Muslim Fortresses in the Levant: Between Crusaders and Mongols (61 page)

Very little field work has been done in this region and it is difficult to assess what, if at all, was the scale of Mamluk re-building in those fortresses.

Almost parallel to the campaign in the Nasseriyya Mountains, Baybars took
and Baalbek. Restoration work began almost immediately on the latter. The large inland fortresses were to assist in establishing Mamluk rule, to continue to serve as administrative centers, to see to law and order in the region, and to provide security for the local population and those who traveled along the Sultanate’s roads. Some of them stored military supplies such as siege machines and surplus grain that were transported to different parts of the Sultanate when required. In contrast to the policy implemented inland, along the Euphrates Baybars had chosen to restore only two fortresses. Throughout his reign the sultan was conscious of the need to preserve a fine balance between the strength and size of the garrisons and the size of his field armies in the Syrian cities and Cairo. The key seems to have been to hold fewer fortresses and invest in a strong mobile field army.

The restoration of fortresses during the reign of Qalāwūn

Qalāwūn added a number of important strongholds; none, however, were located along the frontier. It seems that, rather than initiate the conquest and restoration of new fortresses, he devoted much of his time to finishing work that Baybars had begun. The fortresses of Safad,
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Baalbek and
al-Akrād were completed during his reign.
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The rise of Qalāwūn to power did not bring any changes in Mamluk policy towards the Īlkhānid state. Towards the end of his first year in power, news of Īlkhānid preparations for a new invasion into Syria arrived in Cairo. In October 1280 the Īlkhānid army conquered Baghrās, Darbassāk and
, all located on or near the main route leading to Aleppo and all owned at the time by the Mamluks, according to a treaty signed during Baybars’ reign. The Mamluk garrisons abandoned the fortresses and fled as the Īlkhānid army arrived. Aleppo too was deserted; the Īlkhānid army took advantage of the situation and looted the city.
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Getting reinforcements to the Mamluk fortresses in Cilicia became one of the main problems during Qalāwūn’s reign and in later decades. In contrast to the fortifications along the Euphrates that could receive help within days or a couple of weeks at the most, the Mamluk garrisons in Cilicia were often left to fend for themselves. Abū’l-Fidā’ describes one of the occasions on which the Mamluk garrisons abandoned the fortresses in Armenian territory during Ghazan’s invasion in 699/1299–1300.

When Ghazan came with the Mongol hosts to Syria, the Armenians had designs on the territories which the Muslims had conquered from them. The Muslims were unable to hold them, so the garrison-troops and foot soldiers there left them and evacuated them. The Armenians occupied them, regaining Hamūs, Tall
, Kūbar, Sarfandkār, al-Naqīr. Of all these citadels, only Hajar Shaghlān was left to the Muslims. The Armenians occupied the other territories to the south of the river Jayhān.
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The problem of the defense of the Cilician frontier was only solved when the Armenian kingdom fell in the last quarter of the fourteenth century and its entire territory was occupied by the Mamluk sultanate.
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Although it was not the first time the Īlkhānid army managed to penetrate Syria in depth, the panicked desertion of Aleppo by its inhabitants and garrison may have emphasized the need to further invest in inland strongholds and strengthen the urban fortifications. Restoration of Aleppo’s citadel began in Qalāwūn’s reign.
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The strengthening of the Damascus fortifications had begun during Baybars’ reign, but most of the work was completed by Qalāwūn.
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Qalāwūn’s policy towards the Franks in the early years of his reign was significantly more moderate than that of Baybars. The sultan was determined to use all the diplomatic means available in order to keep the peace with the Frankish enclaves. The reason for this policy, so different from that of his predecessor, was probably the growing tension along the Mamluk–Īlkhānid border (news of Abagha’s coming invasion reached the Mamluk court towards the end of 1280).
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Qalāwūn knew that his army was not large enough and could not fight on two fronts at the same time. Thus, between the years 1282 and 1286 the sultan signed treaties with the Frankish authority in Acre, the commanders of the Templars in Acre, Chastel Pelerin and Tortosa and also the ruler of Tyre, Beirut and Sidon.
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This period of restrained policy came to an end at the beginning of 1285, when Qalāwūn besieged and took the Hospitallers’ fortress of Marqab (Margat) located in the southern region of the principality of Antioch. It was the first large Crusader fortress the Mamluks conquered and maintained on the coast.

In deciding to keep and rebuild Marqab Qalāwūn strayed from the destructive policy conducted by Baybars along the southern coastal plain. The decision to garrison Marqab was probably the result of a number of developments in the region. Thee was a need to assert law and order amongst the Druze, the Maronites, the Mutawālī and the Nizārīs, who would not submit to Mamluk rule.
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Another reason for the conquest of Marqab was its location near the merchant route that runs parallel to the coast and links Cilicia and Syria. The commercial activity of the Genoese and the growth in the volume of trade justified the Mamluk need to control and supervise mercantile development along this route and direct part of the profits into the Sultanate’s treasury. The economic value of the northern coast may have grown considerably after the destruction of ports and towns along the Palestinian coast in the 1260s. According to Northrup, the reason behind the conquest of Tripoli in later years was that a large percentage of the naval traffic sailing parallel to the north Syrian coast dealt in slaves purchased for the sultan’s army in Cairo.
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The fear that the ranks or for that matter any one at all would
interrupt the trade along this route may have caused Qalāwūn to increase security by holding the small harbors in this section of the coast.
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The location of Marqab and
, between the northern harbors of al-Suwaydiyya (St Simon) and Latakia that served the merchants of Aleppo and the port of Tortosa (south of Marqab) that served Homs, enabled the Mamluks to keep a watchful eye on all three harbors.

From Abū’l-Fidā’s description it appears that defensive aspects were taken into account. The decision to keep the fotress was reached even before it was captured. Once his mind was made up Qalāwūn tried to conclude the siege as soon as possible and in a peaceful manner in order to reduce the damage to the structure of the fortress from the Mamluk siege machines:

When the mines had got the better of the castle-walls, its people asked for terms. The sultan ageed out of desire to keep it in being, for if he had taken it by the sword and destroyed it, its restoration would have been troublesome.
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Qalāwūn’s debate concerning the fate of Marqab – to restore or destroy, as described by Ibn
– gives a rare insight into the manner in which decisions of this type were taken. The final decision was made y the sultan alone, but it was preceded by a discussion with the amirs of the highest rank. Some differences of opinion were voiced but the sultan supported the idea that the fortress should be kept, and the damage repaired. Qalāwūn declared that the importance of Marqab lay in its ability to provide support and defense for the fortresses in the close vicinity.
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The taes collected from the local population financed the restoration of the fortress, its daily running and the garrison’s pay. A large garrison was established, numbering a thousand men from two military groups: the archers (
uqjyya,
) and the troops (
jarjya,
), who were commanded by amirs from the
(followers). In addition there were Mamluks recruited from the
, the
and the
, four hundred craftsmen and one hundred and fifty soldiers.
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