Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions (2003) (40 page)

But the second part of the doctrine undermines this reassuring tone by insisting that the United States will maintain such a power gap between itself and the rest that no country would even consider raising a challenge. This is the doctrine of absolute security through overwhelming military superiority. It is in many ways an apt doctrine for America. Only America has the human, institutional, natural, and technological resources to pull it off. It plays to the long-developed sense of American invulnerability as a birthright and to the habitual American trust in superior arms. It also reflects the sense Americans have of being exceptional and apart from the rest of humankind, a special, chosen people who can achieve immunity because they deserve immunity, and from whom the rest of the world need have no fear because Americans have been vouchsafed the ‘truth.’ And the truth has made them free and good. Thus the solipsistic Manichaeism so palpable in the president’s rhetoric about ‘freedom’s triumph over all its age-old foes.’
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Make no mistake, this new doctrine is imperial, and it is heralded by a set of latter-day Rudyard Kiplings spawned by the
Wall Street Journal and
other right-wing publications that inaccurately label themselves ‘conservative’ and call for America to ‘take up the white man’s burden.’ A former
Wall Street Journal
editor, Max Boot, argues in
The Case for American Empire
that the September 11 attacks were ‘the result of insufficient American involvement and ambition; the solution is to be more expansive in our goals and more assertive in our implementation.’
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Says Boot, ‘Afghanistan and other troubled lands today cry out for the sort of enlightened foreign administration once provided by self-confident Englishmen in jodhpurs and pith helmets.’
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The
Washington Post
columnist Sebastian Mallaby echoes this theme, saying that ‘the logic of neoimpe-rialism is too compelling…to resist,’ and urges that orderly societies led by the United States ‘impose their own institutions on disorderly ones.’
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Not to be outdone, the
Atlantic Monthly
correspondent Robert Kaplan calls for bringing ‘prosperity to distant parts of the world under America’s soft imperial influence.’
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The argument is seductive on two counts. First, it is true that there are new asymmetric threats against which old deterrents may be inadequate. Second, to anyone living in a modern, secular, materialistic western ethos it seems obvious that American-administered order and economic development is preferable to chaos. Although its secularized proponents would deny it, this is the same thinking that McKinley invoked when, in deciding to add the Philippines to the American empire, he spoke of the need to ‘uplift them and Christianize them.’ Most neoimperialists would shrink from any association with ‘Christianizing,’ but substitute ‘Americanizing,’ and there isn’t much difference.

The logic of the new doctrine is one of infinite expansion. In the era of globalization, the number of possible threats is very large, and the attempt to control one, such as Iraq, may only subject us to new dangers. We are already seeing this in Afghanistan. To counter the new threat it may thus be necessary to gain control over new territory or new entities. In the end, the only safety is in making every place an extension of yourself.

This would seem to be a daunting task. Traditional international relations theory holds that the rise of any imperial power will automatically generate counteralliances and cooperation among the other powers to offset the influence of the dominant power. As a result, the dominant power redoubles its efforts at countering the new alliance until eventually the empire becomes overstretched and collapses. But the neo-imperialists again believe America is exceptional – because it is a democracy and harbors no lust for territorial gain, and its imperium is attractive and user-friendly, one of soft, even seductive, power. There will be no counterbalancing activity because all will welcome the American way. Who would not want to be American if they could? Thus American women and men are to be sent to the far corners of the earth on a crusade to spread the American creed to a world hungering and thirsting for it.

It won’t work. Let me count the reasons.

First, there is no such thing as absolute military security. Did our laser-guided bombs and nuclear missiles and satellite photos protect us from the September 11 hijackers’ boxcutters and suicidal fanaticism? Are our sophisticated military capabilities cowing the North Koreans into submission? Is the proliferation of our overseas bases reducing our risks? The answer is no in every case, and the proliferation of bases may even be increasing our risks.

Second, even as nice as we Americans are, the rest of the world doesn’t necessarily see us as we see ourselves, doesn’t necessarily want to
be
like us even if it likes us, and is already moving to counterbalance our power. This movement can be seen most obviously in the maneuvering in the UN Security Council over Iraq, but it is also apparent in the EU’s drive to achieve more equal status with the United States, in the renewed ties between Russia and China, and in many countries active efforts of to promote Linux over Microsoft’s Windows as the main computer operating system. There is a fundamental human factor at work here that Americans find hard to understand but that, given our history, we should be the first to understand. Nations are very much like individuals. More than desire for material gain or fear or love, they are driven by a craving for dignity and respect, by the need to be recognized as valid and just as valuable as the next person or country. The Turkish novelist Orham Pamuk, when asked what leads an old man in Istanbul to condone the World Trade Tower attacks or a Pakistani youth to admire the Taliban, responded, ‘It is the feeling of impotence arising from degradation, the failure to be understood, and the inability of such people to make their voices heard.’
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Much as it may like and admire Americans (and, as I have said, it does) the rest of the world has its own traditions, ways, and values for which it wants respect.

Globalization does not change this fact. A Frenchman doesn’t stop being French or turn his back on Descartes by eating a McDonald’s hamburger, and a young Indonesian woman leaving a traditional village to work in a Nike shoe factory and live in its dormitory may cling the more tenaciously to, or even return to wearing, the Muslim head scarf as a way of holding onto her values in a strange world. We can’t stamp this out, and we shouldn’t try.

Third, an American crusade won’t work because it will increasingly involve us in the kinds of alliances of convenience and ruthless actions that only complicate our lives in the long run even as they corrupt our own character and institutions.

Fourth, economic globalization and American profligacy have already undermined our economic sovereignty and made us more dependent than we know on those we would dominate. The charge of wanting to invade Iraq in order to control its oil, which sounds false to many American ears, has such credence abroad precisely because much of the world knows of American economic vulnerabilities and sees American military threats as intended to keep capital flowing to the American safe haven and to control the prices of vital resources so as to maintain ‘Bubba’s’ way of life. The U.S. economy is currently on an unsustainable track. Its growth is driven overwhelmingly by consumption that is based on ever-rising borrowing. As a nation, we consume increasingly more than we produce, and we are able to do so only by borrowing from abroad. Because of our status as the provider of the world’s security and its major reserve currency, our dollar is strong, enabling us to enjoy a standard of living above what we actually earn. But the euro is beginning to provide an alternative reserve currency, and our international borrowing needs are rising to levels that increasingly make lenders nervous. How are we going to be the world’s Caesar when we are shaking a tin cup, unless, of course, we just take what we need?

But that’s the final reason why the American crusade won’t work. Americans are not Romans or even Brits. America may do stupid and even bad things from time to time. But the American people don’t regard body bags as symbols of their glorious valor, nor do they hanker to send their second sons or daughters into the colonial service. Having begun life in rebellion against empire, we never became really comfortable with the habit of empire and simply are not good imperialists. For one thing, we are too eager for people to like us.

What then is to be done? It’s simple really, and something George W. Bush should be able to embrace in a heartbeat. In fact, Bush had it right the first time when he said during the campaign, ‘If we are a humble nation, they’ll see that and respect it.’
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What we need is a return to real conservatism. The imperial project of the so-called neoconservatives is not conservatism at all but radicalism, egotism, and adventurism articulated in the stirring rhetoric of traditional patriotism. Real conservatives have never been messianic or doctrinaire. The very essence of conservatism, which the neoconservatives constantly preach, is limited government. Yet the imperial project they are proposing will greatly increase the role of government both at home and abroad. Already we have dramatically increased federal spending while beefing up our already overwhelming military machine and making the Department of Homeland Security the biggest domestic bureaucracy we have ever had. This is not conservatism. It is Big Government. Traditional conservatives have always been careful to balance the budget and to insist on each citizen’s responsibility to perform civic duties. But the new imperialists are calling for tax cuts even as they raise spending. There is to be no draft and no sacrifice, and the president’s only nod to civic duty came when he urged everyone to go shopping to help the economy.

This is neither conservatism nor liberalism but simple irresponsibility. Recall the words of the great conservative philosopher Edmund Burke, who said of Britain’s power in an earlier era, ‘I dread our being too much dreaded.’ Power is a magnet for threats, and the reaction to them can spur radical projects. Governor Winthrop saw a ‘citty on a hill’ as being attractive by dint of its virtue, not its power. And John Quincy Adams enjoined that we ‘not go abroad in search of monsters to slay.’ Those are all good conservative guides to consult on America’s future strategy.

People often say that criticism of the United States is not to be taken too seriously, because it is normal for number one to be the butt of envy and complaint just as Rome and Britain were in their time. But this nonchalant injunction raises a serious question. Do we want to be like Rome or Britain? We say frequently that America must be the leader and that America is the ‘indispensable nation.’ But a Mexican friend asks, ‘Why? Why must America be in charge of everything? Who appointed you?’ Of course, there is a long history behind all this, but his comment reminds us that there is an alternative strategy that would not call for abandoning America’s commitments and responsibilities. The United States cannot and should not try to withdraw from deep engagement in global affairs. Let’s remember that despite all its mistakes, the United States, according to the Pew polling data, is still considered a relatively safe hegemon. But it would be desirable, from all points of view, for the United States to be the call of last resort, rather than the call of first resort. Here are some thoughts on what such a strategy might entail.

At this point there is little choice but for the United States and whatever partners it can gather to overthrow Saddam and occupy Iraq. The cost of not doing so is now greater than that of doing so. But we should do all in our power to avoid a long American occupation. We could avoid becoming the occupier and help to heal recent wounds by re-establishing the significance of the UN and asking it to form a consortium of countries like Malaysia, Jordan, Switzerland, Canada, and others to oversee creation of a new Iraq. The U.S. would be a major participant and would pay a large part of the bill, but it would not be alone or in charge.

The future of the UN itself must also be addressed. Although flawed, the UN exists because, as Winston Churchill said of democracy, ‘it is the worst system except for all the rest.’ Rather than scrap it, we must revitalize and redesign it. India, Brazil, and perhaps Japan and Saudi Arabia should be added as permanent members of the Security Council. At the same time, Britain and France should be replaced by a single EU representative. At some time, conditions must be established for selection of rotating Security Council members, and the extent of veto power reviewed. It may seem Utopian at the moment, but in the long run, a viable UN will make America more, rather than less, powerful.

Any action in Iraq should be coupled with a renewed effort at resolving the Israeli-Palestinian impasse. This should include making aid to Israel conditional on withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza, a freeze on all settlement development, and closing of all settlements except those tentatively agreed on at Camp David and Taba. The outlines of the Taba non-agreement could be imposed with deployment of NATO troops on the West Bank and in Gaza to police it. In no way should any deal be conditioned on an end to all violence, a condition that simply gives veto power to the extremists on both sides.

With regard to North Korea, we should negotiate a new deal that both guarantees the security of the country from outside attack and assures it sufficient electricity and food; sign a peace treaty to conclude the Korean War and accord the North formal diplomatic recognition; and support South Korea’s efforts at developing trade and investment with the North and at economic development. Internal economic development is far more likely to change the Kim regime than external threats. Of course, in return for all this North Korea must halt its nuclear weapons projects and make them subject to ongoing UN inspection and verification.

The term ‘adult supervision’ has been used to describe America’s relationship with Europe and Japan. Other observers, like Kagan, argue that these countries are living in an artificial paradise that enables them to indulge in empty posturing and selfish cosseting because they leave to America the burdens of dealing with the real world. There is truth in this, and the argument is used to denigrate the Europeans and Japanese as ungrateful and unwilling to do the things necessary to take care of themselves. What goes unsaid, as I have suggested, is that the United States prefers to keep them in a state of extended adolescence as a condition of its own dominance. Unfortunately, we buy this dominance at an increasing cost. Like adolescents, the other developed nations resent our supervision and become more and more rebellious. At the same time, the costs to us of protecting their oil lanes and their neighborhoods are high and growing.