Silenced: How Apostasy and Blasphemy Codes Are Choking Freedom Worldwide (10 page)

Iran’s population is around seventy million. Comprising 89 percent Shia Muslims, 9 percent Sunni Muslims, 0.5 percent Baha’is, and 0.5 percent Christians, as well as small and diminishing numbers of Jews, Zoroastrians, and Mandaeans, the Iranian state is intertwined with Shia religion. That relationship was intensified when, in 1979, the Pahlavi monarchy was toppled and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini led a revolution producing a regime controlled by Shia Islamic jurists.
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According to Khomeini’s revolutionary doctrine, state institutions that embody the establishment of Shia Islam include: (1) the
Vali Faqih
, or Supreme Leader (initially Khomeini, who declared himself to be the representative of Imam Mehdi, the “hidden Twelfth Imam” of traditional Shia belief); (2) the
Majles-e Khobregan
, Council of Experts, comprising eighty-three clerics who choose the successor to the Vali Faqih if he dies in office; (3) the
Shura-ye Negahban
, Council of Guardians, made up of six clerical jurists chosen by the Supreme Leader and six other Muslim jurists, which ensures that legislation is compatible with Islamic precepts and
must approve all presidential and parliamentary candidates; and (4) the
Shura-ye Tashkhis-e Maslahat-e Nezam
, Committee to Determine the Expediency of the Islamic Order, or the Expediency Council, comprising senior state leaders, which arbitrates legal and theological disputes in the legislative process.

Iran combines republican and theocratic elements, but the latter far outweigh the former. The Guardian Council “screens” candidates who seek to run for Parliament, the Presidency, or the Council of Experts. By disqualifying all the candidates it deems insufficiently Islamic, which are most of them, the Guardian Council undercuts democratic choice. In addition, the elected bodies have limited power, and their decisions can be vetoed by the unelected ones. Ali Afshari aptly calls this a “vicious cycle”: the Supreme Leader appoints all six clerical voting members of the Guardian Council (the six nonclerical members are advisors who cannot vote); the Guardian Council assesses the qualifications of all Assembly of Experts’ candidates; and, to close the loop, the Assembly of Experts approves the Supreme Leader and is the only body that can impeach him.
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Khomeini announced that government rule stemmed from the “absolute dominion of the Prophet of God” and stood above “all ordinances that were derived or directly commanded by Allah.”
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Iran’s June 2009 elections seemed to bring the Islamic state’s authority into question. A popular uprising filled the streets of Tehran and other Iranian cities with tens of thousands of dissenters—in a movement popularly called the “Green Revolution”—who protested the purported landslide reelection of President Ahmadinejad over Mir Hussein Mousavi, election results that were eventually confirmed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Since then, despite brutal crackdowns within the country, outspoken dissatisfaction with the regime’s hard-line rulers has continued. There are signs of divisions within the regime, but, at the time of this writing, it is not clear what effect the upheaval will have on Ayatollah Khomeini’s 1979 Islamic Revolution.

Questioning the theological doctrines that undergird the regime may be understood as blasphemy and apostasy. Iranian legislation does distinguish the terms; however, in practice, the authorities often use them interchangeably, and sometimes in an apparently ad hoc fashion, to punish those who challenge the regime or to repress those, such as Baha’is, whose very existence is held to be a violation.

The Iranian penal code defines blasphemy as a serious crime, and Article 513 states, “Anyone who insults the Islamic sanctities or any of the
imams
or her Excellency
Sadigheh Tahereh
[a respectful adjective to describe Prophet Muhammad’s daughter Fatima] should be executed if his insult equals to speaking disparagingly of Prophet Muhammad. Otherwise, he should be imprisoned from one to five years.”
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In all of the Penal Code’s 729 articles, none specifically define, regulate, or criminalize apostasy. The word itself is mentioned only in Article 95 on adultery and Article 180 on the consumption of alcohol, and then indirectly: “[I]f a person is to be punished according to
Haad
[for adultery or intoxication] the punishment will not be revoked even if he is insane or apostate.”

However, there is mention of apostasy in other legal provisions, which function as de facto apostasy laws. Article 167 of the constitution, Article 214 of the Criminal Procedure Act, Article 8 of the Modified Act on Establishment of General and Revolutionary Courts, and Article 42 of the Regulations Governing Special Court for the Clergy are used to convict and punish apostasy. In addition, Article 26 of the Press Law states, “[W]hoever insults Islam and its sanctities through the press and his/her guilt amounts to apostasy, shall be sentenced as an apostate and should his/her offense fall short of apostasy he/she shall be subject to the Islamic penal code.” Article 29 of the Councils Law states, “[T]hose who are convicted of apostasy by competent courts are deprived of being candidates in elections.”
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In practice, the principal article used to punish apostasy is Article 167 of the constitution, which states that if there is no codified law, the judge “has to deliver his judgment on the basis of authoritative Islamic sources and authentic
fatwa
.”
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It is important to understand that the “judges” and “courts” in such cases have sweeping powers. Many Iranians charged with undermining national security, apostasy, blasphemy, or other “crimes” described in this chapter were tried by Islamic revolutionary courts.

These courts, created immediately after the 1979 revolution, are notorious for lack of due process, use of torture either as punishment or to obtain confessions, and other gross violations of human rights. There are no juries, and the judges, who are religious figures, also function as prosecutors and sometimes as investigators. Defendants have no legal representation, “trials” may last only a few minutes, and verdicts cannot be overturned or appealed. The judges are believed to know the “right path” (
serate mostaqim
) and have accepted every means—including beating, lashing, solitary confinement, amputation, rape, sexual abuse, burning, starvation, and strangulation—to force defendants to follow it. The enforcement mechanism of these “divine” laws is the Ministry of Intelligence and National Security, also known as SAWAMA, the Revolutionary Guards, the
Basiji
paramilitary groups, and the pseudo-official Partisans of the Party of God (
Ansar-e Hezbollah
). This apparatus works under the command of the Supreme Leader.
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In this system, even if there is no codified offense, a judge can punish apostasy if there is a relevant
fatwa
. One source of such fatwas is Ayatollah Khomeini himself, an “authoritative Islamic source” whose writings are frequently used by Iranian judges to justify executions. Khomeini’s
Tahrir-al-Vasileh
is probably the main source used to address apostasy, and in it he says, “A national apostate will be caused to repent and in case of refusing to repent will be executed. And it is preferable to give a three-day reprieve and to execute him on the fourth day if he refused.”
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This use of noncodified law has two consequences. First, when engaged
in dialogue with the international community, the government can always claim that there is no such crime as apostasy and that no one in Iran has been ever prosecuted for this crime.
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Second, judges have very large discretion in whether to describe something as apostasy and how it will be punished.

In only a few cases has the regime executed anyone on an explicit charge of apostasy. In most instances, the regime uses a selective interpretation of possible surrogates of apostasy and blasphemy to prosecute those who might challenge its “divine” authority. Dissidents may be charged with
inter alia
, “friendship with the enemies of God,” “hostility towards friends of God,” “corruption on earth,” “fighting against God,” “obstructing the way of God and the way towards happiness for all the disinherited people in the world,” “spreading lies,” “insulting the Prophet,” “acting against the national security,” “distributing propaganda against the government of Islamic Republic of Iran,” “attracting individuals to the misguided sect of Baha’ism,” “insulting Islam,” “calling into question the Islamic foundations of the Republic,” or even “creating anxiety in the minds of the public and those of Iranian officials.” It often appears that, when there is nothing else handy with which to charge a person, the Islamic government brings charges of apostasy, which has the added convenience of carrying the death penalty.

There are also indications that the legal situation may worsen. In February 2008, a draft of a new proposed Islamic penal code was presented for discussion in the Iranian parliament (
Majlis
) that, for the first time, would make the death penalty for apostasy and heresy a legal stipulation in the criminal code.
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Because the proposed law uses the word
Hadd
, it would make the death penalty for apostasy mandatory and bar any reduction or annulment of this sentence. This law would be a special danger to liberal thinkers, to those who leave Islam, and to Baha’is. Any adherent of a non-Muslim religion with one parent who was Muslim when he or she was conceived would also be declared apostate under the proposed law.

Following is a translation, made by the Baha’i community, of relevant sections of the proposed law:
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Section Five: Apostasy, Heresy, and Witchcraft

Article 225–1: Any Muslim who clearly announces that he/she has left Islam and declares blasphemy is an apostate.

Article 225–2: Serious and earnest intention is the condition for certainty in apostasy. Therefore, if the accused claims that his/her statement had been made with reluctance or ignorance, or in error, or while drunk, or through a slip of the tongue or without understanding the meaning of the words, or repeating words of others; or his/her real intentions had been something else, he/she is not considered an apostate….

Article 225–3: There are two kinds of apostates: innate (
Fetri
) and parental (
Melli
).
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Article 225–4: Innate Apostate is someone whose parent (at least one) was a Muslim at the time of conception, and who declares him/herself a Muslim after the age of maturity, and leaves Islam afterwards.

Article 225–5: Parental Apostate is one whose parents (both) had been non-Muslims at the time of conception, and who has become a Muslim after the age of maturity, and later leaves Islam and returns to blasphemy.

Article 225–6: If someone has at least one Muslim parent at the time of conception but after the age of maturity, without pretending to be a Muslim, chooses blasphemy is considered a Parental Apostate.

Article 225–7: Punishment
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for an Innate Apostate is death.

Article 225–8: Punishment for a Parental Apostate is death, but after the final sentencing for three days he/she would be guided to the right path and encouraged to recant his/her belief and if he/she refused, the death penalty would be carried out.

Article 225–9: In the case of a Parental Apostate, whenever there appears to be a possibility of recanting, sufficient time would be provided.

Article 225–10: Punishment for women, whether Innate or Parental, is life imprisonment and during the sentence, under the guidance of the court, hardship will be exercised on her, and she will be guided to the right path and encouraged to recant, and if she recants she will be freed immediately.

Article 225–11: Whoever claims to be a Prophet is sentenced to death, and any Muslim who invents a heresy in the religion and creates a sect based on that which is contrary to the obligations and necessities of Islam, is considered an apostate. [This article seems to be particularly directed at Baha’is.]

Article 225–12: Any Muslim who deals with witchcraft and promotes it as a profession or sect in the community is sentenced to death.

Article 225–13: Assistance to the crimes in this chapter, in case there is no other punishment assigned to it by law, is punishable by up to 74 lashes in proportion with the crime and the criminal.

Article 112’s extension of the punishment for “threatening Iranian national security” to those outside of Iran’s border is especially dangerous in a government whose former “Supreme Leader” passed a death sentence on Salman Rushdie, has dispatched agents overseas to murder its opponents, and whose members have
called for the death of Scandinavian editors and cartoonists, among others.
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On September 9, 2008, the Iranian parliament passed the bill by 196 votes for, seven against, and two abstentions. It then went to committee for review.
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In February 2010, Amnesty International reported that the provisions on apostasy had been removed from the bill in committee but that they could be reintroduced.
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The Baha’i religion began in Iran in the nineteenth century and originated from another religious movement, the Babis. The Babi movement began in 1844 with the Bab, Seyyed Ali Muhammad, a merchant from Shiraz, and gained many followers. However, it soon encountered hostility, especially from the Shia clergy. Officials ordered the imprisonment, torture, and death of thousands of adherents. After being imprisoned for a time, the Bab was executed in 1850. In 1863, Baha’u’llah, Hossein Ali Nouri, one of the followers of the Bab, announced that he was “Him Whom God Shall Make Manifest.” He was immediately imprisoned and subsequently banished to Iraq, Turkey, and Israel, which were all part of the Ottoman Empire. He passed away in 1892 in exile in what is now Israel.
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