Scapegoat: The Death of Prince of Wales and Repulse (8 page)

‘On the night before
Prince of Wales
was sunk, Phillips told me categorically, however, that he was quite convinced that in the event, fighter cover would be provided, and that his Chief of Staff, whom he had left behind on shore at Singapore, would arrange this… It seemed incredible to him that his Chief of Staff would not appreciate that he had gone to Kuantan in answer to the signal reporting the landings.’
⁷

However, of equal interest are the signals
Tenedos
sent out saying she was under attack from Japanese aircraft. These do not appear to have been received in Singapore.

One conclusion, and the one most widely adopted by historians, is that the signals were indeed not received. Technologically such a thing is possible, even though they were picked up by
Prince of Wales,
and as far away as the Indian Ocean. If the signals had been received, air cover would surely have been sent over Kuantan. Phillips had no reason to think that the
Tenedos
signal had not been received in Singapore, and in the belief that it had, saw no need to break radio silence and give away his exact position, on the basis that Singapore had all the information it needed. A further factor which historians have tended to ignore is that if, as he had been told, a major landing was taking place at Kuantan, it would be reasonable to suppose that every available aircraft in Singapore would have been scrambled to be there.

Given the chaos that was Singapore’s command structure, it has to be a possibility that the
Tenedos
signal was in fact received but either not communicated upwards or not acted on when it was. The latter appears to have been the case with the intercept revealing Force Z had been sighted. Yet the finger of suspicion has to point at Admiral Palliser. He had been left behind in Singapore to act as Tom Phillips’s eyes and ears and to act as the liaison officer for Force Z. Even on the undeniable evidence, history has let him off lightly. He sent a signal to Phillips stating categorically that air cover would not be available, and repeating the word ‘not’ so that there could be no misunderstanding, yet failed to either cancel this earlier message or tell Phillips that air cover was in fact available. He sent a further signal which clearly implied that such fighters as there were, were being held back for the defence of Singapore. From a host of reports of Japanese activity he chose to send a signal stating clearly that the Japanese were landing at Kuantan which happened to be a completely false report. It is sometimes said that Palliser might have been unaware of the fact that the report was false. It might equally be said that there is no record of him trying to find out either way. He apparently failed to realize that his signal would leave Phillips with no option but to head for Kuantan, and failed to organize air cover for that eventuality.

If one believes Air Vice-Marshal Pulford, no one told him and the RAF where Force Z was; unfortunately, Pulford was ordered to leave Singapore shortly before it fell in a launch that was sunk by Japanese forces. Pulford died of starvation on the island on which he was stranded. Historians have universally assumed that Tom Phillips was to blame for the fact that Pulford claimed not to know the whereabouts of Force Z. It may well be that the brunt of the blame lay with Pulford’s own pilots.

As we have seen above, one of the staunchest defenders of Phillips, Commander Michael Goodenough, blamed Palliser for the disaster and carried a campaign for blame thus to be apportioned to the writer of the official naval history of the war: ‘I am sure that Phillips’s attitude was that he believed his Chief of Staff would arrange the provision of a fighter defence. It seemed incredible to him that his Chief of Staff would not appreciate that he had gone to Kuantan in answer to the signal reporting the landing.’
⁸

Goodenough also referred to the ‘muddle’ in Singapore, a clear swipe at Palliser.

It seems incredible to me too. Palliser died in 1956 and seems to have been almost totally silent on the loss of the two ships from which his career certainly did not suffer. In 1944, Palliser was made Fourth Sea Lord and Chief of Supplies and Transport. He was made a Knight Commander of the Bath in 1945, and a full Admiral in 1947, retiring in 1948. He did write a letter of condolence to Lady Phillips, but among so many outpourings of emotion it seems cold, formal and clipped. Any criticism of Palliser has tended to be over his failure to second-guess Phillips and the decision to divert Force Z to Kuantan. This is unfortunate, as it puts a smoke screen over an area of equal culpability, which is why Palliser appeared to keep the voyage of Force Z as secret from the RAF as from the Japanese. Why did Palliser not ensure that FECB knew about Force Z? Why did he not plug in to them as a vital source of intelligence? Why did he not countermand his earlier signal saying fighter protection was not available? If he was at all troubled by the whereabouts of Force Z, why did he not send it a signal stating where he thought it was, leaving it to Phillips to break radio silence and reply if he deemed it necessary? In summary, Phillips’s Chief of Staff in Singapore signalled information to Force Z that was either misleading or plain wrong and failed to liaise either with the RAF or intelligence and intercept forces in Singapore. One is left wondering what he did actually do on the day Force Z died.

There is also the mystery, reported on in only one book, of the two Buffaloes apparently sent out by Palliser:

‘At some point, perhaps after receiving the signals from the
Tenedos
, Palliser sent Phillips a signal informing him that he had two aircraft and asking for instructions on where to send them. Admiral Palliser received no reply, and sent the aircraft off based on what he thought Phillips would do; unfortunately, his guess was not correct, and the aircraft went to the wrong location.’
⁹

At the time of writing I am trying to track down this signal. Assuming it exists, it is clear that it carries no time, and it begs the question of where on earth Palliser felt Force Z was going if not to intercept the invasion he had told them about. I can find no comment from any survivor suggesting receipt of a signal from Palliser, which would surely have been a major talking point on the bridge and been received by
Repulse
as well. Perhaps the mysterious signal was not received by either ship or simply not reported in the frantic activity of the moment. As is discussed below, there were clear problems with
Prince of Wales’
s signalling capacity once the engagement started: ‘Meanwhile (1240)
Prince of Wales’
s radio had apparently gained power – or, more probably, Phillips was flashing messages to his destroyers to be relayed on.’
¹⁰

The same author points out that the first signal from
Prince of Wales
‘had clearly been composed earlier and was delayed in transmission, either because of the necessity of passing it on to a destroyer, or because of atmospheric conditions.’
¹¹

Historians have assumed too easily that
Prince of Wales
was able to send signals with immediate effect.

What is interesting on two counts, is that the RAF
did
send aircraft to Kuantan early in the morning of the day of the sinkings – three Hudsons and six Vildebeest bombers, as well as two Buffaloes. They saw nothing and were not seen by Force Z. Firstly, it argues for very badly trained aircrew if aircraft are sent out to attack an invasion force and cannot even spot a battleship, a battle-cruiser and three destroyers at the very place they are sent to. Secondly, it proves Phillips was right in thinking an invasion report for Kuantan would provoke air cover. He was undeniably correct because it did just that. The RAF did not cover itself in glory that day. Their aircraft abandoned Kuantan aerodrome which was followed by a near-mutiny from ground staff. Their errors, and the errors of those who took reports in Singapore, were compounded by a Blenheim bomber that took off from Kuantan that morning and reported that it had seen a battleship or aircraft carrier at 0649. As the result of radio failure, its report was not actually made until 1013. No one seems to have thought this might be Force Z. This may have been the solitary aircraft seen from
Repulse
at around 0630. The RAF had two opportunities to identify that Force Z was at Kuantan, and failed on both occasions.

The conclusion is inescapable. Regardless of any mistakes that may have been made by Phillips, British forces had several opportunities to identify the presence of Force Z at a danger point, from intercepted signals to sightings made or not made from their own aircraft, which identification must have provoked a combat air patrol. The link was not made and the patrol was not sent. Tom Phillips should not have needed to call for air cover; it should already have been sent.

All this relates to the three strongest charges against Phillips, all of which concern the failure to send signals. The first charge is that he failed to call for fighter cover, the second that he failed to tell Singapore he was diverting to Kuantan, and the third that he failed to notify Singapore when Force Z was attacked.

The first charge is the easiest both to dismiss and to explain. The saga of the perceived failure to call for fighter cover is in itself an interesting insight in to how history works, or sometimes fails to work. We now know that a handful of Brewster Buffalo fighters were available to Force Z when it was attacked. Armed with that knowledge, it is clear Phillips should have called for fighter cover.
Yet Phillips had no reason to believe that cover was available, and every reason to believe it was not.
Hindsight has meant that historians have lost sight of the view from the bridge of
Prince of Wales.
He knew RAF bases were falling like ninepins. He had been told categorically that fighters were not available and that information had not been rescinded in several subsequent signals. It had been suggested to him by signal from Palliser that if any air cover did become available it would be held back for the defence of Singapore. It is difficult to think of anything that might have led Phillips to believe the cover he had pleaded for was in fact available. Only an idiot asks for something they know is not there, and whatever else Tom Phillips might have been, he was not an idiot.

There is one key fact that no commentator has noted that validates Phillips’s decision not to send out a call for fighters. Captain Tennant of
Repulse
has been widely praised for his actions during the engagement, and for realizing that no signal had gone out from
Prince of Wales
telling Singapore Force Z was under attack. Yet when Tennant did signal, at 1158, he made no request for fighter cover, but for destroyers and, later, tugs. It was not just Phillips who believed no such cover was available. Nor was it even just Phillips and Tennant. Phillips was surrounded by experienced officers on the bridge of
Prince of Wales.
Never once since the sinking has there been any evidence that any of those officers believed air cover was available.

The second and third charges are basically that Phillips kept radio silence when he should have reported he was changing course to Kuantan and when Japanese aircraft first engaged him. The two issues need to be treated separately.

Commander Goodenough was not the only person who believed Phillips was entirely justified in assuming Palliser would know that the only possible course of action for Force Z was to divert to Kuantan on receipt of the signal that landings were taking place there. Had they intercepted a landing,
Prince of Wales
and
Repulse
could have wreaked carnage among the invasion barges and might quite literally have altered the course of the war. However, such an operation was only possible if Force Z could surprise the Japanese, surprise that could all too easily be lost if Force Z signalled its intention to proceed to Kuantan. Palliser cannot seriously have assumed that Phillips would telegraph his intentions to all and sundry, thereby giving up surprise, the one thing he had on his side.

One of the most compelling writers on the sinking of Force Z, Arthur Nicholson, argues in his book
Hostages to Fortune
that the absolute imperative in Admiralty standing orders against breaking radio silence might have strongly influenced Phillips: ‘W/T silence should not be broken to report a single enemy aircraft unless the Commanding Officer considers its presence is a first indication that there are enemy surface forces in the area, of which the Admiral is not already aware.’
¹²

These instructions would certainly have influenced Phillips, though not necessarily as a result of a slavish obedience to orders. He knew of the bitter rivalries at the Admiralty, and that commanders who were perceived to fail were subject to witch-hunts. Captain Leach of
Prince of Wales
was nearly brought to a court martial for breaking off the action against
Bismarck
until other senior officers rallied round. Phillips would have known of the move by Churchill to court-martial Admiral James Somerville for lack of offensive spirit at the Battle of Spartivento in November 1940, when Somerville had actually handled the action well. As well as being aware of the vultures at the Admiralty, Phillips was also well aware of the major part played in the sinking of the
Bismarck
by an ill-advised signal to his base sent by the German Admiral which revealed
Bismarck’
s position. However, while both these may have been contributory factors, they are unlikely to have been decisive. More likely is the simple fact that as far as Phillips was concerned there was nothing Singapore could do for him. He did not believe, and had no reason to believe, that it could offer fighter cover. Such vessels as he had left behind might have been useful as an anti-submarine screen on the approach to Singapore, where the Japanese might have been expected to concentrate their forces, but were little more than a liability in an action that Phillips quite reasonably believed would centre on bombing. Calling for reinforcements from Singapore would be little more than asking lambs to join the slaughter. What reason did Phillips have for signalling Singapore? Is it an accident that Tennant’s signal at 1158 giving his position and the message ‘Enemy aircraft bombing’ was to ‘Any British Man-of-War’, not to Singapore?