Modern Islamist Movements: History, Religion, and Politics (7 page)

leading to the attacks on September 11, 2001. At the same time, there are certain Islamist groups which are excluded from consideration. This study intends to focus on some of the ones which have been and continue to be particularly influential. While there are a variety of Shiite Islamist groups that are important and influential, this book does not focus on such groups. Within this framework, this book treats the historic contexts related to Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia, on the other, somewhat differently than it treats Egypt, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, partly because of the unique circumstances related to those two regions (although the circumstances in each country and region in this study can be considered distinctive in their own way). One of several factors that makes Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza different from the other countries and regions in this study is that it is a region where most Muslims believe the removal of land from the possession of an indigenous Middle Eastern popu- lation was most severe and unjust. As part and parcel of that, Israel is the only majority-Jewish state in the Middle East and the world; in addition, within that context, Arabs and Jews live in dramatically close proximity to each other, and the conflicts between Arabs and Jews are particularly magnified. These and other factors related to Israelis, Palestinians, and their relationships necessitate providing additional historic context about the formation of Israel and various Palestinian groups, including the Islamist

group Hamas, in a way that is different from the other chapters.

While Islam plays a role in one way or another in all the countries and regions in this study, certain forms of Wahhabi Islam played a distinctively crucial role in the formation, establishment, and perpetuation of the modern Saudi state. At the same time, the Saudi government possesses a responsibil- ity that no other nation in the world does; it must protect Mecca and Medina, the two holiest cities in Islam, while ensuring safe passage for Muslims to and from these sacred cities. The almost all-encompassing role of Wahhabi Islam in Saudi Arabia’s history, development, and current status, its role as protector of Islam’s holiest sites, and the role that those and other factors played in shaping Usama Bin Laden’s worldview are some of the reasons that the chapter on Saudi Arabia provides additional historic con- text related to Wahhabi movements and their role in the formation of Saudi Arabia and al-Qaida.

Egypt, the West Bank and Gaza, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan

These countries and regions are the book’s focus because Islamists from these areas have had a substantial impact on the formation of Islamism in general and al-Qaida in particular. Specifically, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Muhammad Atef (1944?–2001), two of al-Qaida’s most powerful leaders,

were born in Egypt and in 1998 (the year that their Islamic Jihad organization joined forces with Bin Laden’s al-Qaida) these intellectuals began to have an increasing impact on the policies and strategies of al-Qaida, while Islamist ideas from Egypt had a significant influence on al-Qaida and the Taliban before that time as well.112

Palestinians, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and issues related to the prospects of a Palestinian state also figure prominently within Islamism. For the vast majority of Muslims, the oppression and injustice to which they believe Israel (with American and European support) has subjected the Palestinians constitute some of the most cataclysmic events in the majority- Muslim world during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The calamities which Muslims believe have repeatedly struck the Palestinians have been reported on television, radio, in newspapers, and magazines almost daily since the 1940s. One of the few ideals which some governments in the majority-Muslim world share with the Islamist groups that oppose them is the hope for the establishment of a Palestinian state and an end to what most Muslims perceive to be Israeli oppression of Palestinians. Indeed, one of the most urgent demands that various Islamist groups, including al-Qaida and the Taliban, have been making is for the creation of a fully autonomous Palestinian state. Islamist groups, such as Hamas, play a significant role in Palestinian politics. Hamas is, in some respects, emblematic of Islamism more generally, and a pro-Palestinian position in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict forms a central problematic within the ideologies of Islamic groups throughout the world.113

Saudi Arabia and Iran, which are majority Sunni and Shiite respectively, have based their laws, their governments, and, to the extent that political structures can influence such matters, their societal mores on Sharia. The role of Islam in Saudi Arabia and its support of Islamist groups – particularly its on-again/off-again and at-times-direct/at-times-indirect support of al-Qaida – make an analysis of that country and its relationship to Islamism a key component of this study. A scholarly treatment of the religious, political, cultural, and economic ethos of Saudi Arabia is also helpful insofar as Usama bin Laden, 15 of the 19 September 11 hijackers, and large numbers of al-Qaida members inside and outside of Afghanistan are or were from Saudi Arabia.114 Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, born in (Uyaynah, a town in modern-day Saudi Arabia, wrote numerous publications that helped set the foundations for Islamism and the modern Saudi state.115 Also, three of the Muslim scholars with whom Bin Laden trained and whose advice he subsequently sought are Saudis.116

Pakistani Islamism and, to a limited extent, the Pakistani government itself have contributed to the rise and strength of Islamism in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and other parts of the majority-Muslim world.117 Historically, India and Pakistan have had a long-standing interest in maintaining influence

in Afghanistan as they have attempted to limit the political, economic, and related activities of the Iranians, Soviets, Chinese, Central Asians, and others within the Afghan region.118 More recently, from the 1990s until a few weeks after September 11, the Pakistani government, through its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) network, supported al-Qaida and the Taliban.119 The role of Pakistan in Islamism and modern Islamic intellectual life is significant in terms of its connections to the ideologies, actions, and organizational structures of the Taliban and al-Qaida.

Since Afghanistan was Bin Laden’s adopted home for close to 20 years, it was a key base of operations for members of al-Qaida such as Bin Laden, Zawahiri, Atef, top-level al-Qaida advisers, significant numbers of rank-and-file al-Qaida militants, as well as sympathetic Taliban members, which constitute another focus of this study. From there, they formed their policies for al-Qaida, while attempting to strengthen that group’s ties to the Taliban and other Islamist organizations.120 Because al-Qaida’s headquarters and educational and training centers were in Afghanistan, it was the first target of American attacks and military occupation after September 11. While Afghan intellectuals did not provide the necessary intellectual under- pinnings for al-Qaida’s formation, the country provided the physical location where members of al-Qaida exchanged ideas, crystallized their worldviews, planned strategy, created group cohesion, and trained them- selves for future operations. Most of al-Qaida’s founding principles emerged in a nation 2,200 miles away, Egypt.

Indeed, the next chapter of this book (Chapter 2) focuses on the his- tory of Islamism in Egypt. It analyzes the ideas of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–97), Muhammad (Abduh (1849–1905), and Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865–1935), who resided in Egypt for various periods of time. The chapter then discusses the life and ideas of Hasan al-Banna (1906–49), who drew upon the ideas of Afghani, (Abduh, and Rida, founded Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, and was one of Islamism’s most influential activists. The chapter also explores the lives and ideas of other significant Islamists, such as Sayyid Qutb (a profound figure in the Muslim Brotherhood’s history) and Ayman al-Zawahiri, who has played a crucial role in al-Qaida.

Chapter 3 examines the Palestinian resistance against Israel among Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, Jerusalem, and Israel proper, and the ways in which various groups such as al-Fatah, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and Hamas have mobilized themselves in their efforts to create a Palestinian state. The chapter will analyze key figures in the Palestinian resistance, the structures of Palestinian resistance groups, and the various ways in which those groups have adapted and/or rejected Islamic and secular ideas in their ideologies. In addition, the chapter provides historic background regarding the establishment, formation, and development of the modern state of Israel.

Chapter 4 examines the role of the Wahhabi movement and Islam in the formation of the modern Saudi state and the ways in which various leaders in the Arabian peninsula appropriated Islam in the periods before, during and after the founding of the modern state of Saudi Arabia. The chapter analyzes the life and ideas of the influential Muslim intellectual Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–92) and the ways in which various political and religious leaders in the Arabian peninsula adapted his ideas as they formu- lated their conceptions of – or opposition to – the modern Saudi state. While the chapter examines the role of Wahhabism in Saudi statecraft, it also analyzes the role of Wahhabi ideas in the formation of Usama bin Laden’s ideology and his and al-Qaida’s resistance to the Saudi government.

Chapter 5 explores various aspects of some Islamist groups in Pakistan. In some ways like Egypt, the Indo-Pakistani region has been a major center of Islamic intellectual life and religious reform. A number of Sunni Islam’s most prolific modern intellectuals, such as Sayyid Ahmed Khan, Muhammad Iqbal, Sayyid Abu)l Acla Mawdudi, and Fazlur Rahman, have lived and worked in India and/or Pakistan.121 One of the largest Islamist organizations in the Sunni Muslim world, the Jama(at-i Islami was founded in Pakistan and continues to support and operate mosques, Islamic schools, hospitals, and other social service agencies there and outside the country.122 Pakistani- based Islamic organizations such as the Jama(at also provided educational, religious, political, and military support to the anti-Soviet Afghan mujahideen during the 1980s, to al-Qaida as it began to form in the mid-1980s and continued its work thereafter, and to the Taliban which began to take power in Afghanistan in 1994.123 The chapter on Pakistan explores the intellectual and organizational development of Islamism and reform in the Indo-Pakistani region during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, giving specific attention to Muslim perspectives within this context which gave rise to the mobilization and the long-term popularity of such groups as Jama(at-i Islami, al-Qaida, and the Taliban among segments of the Pakistani population.

Over time, the regimes ruling India and Pakistan have had an interest in influencing political, cultural, and religious affairs in Afghanistan for a number of reasons. One significant impetus behind these nations’ historic involvement in Afghanistan’s internal politics has been India’s and Pakistan’s desire for security. Indian and Pakistani governments have long tried to use the Afghan region as a buffer against Iranian, Russo-Soviet, Central Asian, British, and even Chinese influence in the area. The involvement of the Pakistani government and Pakistani Islamist groups in Afghanistan’s internal affairs during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries has been an extension of Pakistan’s long-standing concern with that country’s future.124 The chapter on Pakistan will also analyze the complex accommodationalist/ oppositionalist strategies that Pakistan’s government has taken toward Islamist groups operating within its borders and in Afghanistan and India.

Chapter 6 will examine the role of Islamist groups in Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s protracted war against the Soviet invasion and occupation from 1979 to 1989 and the subsequent Afghan civil war in the 1990s not only decimated the country, it made Afghanistan a crucial center for the formation and growth of al-Qaida and the Taliban.125 This chapter will examine the role which American military, financial, and political support of the mujahideen and of Usama bin Laden played in the origins and development of Islamism in Afghanistan during the 1980s and 1990s. It analyzes various Afghan and Muslim responses to the substantial decrease in American economic aid to Afghanistan after the Soviet pull-out from that country in 1989.126 There was, for instance, an expectation among many Afghans that after the war against the Soviets, the United States would support an extended redevelopment program. Millions of Afghanis felt betrayed when the United States showed little commitment to rebuilding the country after it had played a key role in helping the Afghanis oust the Soviets in the 1980s.127

The chapter on Afghanistan will also discuss the monetary and religious contributions which Usama bin Laden made – and which many Afghanis believed he had made – to a poverty-stricken Afghanistan in the aftermath of American disengagement, and how Bin Laden’s involvement and perceived involvement in Afghanistan’s internal affairs lent strength to his stature among Muslims inside and outside of the country.128 The chapter will also examine the relationship between al-Qaida and the Taliban, as well as the successful recruitment of large numbers of Muslims to their training camps, while providing an explanation of the goals which the multi-ethnic and transnational al-Qaida attempted to achieve by directing its message to large numbers of Muslims throughout the world with the hope of eventually establishing a global Islamic state. Central to this analysis is an examination of Islamism’s growth in Afghanistan through an exploration of the Taliban’s history, organization, and ideology. The chapter also examines the role of madrasahs in the Taliban’s rise and development. Chapter 7, the book’s conclusion, will summarize some of the book’s findings and suggest some ideas regarding the future of Islamist movements.

The chapters in a book such as this one could be ordered in a variety of ways. The chapters in this volume move geographically in an approximate manner from west to east, Egypt being the westernmost country, which receives extensive treatment, Pakistan and Afghanistan lying further to the east, with Israel, the West Bank, Gaza, and Saudi Arabia lying roughly in between. While this study could have begun in any of the countries that are analyzed, Egypt is a viable place to begin because of the vitality of Islamic thought which has been present in that country for substantial periods of its history and because of the influence that Islamic ideas which have emanated from Egypt have had on the majority-Muslim world.