Terror in the Balkans (119 page)

31. For an introduction to the debate on Nazi foreign policy, see Ian Kershaw,
The Nazi
Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation
, 4th ed. (London: Arnold, 2000), chap. 6.

32. Alexander Lassner, “The Foreign Policy of the Schuschnigg Government 1934–

1938: The Quest for Security,” in
The Dollfuss/Schuschnigg Era in Austria: Con-

temporary Austrian Studies Volume 11
, ed. Gunther Bischof et al. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 163–186.

33. Mark Mazower,
Hitler’s Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe
(London: Allen Lane, 2008), 47.

34. Schmidl,
März 38: Der deutsche Einmarsch in Österreich
, 48–50.

35. Ibid., 47–48.

36. Peter Broucek, “Heereswesen,” in
Geschichte der Ersten Republik 1
, ed. Erika Weinzierl and Kurt Skalnik (Graz: Styria, 1983), 218–222.

37. Schmidl,
März 38: Der deutsche Einmarsch in Österreich
, 49, 57.

38. Ibid., 50. See also Kitchen,
The Coming of Austrian Fascism
, 105–106.

39. Schmidl,
März 38: Der deutsche Einmarsch in Österreich
, chap. 6.

40. Kitchen,
The Coming of Austrian Fascism
, p. 234. On the purging of non-Nazi offi -

cers, see Richard Germann, “‘Österreichische’ Soldaten in Ost- und Südosteuropa

1941—1945: Deutsche Krieger—Nationalsozialistische Verbrecher—Österreichische

Opfer?” (PhD thesis, University of Vienna, 2006), chap. 2.

288
Notes to Pages 67–72

41. Alexander B. Rossino,
Hitler Strikes Poland: Blitzkrieg, Ideology, and Atrocity

(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 5–8.

42. Hürter,
Hitlers Heerführer: Die deutschen Oberbefehlshaber im Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion 1941/42
, 158.

43. Rossino,
Hitler Strikes Poland: Blitzkrieg, Ideology, and Atrocity
, 1, chaps. 2–4, 234.

44. Omer Bartov,
Hitler’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis and War in the Third Reich
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 66.

45. Rossino,
Hitler Strikes Poland: Blitzkrieg, Ideology, and Atrocity
, 86–87, 126–129, 203–216; Charles D. Melson, “German Counter-Insurgency Revisited,”
Journal of

Slavic Military Studies
24 (2011): 121.

46. Jürgen Förster, “Hitlers Entscheidung für den Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion,” in
Der
Angriff auf die Sowjetunion
, Horst Boog et al. (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1991), 27–68.

47. Wette,
The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality,
17–24. On the importance of anti-Bolshevism within the generals’ mind-set, and the connection with their anti-

Semitism, see also Messerschmidt, “Harte Sühne am Judentum. Befehlslage und

Wissen in der deutschen Wehrmacht;” Steinberg,
All or Nothing: The Axis and the

Holocaust 1941–1943,
236–241; Christian Streit, “Ostkrieg, Antibolschewismus, und

‘Endlösung,’”
Geschichte und Gesellschaft
17 (1991), 242–255; Streit,
Keine Kameraden: Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen
, 2nd ed., 50–59.

48. Bartov,
Hitler’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich
, 129.

49. For overviews and guidance on further literature regarding the German military

planning for Barbarossa, the criminal aspects of the invasion, and the subsequent

military campaign, see Rolf-Dieter Müller and Gerd R. Ueberschär, eds.,
Hitler’s

War in the East 1941–1945: A Critical Assessment
(Oxford: Berghahn, 2000); Evan

Mawdsley,
Thunder in the East: The Nazi-Soviet War, 1941–1945
(London: Blooms-

bury, 2006).

50. OKW WFSt. / Abt. L (IV/Qu.), 5/19/41, Anlage 3. Richtlinien für das Verhalten

der Truppe in Russland. Reprinted in Wolfram Wette and Gerd R. Ueberschär,

eds.,
Der deutsche Überfall auf die Sowjetunion 1941: Berichte, Analyse, Dokumente

(Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1991), 258–259.

4. in vasion a nd occupat ion : y ugosl av i a, 1941

1. On the Italian army’s failings, see MacGregor Knox,
Hitler’s Italian Allies: Royal
Armed Forces, Fascist Regime, and the War of 1940–1943
(Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 2000), 23–67; Richard L. Dinardo,
Germany and the Axis Powers:

From Coalition to Collapse
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 28–36; Mark Mazower,
Hitler’s Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe
(London: Allen Lane, 2008), 341.

2. Detlef Vogel, “German Intervention in the Balkans,” in Gerhard Schreiber et al.,

Germany and the Second World War, Volume III: The Mediterranean, South-East

Europe, and North Africa 1939–1941
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 479–485.

Notes to Pages 73–76
289

3. Fred Singleton,
Twentieth-Century Yugoslavia
(London: Macmillan, 1976), 68.

4. Jozo Tomasevich,
War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and

Collaboration
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 337–338.

5. Stevan K. Pavlowitch,
Yugoslavia
(London: Ernest Bevin, 1971), 76, 83–84; Stevan K. Pavlowitch,
Serbia: The History behind the Name
(London: Hurst, 2002), 135–

136; Singleton,
Twentieth-Century Yugoslavia
, 3; Gerhard Schreiber, “Germany,

Italy, and South-East Europe: From Political and Economic Hegemony to Military

Aggression,” in
Germany and the Second World War, Volume 3: The Mediterranean,

South-East Europe, and North Africa 1939–1941
, Gerhard Schreiber et al. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 316–321. On interwar Yugoslavia generally, see Tomasevich,

War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration
, chap.

1; Dejan Djokic´,
Elusive Compromise: A History of Interwar Yugoslavia
(London:

Hurst, 2007).

6. Pavlowitch,
Yugoslavia
, 83–84.

7. Pavlowitch,
Serbia: The History behind the Name
, 128.

8. Tomasevich,
War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Col-

laboration,
chap. 1; Djokic´,
Elusive Compromise: A History of Interwar Yugoslavia
, chaps. 1 and 2.

9. Tomasevich,
War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collabo-

ration,
39–46; Pavlowitch,
Serbia: The History behind the Name,
131–132; Djokic´,
Elusive Compromise: A History of Interwar Yugoslavia,
chap. 5.

10. Djokic´,
Elusive Compromise: A History of Interwar Yugoslavia
, 280.

11. Marko Attila Hoare, “Whose Is the Partisan Movement? Serbs, Croats and the Leg-

acy of a Shared Resistance,”
Journal of Slavic Military Studies
15 (2002): 25.

12. Schreiber, “Germany, Italy, and South-East Europe: From Political and Economic

Hegemony to Military Aggression,” 316–325, 362–372.

13. Vogel, “German Intervention in the Balkans,” 479–481; Ian Kershaw,
Hitler: Nem-

esis, 1936–1945
(London: Penguin, 2000). On German policy towards Yugoslavia in

1941, see also Klaus Olshausen,
Zwischenspiel auf dem Balkan: Die deutsche Poli-

tik gegenüuber Jugoslawien und Griechenland von März bis Juli 1941
(Stuttgart:

Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1973).

14. Vogel, “German Intervention in the Balkans,” 480–485. On Hitler’s Serbophobia,

see also Klaus Schmider,
Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien 1941–1944
(Hamburg:

E. S. Mittler, 2002), 43.

15. Vogel, “German Intervention in the Balkans,” 493–526; Mark Wheeler, “Pariahs to Partisans to Power: The Communist Party of Yugoslavia,” in
Resistance and Revolution in
Mediterranean Europe 1939–1948
, ed. Tony Judt (London: Routledge, 1989), 123–125.

16. Klaus Schmider, “Der jugoslawische Kriegsschauplatz,” in
Das Deutsche Reich und
der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 8. Die Ostfront, 1943/44: Der Krieg im Osten und an den

Nebenfronten,
Karl-Heinz Frieser et al. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2007), 1010–1011.

17. Ibid., 1009–1010.

18. On the partition of Yugoslavia in spring 1941 and its immediate effects, see for overviews Mazower,
Hitler’s Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe
, 132–133, 340–354;

290
Notes to Pages 76–80

Schmider,
Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien 1941–1944
, 28–53; Stevan K. Pavlowitch,
Hitler’s New Disorder: The Second World War in Yugoslavia
(London: Hurst, 2008), chap. 2. For more detailed treatment, see Tomasevich,
War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration
, chaps. 2–6.

19. Matteo Milazzo,
The Chetni Movement and the Yugoslav Resistance
(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 3; Mazower,
Hitler’s Empire: Nazi Rule

in Occupied Europe
, 340–341.

20. Milazzo,
The Chetni Movement and the Yugoslav Resistance
, 10.

21. Ibid., 11.

22. On the NDH, see Ladislaus Hory and Martin Broszat,
Der Kroatische Ustasha-

Staat 1941–1945
(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1964); Tomasevich,
War and
Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration
, chaps. 6–11.

23. Schmider,
Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien 1941–1944
, 28–33.

24. Milazzo,
The Chetni Movement and the Yugoslav Resistance
, 6; Schmider,
Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien 1941–1944
, 49–51.

25. Tomasevich,
War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collabo-

ration
, 4, 30–39, 336–342; Marko Attila Hoare,
Genocide and Resistance in Hitler’s
Bosnia: The Partisans and the Chetniks 1941–1943
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 21–23.

26. On the Ustasha’s anti-Semitic beliefs, see Tomasevich,
War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration
, 43, 348–349, 370, 593.

27. Hoare,
Genocide and Resistance in Hitler’s Bosnia: The Partisans and the Chetniks
1941–1943
, 22–23.

28. Tomasevich,
War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collabo-

ration
, 335.

29. On NDH-Italian-German relations and the state of the NDH economy, see Tomase-

vich,
War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration
, 241–294, 617–706.

30. Ibid., 387.

31. On Catholic support for the Ustasha, see Tomasevich,
War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration
, 369–372. On priests’ abhorrence of Ustasha crimes, see ibid., 400.

32. Ibid., 343.

33. Ibid., 380–387.

34. Pavlowitch,
Hitler’s New Disorder: The Second World War in Yugoslavia
, 32.

35. Walter Manoschek,
“Serbien ist judenfrei”: Militärische Besatzungspolitik und

Judenvernichtung in Serbien 1941/42
(Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995), 49; Schmider,

Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien 1941–1944
, 594.

36. Manoschek,
“Serbien ist judenfrei,”
28; Schmider,
Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien
1941–1944,
573; BA-MA, RW 40/2. Militärbefehlshaber Serbien, 5/1/41, 5/4/41.

Unterstellung. All further archival references are BA-MA unless otherwise stated.

On Turner, see in particular Christopher R. Browning, “Harald Turner und die

Militärverwaltung in Serbien 1941–1942,”
Verwaltung contra Menschenführung im

Notes to Pages 80–82
291

Staat Hitlers,
ed. Dieter Rebentisch and Karl Topper (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1986), 351–373

37. Walter Manoschek, “The Extermination of the Jews in Serbia,” in
National Socialist Extermination Policies: Contemporary German Perspectives and Controversies
,

ed. Ulrich Herbert (Oxford: Berghahn, 2000), 167.

38. For an overview of the general structure of the German occupation in Serbia and the individuals who headed it, see Schmider,
Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien 1941–1944
, 573–575, 590–608.

39. Georg Tessin,
Verbände und Truppen der Deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS

im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939–1945
(Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1972–1997), 6:193, 272; 12:149, 188; Richard Germann, “‘Österreichische’ Soldaten in Ost- und Südosteuropa 1941–1945: Deutsche Krieger—Nationalsozialistische Verbrecher—Österrei-

chische Opfer?” (PhD thesis, University of Vienna, 2006), 120–122.

40. Albert Seaton,
The German Army 1933–1945
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,

1982), 159–160; Bernhard R. Kroener, “The Manpower Resources of the Third

Reich in the Area of Confl ict between Wehrmacht, Bureaucracy, and War Econ-

omy, 1939–1942,” in
Germany and the Second World War, Volume 5. Organization

and Mobilization of the German Sphere of Power. Part 1: Wartime Administration,

Economy, and Manpower Resources 1939–1941
, Bernhard R. Kroener et al. (Oxford:

Clarendon, 2000), 810–816, 964–1000; Germann, “‘Österreichische’ Soldaten in

Ost- und Südosteuropa 1941–1945: Deutsche Krieger—Nationalsozialistische Ver-

brecher—Österreichische Opfer?,” 120–122.

41. Schmider, “Der jugoslawische Kriegsschauplatz,” 1013.

42. RW 40/2. Kriegstagebuch, 5/11, 5/16 and 5/20/41.

43. Charles D. Melson, “German Counter-Insurgency Revisited,”
Journal of Slavic

Military Studies
24 (2011): 124–125.

44. Manoschek, “The Extermination of the Jews in Serbia,” 164.