PARIS 1919 (86 page)

On September 2, 1919, he left Washington for a trip across the country. His closest advisers begged him not to go. Wilson was adamant. The treaty must be saved, even if he had to give his life for it. “In the presence of the great tragedy which now faces the world,” he told them, “no decent man can count his personal fortunes in the reckoning.”
¹⁴
Grayson heard the decision with dread: “There was nothing I could do except to go with him and take such care of him as I could.” As Wilson boarded his special train, he complained about the dreadful headaches that he had been having. For almost a month Wilson made speech after speech, sometimes two, even three a day. He hammered at the same themes. The treaty was a great document for peace and for humanity, dearly bought with the sacrifice of the young American men who had gone over to fight in Europe. Those who opposed it back in Washington were partisan, shortsighted, selfish, ignorant, perhaps something worse. “When at last in the annals of mankind they are gibbeted, they will regret that the gibbet is so high.” He was glad, he told an audience in St. Louis, that he was away from the capital. “The real voices of the great people of America sometimes sound faint and distant in that strange city!” The crowds grew larger and more enthusiastic as he headed west. Supporters of the treaty grew moderately confident that it might get through if only Wilson would accept some of the milder reservations.
¹⁵

Wilson's headaches grew worse and he looked more and more exhausted. Bad news came in from Washington. Sentiment was growing in favor of reservations. William Bullitt, still smarting from the repudiation of his trip to Russia, now took his revenge, making a dramatic appearance before the Senate hearings to paint a picture of one blunder after another in Paris. Worse, he said that Lansing, the secretary of state, shared his criticisms. Lansing issued an unconvincing denial. “My God!” exclaimed Wilson. “I did not think it was possible for Lansing to act in this way.” Grayson noticed with alarm that the president turned pale and saliva appeared in the corners of his mouth. In San Francisco, Wilson told an old friend, a woman whom he had once been close to, that the attacks on the treaty were simply personal. “If
I
had nothing to do with the League of Nations, it would go through just like that!”
¹⁶

On September 25 Wilson was in Colorado. By now he was having repeated coughing attacks which Grayson attributed to asthma. He had to sit propped up at nights and could not sleep for more than two hours at a time. He spoke in Pueblo that afternoon, his fortieth speech in twenty-one days. “Disloyalty,” he said of the League's opponents. There would be no compromise with them, no reservations to the covenant: “We have got to adopt it or reject it.”
¹⁷

Wilson never spoke in public again. At two the next morning, Mrs. Wilson woke Grayson. He found the president in a pitiable state, ill, gasping for air, the muscles in his face twitching. Wilson feebly insisted that he must carry on. His wife and doctor overruled him. “The doctor is right,” Wilson told his secretary with tears in his eyes. “I have never been in a condition like this, and I just feel as if I am going to pieces.” The president was suffering, Grayson said in a public statement, from physical exhaustion and a nervous reaction affecting his stomach. The rest of the tour was canceled and the president's train headed back to Washington.
¹⁸

On October 2, at the White House, Wilson had a massive stroke that left him partly paralyzed on his left side. Although he would make a limited recovery over time, he was not physically or mentally the man he had been. He never effectively functioned as president again, although he continued to influence the battle over the treaty from his sickroom. Mrs. Wilson and Grayson took it upon themselves to conceal the full extent of his illness and to carry out his wishes. In the first weeks after the stroke, when it was not clear that Wilson would survive, they kept everyone except Wilson's daughters and the essential nurses and doctors from seeing the president. The leader of the Senate Democrats, Gilbert Hitchcock of Nebraska, was shocked when he finally saw Wilson on November 7. “As he lay in bed slightly propped up by pillows with the useless arm concealed beneath the covers I beheld an emaciated old man with a thin white beard which had been permitted to grow.”
¹⁹

The treaty continued to make its way through the Senate for the rest of October and part of November 1919. Amendments, twelve in all, were defeated by a combination of Democrats and moderate Republicans. Lodge managed, however, to hold most of the Republicans together, and their votes, along with those of the few Democrats who crossed party lines, were sufficient to attach a number of reservations to the treaty. The most crucial reservation involved Article X; the United States would not act to protect the territorial integrity or independence of any League member unless Congress approved. Lodge put forward a motion of ratification incorporating the reservation. When Hitchcock went to Wilson's bedside for a second time on November 17 to discuss this, he found the president significantly more alert—but also more determined than ever. Wilson adamantly opposed the reservation in any form. “That cuts the very heart out of the treaty.” He told Hitchcock to let the Republicans take the responsibility for defeating the treaty; they would have to answer to the people of the United States. The following day Mrs. Wilson sent Hitchcock a letter she had written at her husband's dictation. The reservations of Senator Lodge and his cronies amounted to a nullification of the treaty. “I sincerely hope,” Wilson said unequivocally, “that the friends and supporters of the League will vote against the Lodge resolution of ratification.” The next day the Senate voted on Lodge's motion. It was defeated by a combination of those Democrats, the majority, who still followed Wilson's bidding and Republican Irreconcilables. Four weeks later, Wilson learned that he had won the Nobel Peace Prize.
²⁰

Moderate Republicans and Democrats made a last-ditch effort to find a compromise. From the White House an embittered Wilson did his best to block them. Even so the moderates came close; when the Senate voted for the final time on March 19, 1920, on a fresh resolution to ratify the treaty, with slightly modified reservations, the new resolution passed. Twenty-three Democrats defied their president to vote in favor. The necessary two-thirds majority, however, remained just out of reach so the Senate failed to give its consent to the treaty. “Doctor,” Wilson said to Grayson that night, “the devil is a busy man.”
²¹

He never changed his view that he had been right to reject compromise. The United States later signed separate treaties with Germany, Austria and Hungary, but it never joined the League. Wilson, who had briefly contemplated running for president again, lingered on until 1924. Mrs. Wilson survived to go to John F. Kennedy's inauguration in 1961.

Wilson's efforts, and those of the many other peacemakers who shared his ideals, were not completely wasted. The Treaty of Versailles, and the other treaties with the defeated that used it as a model, certainly contained provisions about territory and reparations that could have been written in earlier centuries, but they were also imbued with a new spirit. The covenant of the League came at the start, not as an afterthought, and the League itself was woven into the later clauses, supervising the plebiscites, governing the Saar and Danzig, and monitoring the mandates. The provisions for an International Labour Organization, for treaties to protect minorities, to set up a permanent court of justice or to try men such as the kaiser for offenses against international morality, underlined the idea that there were certain things that all humanity had in common and that there could be international standards beyond those of mere national interest. And when those treaties were attacked in the interwar years it was generally because they had failed to match those standards.

Later it became commonplace to blame everything that went wrong in the 1920s and 1930s on the peacemakers and the settlements they made in Paris in 1919, just as it became easy to despair of democracy. Pointing the finger and shrugging helplessly are effective ways of avoiding responsibility. Eighty years later the old charges about the Paris Peace Conference still have a wide circulation. “The final crime,” declared
The Economist
in its special millennium issue, was “the Treaty of Versailles, whose harsh terms would ensure a second war.”
²²
That is to ignore the actions of everyone— political leaders, diplomats, soldiers, ordinary voters—for twenty years between 1919 and 1939.

Hitler did not wage war because of the Treaty of Versailles, although he found its existence a godsend for his propaganda. Even if Germany had been left with its old borders, even if it had been allowed whatever military forces it wanted, even if it had been permitted to join with Austria, he still would have wanted more: the destruction of Poland, control of Czechoslovakia, above all the conquest of the Soviet Union. He would have demanded room for the German people to expand and the destruction of their enemies, whether Jews or Bolsheviks. There was nothing in the Treaty of Versailles about that.

The peacemakers of 1919 made mistakes, of course. By their offhand treatment of the non-European world, they stirred up resentments for which the West is still paying today. They took pains over the borders in Europe, even if they did not draw them to everyone's satisfaction, but in Africa they carried on the old practice of handing out territory to suit the imperialist powers. In the Middle East, they threw together peoples, in Iraq most notably, who still have not managed to cohere into a civil society. If they could have done better, they certainly could have done much worse. They tried, even cynical old Clemenceau, to build a better order. They could not foresee the future and they certainly could not control it. That was up to their successors. When war came in 1939, it was a result of twenty years of decisions taken or not taken, not of arrangements made in 1919.

Of course things might have been different if Germany had been more thoroughly defeated. Or if the United States had been as powerful after the First World War as it was after the Second—and had been willing to use that power. If Britain and France had not been weakened by the war—or if they had been so weakened that the United States had felt obliged to step in. If Austria-Hungary had not disappeared. If its successor states had not quarreled with each other. If China had not been so weak. If Japan had been more sure of itself. If states had accepted a League of Nations with real powers. If the world had been so thoroughly devastated by war that it was willing to contemplate a new way of managing international relations. The peacemakers, however, had to deal with reality, not what might have been. They grappled with huge and difficult questions. How can the irrational passions of nationalism or religion be contained before they do more damage? How can we outlaw war? We are still asking those questions.

Notes

INTRODUCTION

1. Cambon, vol. 3, p. 292.

2. Temperley,
History,
vol. 1, pp. 243–46.

3. Webster, p. 15.

4. Ribot, p. 255.

5. Callwell, vol. 2, p. 197.

CHAPTER 1: WOODROW WILSON COMES TO EUROPE

1. Beers, p. 148; Seymour, p. 8; Shotwell, pp. 67–69.

2. Willert, p. 166.

3. FRUS, vol. 1, pp. 128–37; Walworth,
Woodrow Wilson,
vol. 2, p. 215.

4. Link,
Road to the White House,
pp. 2–4; Nordholt, pp. 13, 33.

5. Villard, p. 226; Library of Congress, Baker Papers, Group 1, notebooks, 8.3.19.

6. C. T. Thompson, p. 190; F. Palmer, p. 400.

7. Beers, pp. 52–53, 100; Armstrong, p. 104; Walworth,
Wilson and His Peacemakers,
p. 9; F. Palmer, p. 363.

8. Bailey, pp. 87, 92–101; House,
Intimate Papers,
vol. 4, pp. 220–26.

9. Nordholt, p. 195; Library of Congress, Baker notebooks, 18.10.18.

10. Fried, p. 309.

11. PWW, vol. 55, p. 120; vol. 56, p. 128; Scott, p. 386.

12. Seymour, pp. 9–10.

13. Link,
Confusions and Crises,
pp. 11–14.

14. National Archives of Canada, Biggar Papers, vol. 2, letter of 20.3.19; Yale University Library, Auchincloss Papers, Group 580, series I, diary, 22.12.18; Hecksher, pp. 347–53, 498–99.

15. Seymour, pp. 22–26; Shotwell, pp. 75–78; Hunter Miller,
Drafting of the Covenant,
vol. 1, pp. 41–44.

16. Scott, p. 367; C. T. Thompson, p. 369.

17. Seymour, p. 24.

18. Link,
The New Freedom,
pp. 324–27; Department of State,
Lansing Papers,
vol. 2, p. 461.

19. Department of State,
Lansing Papers,
vol. 2, pp. 461–62; Link,
The New Freedom,
pp. 375, 386.

20. Link,
The New Freedom,
pp. 67, 398; British Library, Balfour Papers, 49734/186–192.

21. Zivojinovic, p. 44; Hunter Miller,
Drafting of the Covenant,
vol. 1, p. 46.

22. Seymour, p. 25.

23. Roosevelt, p. 97; Fried, pp. 309, 318, 332; Sharp, “The Genie,”
passim;
Bonsal,
Suitors
and Suppliants,
p. 275; PWW, vol. 55, p. 463; Hunter Miller,
Drafting of the Covenant,
vol. 1, p. 294.

24. Lansing,
Peace Negotiations,
pp. 97–98; Temperley,
History,
vol. 1, p. 439.

25. Sharp, “The Genie,” p. 10; Wambaugh, vol. 1, pp. 3–5, 13–14, 17; Davies,
White Eagle,
Red Star,
p. 35; FRUS, vol. 12, p. 515.

26. Temperley,
History,
vol. 4, p. 429; Spector, p. 243.

27. Seymour, p. 25.

28. Link,
Wilson the Diplomatist,
pp. 14–15, 96–97; Yale University Library, Auchincloss diary, 5.11.18.

29. FRUS, vol. 1, pp. 296, 407.

30. Hunter Miller,
Drafting of the Covenant,
vol. 1, p. 43; Seymour, p. 23; D. Lloyd George,
Truth About the Peace Treaties,
vol. 1, pp. 223–24.

31. Zeine, p. 85, n. 11; H. Nicolson,
Peacemaking,
pp. 35–42; Nordholt, pp. 285–86; Bailey, pp. 27–28; PWW, vol. 54, p. 432; R. W. Curry, pp. 210–11; Schwabe, Wilson, Revolu
tionary Germany, and Peacemaking,
pp. 180–81.

32. PWW, vol. 53, pp. 378–79, 397; Seymour, pp. 38–39; Shotwell, pp. 81–84.

33. Shotwell, pp. 85–88; PWW, vol. 53, pp. 382–84.

CHAPTER 2: FIRST IMPRESSIONS

1. Library of Congress, Baker notebooks, 23.12.18.

2. George and George, pp. 76–79.

3. Link,
New Freedom,
p. 95; Library of Congress, Baker notebooks, 16.12.18; Esposito, pp. 741–56; George and George, p. 231.

4. Link,
New Freedom,
pp. 93–94; George and George, pp. 92–93.

5. House,
Intimate Papers,
vol. 4, p. 88; Yale University Library, House Papers, series II, c, diary.

6. Mordacq,
Le ministère Clemenceau,
vol. 1, pp. 93–95; Riddell,
Intimate Diary,
p. 78; D. Lloyd George,
Truth About the Peace Treaties,
vol. 1, pp. 245–46; Yale University Library, House diary, 1.4.19; Library of Congress, Baker notebooks, 3.4.19.

7. See D. Lloyd George,
War Memoirs,
vol. 6, chapter 85; D. Stevenson,
First World War,
pp. 225–35; Rudin, pp. 271–83.

8. Floto, p. 78; FRUS, vol. 1, p. 333.

9. House,
Intimate Papers,
vol. 4, pp. 252–53.

10. Walworth,
Woodrow Wilson,
vol. 2, p. 217; Tillman, p. 66; D. Lloyd George,
Truth
About the Peace Treaties,
vol. 1, pp. 181–82.

11. PWW, vol. 53, p. 520; D. Lloyd George,
Truth About the Peace Treaties,
vol. 1, pp. 185–201.

12. D. Lloyd George,
Truth About the Peace Treaties,
vol. 1, pp. 149–50, pp. 193–94.

13. PWW, vol. 53, pp. 707–8; vol. 54, p. 175.

14. FRUS, vol. 1, pp. 386–96; House,
Intimate Papers,
vol. 4, p. 243, n. 1; PWW, vol. 54, p. 235; Ministère de la Défense, Clemenceau Papers, 6N72, Conférence de la Paix, memorandum of 18.12.18; C. T. Thompson, pp. 56–58; Shotwell, p. 100, n. 2.

15. Bonsal,
Suitors and Suppliants,
p. 132; Bonsal,
Unfinished Business,
p. 68; F. Stevenson, p. 192; Riddell,
Intimate Diary,
p. 41; Watson, pp. 401–7; D. Stevenson, “France at the Peace Conference,” p. 13.

16.
Times,
21.12.18.

17. Seymour, p. 42; Shotwell, p. 88; FRUS, vol. 11, p. 498; H. Nicolson,
Peacemaking,
p. 225; Toynbee, pp. 200–2.

18. House,
Intimate Papers,
vol. 4, pp. 269–71; Yale University Library, Auchincloss diary, 18.12.18.

CHAPTER 3: PARIS

1. National Archives of Canada, Biggar Papers, letter of 14.1.19; Shotwell, pp. 112, 115.

2. House,
Intimate Papers,
vol. 4, pp. 218–19; FRUS, vol. 1, pp. 119–23; Ministère de la Défense, Clemenceau Papers, 6N72, Conférence de la Paix, Pichon to Jusserand, 7.11.18; D. Lloyd George,
Truth About the Peace Treaties,
vol. 1, pp. 147–48; Yale University Library, Wiseman Papers, series I, 7/178, Peace Conference diary, 19.1.19.

3. Williams, p. 246; Watson, p. 220.

4. Kleine-Ahlbrandt, p. 39.

5. Aldcroft,
Versailles to Wall Street,
pp. 13–19.

6. Nevakivi, p. 109; Laroche, pp. 58–60; Keylor, “Versailles and International Diplomacy,” p. 483, n. 41; Guiral, p. 309.

7. Mordacq,
Le ministère Clemenceau,
vol. 3, p. 118; Riddell,
Intimate Diary,
p. 20; Yale University Library, House diary, 28.4.19; Orlando, p. 369.

8. F. Stevenson, p. 286.

9. Williams, p. 28.

10. Ibid., pp. 16, 280–82.

11. Ibid., p. 278.

12. Watson, p. 136; F. Stevenson, p. 212; D. Lloyd George,
War Memoirs,
vol. 5, p. 2675.

13. Williams, pp. 249, 254–55.

14. D. Lloyd George,
War Memoirs,
vol. 5, p. 2681; Williams, pp. 72–74, 165; Mordacq,
Le
ministère Clemenceau,
vol. 2, p. 343, vol. 3, p. 5.

15. Trachtenberg,
Reparation in World Politics,
p. 30; Mordacq,
Le ministère Clemenceau,
vol. 3, p. 206; P. Mantoux, vol. 2, p. 274; Watson, pp. 338–39; Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Série à Paix, 60 (Conditions de la Paix), notes préliminaires sur la réorganisation de l'Allemagne, 27.10.17.

16. Churchill College, Hankey Papers, 4/11, Hankey to Esher, 10.2.19; Headlam-Morley, p. 102; Library of Congress, Beer Collection, diary, 1.3.19; Yale University Library, House diary, 24.1.19.

17. Riddell,
Intimate Diary,
p. 20.

18. Mordacq,
Le ministère Clemenceau,
vol. 3, p. 106; Watson, pp. 278–79, 341; Williams, pp. 203–4; PWW, vol. 57, p. 513; F. Lloyd George, p. 155.

19. Hardinge, p. 242; F. Stevenson, p. 192; Nitti, p. 95.

20. Repington, p. 389; Williams, p. 286; Keiger, pp. 92, 98, 210, 223; Adamthwaite, p. 8; Hughes,
Policies and Potentates,
pp. 223–27; Watson, pp. 250–58.

21. Keiger, pp. 234–36, 246–47, 251–52, 255, 256–59.

22. Mordacq,
Le ministère Clemenceau,
vol. 3, p. 191; Duroselle, pp. 721–28.

CHAPTER 4: LLOYD GEORGE AND THE BRITISH EMPIRE DELEGATION

1. Watson, p. 226; D. Lloyd George,
War Memoirs,
vol. 5, pp. 2678–79, 2686; Mordacq,
Clemenceau au soir de sa vie,
vol. 1, pp. 256–57.

2. Rowland, p. 419; Cecil,
Great Experiment,
p. 67.

3. Grigg,
Young Lloyd George,
pp. 100–2.

4. Grigg,
From Peace to War,
p. 225; Churchill,
Aftermath,
pp. 4–5.

5. Grigg,
Young Lloyd George,
pp. 210–12.

6. Harrod, p. 257.

7. Grigg,
Young Lloyd George,
p. 67.

8. Ibid., pp. 33–36.

9. Grigg,
The People's Champion,
p. 338; Harrod, p. 240.

10. Grigg,
The People's Champion,
p. 77.

11. Ibid., p. 358.

12. Ibid., p. 125, n. 3.

13. Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Europe, 1918–1929, EU18–40, Grande Bretagne, vol. 7, Les comptes-courants, 1.3.23; PWW, vol. 58, p. 103; Grigg,
The People's Champion,
pp. 327–30.

14. Grigg,
From Peace to War,
pp. 212, 478; Dugdale, pp. 131–33.

15. Beaverbrook, p. 303; Grigg,
From Peace to War,
p. 477.

16. Dockrill and Steiner, pp. 55–86; Dugdale, p. 199.

17. Fry, vol. 1, pp. 246–48, 255; Amery, vol. 1, p. 240; Vansittart, p. 248; Grigg,
From Peace
to War,
p. 420.

18. Dockrill and Steiner, p. 77.

19. Riddell,
Intimate Diary,
p. 42.

20. Grigg,
Young Lloyd George,
pp. 212, 285, 296–97.

21. D. Lloyd George,
War Memoirs,
vol. 4, pp. 1731–32.

22. Cook, p. 385; MacMillan, pp. 67–69, 72–73; Fitzhardinge, The Little Digger, vol. 2, pp. 91–94, 300; D. Lloyd George,
War Memoirs,
vol. 4, p. 1744.

23. Fitzhardinge,
Little Digger,
vol. 2, p. 354; House of Lords Record Office, Lloyd George Papers, F/28/2/9; Roskill, vol. 2, pp. 29–30; R. C. Brown, vol. 2, p. 152.

24. FRUS, vol. 1, pp. 482–86, 531–33; Public Record Office, CAB29/28, British empire delegation minutes, 1 (13.1.19).

25. Zimmern, p. 30; Hunter Miller,
Drafting of the Covenant,
vol. 1, 490; House of Lords Record Office, Lloyd George Papers, F/5/5, Botha to Lloyd George, 15.5.19; Nicolson,
Peacemaking,
p. 240; Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Série à Paix, 1914–1920, vol. 287, travaux préparatoires de la conférence, Paul Cambon to Pichon 6.11.18; see, for example, Yale University Library, House diary, entries for 28.10.18 and 6.2.19.

26. Garran, p. 257; Steed, vol. 2, p. 265; H. Nicolson,
Peacemaking,
pp. 44–45.

27. National Archives of Canada, Biggar Papers, letter of 9.2.19.

28. Shotwell, p. 170.

29. National Archives of Canada, Christie Papers, vol. 4, file 9; H. Nicolson,
Peacemaking,
p. 45; Toynbee, p. 205.

30. E. Howard, p. 288.

31. National Archives of Canada, Christie Papers, vol. 7, file 20; Borden, vol. 2, p. 844.

32. D. Lloyd George,
War Memoirs,
vol. 4, p. 1754; House of Lords Record Office, Lloyd George Papers, F/5/2/28, Borden to Lloyd George, 23.11.18.

33. Louis,
Great Britain and Germany's Lost Colonies,
pp. 82–83.

34. Fitzhardinge,
Little Digger,
vol. 2, pp. 74–75.

35. Bonsal,
Suitors and Suppliants,
pp. 113, 229; National Archives of Canada, Biggar Papers, vol. 2, letter to Mrs. Biggar, 7.3.19.

CHAPTER 5: WE ARE THE LEAGUE OF THE PEOPLE

1. H. Nicolson,
Peacemaking,
pp. 253–54; Shotwell, pp. 175–77; Seymour, pp. 154–55; House and Seymour, p. 181; Riddell et al.,
The Treaty of Versailles,
p. 15; PWW, vol. 54, p. 5.

2. House,
Intimate Papers,
vol. 4, p. 469.

3. Churchill,
Aftermath,
pp. 13–14; Gelfand, pp. 227–28, 259.

4. National Archives of Canada, Borden Papers, vol. 431, file 53; H. Nicolson,
Peacemaking,
p. 26; FRUS, vol. 3, pp. 535–37; Tardieu, pp. 88–91.

5. Hankey, pp. 29–31; FRUS, vol. 3, pp. 553–56.

6. FRUS, vol. 3, pp. 492, 537.

7. Ibid., pp. 600, 607, 618.

8. White,
Autobiography,
p. 555.

9. FRUS, vol. 3, pp. 609–13; Mordacq,
Le ministère Clemenceau,
vol. 3, p. 106; Villard, pp. 387–88.

10. FRUS, vol. 3, pp. 546–47, 551.

11. Aldrovandi Marescotti,
Nuovi ricordi,
p. 102; FRUS, vol. 3, pp. 614, 620–22.

12. D. Lloyd George,
Truth About the Peace Treaties,
vol. 1, p. 91.

13. Mazower, “Minorities,” p. 50; Library of Congress, Bliss Papers, box 244, letter of 26.2.19.

14. R. W. Curry, p. 211.

15. National Archives of Canada, Borden Papers, 444/158; FRUS, vol. 3, pp. 1022–23; Shotwell, p. 179.

16. Shotwell, pp. 144–45; Seymour, p. 128.

17. Hoover, p. 88; Mitchell, pp. 92–96; FRUS, vol. 2, p. 635; vol. 3, p. 513.

18. FRUS, vol. 3, p. 516.

19. Hoover, pp. 91–99; FRUS, vol. 2, pp. 658–61; Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Tardieu Papers, 166/195, “Conférence interallié de Londres, 2 et 3 décembre 1918”; Trachtenberg,
Reparation in World Politics,
pp. 23–24.

20. Hoover, pp. xv–xx; D. Lloyd George,
Truth About the Peace Treaties,
vol. 1, pp. 305–6; FRUS, vol. 2, pp. 713–14.

21. Temperley,
History,
vol. 1, pp. 304–8; Hoover, pp. 99–114.