Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions (2003) (18 page)

In the United States, by contrast, politics had jogged to the right with the two Reagan administrations and then the first Bush administration in 1988. One of the main expressions of this new conservatism was suspicion of big government and opposition to regulations, particularly those that were thought to shackle productive business at the hands of unproductive bureaucrats. Reagan’s first Secretary of the Interior, James Watt, cut funding for programs to protect endangered species, pushed to open wilderness areas for oil and gas leases, and removed a number of environmental regulatory responsibilities from the jurisdiction of the federal government. More important were the views of John Sununu, who as White House chief of staff in the first Bush administration played a key role in the preparations for Rio. A former governor of New Hampshire, he had been a leader in establishing regulations to control acid rain and counted himself an environmentalist. But he also felt that environmentalist positions are often ideological and block economic development on the basis of insufficient scientific evidence of the danger of damage or of proof that a proposed remedy will work. In the case of global warming, Sununu argued that significantly reducing fossil fuel emissions would be very costly, and that the scientific evidence didn’t yet prove the problem to be serious enough to warrant the expense. ‘If you’re going to make a trillion-dollar decision, if you’re going to make a decision that’s going to affect a million jobs, you ought to make it on the basis of what you know and not on the basis of what your emotions may lead you to feel,’ he said.
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In this, Sununu probably reflected the views of the U.S. Senate, which would have to ratify any international treaty. The Bush administration entered the preparations for Rio warily, looking hard at the cost⁄benefit equation.

Industry was also looking at the evidence and the potential costs. In the case of the ozone hole, manufacturers fought against CFC replacement as long as the danger was only theoretical. But as soon as the evidence of the ozone hole became clear and the nature of the danger certain, industry moved with alacrity to make the necessary changes. Global warming was more complex. Any regulations would hit major industries and thousands of companies across the economy. The evidence was uncertain, the potential damage unclear (some even said the effect might be beneficial), and the costs of a fix would be very high. Thus, American industry prepared to lobby against all but the most flexible of conclusions.

European industry took a somewhat different attitude. It was not un-worried, but it had neither the American companies’ history nor their capacity for active lobbying of its governments. Moreover, it faced a less costly problem. The ongoing nuclearization of France meant it would be greatly reducing fossil fuel emissions in any case. So French industry was really not going to be required to do very much. The situation was similar in Britain and Germany. For decades Britain had subsidized its coal mines and thereby artificially kept coal alive as its primary power-generation fuel. But the Thatcher government had earlier made the decision to halt the subsidies. At the same time, the discovery of vast natural gas reserves in the British sector of the North Sea made it both convenient and economical to switch from coal to much cleaner-burning natural gas. Thus Britain too was going to be greatly reducing emissions as a natural course. German industry had the best deal of all. With reunification, Germany had inherited the old, inefficient coal and peat-fired factories of the East, which it was systematically closing down and replacing with modern plants. The old East German plants were so bad that companies from West Germany could actually increase their emissions while dramatically reducing the country’s overall emissions. As for the rest of Europe, since it all fit under the EU umbrella, it benefited from the emissions reductions in Britain, France, and Germany. Many European countries would be able to increase their individual emissions because the EU as a whole would nevertheless experience a reduction.

Finally, there were the developing countries. Many saw the West’s ‘concern’ over the environment as a plot to curb their growth. In any case they wanted to be paid with large amounts of development aid for any commitments they might make. OPEC countries represented a special subset of the developing countries and – surprise, surprise – they didn’t want to hear about limitations on emissions.

As these forces prepared to tango in Rio, the UN designated an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) to develop the agenda and hold preliminary talks on the agreements to be signed by the heads of government at the full ‘Earth Summit’ planned for June 1992. The final agenda included a treaty on protecting biodiversity, a program for preservation of forests, an ambitious Agenda 21 framework to guide comprehensive environment and economic development policy, and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. It was this last item that was the major focus of debate and that eventually led to Kyoto. The approach was heavily influenced by the experience of the Montreal Protocol. All the discussions essentially boiled down to two questions: Would there be targets and timetables for reduction of greenhouse gas emissions
a la
the Montreal Protocol on Ozone? And would the developing countries be required to participate?

The play began in the winter of 1991 when the INC held the first of its preparatory meetings on the proposed climate change treaty. Setting the tone was the UN Environmental Project’s Director Mostafa Tolba, who said that ‘people everywhere look to 1992 as our best chance, perhaps our last chance, to save our Earth.’
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But although the IPCC’s scientists had concluded that a cut of 60-80 percent in carbon dioxide emissions would be needed to stabilize atmospheric carbon concentrations, few were prepared to consider such cuts in the face of economic reality. The strongest proposal considered was to freeze carbon dioxide emissions at 1990 levels by 2000. This was proposed by the European Community and supported by the Alliance of Small Island States as well as by Canada, Australia, and the Nordic states. It was not a scientifically or economically derived target, but simply the best they thought they could do. The United States, in a rare alliance with the OPEC countries, opposed any emissions targets or timetables. The developing countries, led by China and India, made it clear they could accept no commitments that might restrict their growth, and emphasized the need for financial assistance and technology transfer if they were to achieve anything.

By summer 1991, the battle had hardened into trench warfare. At the London G-7 meeting in July, the European Community, Canada, and Japan all called on the United States to join them in making the commitment to freeze emissions. The U.S. refusal, citing lack of sufficient scientific evidence, elicited a rare on-the-record criticism from European leaders. Said one top official: ‘The United States wants to avoid anything other than generalization. Everybody else wants to make a commitment.’
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Particularly striking was the position of Great Britain, which not only committed to emissions reductions but made clear its view that as the world’s biggest polluter the United States should do its part. It was also noted that U.S. skepticism was making it easy for future polluters like India and China to ignore the whole thing. As if on cue, a month later a group of developing countries issued a statement disclaiming responsibility for environmental problems and demanding large financial assistance in return for any environmental cooperation. Malaysia went so far as to threaten to boycott the conference if it focused too much on de-veloping-country responsibilities.

In the ensuing months, Bush, who had said he would be ‘the environment president,’ came under increasing pressure from domestic environmental groups to prove it. Rio became a cause for celebrities. The actor James Earl Jones told audiences that ‘the entire human race is at stake,’
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and the Sierra Club organized a grass-roots campaign to urge the president to take the leadership of the summit by agreeing to sign strong agreements. The World Resources Institute suggested that if the president didn’t act forcefully he would be vulnerable to charges of antienvi-ronmentalism in the upcoming election campaign, and Democratic Party leaders in the Congress introduced legislation calling for stabilization of U.S. emissions at 1990 levels by 2000 – the commitment for which the EC was lobbying. Despite this pressure and Sununu’s departure from the chief of staff job, Bush held firm to making no target and timetable commitments. At the UN, U.S. negotiators insisted there had to be quantification and a suitable scientific basis for making what could be very expensive commitments. Their position was strengthened when the American Association for the Advancement of Science issued a report with mixed conclusions about the potential effects of greenhouse gas emissions. It advised taking action to reduce emissions but said the information available did not warrant drastic action.

If it was good enough for the scientists, it was good enough for Bush, and his administration stuck with its position. The United States favored a treaty that would commit signatories to reducing emissions – but in a manner and at a time based on well-established scientific findings and consistent with the basic needs and institutions of each country. As the date for the Rio meeting approached, the other industrial countries threatened to conclude a treaty based on the commitment to freeze emissions without the United States. Bush threatened in turn not to attend the meeting if it appeared the United States would be isolated and a target for attack. In the end, the European Community concluded it would be better to have a weak treaty with the United States in than a strong treaty with the United States out, and relented on the demand for targets and timetables. The final agreement of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change acknowledged the harmful effect of human greenhouse gas emissions and committed the signatories to reduce such emissions to 1990 levels by 2000, but the agreement was non-binding. Developed countries were expected to provide financial and technical assistance to developing countries, from whom nothing but goodwill was required.

Bush eventually joined the party, literally – the 1992 Rio Earth Summit – on June 13. Ted Turner and Jane Fonda were there, along with Shirley MacLaine and Jerry Brown. Jimmy Cliff sang while Native Americans sat around a campfire softly beating drums. The Europeans announced a $4 billion package of environmental aid that put to shame a small U.S. offering, and issued a statement affirming their commitment to reduced emissions. When asked if the EC was assuming a new leadership role, European Community Director General for the Environment Laurens Jan Brinkhorst said: ‘It’s logical that we are moving into that position.’ Bush insisted, however, ‘We are the leaders, not the followers.’
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But this wasn’t his crowd to begin with, and he lost any remaining sympathy when he said, ‘The American way of life is not up for negotiation.’
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As a matter of fact that is exactly what was up for negotiation.

FROM RIO TO KYOTO

T
he road from Rio to Kyoto turned out to be tortuous. One of the first curves came up fast as Democratic Party candidate Bill Clinton defeated Bush in the 1992 election only five months after Rio. The Democrats had always had more support among environmentalists than the Republicans, and this time Clinton’s vice president, former Senator Al Gore, counted himself among the environmentalist true believers. As a student, Gore had been deeply impressed by Keeling’s research and its implications, and was a champion of environmental legislation in the Senate. In his best-selling
Earth in the Balance
, Gore set out detailed proposals for a new environmental policy that would include a kind of carbon tax, higher gas mileage requirements for vehicles, and a fee on manufacturers’ use of non-renewable materials.
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As vice president, Gore had a chance to put these ideas into action; he became the captain of the new administration’s environmental team and lost no time in putting together a Climate Change Action Plan, announced in October 1993. Among other things, it committed the United States to achieving 1990 carbon emission levels by 2000, exactly what the rest of the world had been demanding of the United States in Rio. A few months later the Rio treaty came into force as it was ratified by the requisite number of countries, including the now very supportive United States.

But the road was about to get bumpy. In November 1994, the Republicans gained control of the House of Representatives for the first time in forty-two years and elected the fiery Newt Gingrich as Speaker, arguably the second most powerful position in the U.S. government. His attitude toward environmentalism was best captured in a newspaper interview in which he said, ‘I love the environment, but I’m cheap at loving the environment.’
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The class of’94 was the most conservative group of Republicans that Washington or the world had seen since the 1920
s
. They hated big government, and to them, environmentalism was big government. Speaking shortly after the election, Utah Representative Jim Hansen said, ‘The question is not whether to close the [national] parks, but how to accomplish this goal.’
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The Chairman of the House Resources Committee Don Young, a Republican from Alaska, noted that ‘when I see a tree, I see a paper to blow your nose.’
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He added: ‘Environmentalists are a socialist group of individuals that are a tool of the Democratic Party. They are not Americans, never have been Americans, never will be Americans.’
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Congresswoman Helen Chenoweth of Idaho chimed in that ‘environmental policies are driven by a kind of emotional spiritualism that threatens the very foundation of our society, by eroding basic principles of our Constitution.’
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Whether these Republicans were right or wrong could be debated, but they were certainly not in doubt.