Modern Islamist Movements: History, Religion, and Politics (37 page)

By 1984, because of the Zia government’s ban on student protests within Pakistan – many of which were in favor of the Jama(at and other Islamist groups – and what increasing numbers of the Jama(at’s members believed were only partially effectual Islamization measures on the part of the government, the Jama(at began to distance itself from the Zia government. Concomitantly, the Jama(at’s relatively weak showing – when compared to other potential allies of Zia’s government – in the parliamentary elections in 1985 convinced Zia that it was no longer necessary for him to seek the support of the Jama(at, furthering the rift between the Jama(at and Zia’s government. The Jama(at’s relationship with Zia’s administration had the effect of tarnishing its Islamist credentials in the sense that there were hardline Islamists inside and outside of the Jama(at who opposed that party’s alliance with Zia because they believed that the party had made too many compromises of its ideals in order to accommodate many of Zia’s secularist ideas and self-interested political goals.101 As Zia’s popularity declined among many Pakistanis, so too did that of the Jama(at. One way the party’s weakness manifested itself was in its diminished showings in the national elections of 1988, 1990, and 1993.102

In spite of the Jama(at’s relatively poor electoral results, by the end of the presidency of Zia, who died in a plane crash in 1988, the Jama(at had become a powerful religious and political force domestically and inter- nationally, with a palpable influence on Pakistan’s society and culture. The Jama(at maintained this influence because of its strong, largely grassroots configuration and its ability to utilize Islam in such a way as to affect some of Pakistan’s governmental policies. Within Pakistan, the Jama(at continues to be a significant organization which can influence various aspects of Pakistan’s political life through its strong organizational structure.

During its history, the Jama(at has had four leaders: Sayyid Abu)l A(la Mawdudi, who led the group from 1941 until 1972; Mian Tufail Muhammad, who led the group from 1972 until 1987; Qazi Hussain Ahmad, who led the group from 1987 until 2009; and Munawar Hassan who began leading the group in 2009.103 During the various periods when these leaders were at its helm, differing groups comprised the Jama(at’s socio-political base. Some of the categories that have been part of the Jama(at’s base include the urban middle classes, business owners, Muhajirs, who are Muslims who moved from India to live permanently in Pakistan during and soon after Pakistan became independent of India in 1947, significant numbers of Punjabis, and Pashtuns. Over the years, the Jama(at has also attempted to strengthen its relationship with students, Pakistan’s current and prospective politicians, government workers, scholars, and intellectuals. One of the reasons that the organization has been able to make lasting inroads within Pakistan’s government is because of the ways in which it has incorporated university students into its fold, teaching them its understanding of Islamic

tenets and piety in such a way that has shaped these people’s faith and practice, while fostering their loyalty to the Jama(at. This grassroots bottom-up strategy also exemplifies Mawdudi’s emphasis on utilizing Islamic education and group-building as crucial methods in his and the Jama(at’s efforts in Islamizing Pakistani society.104

Islamist Symmetries

Although Pakistan and Egypt are separated by more than 2,000 miles and have different national languages and histories, Pakistan’s Jama(at-i Islami and Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood share some striking similarities. Both groups (1) were founded around the same time; (2) were led in their early formative stages by charismatic and dedicated leaders (Mawdudi in the case of the Jama(at and al-Banna in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood);

(3) used printed tracts which carried various teachings about Islam that the leaders of the groups believed were crucial for the populations of each country to know; (4) utilized already-existing mosques and Friday sermons as vital organizational structures and means of spreading their messages;

(5) engaged in certain forms of grassroots organizing which involved, in part, leaders of the two organizations training people under them who would spread the groups’ respective messages within the people’s neighborhoods with the hope of spreading their Islamist message more widely and finding new members for their respective organizations; (6) fused their religious and political messages in such a way that positioned them to attempt to change or overthrow the secularist governments which they opposed in their respective countries; and (7) had a substantial impact on Islamist groups outside of their respective countries, with Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood being a catalyst for chapters of the organization in a variety of nations and regions including Jordan, Syria, Sudan, and the West Bank and Gaza, while the Jama(at has had a significant influence on other Islamist groups in Pakistan, and the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as Islamist groups operating in Kashmir and India, for example.105

The two groups, like some other Islamist groups, also have a common vision for the Islamic state that they would like to establish, which includes the establishment of Islamic law for every aspect of life in both countries; the creation of Islamically-based governments which are led by what members of these groups believe to be true Muslims; the formation of Islamic schools and universities, which would teach Islam from a single perspective and would be the only kinds of schools that people in those countries could attend; the enforcement of stringent moral and legal codes, which would include the separation of women and men, who are not related, and the prohibition of alcohol, gambling, and prostitution; and the

institution of economic systems within those countries where wealth would be distributed equitably and where the large gaps between the rich and the poor would be reduced. For both groups, the Islamic governments that come into place should make available health care and a wide array of social services including food pantries, homeless shelters, and welfare services that would assist as many people as possible.106 While many members of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and Pakistan’s Jama(at-i Islami hold these and other principles in common, there is also some diversity within these and other Islamist organizations, which includes differences with respect to the ages of the groups’ members, the degree to which certain members believe governmental institutions and ideas should be accommodated, the speed at which change should take place, and the methods that should be used in effecting such changes.107 The level at which Islamist groups, such as Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and Pakistan’s Jama(at-i Islami, can remain unified and attempt to be effectual in the midst of these and other challenges is an open question.

In Pakistan, Islamist groups such as the Jama(at-i Islami and similar organizations have exerted a considerable influence on many aspects of laws, customs, and morals, including marriage and divorce, education, and Pakistan’s penal code.108 The Islamists in Pakistan have also had an impact on various mass media outlets in Pakistan, including television, radio, and newspapers, for example.109 These developments constitute the creation of a public Islam in Pakistan, which has had the purpose of giving the Pakistani government the appearance that its policies are consistent with Islamic principles. One of the goals of this public Islam has been to convince the Pakistani citizenry at large, as well as members of Pakistan’s Islamist groups and their sympathizers, that the Pakistani state has taken Islam so seriously that it has enabled Islam to significantly influence some of the most important aspects of life in Pakistan. Thus, the state has been using this public Islam in its accommodationalist/oppositionalist approach as a way of accommodating the Islamists and their sympathizers, and, at the same time, in the government’s countervailing efforts of opposing the influence of various Islamist groups in Pakistan, including that of the Jama(at-i Islami.110 Egypt’s government under President Hosni Mubarak, who held office from 1981 until 2011, also established a form of public Islam in its deployment of an accommodationalist/oppositionalist approach as it attempted to limit the influence of the Islamists there. The Mubarak government’s efforts to promote its particular version of Islam consisted of similar approaches to those of the Pakistani government, which included attempts to imbue aspects of Islam into Egypt’s educational system (including Cairo’s al-Azhar University), laws, mosques, state television, newspapers, tourist information, and international diplomacy.111 In these and other private and public spheres, Mubarak’s government, on the one hand, and

Egypt’s Islamists, on the other, each attempted during Mubarak’s regime to make themselves appear more Muslim than the other, with the hope of winning as many Egyptians with Islamist sympathies as possible to their side.112 The potential long-term implications of this dynamic relationship between Islamists and the governments that they oppose (both within and outside of Egypt) remain to be seen, particularly in view of the protests that began with events in Tunisia and Egypt in early 2011.

Many of these dynamics and effects, as well as the Mubarak government’s accommodationalist/oppositionalist approaches, have also been at work in the Pakistani government’s relationship with Islamists inside and outside of Pakistan, and in the relationships of the Moroccan, Jordanian, and Indonesian governments with Islamists in their countries, to name a few examples.113 This push-and-pull between certain governments in the majority-Muslim world and the Islamists who have opposed them has had a significant effect on the governments who confront these groups and on the groups that oppose them. Nottheleastoftheseeffectshasbeentheestablishmentofvariousgovernmentally- approved “public Islams” among governments whose ideologies had, historically, been based on secularist principles. The very perpetuation of these “public Islams” could call into question the extent to which a variety of states in the majority-Muslim world (such as Pakistan and Egypt) could be considered fully secular at present or in the future.The implications of potentially expanding “public Islams” could continue to have profound effects on the day-to-day lives of Muslims living in those majority-Muslim countries as well as those countries’ relationships with Western nations.114 Yet, the eventual outcomes of such dynamics and events are not yet clear.

Notes

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid., 30–1.

(Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1978), 6–7.

40 Ibid., 179–99.

41 Ibid., 173–4.

45 Ibid., 35–7.

46 Ibid., 35–6.