Marcus Agrippa: Right-hand Man of Caesar Augustus (25 page)

With the ships locked in grim combat in the centre, Agrippa sought to gain the clear advantage and now gave the order for his left and right flanks to advance. Becoming aware of this manoeuvre on his right side, Publicola peeled off some of the ships from the main formation to avoid being encircled and prepared to engage Agrippa head on. The effect, intended or not, was to split the centre bloc in two, creating an opening in the battlespace.
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As Arruntius’ vessels jostled those of M. Octavius and M. Insteius, behind them the captains of sixty of the Egyptian ships ordered their crews to hoist their sails and, as the wind picked up, sped through the open channel and veered southwest.
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The crews of both Agrippa’s and Antonius’ ships looked on with astonishment as they watched the colourful ships plunge through the lines. Dio writes that Antonius interpreted the move to mean his queen was leaving the battle and he immediately followed after her aboard a quinquereme.
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With the
Iapyx
blowing at full strength and Agrippa’s ships blocking the way, the rest of his fleet was trapped. He clambered aboard Kleopatra’s flagship and went straight to the prow.
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Before the battle Agrippa may well have given an order for Antonius’ and Kleopatra’s ships to be identified and captured because ‘at this point, Liburnian ships were seen pursuing them from Caesar’s fleet, but Antonius ordered the ship’s prow turned to face them, and so kept them off’.
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Agrippa must have been exasperated at the sudden turn of events. All he could do now was trust that his officers would carry out their orders.

For another man too, capturing Antonius was personal. He was Eurykles the Laconian,

Eurykles failed to take the flagship and the Egyptian vessels, with the wind now filling their sails, slipped away at speed, taking the Roman commander and treasure with them. The effect on Antonius’ men, who thought he had abandoned them, was devastating. Some of Antonius’ crews tried to follow after their commander, jettisoning anything which might lighten their load, but not having sails they had to rely on oars, and were unable to keep up.
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Agrippa was not about to let his opponent’s main fleet get away. The battle raged with increasing bitterness:

Agrippa’s ship was now just one vessel in the general, confusing mêlée: it was down to the captains and crews of individual ships to disable and defeat their opponents. They did precisely what he had hoped they would and ‘they scattered at their will the opposing vessels, which were clumsy and in every respect unwieldy, several of them attacking a single ship with missiles and with their beaks, and also with firebrands hurled into them’.
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Caesar did not intend to use fire, hoping to capture Antonius’ ships undamaged, even calling out to Antonius’ men to lay down their arms now that their commander had fled, but that had become an unattainable goal.
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‘Now another kind of battle was entered upon’, writes Dio grimly, where:

As the fires raged men suffered terrible deaths – from inhaling choking smoke or being engulfed in flames aboard their burning ships or, having leaped overboard to save themselves, sank under the weight of their sodden clothing or armour, and drowned (fig. 3).
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Orosius says the battle continued through the early evening. Florus is more precise, writing that only after Antonius’ fleet was ‘most severely damaged by the high sea’ did his men finally give up the fight at the tenth hour – around 4.16pm.
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Only at daybreak next morning was Caesar able to declare his victory complete.
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The carnage of the battle is graphically evoked by Florus who writes,

Figure 3. The Battle of Actium in the Gulf of Ambracia raged for several hours. After an initial clash, both sides used massed weapons of destruction, such as ballistas and catapults, to lob lit ammunition onto enemy craft, resulting in terrible casualties.

Agrippa had won the battle for Imperator Caesar and captured hundreds of his enemy’s ships, but victory came at a price.
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Not more that 5,000 men from Antonius’ fleet had lost their lives; Caesar’s casualties were much greater, numbering 12,000 dead, 6,000 wounded and of them 1,000 died later despite medical care.
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On land Antonius’ 19 legions of undefeated men-at-arms and 12,000 cavalry could not accept that their commander had abandoned them and, as late as seven days after the battle, were still clinging to the belief that he would make a surprise appearance and lead them to victory.
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Only when Canidius was found to have deserted them – sneaking away under the cover of darkness – did the men capitulate and offer their unconditional surrender to Caesar.
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Problematic was that Antonius and Kleopatra had got clean away. Agrippa sent part of his fleet in pursuit of the fugitive
triumvir
and queen.
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The couple managed to remain one step ahead of the pursuers who finally gave up the chase and returned to the Bay of Gomaros. Meanwhile, Agrippa moved quickly to secure the Greek peninsula. With the rest of his fleet he captured the enemy’s fortifications, encountering no opposition because of their small numbers and, without a battle, won over the rest of Antonius’ army, which was retreating to Macedonia. He secured for his friend
Colonia Laus Iulia Corinthiensis
, which Iulius Caesar had refounded as a colony of army veterans in 44 BCE just months before his assassination, yet had been the only Greek city to keep its city gates firmly shut to his official heir.
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Though Caesar wanted to return to Italy, there was much to do locally before he could go. He chose to stay in Athens for the remainder of the year, administering the region from there and hoping to learn more of Antonius’ whereabouts.
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He soon discovered that Antonius had ravaged the free Greek communities, stripping them of money, slaves and animals for his war effort; their free citizens had even been forced to carry heavy loads of grain upon their backs – among whom was Plutarch’s own Uncle Nicarchus – to Antikyra and load up the vessels bound for Actium.
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At this point Caesar did not know where his adversary had escaped to.

Caesar could not leave Greece without leaving his mark upon the landscape. On the site of his former army camp he founded a new city and populated it with the inhabitants of smaller, failed cities in the surrounding region.
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He named
this place Nikopolis, ‘Victory City’, in honour of his success at Actium. The centrepiece, set upon the highest point of the city above a grove sacred to Apollo, was to be a war memorial adorned with the spoils of the Actian War. Games to Actian Apollo – Caesar’s favourite god – were inaugurated to take place every five years and ground was broken for a gymnasium and stadium to be built to host the athletic competitions.

His immediate challenge, however, was the army. Despite the victory at Actium, Kleopatra had sailed away with her treasure and Caesar still did not have sufficient funds to cover his financial obligation to his troops. Further his ranks were now swollen with men from Antonius’ legions.
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His own men had remained loyal through the years of campaigning, believing they would be rewarded by capturing the rich spoils of Egypt, but the inactivity since Actium led many to believe this was now no more than a pipe dream. While the officers of the Caesarian legions kept this rank and file in check, the men were nevertheless becoming restless. Many of the veterans – men who had served sixteen years – faced demobilization and, when they realized they were not going to receive any payment for their service, began to protest.
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Fearing the demonstrations might become an all-out mutiny and spread to other units, Caesar charged Agrippa with repatriating the legions to Italy (
map 9
).
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He trusted his friend completely and that alone would have been reason enough to assign him the important task; but, with so many troops returning back home at one time he also needed a strong authority figure to maintain control. A man with proven credentials, Agrippa was now a ranking patrician who carried high status and an ex-consul, whereas his present deputy in Rome, Maecenas, was member of the
ordo equester
without portfolio and, as such, his orders might be disregarded by the returning troops. Paterculus remarks that Maecenas, equally beloved of Caesar, ‘might have achieved a position no less high than Agrippa, but had not the same ambition for it’.
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Yet the two men complemented Caesar’s skills and temperament. They formed his personal, but unofficial council (
concilium
) of advisors. Where Agrippa brought tried and tested know-how in management and military science, Maecenas provided the connections and panache Imperator Caesar needed to get things done in political Rome. To speak and act for him in his absence, Caesar empowered
both
men: