Target (16 page)

The fact that a Russian general, ally or not, could stop Patton is quizzical enough. But confirming Skubik’s account, Ladislas Farago writes
²⁰
that General Antonov warned Eisenhower that any move on Prague could result in a “possible confusion of forces”—in other words, fighting between the two armies. Eisenhower, friendly to his Russian allies at that point—as was Washington in general—was loath to have such an occurrence. Nevertheless, Bryan J. Dickerson, former editor of
Cold War Times
and a World War II historian, confirms that, as Skubik writes, end-of-war “clashes” between U.S. and Soviet troops did occur.
²¹
“In the town of Rokycany [Czechoslovakia], Carmine Caiazzo and other soldiers of the 9
^th
Infantry Regiment had several hostile incidents with nearby Soviet troops.” In fact, adds Dickerson in his source notes, “Quite a few American veterans told me of hostile confrontations with Soviet troops, particularly in the first few days after the German surrender.” So the two sides had already come to blows, giving further credence to Skubik’s intelligence that the Soviets, especially Stalin, were mad at Patton and wanted to eliminate him. And if not for the intention and clashes in Czechoslovakia, Stalin, at this time, had other reasons to want Patton dead.

On May 7, 1945, still fuming over what he considered the sellouts to the Russians of Berlin and Prague, Patton was hosting Robert Patterson, Undersecretary of War, soon to be elevated to Secretary of War, who had come to Germany from Washington. Newly installed President Harry Truman, and the administration he inherited at Roosevelt’s death, envisioned good relations with the communists, who his administration—basically still Roosevelt’s—naively believed had noble intentions. Patterson had brought the pro-Soviet attitude with him but Patton was not buying it. His inherent anti-communism and experience of the Russians in the war had caused him to regard them as little more than barbarians. (“Mongolians,” was the phrase he liked to use.
^x
) That night, according to Patton aide Major Alexander C. Stiller, who was present, he let his feelings be known to Patterson in the following conversation:
²²

Patton was flat-out calling for war with the Soviets.

Farago says the Harvard-educated Patterson, one of Roosevelt’s wartime “Wise men”
^y
advisors who would soon be promoted to Truman’s secretary of war, was “embarrassed” by Patton’s rant. It was definitely not the official Washington view, and was disturbingly threatening. Patton, at that moment, controlling a vast, victorious army, was as powerful a man as there was on the planet. His enemies might have wondered what would happen if he acted
on those views. It was known that Patton was sympathetic to Soviet displaced persons, mostly POWs at this stage, who resisted returning to Russia even though America had promised Stalin they would be sent back to their countries of origin. These included Ukrainians, Latvians, and Byelorussians who had fought the Red Army, either as Nazis or partisan nationalists, and knew repatriation meant certain death or slavery. Stalin was out for revenge, as well as to quell any resistance. There were even rumors that Patton was harboring German SS units that had surrendered to him for possible later use against the Soviets—rumors, as often rumors are, based in fact. Undoubtedly his inflammatory remarks to Patterson were relayed up the chain of command—to Eisenhower at Allied headquarters, and on up to the administrations in Washington and London, which basically would have had the same reaction as Patterson.

And from there, could his remarks have reached the ears of the Soviet Union?

Most likely. Not only were the Soviets favored allies and therefore privy to such information, especially since Washington was intent on proving its sincerity to them, but they also had the largest and best spy network in the world—one much more infiltrated into the British and American governments than was, and still today is, generally known. Stalin, because of his spies, often was informed of vital American secrets before even top level U.S. officials were—a fact that was just becoming evident at that time to very few.
^z
But even if they were not advised of Patton’s specific statements to Patterson, they and the world were already certainly aware of his
growing anti-Soviet sentiment—something that would have also angered Stalin, who tolerated no dissent.

In late April of 1944, for instance, Patton had been embroiled in yet another war-time controversy when American newspapers in sympathy with the pro-Soviet Left—which most at that time were—had falsely reported that he had failed in a public speech to mention “our brave Russian allies” as one of the countries, along with America and Britain, that would rule the post-war world. In fact, Patton
had
included Russia in the speech—the precise utterance, according to his diary, being “. . . it is the evident destiny of the British and Americans, and, of course, the Russians, to rule the world . . . .”
²³
But the supposed omission, in a short greeting to the ladies of Knutsford, England, opening a coffee house for American G.I.s, quickly resulted in editorialists and legislators calling for Patton’s dismissal and Eisenhower, acutely attuned to their cries, warning Patton, his best fighting general, that one more public relations slip-up would cost him his job.
²⁴

And had there still been any doubt in Moscow about his ill feelings toward them, Patton had emphatically restated it on May 11, 1945, at a gathering of Allied hierarchy in Paris celebrating the German surrender which had occurred just three days before. As reported by Patton’s nephew, Fred Ayer, Jr.,
²⁵
the celebration was being held in a suite at the Hotel Majestic overlooking the Arc de Triomphe. Among the guests were Ayer, a special agent with the FBI in charge of European operations, his famous uncle, a group of other generals, their aides, diplomats, and high-level civilian guests, including “some sort of Presidential Assistant from the White House” whose “face and name, I am glad to say, have vanished from my memory.”

Patton, however, was not celebrating.

Pointing a cigar “like a weapon” at his host—no less a partisan than Eisenhower deputy, Major General Everett Hughes—Patton burst out,

At that point, writes Ayer, an “uneasy” feeling swept the room.

Patton disregarded it.

“These people are right. They won’t have a chance. We’ve signed away their lives. By God, we ought to tear up those damned fool agreements [with the Soviets] and march right through to the eastern borders . . . .”

Ayer, worried for his uncle, blurted out, “Uncle George, for God’s sake, you can’t talk that way here.”

Patton shot back coldly,

If Patton’s remarks to Patterson had been exploratory, this was a declaration.

Patton was prescient—and the spying Russians knew it.

But little, if any, of this was known to Skubik, although Bandera, he writes, did tell him that Patton was courting Soviet dissidents, like his Ukrainians, to possibly fight the Russians. “This contact [with the Ukrainian nationalists] was clear evidence to Stalin that Patton intended to start a war against the Soviets immediately rather than wait,”
²⁶
wrote Skubik. But back then, what mainly was on his mind as he left Bandera that May 16, 1945 day was that he had gotten important intelligence concerning General Patton’s safety, and it had come from a source, regardless of his past and politics, who should know—a renegade leader who had spies in the NKVD. Skubik, having served in the Third Army, had high regard for Patton. In order to get the information to higher-ups as quickly as possible, he decided to bypass the slower report or memo-writing route and go directly to CIC headquarters. His superior there, First Lieutenant William L. Gillespie, apparently sufficiently impressed, “suggested that I report this information to Colonel MacIntosh of the OSS.”

But there the urgency stopped.

At OSS offices—location and date unspecified—he writes he was received by a “Major Stone” who referred him to General Donovan, who records confirm was in Germany at the time.
^aa
27
Donovan, according to Skubik, was not impressed with the information or, apparently, with Skubik. In fact, he was perturbed—an odd reaction since Skubik was only doing his job, reporting what needed to be reported, and the two had never met before. “He told me that Bandera was on the list to be arrested. That [Bandera’s intelligence] about Patton was a provocation.” He wanted Skubik to arrest Bandera which “I couldn’t do without killing twenty or more of his body guards.”
²⁸
This angered Donovan. Emerging from the meeting confused and angry himself, Skubik writes that Major Stone “thanked me and said, ‘Stay away from Bandera. He’s bad news.’. . . I was disappointed with my first visit to OSS.”
²⁹

But several weeks later—towards the end of May, he writes—he got the same intelligence again—and again from a credible source—another of the Ukrainians he was detailed to interrogate.