Modern Islamist Movements: History, Religion, and Politics (35 page)

they should find encouragement in the idea that Muhammad encountered similar obstacles and, with God’s favor, overcame them.

In addition to God’s favor, another compelling factor that enabled the early Muslims to establish a genuine and long-lasting Islamic community was the “fact” – in Mawdudi’s view – that many pious, heroic, and truth-minded people joined Muhammad’s movement in order to aid in the defense and propagation of Islam.50 So too, for Mawdudi, in the modern world truly committed,pious,and courageous Muslims must join the Islamic revolutionary movement, which will lead to the establishment of a “true Islamic state.”51 In discussing this revolutionary process, Mawdudi believed that Pakistan should be the first country to benefit from a truly Islamic state and that the Islamic revolutionary process should spread throughout the world. According to Mawdudi, another essential virtue of the early Muslims, who surrounded Muhammad, was that they were utterly committed to the great truth of Islam, which, in addition to their unyielding faith and constant prayer, enabled them to tolerate overwhelming hardship and find triumph against their enemies.52 Mawdudi believed that as this triumph against the enemies of early Islam became secure, a large number of pious Muslim “workers” were trained to “perform any task that [they] were called upon to undertake in the capacity of a Muslim.”53 According to Mawdudi, while Muhammad “guided the affairs of the state” in Medina, he “trained thousands of men to perfection in running every department of government in the Islamic manner.”54

For Mawdudi, as Muhammad engaged in these tasks, he strengthened Islam and laid the groundwork for Islam’s continued expansion and institutionali- zation after his death.55 Through these and other means, Muhammad initiated a long-lasting “bloodless revolution” against virtually all non-Muslim entities, including polytheism, Christianity, and Zoroastrianism.56 For Mawdudi, that Islamic revolution was comprehensive in that it changed people’s modes of living, spiritual values, and every other aspect of their lives.57

Mawdudi believes that modern Muslims must follow the model of Muhammad and the early Islamic community as they perpetuate modern- day Islamic revolutions. This process involves, in part, educating people in the true Islam, showing them the weaknesses of non-Islamic states, instructing them in the ways of physical revolution against non-Islamic states, and training certain people to lead every aspect of government in an Islamic manner after the Islamic revolution succeeds.58 Mawdudi expresses his hope that this revolutionary transformation of society could be – at least in part –“bloodless.”59 In describing the ways in which the Arabian peninsula was changed by Muhammad and the early Islamic community, Mawdudi states that they were “transformed as if by a magic touch.”60 Mawdudi is suggesting that this magic touch was constituted by God’s power together with the persuasive influence of the Quran and Muhammad’s powerful preaching and example.61 For Mawdudi, God’s power continues to be at

work in the modern world and one of several ways that modern Muslims can facilitate the “magic touch” of a bloodless revolution in the world today is by preaching the message of the Quran, the Hadith, and the Prophet and enabling its truth to reach people in such a way that they mobilize themselves to transform society so that it becomes “truly Islamic.”62

Mawdudi did not view violence as a justifiable means of spreading Islam or of perpetrating an Islamic revolution. According to him, physical jihad should not be used for the spread of Islam.63 For Mawdudi, the purpose of jihad is to combat injustice and tyranny and to restore a situation of liberty and equality that is in accordance with the Quran and Hadith. In his view, there are a variety of social and political systems that human beings have instituted – such as monarchy, democracy, communism, and secularism, to name a few – which have created injustice and have supplanted Islam which, in Mawdudi’s view, constitutes the best religious, political, and social system. For Mawdudi, Islam constitutes the proper challenge to humanly-constructed systems, which are inherently tyrannical, because Islam demands freedom and liberation for everyone in the world.64 According to Mawdudi, in addition to using peaceful forms of jihad to resist injustice, tyranny, and corruption, Muslims must use peaceful jihad to assist the poor and weak. This peaceful jihad would involve working in a non-violent way to help the poor and weak, so that their economic conditions could be improved, while educating them in the true Islam.

The Jama(at-i Islami of Pakistan in the 1940s

Mawdudi attempted to implement his Islamic ideals in the Jama(at-i Islami, which he established in India in 1941, six years before the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947. In establishing the Jama(at, Mawdudi viewed himself and his organization as having two major opponents: first, India’s Congress Party, which was largely secularist and which Mawdudi believed favored the interests of Hindus and non-Muslims over those of Muslims, and second, the Muslim League, which worked vigilantly toward the establishment of Pakistan as a majority-Muslim state and which Mawdudi believed was too secular and not fully committed to Islamic principles. Mawdudi established the Jama(at as a rival to the Muslim League for the leadership of the movement to establish a majority-Muslim state in the form of Pakistan.65

As Mawdudi called on India’s Muslims to join his organization which he believed was fully committed to the full scope of Islamic principles, several influential members of India’s ulema joined the Jama(at.66 In 1941, the 75 founding members of the organization elected Mawdudi as its first President (emir) and Mawdudi served in that position until 1971. In that inaugural meeting, the members also ratified the Jama(at’s constitution.The organization

then established its base of operations in Pathankot, a town in the Punjab, which is in northern India. Pathankot’s relative geographic isolation enabled the members of the Jama(at to unify and strengthen their organization without being overly concerned about threats from their detractors.67 Between 1941 and 1947, the Jama(at spread its Islamist message to Muslims and others in India through its education campaign, distributing literature, speeches, sermons, rallies, and work in a variety of mosques in India.68

After the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, Mawdudi and several other original members of the Jama(at left India for the newly-created state of Pakistan and established a base of operations for the organization in the city of Lahore. Fairly soon after moving to Lahore, the Jama(at moved away from the isolation of the earlier period when it was based in Pathankot and members of the organization made exhaustive efforts to influence Pakistani politics more broadly. Mawdudi’s Islamist vision of Islam continued to form the organization’s intellectual foundation. The Jama(at influenced many members of Pakistan’s population and some in powerful political positions in Pakistan’s burgeoning government.

After the partition of India in 1947, which created the modern state of Pakistan, the citizens of this new majority-Muslim nation confronted a situation where there were enormous schisms in its polity; ethnic, class, and religious conflicts; painful frictions between groups which favored military rule and those which favored democratic rule; and Pakistan’s political and emerging cultural separation from Muslims who remained in India. This was the turbulent environment in which the Jama(at grew and gained strength. Within these tumultuous circumstances, the members of the Jama(at preached a clear, formulaic, and easy-to-understand message which, from the perspective of its membership, manifested a persuasive and permanent remedy to all of Pakistan’s problems – namely, that Islam was the solution.

The Jama(at-i Islami’s Strategy

The Jama(at’s method of spreading its message and increasing its membership was at least two-pronged. First, the organization engaged in grassroots efforts among the masses of Pakistanis, using mosques as one forum for teaching people the Quran, the Hadith, the life of the Prophet, and many of the most important beliefs and practices of Islam. During this period of the Jama(at’s expansion and during subsequent periods as well, literacy programs were a crucial aspect of the Jama(at’s work. One reason for the emphasis on literacy was because of the high illiteracy rate among Pakistanis and literacy is a vital skill for people who desire to gain greater levels of knowledge about Islam’s beliefs and practices. Indeed, these programs were attractive not only because literacy could enable Pakistanis to grow in their faith and

expand their knowledge of Islam, but also because literacy could play an important role in increasing educational and job opportunities, while potentially catalyzing upward social mobility.69

In addition to literacy programs, the Jama(at sponsored a wide variety of social services, which they believed were fully consistent with Islamic ideals of generosity and mercy and which helped promote the Jama(at’s Islamic beliefs and practices among Pakistanis. Other social service programs which the Jama(at sponsored included hospitals and medical services for the underprivileged, orphanages, unemployment benefits, food pantries, and efforts to prevent violence and crime in certain lower-income neighborhoods. The Jama(at’s understanding of Islam catalyzed its members’ efforts in these areas, while they hoped that these endeavors would increase the Jama(at’s numbers while strengthening the Islamic faith of the people whose lives the organization touched.70

The second prong of the Jama(at’s strategy, which was related to the first, was the organization’s mobilization as a political party. For example, Mawdudi and other members of the organization attempted to cooperate with certain members of Pakistan’s ulema in trying to establish an Islamic constitution for the country. The Jama(at’s religious and political ideas played an influential role in the debates between that organization and the Pakistani government, particularly between 1947 and 1956. One of the times that the Jama(at’s influence was most evident was in the implementation of its ideas in the Objectives Resolution of 1949. This resolution stated a crucial set of principles with respect to Pakistan’s constitution, which was in a formative stage at that point.71 The government’s acceptance of the resolution constituted its commitment to Islamize Pakistan’s constitution and laws in a manner that was largely consistent with the Jama(at’s vision for Islam in that country.72

One of several significant aspects of this resolution is that it requires the government to be responsible for the Islamizing of Pakistani laws and the Pakistani state.73 In other words, this process would not be the sole responsibility of the Jama(at, although, in principle, the Jama(at and organizations like it could continue to operate freely. At the same time, there were numerous examples in Pakistan’s history when the government violated this principle and prohibited the Jama(at and other Islamist organizations from working freely within Pakistan.74

In sum, the passage of this Resolution and its integration into Pakistan’s constitution signified a major victory for the Jama(at in that it required Pakistan to evolve into an Islamic state, if the government actually implemented the ideals articulated in the Resolution of 1949. Although on numerous occasions during Pakistan’s history the government did not adhere to this requirement, the Resolution provided the Jama(at with a substantial basis for opposing what its members often believed were the government’s anti-Islamic policies and actions.75

The Jama(at-i Islami and Kashmir

Another strong and public stance the Jama(at took during this period related to Kashmir, which is a territory with a substantial Muslim population which India and Pakistan have strongly contested since Pakistan’s independence in 1947. In 1948, while the Pakistani government claimed to be observing a cease-fire with India, the Pakistani government continued to support strongly an anti-India insurgency in Kashmir. The anti-India insurgents in Kashmir utilized their interpretation of jihad to justify their military actions and to encourage new members to join their organization. These insurgents also used their interpretation of jihad to garner finances and arms for their organization.76

Mawdudi strongly opposed these insurgent groups, stating that not just any group that desired to do so could simply proclaim jihad against its enemies. According to Mawdudi, this kind of declaration of jihad on the part of individual groups constituted an un-Islamic (and, thus, unjustifiable) arrogation of authority on the part of such groups. Rather, for Mawdudi, the declaration of jihad fell largely under the authority of central governments, which had at their disposal scholars of Islam who had carefully studied the Quran, Hadith, other Islamic sources and the situation at hand, and made a deliberate and thoughtful decision as to whether the declaration of jihad was justified. In the case of the Kashmiri insurgent groups’ declaration of jihad, they themselves did not lead or represent a central government, nor was their declaration based on Muslim scholars’ careful analysis of the sources or the current situation. Mawdudi’s interpretation of the Quran, Hadith, and Islamic history led him to a strong resistance against the ad hoc declaration of jihad by renegade groups. He believed that such declarations could cause a splintering among Muslims and would enable unlearned and power-hungry people to create chaos.77

With these and other principles in mind, Mawdudi declared that the Pakistani government should either formally go to war with India over Kashmir or adhere to the stipulations of the cease-fire to which the Pakistani government had already agreed. Mawdudi’s critique against the Paki- stani government’s policy toward the insurgents in Kashmir carried two implicit messages. First, the Pakistani government, because it was based on largely secular principles, did not have the Islamic legitimacy to declare a jihad against the pro-Indian forces in Kashmir. Second, the kind of government which the Jama(at propounded would have that legitimacy, because, in Mawdudi’s view, it would have been wholly based on Islamic law and would have had the kind of Muslim scholars who could have made a fully justified and authentic declaration of jihad.78

For its part, the Pakistani government attempted to use Mawdudi’s apparent opposition to the Pakistani-supported insurgents in Kashmir to its