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Authors: Harvey Klehr;John Earl Haynes;Alexander Vassiliev

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Victor telegrammed Varvara in October 1942 that he had again requested the embassy to do everything possible to assist her and Armasha.
In response, Gaik Ovakimyan asked the Visa and Registration Office to
defer a decision and send Varvara's file to his office. After reading that
Victor had once promised to work for the KGB but had not done so,
Ovakimyan asked Vasily Zarubin in New York to "`Locate `Screw' [Victor
Hammer], find out his capabilities for our work and the advisability of
reestablishing contact."' That generated an April 1943 report that set out
details about the businesses and backgrounds of the Hammers, which in
turn revived the rumors of the Hammers' links to Trotskyism. An August
1943 Moscow Center directive to the KGB New York station read: "`According to our information, "Screw" [Victor Hammer] or his father financed and raised money for the publication of "The Old Man's" [Trotsky's] book `The History of the Revolution,' which was prepared by the
well-known "polecat" [Trotskyite] Eastman. Certainly the "polecats"
know the father and "Screw" himself, both of whom took part in this publication. It is therefore advisable to re-establish contact with "Screw" on
the condition that he has no direct connection to the "polecats," for infiltration of a WP [Workers Party] group."'00

Ovakimyan also ordered a report with "`all the compromising information you have regarding Vaivara Dmitrievna Hammer."' A memorandum written in December 1942 described her "`as a modest woman,
leads a normal lifestyle, literate, politically well versed, takes an active
part in communal work of the building,"' but "`unsociable with neighbors."' Still another report disclosed that the divorce from Victor had
been precipitated by "`the frivolous lifestyle of Vaivara Hammer, who
had intimate liaisons with performers from the circle surrounding the
Hammer family"' and hostility toward her from Julius. Despite their
breakup Victor had continued to send her "`money and packages,"' and
she, "`to all intents and purposes, is being supported by him."' In March 1940 Varvara "`was recruited by Department i of the 3rd Directorate of
the NKVD USSR to cultivate, " Julius's Russian contacts, likely suspected
of Trotskyism. (One memo claimed, "'There is reason to believe that the
Amer. Trotskyites, on Trotsky's instructions, are in contact with the Trotskyite underground in the USSR through Hammer."') While she had initially agreed, she later "`refused to cooperate further with NKVD organs"' and was not actively used .61

The most serious information uncovered, however, dealt with Victor's
son Armasha. He became enmeshed in a shocking crime in the summer
of 1943 involving families of the Moscow elite. A classmate and friend,
Vladimir Shakhurin, son of the aviation industry minister, was in love with
Nina Umanskaya, daughter of Konstantin Umansky, just appointed ambassador to Mexico. Distressed that she was about to leave the country
with her father, he shot and killed her on the stairs of the Bolshoy Ka-
menny Bridge, then turned the gun on himself, dying the next day. In
the fallout, a number of Shakhurin's student friends were arrested, including two sons of Stalin's confidant Anastas Mikoyan and Armasha. He
was jailed for one and a half years. He returned to Moscow and his
schooling in January 1945, undoubtedly chastened, since he "`now behaves very modestly, spends all his free time in his apartment, preparing
his lessons for the next day, and reading literature."'"'

Armasha's arrest put an end to Victor's 1943 effort to get him out of
Russia, and the KGB put aside the notion of reactivating him. But in 1945
his son was out of prison, and Moscow asked the New York station to do
a background check on Victor Hammer and to "clarify his capabilities for
our work." But there is no indication it made any effort to activate him.
The New York station had to contend with defections and the collapse of
its networks. As it shut down agents, it had little incentive to try to recruit
someone whose familial ties to the Soviet Union would surely excite suspicion and who, in any case, as an art dealer-Victor was running the
Hammer Galleries-was unlikely to be of significant intelligence value.63

After World War II Victor was able to reestablish contact with Armasha and regularly send money and clothing to him and his mother. Because of his background, Armasha clearly enjoyed certain privileges. In
1947 an informant reported that Varvara, angered when Armasha received a Soviet draft notice, demanded that he visit U.S. ambassador Bedell Smith "`and tell him everything so that he sends you to your father
in the U.S. or keeps you out of the army. I'm sick and tired of taking abuse
from this damn country."' Nor was that the only sign the KGB detected
that the Russian Hammers harbored anti-Soviet ideas. One informant re ported that at a Moscow restaurant in 1946 Armasha had complained:
"`Here in the Sov. Union I live only with my mind, but my soul is absent,
since it's impossible to live in this country with one's soul. There is nothing but oppression and enslavement here. Every serf in Russia's past was
happier than today's engineer, professor, or prize winner. Our entire people are enslaved and pinned to the wall."'64

By mid-195o the KGB once again began to take an interest in the
Hammers. In August Moscow Center ordered monitoring of all correspondence among Victor, Varvara, and Armasha and a full record check
of previous investigations and contacts with the three. The mail check
showed many pleas for money from Varvara and Armasha; one KGB
memo in October noted that Hammer was "`very attached to his son Armand, every month sends him ioo-zoo dollars and packages and also is
taking measures to arrange for him to move to the U.S."' At the end of
December a diplomatic co-optee with the cover name "Levin" reported
that he had met Hammer at a reception at the Indian Embassy in New
York. Slightly drunk, Victor, speaking in Russian, expressed his desire to
bring his son to America but complained that he had been continually
rebuffed. He brandished a picture of a grown-up Armasha and eagerly accepted "Levin's" offer to look him up when he returned to the USSR.
When "Levin" stopped by Hammer Galleries, Victor asked him to tell
Armasha "about his papa." A Moscow Center report concluded: "`Considering "Sonny's" [Victor Hammer's] extensive capabilities for working
on our line, his past connection with our organs, and his desire to secure
his son's emigration from the Sov. Union, we deem it advisable to re-establish contact with him through our station in New York.' -65

Armasha, who still lived with his mother while attending the Institute
of Foreign Languages, was described around this time as "a mature, energetic person, courteous to his elders." Once anxious to move to the
United States, he had changed his mind, explaining to his mother "that
no matter where he lived, he would be in a bad situation; here in the Sov.
Union people regard him as the son of the factory owner Hammer, and
if he moves to America people there will regard him as a Communist."
Questioned by the KGB after he had visited the American Embassy to receive gifts sent by his father, he got into another scrape in 1949 when he
and some friends, riding in a car owned by a professor, tried to steal a
tire from a parked ambulance. After being detained in prison, Armasha
was found not guilty. Sometime in 1951, according to a memo from Anatoly Gorsky, the KGB recruited him for unspecified work, likely as an informant on fellow students. Although an evaluation noted that he "'dis tinguished himself as a smart, capable agent,"' it concluded that he had
failed to complete assignments, regularly detected and lost tails in ways
that suggested he had experience in covert work, and peppered his private correspondence with anti-Soviet remarks.66

In June 1951 Anatoly Gorsky wrote a memo that Victor Hammer had
extensive contacts in business circles, among diplomats, and attends
diplomatic receptions."' At one of the latter "Miron," a KGB operative,
approached him and promised to arrange delivery of a letter to Armasha.
"Miron" met Victor at his office at the Hammer Galleries in late January
1952 and gave him Armasha's response. After reading the response Victor told "Miron" that his son "`had apparently inherited linguistic skills
from his grandfather"' and asked for assistance in remaining in correspondence with Armasha, to which "Miron" agreed. This conversation
inaugurated a dance between the American art dealer and the Soviet intelligence services with Armasha as the bait. During a subsequent breakfast, Victor complained about Armasha's continual need for money and
asked "`several times whether it was possible for `Gherman' [Armasha] to
visit the U.S. when he finished his education."' "Miron" deflected the inquiry with the comment that this was years away. Hammer dropped comments about his connections with Eleanor Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins
(although he had been dead for five years). The New York station concluded that Victor wanted "`an opportunity to set up a permanent line
of communications with his son"' and considered bringing him into covert contact with the agency. After another lunch meeting, Victor took
"Miron" on a tour of some of his valuable art and bragged about brother
Armand's connections with President Truman and General Eisenhower,
"`to both of whom he has rendered some valuable services,"' and the
KGB agent was duly impressed by inscribed photographs to Armand
from both men, "`from which one can infer that they know Armand
well."' ("Miron" apparently was unaware that prominent American political figures handed out signed photographs to casual visitors.) Victor
also offered political gossip and his analysis of U.S.-Soviet relations.67

Moscow initially approved of a cautious approach, recognizing that it
was "still too early to re-establish an agent relationship" since a premature
request might spook Victor. It recommended using his affection for Armasha "'by giving him individual minor assignments in order to draw him
into cooperating."' Nevertheless, by May 1952 it was scolding the New
York station for the slow pace of Victor's cultivation. Despite his "'operational value and high potential,"' "Miron" was "`listless and slow in conducting this interesting cultivation."' Moscow demanded a plan that pro vided "`for a transition to an agent relationship with him"' by October
1952. Two weeks later "Miron" met with Hammer. After reading Armasha's letter, Victor again asked if he could be allowed to come to the
United States. "Miron" was evasive, but commented that it would be difficult for Armasha "`to adapt to the empty life of young people in the
U.S."' or to leave his mother or Soviet girlfriend, whom he planned to
marry. Victor agreed but repeated his desire for a reunion with his son.
Two subsequent meetings yielded only Hammer's giving "Miron" his direct phone number.6s

By the end of September Moscow Center was growing impatient and
complained that "Miron" was unnecessarily dragging out the recruitment.
It considered arranging a meeting with Victor on a trip to Europe, where
he would meet "`an experienced operative."' "Miron" was instructed to
sound out Hammer to find a suitable location, but they could not meet
until late October, at which time the Soviet operative boldly stated that
-an American who loves his country and values the preservation of peace
between peoples should contribute to the success of Soviet diplomacy,
which is aimed at preserving peace between people"' and noted that Victor, as a businessman interested in peace and trade, "`could not stand on
the sidelines as a spectator but must help Soviet diplomats in every way
he could with his numerous contacts, information, etc."' Victor evaded,
replying that while "`glad to provide such assistance,"' he doubted he
could be effective and faulted Soviet diplomats for isolating themselves
and failing to build relationships with prominent Americans. "Miron"
concluded that Victor "`did not reject the proposal for cooperation"' and
planned to return to it later, particularly mentioning "`exactly what issues
he would like to get information on from him, in particular through his
brother, who is close to the next president of the U.S."'69

When "Miron" next raised the issue in late November 1952, Victor
danced away again, explaining that he did not have high-level contacts in
the diplomatic world; most people he knew were related to his business.
None of this seemed to faze the KGB, in whom hope continued to spring
eternal in regard to Hammer. After the October meeting, where Victor
had evaded making a commitment, the station chief had written Moscow
that he and "Miron" nonetheless saw Victor's not directly rejecting cooperation "'as a bit of a step forward.- The station chief said a direct approach would not likely work, and it was necessary to continue "gradually"
drawing him into a relationship. While Moscow agreed, it worried that
continuing what had already been done would "`delay the prospect of actively using"' Hammer "`to a remote and indefinite time."' It suggested giving him assignments "`to gather data about some company, background information."' If that worked, "`these assignments can be made
closer in nature to agent-information assignments"' except he would be
paid.70

In January 1953 "Miron" nudged Hammer yet again, explaining that
he was "`a diplomat who needs the help of people like `S' ["Sonny"/Ham-
mer] with his intelligence and contacts and that he was patiently waiting
for `S' to realize that actions speak louder than words."' Victor reiterated
that his well-connected friends only spoke of art with him and did not
discuss sensitive matters. The New York station suggested putting "`some
psychological pressure on him"' by initiating an investigation of Armasha,
who would appeal to his father for help. "Miron," it was suggested, would
promise to look into the matter, report back that inappropriate friends
were the cause of the trouble, but that if Hammer resumed his aid to the
KGB "`this case involving G. ["Gherman"/Armasha] could be dropped."'
Even if Hammer refused, he would probably not expose "Miron." This
option, however, was not pursued.''

On 3 April 1953 "Miron" peppered Hammer with questions about
Bedell Smith; the KGB's old source, judge Samuel Dickstein; and others.
As they finished their conversation "Miron" asked if these meetings made
Victor nervous and whether they should meet more covertly. Victor, however, rejected the overture. While he did not discuss his meetings with
"Miron" with anyone, including his brothers, he saw no reason to try to
hide them. If asked, he would explain that he wanted to maintain good
relations with Soviet diplomats out of concern for his son and that as a
businessman who had once made a fortune in the USSR, lie had an interest in resuming commercial ties. And he knew no secrets. By April
1953 Anatoly Gorsky again recommended having "`a recruitment talk
with him in the immediate future so as to change the current relationship
to an agent relationship' "72

BOOK: Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America
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