Marcus Agrippa: Right-hand Man of Caesar Augustus (24 page)

Antonius’ (and Kleopatra’s) objectives, however, emerge less clearly from the fog of after-action reporting and have been debated by historians, ancient and modern, for years. Some – mostly the ancient writers and historians writing before the nineteenth century – see him as determined to win this battle as he would any other he had fought during his soldiering career, putting his faith in his heavy warships and loyal troops.
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Others – mostly twentieth century historians – dismiss the ancient historians and subscribe to the view that his goal was to withdraw from the confines of the Gulf of Ambracia with as many ships and men as could be salvaged and as much treasure as could be carried, and to pick another time and place for a last stand.
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A third interpretation of the incomplete facts sees Antonius fighting for victory as the primary (but difficult to achieve) objective, with a break-out in force expected as the more likely and pragmatic secondary goal.
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Dio describes a meeting of Antonius’ war council in which the subject of discussion is what to do: to stay and fight or to withdraw and relocate somewhere else. Kleopatra wins the debate with the argument that she and Antonius should escape to Egypt, leaving the troops behind to continue the fight.
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In Plutarch’s account of the same meeting, Canidius pleads with his commander for Kleopatra to be asked to leave so that Antonius can fight a battle on dry land, perhaps in Macedonia or Thrace; but the queen wins with her argument for a sea battle, implying that her secret motive is to slip away under sail when the opportunity arises.
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Indeed, the treasure had been loaded aboard the Egyptian vessels with sails stowed in the event they could make a dash for open sea and, given the circumstances, that would seem to have been a sensible precaution.
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As so often happens during great campaigns of history, the best prepared battle plans can be delayed by weather. On 29 August, a depression settled over the Ionian Sea and Gulf of Ambracia, bringing a severe storm.
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High winds prevented any movement of the fleets on either side, but caused more havoc with Antonius’ fleet in the straits and Gulf of Ambracia than Agrippa’s anchored off Gomaros Bay. When the generals woke on the fifth day the weather system had moved on leaving behind a gentle breeze and a calm sea. ‘Then came the day of the great conflict,’ in Paterculus’ chilling words, ‘on which Caesar and Antonius led out their fleets and fought, the one for the safety, the other for the ruin, of the world.’
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It was 2 September 31 BCE, a date that would be remembered as a pivotal moment in the thousand-year-long history of the Roman Empire, and a day when the western world changed forever.

The forces ranged against each other were enormous (
map 8
). On dry land Caesar had 80,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry men under the command of Statilius Taurus, compared to Antonius’ 120,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry under Canidius, but the 1.5:1 odds in Antonius’ favour would not matter today: this battle was to be decided upon the water.
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Arriving from Iudaea, Herodes had brought an army, chests of cash and a ship filled with grain, but Kleopatra persuaded Antonius to send him away to fight a war of no particular strategic importance with the Arabians and he took no part in the war against Caesar.
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Imperator Caesar entrusted the overall command of his fleet to M. Agrippa.
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The size of Agrippa’s navy continues to provoke argument amongst modern scholars based on the confusion of the ancient sources. Plutarch states he had 250 ships.
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Orosius details 230 ‘beaked ships’, 30 ‘without beaks’ and some triremes comparable with the swift Liburnian type of vessel, which Caesar had brought over with him, but he excludes from his tally the advanced forced of Agrippa.
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Florus, however, states that he had 400 ships.
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Regarding the composition of the fleet,

These ships were similar in design to those used so effectively by Sex. Pompeius (
plate 13
).
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The tactical fighting skills of the Roman pirate had deeply impressed Agrippa. He was a keen observer of the world and when he saw a good idea, he adopted it. With the benefit of the insights learned from his victories at Mylae and Naulochus five years earlier, for the anticipated battle in the Ionian Sea, he had revised his military strategy and replaced the equipment with the smaller, but more agile and swifter vessels.
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The decks were manned by troops of eight legions, not counting the five Praetorian Cohorts, according to Orosius – which is substantially more than the 20,000 heavily armed men plus 2,000 archers of Plutarch’s account.
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A flotilla of smaller boats carried Caesar’s friends whose role was to relay messages between the ships while in action.
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Map 8. The Battle of Actium, 2 September 31 BCE.

In stark contrast to Agrippa’s strategy borne of firsthand experience, Antonius, who had no expertise in naval warfare whatsoever, invested in large, heavy fighting platforms (
plate 20
). His decision was apparently based, ironically, on studying Agrippa’s victory over Sex. Pompeius where he had demonstrated the apparent superiority of huge warships and large contingents of marines aboard them.
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Antonius seems to have missed the point that the key difference between the victor and vanquished of the battles fought off the coast of Sicily was not so much the size of the hardware as the innovation of the war machines Agrippa had installed on them, combined with the creative ability of its admiral and the quality of the soldiers engaged in the combat.
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True to his showy nature, among Antonius’ ships many ‘were many vessels of eight (
okteres
) and ten (
dekeres
) banks of oars, arrayed in pompous and festal fashion’, while he himself donned a purple robe studded with large gemstones, a curved scimitar hung at his side, and in his hand he gripped a golden sceptre.
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Florus confirms the larger size of Antonius’ ships and adds that:

Orosius records that some of his ships rose as high as 10 Roman feet above the waterline.
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Antonius equipped these huge floating fortresses with ‘lofty towers’ which enabled his large numbers of marines to ‘fight from walls, as it were’.
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They were certainly needed as the decks were packed with troops.
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Significantly, against the urging of his captains, Antonius ordered the masts and sails to be taken aboard the ships, not left on land, telling them with fighting words ‘that not one fugitive of the enemy should be allowed to make his escape’.
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The ancient sources are significantly more divided on the number of ships in Antonius’ fleet than they are of Caesar’s. Plutarch states Antonius brought 500 ships with him to Actium.
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Florus says that in battle Antonius had ‘less than 200 warships’, but Orosius gives the number as precisely 170.
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The discrepancy in the counts between the two historians might be explained by the fact that Antonius was forced to burn the Egyptian ships – saving just 60 of the best, being a mix of triremes and
dekeres
– because their crews had died from disease or left through desertion; and furthermore not all of his fleet was stationed in the Gulf of Ambracia.
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Additionally, some ships had been lost – perhaps to Agrippa – and the recent storm had sunk several more.
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The actual number of ships Antonius was able to put to sea on 2 September may not have been that greatly different from Caesar’s – perhaps as few as 170 vessels, but not more than 230.
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For Agrippa and Caesar the day began well before dawn. Agrippa assembled the fleet in the Ionian Sea in a line directly facing the strait of the Gulf of Ambracia (
plate 21
) at a distance Dio says was around 8 furlongs (1.6km or 1 mile) from the enemy and waited for Antonius to make his move.
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Agrippa stood on his command ship positioned on the left wing with L. Arruntius.
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On a small boat Caesar moved down the line of warships to encourage his soldiers and sailors.
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About a mile away in the distance he could see Antonius’ fleet formed up in front
of the strait, riding up and down with the tide, apparently at anchor.
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Then Caesar boarded his own ship on the right flank with M. Lurius, and waited.
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The early morning hours passed by slowly and Antonius’ ships failed to respond, forcing Agrippa’s men to have to use their oars to hold their ships steady in the water.
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If this continued for too long, Agrippa’s men would be soon exhausted from expending their energy just from standing still before the battle had even started. Unseen by Agrippa and Caesar, Antonius was meanwhile haranguing his soldiers from a row-boat, encouraging them to fight as though they were on land, while ordering his captains to hold their ships at the mouth of the strait.
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Between the fifth and sixth hours – approximately 11.56am to 12.56pm – a wind began to rise from the Ionian Sea and Antonius’ men became restless.
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Antonius had sub-divided the command of his fleet between L. Gellius Publicola, located on the right wing, and C. Sosius on the left.
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Behind them in the centre were massed the ships of the Egyptian fleet led by Kleopatra aboard her ‘golden vessel with purple sails’.
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The ships were arranged in close formation.
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Antonius now gave Sosius the order for his left wing to advance.
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Seeing the movement, Agrippa gave the pre-agreed signal for his entire line to move in reverse taking them further out to sea so that the ships now formed a wide arc.
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Agrippa’s strategy was to wait until Antonius was clear of the relative safety of the estuary and, once on open sea, to close his left and right wings to encircle him in a naval equivalent of Hannibal’s famous manoeuvre at Cannae.
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Antonius, anticipating that was exactly what was planned, advanced to engage his enemy – hoping to beat him with his bigger, higher-profile fighting platforms packed with troops who could rain down terror and destruction on the smaller vessels – and had briefed his deputies what to do.
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Working in Agrippa’s favour was a wind which regularly starts to blow down from the west around 11.30am.
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It builds in strength through noon, changing direction to west-northwest becoming a force 3–4 sailing breeze – Vergil calls it the
Iapyx
– causing the waves to become agitated between 2.00pm and 3.00pm, before dying out after sunset.
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This would propel Agrippa’s ships forward, but work against his opponent’s. Antonius would surely have known this too and had to move before the wind picked up. Propelled by banks of oars, Antonius’ galleys moved, slowly at first but steadily gaining speed, towards his enemy’s centre. Orosius records that battle was joined during the sixth and seventh hours – approximately 12.56pm to 1.56pm.
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Plutarch describes the ensuing clash:

In this deadly aquatic embrace Agrippa’s ships sought to ram and sink their opponents’, while Antonius’ ships used long-range missiles and cast-iron grapnels to pick off crews and seize the ships of the other side.
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‘On the one side’, writes Dio, ‘the pilots and the rowers endured the most hardship and fatigue, and on the other side the marines; and the one side resembled cavalry, now making a charge and now retreating, since it was in their power to attack and back off at will, and the others were like heavy-armed troops guarding against the approach of foes and trying their best to hold them.’
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At this point in the battle, Plutarch notes that the sea-fight was still undecided and equally favourable to both sides.
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