Scapegoat: The Death of Prince of Wales and Repulse (4 page)

1300hrs:
An RAF Catalina appears and signals a Japanese landing at Singora. This is one of the few times that Force Z sees friendly aircraft.

1343hrs:
The Japanese submarine
I-65
reports sighting Force Z. At 1550hrs it loses the ships in a squall, finds them again at 1652hrs but finally loses them when a Japanese float plane threatens to attack, and forces it to submerge.

1540hrs:
The Japanese Admiral Ozawa receives the sighting report, and orders his cruisers to send out search planes. However, night is coming on.

1700hrs:
The weather clears, and Force Z is sighted by a search plane from the cruiser
Kinu,
then by search planes from
Suzuya
and
Kumano
.

1710hrs:
I-65
signals that it has lost contact. Force Z steams on, unaware it has been spotted.

1835hrs:
Force Z maintains radio silence, despite knowing it has been spotted
. Tenedos,
short of fuel, is detached and ordered to signal Singapore next day at 0800hrs that Phillips is breaking off the attack against Singora. At this point, Phillips knows that he has been spotted. There is no longer any reason to maintain radio silence, yet still he makes no signal of his intentions to Singapore.

1900hrs:
Force Z swings west and increases speed to 26kt, giving the impression it is heading to Singora.

c.2000hrs:
Japanese bombers mistake a force of Japanese cruisers and destroyers searching for Force Z for Force Z itself, and preparatory to attacking drop a flare over the cruiser
Chokai.
An attack is just averted. Force Z sees the flare, and immediately turns away.

2015hrs:
Under cover of darkness Force Z turns south for the run to Singapore.

2238hrs:
The moon rises, and the rain stops.

2302hrs:
Palliser signals saying that enemy bombers are undisturbed and could attack Force Z five hours after sighting it. He also says the northern Malayan airfields are becoming untenable and hints that Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham may concentrate all air efforts on Singapore.

2335hrs:
Palliser signals ‘Enemy reported landing at Kuantan’. Kuantan is of vital strategic significance and is in effect on Force Z’s way home to Singapore.

2352hrs:
The Japanese submarine
I-58
sights Force Z. A faulty tube hatch delays the attack but eventually five torpedoes are launched at
Repulse
. All miss.

10 December

0052hrs:
Force Z changes course south-west for Kuantan. No signal is sent to Singapore.

It is generally recognized that Phillips had little alternative other than to divert his passage home via Kuantan. Its capture would allow the Japanese to cut British communications in half and it was of supreme strategic importance. It was also further away from Japanese-held airfields. What is hotly disputed is the suggestion that Admiral Palliser in Singapore should have second-guessed Phillips’s response to his signal about Kuantan and arranged for air cover. The official historian writes: ‘One cannot but feel that Admiral Phillips’s belief that air cover would meet him off Kuantan, when he had given Singapore no hint that he was proceeding there, demanded too high a degree of insight from the officers at the base.’
¹⁷

0211hrs:
The Japanese receive
I-58’
s sighting report and order the 22nd Air Flotilla to attack the ships later in the day, giving up on the idea of a surface attack.

0455hrs:
Eleven search planes from 22nd Flotilla are dispatched.

0625, 0644, 0650, 0800hrs:
Eighty-five Japanese bombers fly off from their land bases.

0630hrs:
A solitary plane is sighted. It has been assumed to be Japanese, but there is no reason and no evidence to think it was.

0720hrs:
Prince of Wales
launches its Walrus aircraft to reconnoitre Kuantan. It is directed to land at Singapore, as is
Repulse
’s aircraft, launched later for anti-submarine reconnaissance.

0845hrs:
The destroyer
Express
is sent ahead, and reports ‘complete peace’. Some versions have it saying it is ‘as quiet as a wet Sunday afternoon.’

Force Z dawdles whilst some barges and small craft are investigated. This action has received severe criticism, it being argued that it showed a complete lack of urgency and a failure to realize the seriousness of the situation Force Z found itself in.

0952hrs:
Palliser signals reporting fifteen Japanese transports and an aircraft carrier off Singora ‘… further reinforcing the obvious, that no one in Singapore had expected Force Z to arrive off Kuantan that morning.’
¹⁸

0952hrs:
Tenedos
is sighted and attacked by a Japanese reconnaissance plane searching for Force Z. It launches two bombs, both of which miss.

0955hrs:
Tenedos
reports the attack.

1015hrs:
A Japanese Nell search plane piloted by Ensign Hoashi Masane, sights Force Z and sends a report.
Repulse
detects the plane on radar. The Japanese bomber and torpedo squadrons are low on fuel and about to reach their point of no return.

1020hrs:
Force Z makes its first visual sighting of the enemy.

1030hrs:
Tenedos
skillfully avoids nine bombs, and sends off signals at 1005, 1020 and 1030hrs. It is unclear whether or not these were received in Singapore. The 0800hr signal, relaying Phillips’s calling off of the Singora action, was received in Singapore, ‘… but there it was only inferred that the Admiral’s plans had changed and that he could not have gone as far north as Singora.’
¹⁹

1030hrs:
Signal received from
Tenedos.
Phillips orders first-degree readiness for air attack, an increase of speed to twenty-five knots and a change of course for Singapore.

It is at this point that there is the most unity among commentators in condemning Phillips. It is frequently pointed out that had he sent a report to Singapore when he knew he had been spotted the squadron of Brewster Buffaloes reserved for covering Force Z could have been at the scene of the attack by the time the first torpedoes were launched:

‘In Singapore, Admiral Palliser had still heard nothing from Admiral Phillips. At some point, perhaps after receiving the signals from the
Tenedos,
Palliser sent Phillips a signal informing him that he had two aircraft and asking for instructions on where to send them. Admiral Palliser received no reply and sent the aircraft off based on what he thought Phillips would do; unfortunately, his guess was not correct, and the aircraft went to the wrong location.’
²⁰

1115hrs:
The Japanese aircraft have been sent out with over an hour and a half between the first and the last squadrons taking to the air, and have been in the air for several hours. The divided force attack as and when it spots the enemy. The first attack is by bombers on
Repulse
. One bomb hits. It detonates against deck armour she had gained in one of her many refits (the bomb, at 550lb, is a relatively light one, as all the available heavy armour-piercing bombs have been allocated to the Pearl Harbor attack), but appalling injuries are caused to some of the crew by burst steam pipes. In the cruel language unlikely to be appreciated by someone skinned alive by superheated steam, her fighting efficiency is not impaired.

Tom Phillips has been heavily criticized for his initial order for the two ships to manoeuvre together by flag signal, which totally confused both ships’ fire control systems and masked their anti-aircraft fire. ‘Admiral Phillips had made a fiasco out of his first handling of ships in action …’
²¹
. He soon realized his mistake, and allowed the ships to operate independently.

1132hrs:
Force Z is sighted by sixteen Nells of the Genzen Air Group with the first attack and by nine Nells of Lieutenant Ishihara’s squadron, made on
Prince of Wales
. The
Express
signals, ‘Planes approaching have torpedoes’. An officer on bridge of
Prince of Wales
says: ‘I think they’re going to do a torpedo attack.’ Admiral Phillips is reported to hear the remark, turn round and say: ‘No, they’re not. There are no torpedo aircraft about’. Critics have jumped on these words with glee, seeing in them famous last words which sum up the truth about Tom Phillips.

1144hrs:
One Nell is discomfited by
Prince of Wales
making a sharp turn to port and switches its attack to
Repulse
, but eight torpedoes are launched at
Prince of Wales.
Survivors do not realize that the ship is hit at the stern by two torpedoes, as one hit produces a plume of water but the other is masked by the overhang of the stern. The effect on
Prince of Wales
is catastrophic. The bracket securing the port outboard propeller shaft to the hull shears and the unsecured shaft is allowed to continue revolving too long, tearing a gash in the hull along the length of the shaft. The ship takes on an immediate list of 11.5° to port. With only the two starboard shafts operating, speed drops from 25kt to 16kt. Flooding and shock damage disable much of the ship’s electrics and render four of its eight 5.25 anti-aircraft turrets inoperable. The ship also loses her steering. The torpedo hits render
Prince of Wales
useless as a fighting vessel, but do not sink her. Even at this stage, when his ship could have been kept afloat, Phillips does not signal to Singapore for air support.

1145–1152hrs:
Repulse
manages to avoid seven torpedoes and six bombs, acting now as the focus of the Japanese attacks.

1158hrs:
Repulse
signals ‘OEAB’ (enemy aircraft bombing). In the brief lull that follows the last attacks on
Repulse
, Captain Tennant decides he should manoeuvre closer to
Prince of Wales
to see if he could offer assistance. He is horrified to be told that
Prince of Wales
has made no signal to Singapore, and immediately makes his own. Received in Singapore at 1204hrs, it results in the scrambling of eleven Buffalo fighters of 453 Squadron, at 1225hrs, under the command of Flight-Lieutenant Tim Vigors.

1210hrs:
Prince of Wales
hoists two black balls, the international signal for a ship not under control.

1218hrs:
Twenty-six Bettys of the Kanoya Group, low on fuel, spot a seaplane (probably
Repulse’
s Walrus), and then spot Force Z.

1220hrs:
Prince of Wales
signals she has been hit, and asks Singapore to send destroyers. This signal has been seen by many commentators as showing Phillips’s contempt for air cover: ‘… it is incredible that the Admiral should ask for destroyers rather than fighter aircraft.’
²²

1223hrs:
A new Japanese attack has three planes break off from attaching
Prince of Wales
and turn on
Repulse
when she has already taken evasive action to comb the tracks of eight torpedoes launched at her from relatively long range.
Repulse
is hit by one torpedo on her torpedo bulge, and shrugs off the hit, continuing to steam at twenty-five knots.
Prince of Wales
is hit by four torpedoes evenly spaced along her hull. The last one on her stern is probably decisive, as it negates all damage control in that area.

c1223hrs:
Repulse
’s luck finally runs out. Caught in a pincer movement, she takes three torpedo hits on her starboard side, one to port. Her rudder is jammed, and she takes on a list of 30° to port.

1225hrs:
Eleven Buffalo fighters are scrambled.

1233hrs:
Repulse
sinks.

1243hrs:
The final attack takes place on
Prince of Wales.
A 1,100lb bomb hits the cinema flat, causing horrific injuries to the wounded gathered there in large numbers. The explosion also damages uptakes and downtakes to her last operating boiler room. The ship stops.

1252hrs:
Prince of Wales
signals an emergency, and asks Singapore to send tugs.

1305hrs:
Express
comes alongside
Prince of Wales
to take off survivors.

1318hrs:
Prince of Wales
rolls over and sinks. Two Buffaloes arrive, possibly sent by Admiral Palliser, followed by 453 Squadron. The death toll is twenty officers and 307 ratings from
Prince of Wales
and twenty-four officers and 486 ratings from
Repulse.
Neither Admiral Phillips nor Captain Leach of
Prince of Wales
survives, though the most recent commentator believes ‘Admiral Phillips had not tried to ‘go down with the ship’.’
²³
One account has the last words Phillips was heard to utter as, ‘I cannot survive this.’
²⁴

Though Phillips has had his defenders, including Dudley Pound, Phillips’s son and a number of those who sailed with him on his last voyage, history has not been kind to Admiral Sir Tom Phillips. Many commentators have focused on his failure to comprehend the reality of air power:

‘But, throughout the operation, Phillips continued to show a disregard, almost a contempt, for the dangers of any type of air attack. It is possible (and no more than possible, for there is no hard evidence) that Phillips had quarrelled with Brooke-Popham over the potential danger from the air. It is probable that he had made difficulties over co-operating with the RAF on 453 Squadron’s provision of standing patrols.’
²⁵