Living Silence in Burma (50 page)

Meanwhile political activists in particular put themselves at great risk if they talk to the international press. In 2008, Zarganar, the satirist and social activist, ended up in prison for criticizing the regime’s slow
response to Cyclone Nargis in interviews with the foreign media. Burmese and foreign activists have periodically felt the need to resort to dramatic gestures to raise international awareness. In 1989 and 1990, two sets of Burmese student activists staged plane hijackings, with the main demand being that the press publicize the situation in Burma. One plane came down in Bangkok and one in Calcutta. In both cases, no one was hurt and some of the passengers sympathized with the hijackers in the end. Both incidents received widespread coverage. In 1999, another group of Burmese students took over the Burmese embassy in Bangkok, which again received much international coverage.

Foreign activists have tried to gain media attention for Burma by getting themselves arrested in the country. A group of eighteen activists handed out pamphlets on the tenth anniversary of the 1988 uprising in Rangoon, and were held for six days before they were deported. When they returned to Bangkok, they were greeted by throngs of journalists and their story was picked up around the world. Similarly, James Mawdsley, a British citizen, made three trips into Burma during which he was arrested for distributing anti-government literature. In August 1999, he was sentenced to seventeen years in prison and served fourteen months before being released. James Mawdsley’s case drew a great deal of attention to himself and Burma, and he wrote a book about his experiences as well.

Meanwhile, Burmese activists and politicians in exile, in coordination with Burma campaign groups in various countries, have sought to raise awareness and influence policy on Burma. In particular, they have pressured multinational corporations to withdraw their investments and pushed governments to adopt sanctions. Relying heavily on e-mail and the Internet to network and distribute information, the US-based Free Burma Coalition expanded to over one hundred chapters in 1996. Pepsi, Levi-Strauss, Heineken and several other companies pulled out of Burma, in part because of activists’ pressure in the USA and elsewhere.

Responding to Aung San Suu Kyi’s call for a tourist boycott of the regime-sponsored ‘Visit Myanmar Year’ in 1996/97, the Free Burma movement launched a worldwide campaign to stop travel agencies offering package tours to Burma and to urge tourists to stay away. The campaign significantly reduced tourist arrivals and embarrassed the regime. The generals had launched Visit Myanmar Year not only to make money but also to increase their acceptability at home and abroad.
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It should be noted that the issue of whether tourists should visit Burma or not has been controversial. Those who support tourists going argue that tourists can learn about the situation in Burma first hand and they
can help the Burmese people financially by using their services and supporting their businesses. Those opposed say that the regime benefits monetarily from the taxes on hotels where tourists stay, that many abuses have taken place in relation to the development of the tourist industry, and that mass tourists, at least, will not have a chance to see the real Burma.

In the early 2000s, the US Campaign for Burma and the Euro-Burma Network of campaign groups focused on pushing for Security Council action on Burma. In the 1990s, no one expected the Security Council to take up Burma, but in 2007 Burma was on the agenda more than once, in part because of these groups’ efforts.

The US Campaign for Burma has been particularly creative in how it has raised awareness of the situation in Burma. In 2007 and 2008, the campaigners urged people to put themselves under house arrest for twenty-four hours during the weekend before Aung San Suu Kyi’s birthday. During this period, those under voluntary arrest should invite family and friends over to learn more about Burma, to write letters to the US government and the UN urging them to take action on Burma, and to raise money for the US Campaign for Burma’s lobbying work. They also worked with American celebrities to make short videos on YouTube to educate young people in particular about the crisis in Burma.

Meanwhile, the Burmese border-based resistance organizations, which included elected parliamentarians, NLD members, student activists and ethnic nationalists, served as conduits for information in and out of the country. Besides trying to get reports about human rights abuses and political developments out to the international community, members of the border-based organizations also worked to get news about global standards on human rights and strategies for resistance into the country. Operating out of cramped offices in border towns and capital cities in Burma’s neighbouring countries, Burman and ethnic minority activists participated in developing international campaigns and cultivated links with student, professional and religious groups around the world. Through lobbying trips to the United Nations and foreign capitals and speeches at international human rights conferences, they informed a wider audience about the crisis in Burma and broadened their own political understandings.

As a result of journalists’, activists’ and citizen reporters’ efforts, and their clever use of new technologies such as cell phones, digital cameras, CDs and the Internet, there is far more international awareness about Burma today than there was twenty years ago. Still, Burma has to compete
for attention with a number of other countries that are also in crisis, and it is rarely the first priority.

Foreign assistance to Burma

Along with the debate about sanctions, there has been a vigorous debate about foreign assistance.
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What kinds of foreign assistance should be provided inside Burma and how? Is it possible to provide assistance in a way that won’t benefit the regime? Will foreign assistance make a difference if the regime doesn’t change its policies? These questions have been argued over by people in Burma, foreign governments, exiles, UN agencies and NGOs alike.

Before the mid-1990s few international organizations had access to Burma, and almost all humanitarian assistance went to refugees along the country’s borders. Since the mid-1990s, however, the regime has begun allowing foreign organizations to set up programmes inside Burma, particularly in the fields of health, education and income generation. Given the high levels of malnutrition, preventable illnesses and poverty, many organizations were eager to do what they could to help. Yet as in other countries under authoritarian rule, international NGOs and UN programme staff have had to make difficult decisions about what kinds of compromises they would and would not be willing to make.

The first issue that came up was to what degree organizations should cooperate with the authorities. For instance, some expatriate organizations were told they had to hand over vehicles to military officers in return for being able to continue their programmes. In addition, the regime often sought to channel assistance towards organizations close to the regime. In one case, a UNDP household survey, which was given to the government’s statistical office to carry out, was then farmed out to members of the USDA to administer.
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In 1996, two international organizations financed a health-related publication put out by the Myanmar Maternal and Child Welfare Association (MMCWA). Besides health news, the funded issues also ended up including MMCWA speeches criticizing ‘internal destructionists’, in other words the NLD. Such actions made it difficult for organizations that wanted to help ordinary citizens but could not stop the authorities from interfering or politicizing their assistance.

When international organizations first started coming into Burma, Aung San Suu Kyi asked them to meet with the NLD to discuss their work. The regime made it clear, however, that it would not favour NGOs and UN agencies that did so. Most organizations decided that, in this case and
others, it would be necessary to go along with the regime’s demands if they wanted to continue to maintain access. Some tried to find creative ways to push the boundaries or refuse demands when they could.

Access was another problem. The regime generally did not allow NGOs to work in politically sensitive areas, which were the areas of greatest need. Then, in 2006, the regime introduced new guidelines for foreign NGOs, with the Burmese version of the guidelines being stricter than the English version. Foreign staff would have to apply for permission before travelling to project sites and would have to be accompanied by government staff on all visits to sites. In addition, new NGO staff would have to be chosen from a list of names suggested by the authorities.
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While not all the restrictions have been implemented, NGOs are well aware that they walk a fine line. Médecins Sans Frontières France, which worked in conflict areas in Mon and Karen states, decided to pull out in 2006 after the authorities imposed increasingly tight travel restrictions on its staff and pressured local health authorities not to cooperate with them.
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Since Cyclone Nargis, however, many new NGOs have been able to work in the Irrawaddy Delta though rarely in other areas.

In the 1990s, some Burmese and foreign activists argued that if the UN and foreign NGOs supported healthcare and other programmes, the regime would feel no responsibility to fund these programmes itself. Whether this was the reason or not, according to the 1999 World Bank report, state funding for both primary education and healthcare declined steadily in the 1990s.
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Nevertheless, the international organizations operating in Burma argued that given the terrible health problems in particular, not to provide assistance would be unconscionable.

Some NGO staff point out that having an international presence in the country is important in and of itself, because of the witnessing role international NGOs can play and the dialogues they can initiate with people in and out of the government. Although international NGOs are reluctant to report publicly on abuses they see, UN and NGO staff have found some well-intentioned people within government ministries to whom they can talk. Also, some staff have worked hard to broaden the perspective of the authorities with whom they have worked.

International organizations and UN programmes have had some direct and invaluable benefits for the people they have reached. Vaccines, HIV/AIDS education and treatment and clean water have all meant that some people who would have died otherwise are still alive. Poverty alleviation and rural development have been more difficult, however, as the international organizations have no control over the regime’s
economic policies. They cannot stop land confiscation or inflation, nor can they prevent the authorities from ordering people to grow physic nuts or other crops that may not be the most appropriate for their areas. While it is worthwhile to continue such programmes, and also to engage in capacity-building for Burmese staff, the impact will necessarily be limited until there is a change of government or a significant shift in the way the regime operates.

Aid, then, should be provided, but with a real awareness of what can and cannot be achieved. Burmese staff should be empowered so that they can continue the work whether their organization is able to stay or not. And UN agencies and NGOs should collaborate closely so they can use a carefully calibrated combination of pressure and persuasion with the regime in order to increase access and reduce restrictions.

At the same time, cross-border assistance in the areas of relief, health and education should also be continued. Local organizations with border offices have the capability to reach areas that cannot be reached – or not regularly – from inside the country. These areas include conflict zones, ceasefire zones and remote areas that can be more easily accessed from Burma’s borders.

More effective international involvement

In recent years, Western countries have begun shifting from focusing almost exclusively on punitive measures against the regime to trying to provide more assistance to people in Burma. This trend should be continued, so that there is a better balance of pressure on the regime and support for those who are living under military rule. Along with humanitarian assistance, more support should be given to Burmese civil society organizations of all types so that they can expand their activities and networks. Capacity-building programmes, short-term courses, exposure trips and other activities that will help broaden Burmese social workers’, civil servants’ and professionals’ perspectives should also be supported. If, ultimately, change must come from within Burma, empowering Burmese is important.

Foreign governments and appropriate international organizations – as well as members of the democracy movement – should also work more on identifying and engaging in a dialogue with a broader range of contacts than just the political parties and the regime. This includes middle-ranking officers, retired military personnel, business people with connections to the regime, and others. Such dialogues could generate more ideas and perhaps a greater consensus on how to initiate reforms or persuade some in the higher ranks of the military that change is necessary and possible.

Finally, foreign efforts should continue to focus equally on restoring democracy and ethnic rights, as Burma cannot achieve lasting peace until both are resolved.

14 | Conclusion: a different Burma

In 2008, Burmese of all faiths and economic backgrounds donated money, labour and time to help the Cyclone Nargis victims. This spirit of compassion and spontaneous organizing to help others reflects the way that Burmese people would like to live. Sadly, successive regimes have often subverted this spirit by dividing people and instilling fear in order to maintain their own power. While they would like to obtain wholehearted support from the population for their rule, it is not necessary. All that is needed is for people not to resist.