Never Give In! (13 page)

Applying the standard which I have outlined to the existing German navy law without any addition, that is to say, two ships a year for the next six years, for that is what the law prescribes, and guarding ourselves very carefully against developments in other countries which cannot now be foreseen, it would appear to be necessary to construct for the next six years four ships, and three ships in alternate years, beginning this year with four. . . .

Let me make clear, however, that any retardation or reduction in German construction will, within certain limits, be promptly followed here, as soon as it is apparent, by large and fully proportioned reductions. For instance, if Germany elected to drop out any one, or even any two, of these annual quotas and to put her money into her pocket for the enjoyment of her people and the development of her own prosperity, we will at once, in the absence of any dangerous development elsewhere not now foreseen, blot out our corresponding quota, and the slowing down by Germany will be accompanied naturally on our larger scale by us. Of course both Great Britain and Germany have to consider, among other things, the building of other Powers, though the lead of both these countries is at present very considerable over any other Power besides each other. Take, as an instance of this proposition which I am putting forward for general consideration, the year 1913. In that year, as I apprehend, Germany will build three capital ships, and it will be necessary for us to build five in consequence. Supposing we were both to take a holiday for that year. Supposing we both introduced a blank page in the book of misunderstanding; supposing that Germany were to build no ships in that year, she would save herself between £6,000,000 and £7,000,000 sterling. But that is not all. We should not in ordinary circumstances begin our ships until she has started hers. The three ships that she did not build would therefore automatically wipe out no fewer than five British potential super-‘Dreadnoughts’, and that is more than I expect them to hope to do in a brilliant naval action. As to the indirect results, even from a single year, they simply cannot be measured, not only between our two great brother nations, but to all the world. They are results immeasurable in their hope and brightness. This, then, is the position which we take up, that the Germans will be no gainers, so far as naval power is concerned, over us by any increases they may make, and no losers for the basis I have laid down by any diminution. Here, then, is a perfectly plain and simple plan of arrangement whereby without diplomatic negotiation, without any bargaining, without the slightest restriction upon the sovereign freedom of either Power, this keen and costly naval rivalry can be at any time abated. It is better, I am sure, to put it quite frankly, for the Parliaments and peoples to judge for themselves. . . .

The consequence of defeat at sea are so much greater to us than they would be to Germany or France. There is no similarity between our naval needs and those of the two countries I have mentioned. There is no parity of risk. Our position is highly artificial. We are fed from the sea; we are an unarmed people; we possess a very small Army; we are the only Power in Europe which does not possess a large Army. We cannot menace the independence or the vital interest of any great continental State; we cannot invade any continental State. We do not wish to do so, but even if we had the wish we have not got the power.

These are facts which justify British naval supremacy in the face of the world. If ever any single nation were able to back the strongest fleet with an overwhelming army, the whole world would be in jeopardy, and a catastrophe would swiftly occur. People talk of the proportion which the navies of different countries should bear to the commercial interests of the different nations – the proportion of France, the proportion of Italy, the proportion of Germany – to their respective mercantile marines; but when we consider our naval strength we are not thinking of our commerce, but of our freedom. We are not thinking of our trade, but our lives. Nothing, of course, can make us absolutely safe against combinations which the imagination can summon up. We have faced combinations again and again in the past, and sometimes at heavy odds, but we must never conduct our affairs so that the navy of any single Power would be able to engage us at any single moment, even our least favourable moment, with any reasonable prospect of success. If this is insular arrogance, it is also the first condition of our existence. I am glad to be able to assure the House that no difficulty will be experienced in making arrangements to maintain our relative positions in the near future, and to secure as quickly as we need them adequate margins of safety. I am glad also that these measures will not involve any excessive or disproportionate expense. We do not, of course, require to build any more ships other than those I have referred to under the head of ‘new construction’. All we should need to do is to bring, as we require it, and no sooner, a larger proportion of our existing Fleet into a higher status of commission, and consequently of greater readiness. We propose also at the present time, in view of the increases which are in progress, to recast completely the organisation of the Fleet. Under the new organisation the ships available for home defence will be divided into first, second, and third Fleets, the whole three Fleets, comprising eight battle squadrons of eight ships each, together with their attendant cruiser squadrons, flotillas, and all auxiliaries. . . .

I hope the House will discern from the account I have given the general principle of naval administration to which we adhere – homogeneity of squadrons; simplicity of types and classes; modernity of material; concentration in the decisive theatres; constant and instant readiness for war; reliance upon gun power; reliance upon speed; and, above all, reliance upon 136,000 officers and seamen, the pride of our race, and bred from their boyhood up to the permanent service of the sea. These are the principles which we ask the House of Commons to approve. For the rest I have only a word to say.

The spectacle which the naval armaments of Christendom afford at the present time will no doubt excite the curiosity and the wonder of future generations. Here are seen all the polite peoples of the world, as if moved by spontaneous impulse, devoting every year an immense and ever-growing proportion of their wealth, their manhood, and their scientific knowledge to the construction of gigantic military machinery, which is obsolescent as soon as it is created; which falls to pieces almost as soon as it is put together; which has to be continually renewed and replenished on a larger scale; which drains the coffers of every Government; which denies and stints the needs of every people; and which is intended to be a means of protection against dangers which have perhaps no other origin than in the mutual fears and suspicions of men. The most hopeful interpretation which can be placed upon the strange phenomenon is that naval and military rivalries are the modern substitute for what in earlier ages would have been actual wars; and just as credit transactions have in the present day so largely superseded cash payments, so the jealousies and disputes of nations are more and more decided by the mere possession of war power without the necessity for its actual employment. If that were true the grand folly of the twentieth century might be found to wear a less unamiable aspect. Still we cannot conceal from ourselves the fact that we live in an age of incipient violence and strong and deep-seated unrest. The utility of war even to the victor may in most cases be an illusion. Certainly all wars of every kind will be destitute of any positive advantage to the British Empire, but war itself, if ever it comes, will not be an illusion – even a single bullet will be found real enough. The Admiralty must leave to others the task of mending the times in which we live, and confine themselves to the more limited and more simple duty of making quite sure that whatever the times may be our Island and its people will come safely through them.

‘AIR POWER!’

10 November 1913

The Lord Mayor’s Banquet, The Guildhall, London

Churchill was one of the very first to understand the potential of air power, not just as spotter-aircraft for naval artillery, but on the battlefield as well. He founded the Royal Naval Air Service and, indeed, became an impassioned aviator himself, proud to share the dangers of the early aviators when the art of flying was in its infancy.

Our hearts should go out tonight to those brilliant officers – Commander Samson and his band of brilliant pioneers – to whose enterprise and to whose devotion it is due that in an incredibly short space of time our naval aeroplane service has been raised to that primacy from which it must never be cast down. (
Cheers.
) But that is not enough, and I have come here tonight to tell you that it is not only in naval aeroplanes that we must have superiority. I would venture to submit to this great company assembled that the enduring safety of this country will not be maintained by force of arms unless over the whole sphere of aerial development we are able to make ourselves the first nation. Many difficulties have to be overcome. Other countries have started sooner. The native genius of France, the indomitable perseverance of Germany, have produced results which we at present cannot equal. In order to achieve the position which is necessary the War Office and the Admiralty will have to work together, as they are now working, in the closest intimacy and cooperation. In order to achieve that position you will have to make up your minds to spend year after year your money, and month after month to pay your toll in precious lives. The keenest eye, the surest hand, the most undaunted heart, must be offered and risked and sacrificed in order that we may attain – as we shall undoubtedly attain – that command and perfection in aerial warfare which will be an indispensable element, not only in naval strength, but in national security. (
Loud cheers.
)

‘UNCONQUERABLE AND INCOMPARABLE’

4 March 1914

Royal Aero Club dinner, Savoy Hotel, London

At a time that the British War Office’s principal thinking still revolved around sending men to war on horseback, the First Lord of the Admiralty, with his boundless energy, was driving forward military aviation and encouraging the development of what he called his
‘Land Battleships’,
later to be known as the
‘Tank’.
Indeed it was to the tank that Field Marshal Ludendorff was to credit the defeat of the German Armies in 1918.

The progress which has been made in this country in the last few years, and especially in the last year, has been very great. Though we started last we have profited to the full by all that has been discovered in other lands, and we have contributed ourselves, in some important particulars, to the sum of knowledge. Not only with aeroplanes but with airships things are done today which nobody would have thought right or prudent to do twelve months or even nine or six months ago. . . . This new art and science of flying is surely one in which Great Britain ought to be able to show herself – I do not say supreme in numbers, but supreme in quality. Perhaps flying is one of the best tests of nationality which exists. It is a combination of science and skill, of organisation and enterprise. The forces in our country are unconquerable and incomparable if they are only properly directed. It has been reserved for us to see flying a commonplace and ordinary event. That is a great fact, because no one can doubt that the development and discovery of the flying art definitely enlarges the boundaries of human activity. One cannot doubt that flying, to judge from the position which it has reached even today, must in the future exercise a potent influence, not only upon the habits of men, but upon the military destinies of states. (
Cheers.
)

‘THE WORLD IS ARMED AS IT WAS NEVER ARMED BEFORE’

17 March 1914

House of Commons

This speech, introducing the Naval Estimates, lasted for over two hours. It was remarkable for its detail its power and for Churchill’s complete mastery both of the subject and the House. The Tory
Daily Telegraph,
no friend to the First Lord, described it as ‘the longest and perhaps also the most weighty and eloquent speech to which the House of Commons have listened during the present generation’.

We must begin by recognising how different is the part played by our Navy from that of the navies of every other country. Alone among the great modern States, we can neither defend the soil upon which we live nor subsist upon its produce. Our whole Regular Army is liable to be ordered abroad for the defence of India. The food of our people, the raw material of our industries, the commerce which constitutes our wealth, have to be protected as they traverse thousands of miles of sea and ocean from every quarter of the globe. Here we must consider the disparity of risks and stakes between us and other naval Powers. Defeat to Germany at sea means nothing but loss of the ships sunk or damaged in battle. Behind the German ‘Dreadnoughts’ stand four and a half million soldiers, and a narrow sea-front bristling with fortresses and batteries. Nothing we could do, after a naval victory, could affect the safety or freedom of a single German hamlet.

Behind the British line of battle are the long, light-defended stretches of the East Coast, our endless trade routes and food routes, our small Army and our vast peaceful population, with their immense possessions. The burden of responsibility laid upon the British Navy is heavy, and its weight increases year by year. All the world is building ships of the greatest power, training officers and men, creating arsenals, and laying broad and deep the foundations of future permanent naval development and expansion. In every country powerful interests and huge industries are growing up, which will render any check or cessation in the growth of navies increasingly difficult as time goes by. Besides the Great Powers, there are many small States who are buying or building great ships of war, and whose vessels may, by purchase, by some diplomatic combination or by duress, be brought into the line against us. None of these Powers need, like us, navies to defend their actual independence or safety. They build them so as to play a part in the world’s affairs. It is sport to them, it is life and death to us. These possibilities were described by Lord Crewe in the House of Lords last year. It is not suggested that the whole world will turn upon us, or that our preparations should contemplate such a monstrous contingency. By a sober and modest conduct, by a skilful diplomacy, we can in part disarm and in part divide the elements of potential danger. But two things have to be considered: First, that our diplomacy depends in great part for its effectiveness upon our naval position, and that our naval strength is the one great balancing force which we can contribute to our own safety and to the peace of the world. Secondly, we are not a young people with a blank record and a scanty inheritance. We have won for ourselves, in times when other powerful nations were paralysed by barbarism or internal war, an exceptional share of the wealth and traffic of the world.