Muslim Fortresses in the Levant: Between Crusaders and Mongols (68 page)

The Mamluk idea behind maintaining a permanent force in Cilicia was to create a secure and controlled zone that would protect the northern Syrian towns: a chain of fortresses that would raise the alarm and hold back the enemy until the arrival of Mamluk reinforcements. Although the Armenians and Īlkhānids seldom invaded Syria from the north, the Mamluks remained alert.

The fortresses rebuilt by the Mamluks in Cilicia varied in plan and method of construction as well as in building materials. Some of the strongholds were first established by the Byzantines; most were built by the Armenians and a few by the Military Orders.

Because of the instability along the Mamluk-Armenian frontier, fortresses often changed hands. The lack of continuity and the fact that they ere often held for short periods, makes it difficult to establish their exact lineage.

Most of the strongholds within the Armenian kingdom that passed into Mamluk hands are mentioned in a series of treaties signed between the two sides during the second half of the thirteenth century and the early decades of the fourteenth. The treaties seem to have left the Armenians little room for negotiations. The military balance tilted in favor of the Mamluks and it changed only when the Armenians received assistance from the Īlkhānids. The Īlkhānid state, however, did not always rush to support, defend or fight beside its client kingdoms. In 664/1266, when al-Malik
, the Ayyubid lord of Hama, set out with a Mamluk army towards Cilicia,
¹⁶¹
the Armenian king
tried to recruit help from the Īlkhānid army. The Īlkhān refused due to problems on his eastern border.
¹⁶²

In 1271 matters evolved in quite a different manner. The Mamluk campaign was canceled or postponed for fear that Abagha would send a reinforcement of 20,000 soldiers to the Armenian kingdom.
¹⁶³
Although the Īlkhānid state carried considerable weight and could easily change the balance of power in the region, it was the Mamluks who dictated and decided the main clauses in many of those treaties. Whatever the two sides ultimately agreed upon, there was always a clause that required the Armenians to surrender a number of fortresses to the Mamluks. In addition there was always a clearly phrased clause that forbade the Armenians to restore existing fortresses or build new ones. A condition of this type was inserted in the treaty signed in 684/1285.
¹⁶⁴
That this clause was included was due to the remarkable capacity the Armenians had demonstrated in refortifying fortresses abandoned and damaged by the Mamluk garrisons. In certain cases the Armenians initiated the building of new fortresses in order to improve the safety of central trade routes.
¹⁶⁵

The survey below of Mamluk raids into the Armenian kingdom and the treaties that followed defines the fortresses the Mamluks tried to gain control over. By following the military and political maneuvers involved one may be able to better understand the problems, the advantages and disadvantages of fortifications in this particular region.

Mamluk presence in Cilicia: raids followed by treaties

The first Mamluk assault on the Armenian kingdom (664/1266) was probably a direct response to a sequence of raids carried out by the Armenians into northern Syria in 1262–4. Bar Hebraeus gives a very different explanation for this first raid. According to his account a Mamluk delegation left for the Armenian court in 1266, with the following offer: the king would surrender and pay tribute to the Sultanate. In return Baybars would open the routes from Syria to Cilicia and make safe the transport of food supplies to the kingdom.
¹⁶⁶
From the choice of words in Bar Hebraeus’ account it appears that the matter was of a sensitive nature. King
I would have given the sultan a positive answer if he had not feared Abagha’s reaction. The Mamluk raid is described by both Smpad and Bar Hebraeus in a similar manner. The capital, Sīs, was sacked, the population massacred,
¹⁶⁷
and the fortresses along the frontier – Adana, Ayās, Mesis and
, Karanjil,
(which belonged to the Teutonic Order) and Sarfadkār – left in ruins (
Map 3.5
).
¹⁶⁸

In 666/1268 King
surrendered several fortresses to Baybars. In return the sultan released the king’s son who had been taken hostage two years earlier.
¹⁶⁹
The fortresses Baybars received were Darbassāk, Marzabān,
, Raban, Bahasnā and al-Zarb.
¹⁷⁰
The king changed his mind at the last moment and insisted on retaining Bahasnā. The sultan, however, did not relent. Once
was informed of the sacking of Antioch, he agreed to the initial terms of the treaty. As a guarantee, a hostage was held in the sultan’s court until all the Armenian fortresses were safely transferred to the Mamluks.
¹⁷¹

The second Mamluk raid took place in 671/1273. The army left Aleppo, and following Baybars’ orders took the Armenian fortress of Kaynūk (Göynük), situated on the bank of the Aq Su River, northeast of
. The Mamluks did not garrison the site. The direct reason for the raid was an attack by the inhabitants of Kaynūk on Mamluk merchants and agents.
¹⁷²
In 673/1274–5 the Mamluks again invaded Cilicia, because the Armenians had neglected to pay the tribute determined in the treaty signed in 1268. Furthermore, their attempt to restore a number of fortresses and build a new fortress at the foot of the Taurus mountains was a clear breach of the treaty.
¹⁷³
Thee is an almost tangible element of revenge, and one of the raid’s aims seems to have been to make sure the Armenians were aware of their position, to punish them for being such loyal allies of the Īlkhānids and eager participants in each Īlkhānid invasion into Syria. A chain of destruction and ruin was left throughout the country and a large amount of booty was collected. The Mamluks did not take further advantage of the kingdom’s weakness and did not demand any of its strongholds as they had done on previous occasions.