whenever repression intensifies, many people in Burma become cynical about the possibility of effecting change and turn to fatalistic interpretations of their situation. Still, the idea of a different future is kept alive through the determined struggles of Aung San Suu Kyi and numerous other committed politicians, through student activism and monks’ calls for dialogue, through writers, film-makers and artists who manage to convey a belief that change is possible despite the censors, and through news of political transformation in other former dictatorships.

Where is Burma’s Ramos?

For a political transition to occur in Burma, it is likely that there will need to be a convergence of three factors: unified domestic political pressure, concerted international pressure and a powerful group in the military which decides to work with the democratic movement. A shift in approach by a military leader or faction would not necessarily have to revolve around a desire to restore democracy but could emerge out of an intra-military power struggle or a decision to work together with people from outside the military on economic reform. Once such a process started it is possible that it could take on a life of its own, as has happened in some other countries.

In South Africa, international pressure and widespread domestic resistance set the preconditions for a political transformation. But it was not until de Klerk agreed to negotiate with Mandela that change was possible. While de Klerk originally did not intend to allow a black government to come to power, the South African economy was deteriorating because of sanctions and boycotts. De Klerk finally came to the conclusion that continued intransigence would only lead the country to ruin.
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The Philippines offers another model where two powerful generals split away from Marcos, but not because they were committed to democracy.
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Former defence minister Juan Ponce Enrile and General Fidel Ramos were angry about not obtaining the promotions they had hoped for. Meanwhile, Marcos’s overspending and economic mismanagement had severely weakened the economy. At the same time, a people-power movement backed by the Catholic Church had formed around Corazon Aquino, the wife of slain political leader Benigno Aquino and the real winner of the February 1986 presidential election. As the situation became more unstable, Enrile and Ramos saw their chance. They set up a rebel headquarters at Camp Aguinaldo in Manila. When it became clear that the forces loyal to Marcos were going to attack, civilian demonstrators surrounded the base to protect the Enrile–Ramos faction, putting nuns in front. Many soldiers defected to the Enrile–Ramos camp, and others refused to shoot the nuns and the civilian protesters. Representatives of the US government told Marcos they would fly him out of Manila, and he complied, although he originally assumed he was being airlifted only to his home province. Instead he was taken to Hawaii.

Although Enrile and Ramos originally intended to take power for themselves, not to restore democracy, they had to work with Corazon Aquino and the democracy movement. And she, realizing the need to placate the army, agreed to share power with them. In the first three years of her administration, disgruntled groups in the military made several coup attempts. But Aquino managed to hang on, convincing Ramos in the process of the importance of maintaining a democratic system. After her term of office was over, General Ramos was elected to succeed her, and the military gradually came to accept democratic rule.

In Burma, economic mismanagement has led to high inflation and widespread poverty. A pro-democracy movement emerged in the late 1980s and has been weakened but not defeated. Furthermore, there has been a fair amount of international pressure on the regime to negotiate. But so far Rangoon’s generals have refused to budge, and no de Klerk or Ramos has emerged. This is partly because international pressure has not been strong enough. The regime has been able to rely on China and India in particular for diplomatic support and large-scale investment, owing to these countries’ economic and national security interests in Burma. It is also because the regime feels it has successfully been able to undermine its domestic opposition. In the Philippines and South Africa, some public opposition in the form of legal organizations and an alternative press was tolerated, but in Burma the pro-democracy movement has had virtually no legal channels for organizing and disseminating its views, and even the smallest anti-regime actions are harshly punished.

Perhaps, as a first step, the Burmese generals could be persuaded to follow the example of Vietnam or Indonesia under Suharto, liberalizing the economic sphere and allowing civilians to have a much greater role in some areas of policy-making while still retaining control of the political sphere. Although the 2008 constitution suggests there will be little change in the way the country is run, it is possible that the existence of political parties and a partly elected parliament will lead to pressures on the authorities to improve their economic policy-making and do more for the well-being of their citizens.

While the regime insists the country would fall apart if it were not in power, the example of Indonesia suggests that it need not be so. Also comprised of numerous ethnic groups and people of many faiths, Indonesia made the transition from military rule to democracy relatively smoothly. Sudden economic collapse, anger at the corruption of the Suharto regime and the suppression of student activists and other pro-democratic groups finally led large numbers of people to take to the streets. Rioting, looting and attacks on the Chinese community took place, allegedly with the support of some in the military. But when Suharto no longer had the full support of the army leadership, he was forced to step down. There were other outbreaks of violence in the following months, but the new government was able to contain this relatively quickly.

Indonesia also contended with armed insurgencies, albeit on a much more limited scale than in Burma. After democracy was restored, however, the Indonesian government was able to negotiate an autonomy agreement with the Free Aceh Movement which has held up well. Significantly, the agreement was made under the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a former general. He has urged Burma’s generals to follow in Indonesia’s footsteps, calling for democratization and national reconciliation.

Democratization and national reconciliation

Although the regime has often said that Western-style democracy is not appropriate for Burma, liberal democratic governments have flourished in Japan and India and, more recently, in Taiwan. This suggests that democracy is not incompatible with Asian societies. Democracy takes somewhat different forms in each country in which it is practised. It is shaped by the culture and history of the people as well as by the way in which it is introduced. Democracy is never perfect, but it is a system of government that recognizes the inherent dignity of all citizens and their right to participate in decisions that affect their lives. This is what people in Burma voted for in 1990 and this is what they are still looking for today: to be able to live in dignity and to have a government that respects their needs and reflects their desires.

Moreover, many of the core values enshrined in a democratic system are also deeply rooted in Buddhism. Buddhist ideology is fundamentally broad-minded, and it insists on a detached attitude towards the world. Each person must make his or her own way towards enlightenment, and this must be done by recognizing that everything to which we cling is ultimately impermanent. If such tenets were applied to political and
social relations, ideological inflexibility and racial prejudices should ideally find little support.

At the same time, Buddhist philosophy insists that individuals use their powers of reasoning to make informed decisions. As General Aung San wrote in 1935 in an essay entitled ‘Burma and Buddhism’, the Buddha told his followers not to believe anything merely because it was written in a religious book, often repeated or stated by people in positions of authority. Beliefs and ideas, he said, must be tested by observation and analysis, be reasonable and beneficial to all. Concerned that Burmese were slipping into a pattern of passive acceptance, General Aung San stated: ‘It is therefore the bounden duty of every true Burman to revive the spirit of criticism, inherent in Buddhism, and apply it to every problem affecting Burma.’
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While the regime has focused on national consolidation, what is needed is a process of national reconciliation, in the sense of resolving the political demands of all stakeholders. It will be a challenging process in Burma, but, if handled correctly, it can be done. The armed ethnic nationalist organizations and the civilians in conflict areas desperately want peace. Most would be satisfied with a genuine federal system that gives them a certain degree of control over affairs in their state and the right to promote their languages and cultures. Most members of ethnic minority groups who joined political parties set up in 1988 or have stayed out of politics see their people’s futures as inseparable from that of Burma as a whole and will push for moderation. If a new constitution can offer clear protection for states’ rights, and the rights of smaller minorities within those states, it seems likely that a deal can be struck.

The military mindset regarding national unity will, however, have to be changed. The leading generals – and the Burmese population as a whole – must come to see that a union can be better held together by cultivating shared interests and benefits, rather than relying on the use of brute force. In this regard, new concepts, such as unity in diversity and shared sovereignty, must be introduced and valorized.

Most sensitive for the military is the issue of transitional justice. If senior officers believe that a political transition will lead to their being punished for crimes committed under past regimes, they will do all they can to prevent or derail a transition process. On the other hand, given the degree to which many people have suffered in Burma, whether in villages in conflict areas or in interrogation centres and prisons, this issue cannot simply be ignored. Those who seek political change in Burma must convince the generals that their security will be guaranteed, but
they must also find a way to ensure that past suffering is recognized and addressed.

While the ruling Burmese generals have treated Aung San Suu Kyi as the arch-enemy, she is probably the best person to ensure a smooth transition. Aung San Suu Kyi values the Burmese military as the institution founded by her father and understands the need to ensure its dignity. She has the trust of many ethnic leaders as well as of a large part of the general population because of her integrity. Moreover, she has continued to express a willingness to negotiate with the generals, despite everything they have done to her. Nevertheless, it is also important for the democracy movement to do more to nurture the leadership capacity of its most talented members, so that it is not overly reliant on single individuals.

The democratic movement as a whole can also benefit from developing more openness and tolerance. Rigid thinking, hierarchical power structures and a culture of mistrust have characterized not only the military regime but, in many cases, the opposition groups as well. Constructive criticism is frequently interpreted as a challenge rather than a contribution, and people may be valued more for their loyalty rather than their ability to think creatively. Having grown up in a political system that inculcated or intensified such attitudes and practices, this is not surprising. As Min Zin wrote in an article in
The Irrawaddy
news journal: ‘The idea that democracy is a way of life that you must practice in your daily life, in your organization, and in your community is pretty far removed from our practice, attitude, and behavior.’
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Still, there are grounds for optimism. Many more Burmese than in the past have exposure to other ways of thinking than the regime’s, through their travels and their attempts to educate themselves outside the formal education system. Some in the democracy movement, in literary circles and in alternative educational programmes have sought to encourage debate and dialogue and have emphasized the importance of learning from other countries’ experiences. The Internet has also provided a window to the world for those who have access to it. And many in the democracy movement, in religious organizations and in other fields have sought to reach out to others and work collectively for the good of all.