Terror in the Balkans (38 page)

three full Croatian infantry battalions against Battle Group Suschnig’s one.

Wüst’s group possessed only one German artillery battery, Suschnig’s

none, and no tanks were provided to either. Two smaller battle groups,

however, were between them allocated three Panzer platoons, two German

artillery batteries, a German infantry company, an Ustasha company, an

armored train, and parts of two Field Gendarmerie companies.74

But matters were not helped by the reassignment elsewhere, on October

14, of most of the second company of the division’s motorized 501st Field

Gendarmerie Detachment,75 and, nine days later, of four Panzer companies

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terror in the balk ans

that had been temporarily assigned to the division.76 All this when the divi-

sion had to contend with mushrooming chaos elsewhere in its jurisdiction,

particularly Chetnik attacks against Croatian patrols and transport.77

On November 26, the Partisans succeeded in retaking Jajce. “The

heights along the Donje Vakuf—Jajce road were held by strong enemy

forces,” reported Battle Group Wüst, “4,000 men equipped with machine-

guns . . . grenade launchers, artillery, and suffi cient ammunition.”78

Throughout the fi rst week of December, in an effort to wrest the town

back again and destroy the Partisan forces in the vicinity, the 718th pros-

ecuted Operation Jajce III. For this operation the division committed

fewer forces than before. Though it was able to fi eld all six battalions of

the 738th and 750th Infantry Regiments, they were deprived of all but

one Panzer platoon, and one platoon of the 668th Artillery Regiment.

Aside from an anti-aircraft platoon and an armored train, the remaining

forces committed to the operation were, again, Croatian—six infantry

battalions, two Ustasha battalions, two platoons of pioneers, and seven

artillery platoons of various types.79

And throughout the operations, the 718th continued to regard its Cro-

atian army “allies” as a burden. It had not always been thus. In March

1942, for instance, Croatian army units had acquitted themselves well

against Partisans in the 718th’s jurisdiction.80 But in mid-November divi-

sional command damned the Croatian units in its area as poorly armed,

“decadent, and disorganized.”81 There was no trust in their offi cers, “no

connection between offi cers and men . . . Units down to battalion level

are fragmented and leaderless, while the staff offi cers just wander around

with nothing to do.”82 The Ustasha’s units were better armed than the

Croatian army’s, but their discipline was worse. “Theft, murder, and

plunder are the daily routine in the Serb areas . . . (The Ustasha) is hated

by the population, including the Croatian.”83

In view of the division’s pillorying of the Croatian army and Ustasha,

General Fortner’s typewriter probably balked at having to produce the

address he felt obliged to issue, presumably for the sake of cordial rela-

tions, to the Croatian troops on October 10:

Comrades of the Ustasha and the Croatian Army! Side by side with

the men of my division, you have attacked, scattered or exterminated

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205

the Communist enemy. In so doing, you have proven that, when you

are possessed of the true martial spirit and assail the enemy wher-

ever you meet him, no enemy can stand against you, whatever his

numbers. I extend my recognition and gratitude to all of you, from

the oldest commander down to the youngest soldier!84

The reality was that, while the 718th Infantry Division itself stood “ready,

in the event of a general uprising, to defend its positions, the Croatian Army

can only be partially trusted. In the event of an English landing in Dalmatia

it must be reckoned that a general Chetnik uprising will break out and a

large part of the Croatian Army will defect to the insurgents.”85 By the end

of the year, matters within the Croatian army had improved not one iota.86

Not all elements of the 718th held the Croats in such contempt. The

750th Infantry Regiment, for instance, testifi ed to their usefulness as

patrol personnel.87 It is of course possible that here, as elsewhere, the

division was scapegoating the Croats for its own failings. But clearly, given

the Croatian army’s undoubted serial defects, there was much truth in the

718th’s contemptuous assessment.

And the 718th was increasingly plagued by failings of its own. It again

stressed its need for more air reconnaissance, more artillery, more spe-

cialist mountain gear, better communications, and small patrols that

could observe the enemy from concealed positions.88 But the division’s

own fi ghting power was now being whittled down from above, as well as

being dispersed ever more thinly. In mid-November the 718th requested

to be allowed to retain its tanks, pleading that their mere presence helped

deter attacks on supply transports and routes. Four days later, Croatia

Command refused this entreaty.89

The effect of all this on the division’s combat performance in the

operations was entirely predictable. The 738th Infantry Regiment’s

report for the third phase of the Jajce operations claimed that its own

troops’ self-belief was suffering in the face of an enemy who had grown

increasingly self-confi dent, and whose troops had been driven from the

villages only after heavy fi ghting.90 On October 10, meanwhile, the 750th

Infantry Regiment drew up a list of all the bitter experiences the Jajce

operation was teaching it. The defects in its equipment were legion; it

also requested smaller, more realistic daily targets for its advance.91

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terror in the balk ans

The operations themselves were drawn out and hard-fought.92 During

the fi rst operation the troops endured diffi cult terrain, poor weather, and

Partisan disruption to rear communications. The 714th Infantry Divi-

sion, meanwhile, blamed the terrain and the lack of mountain equipment

for its own failure to advance from Jezero-Pliva to Sarici in line with the

operational plan.93 The 714th’s other commitments soon prevented it

from assisting the 718th further in the operations.94

The 718th’s Battle Group Annacker issued a report in late November

that conveyed in detail just how fearsome a prospect the Partisans now

were. On November 25 the battle group had been given the task of extricat-

ing the fi fth company of the 738th Infantry Regiment from encirclement.

Then, “on 26 November at 5.15am the battle group reached the southern

exit of Jajce at Skela. After such a rapid forward movement, it was possible

to surprise the Partisans in Skela. It was established that Partisans wearing

nothing but their underclothes had fl ed into the neighboring woods and

surrounding hills. Some even had to jump out of the window.”95

But then the battle group attacked the Partisans in the factory district,

and it became immediately apparent what it was up against:

A heavy rifl e and above all machine-gun fi re set in at the moment the

searching of the houses began. The commander of the fi rst company,

Lieutenant Steiner, fell immediately to machine-gun fi re.96 Several

NCOs and men were wounded in the same way. The Partisans, who

may well have been members of the intelligentsia, put up a particu-

larly fi erce resistance in these houses. Unobserved by them, the

company was able after heavy fi ghting to break into one of the build-

ings and kill around 30 Partisans. Meanwhile the third company of

the 738th Infantry Regiment . . . came under heavy enemy attack

from the east, and it was established that around 3,000 Partisans

were approaching Jajce from the north-west. Artillery and grenade

launchers were observed being brought into position, and after a

short while they were infl icting heavy fi re on our battle group’s posi-

tions. Aside from this, heavy machine-gun fi re became noticeable.

During the period of heavy grenade launcher and machine-gun fi re,

the enemy was bringing his troops up ever nearer to our own lines.

It was coming to the point where our men would also be encircled

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207

from behind, leading to the battalion’s total destruction. Above all,

many trucks would be lost. Because our battle group lacked artillery,

it was not possible to take on the Partisans effectively. We held out

for longer, and when it was clear that the enemy was about to break

into our lines at Point 568, the third company pulled back to avoid

destruction. Encirclement was at that point almost complete. Giving

up Point 568 also increased the enemy pressure from the north, pres-

sure which the fi rst company could not withstand. The ferocity of

the fi re, from both artillery and grenade launchers, was turned with

full force upon the battle group and battalion staffs . . . Decision then

taken to try and pull back. Once in Vijenac, the troops were fi red

upon from all sides by rifl es, machine guns and grenade launchers,

particularly from the surrounding hills and houses.97

The column was unable to halt, but forced to fi ght its way through the

Partisans to escape.98

By December 7, the 718th Infantry Division had failed to destroy the Par-

tisans but had at least retaken Jajce.99 But all the signs are that a great

many civilians had perished in the process. And there is little evidence,

in contrast with its conduct earlier in the year, that the division paid par-

ticular heed to avoiding heavy civilian casualties. Many of its troops, cer-

tainly, paid no heed at all. They seem to have been primarily concerned

with driving the Partisans out of Jajce, irrespective of the civilian cost,

and reasserting German military prestige.

The killing escalated as the operations unfolded. After the 718th’s fi rst

(temporarily) successful attempt to retake the town, it reported killing

eighty-three Partisans, taking seventy-four prisoners, and seizing a simi-

lar number of guns. The division and its Croatian allies lost thirty-eight

dead and fi fty-two wounded. This signifi es that a real battle had taken

place, one in which the division itself had suffered severely, and not the

indiscriminate butchery of civilians.100 But later the picture changed

dramatically. On October 28, Battle Group Suschnig and Battle Group

Wüst reported that, at a loss to themselves and their Croatian allies of

three dead and six wounded, they had killed at least 145 Partisans—from

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whom just six rifl es and one machine gun had been retrieved.101 Worse,

on October 30 the division reported that its units, primarily Battle Group

Suschnig, had killed 257 Partisans (including
Flintenweiber
), for the loss

of one German soldier wounded and two civilian auxiliaries killed.102

At the end of the second Jajce operation, the 718th Infantry Division

claimed to have killed at least 747 Partisans. It reckoned, observing that

the Partisans sought to bury their dead and carry off their wounded, that

it had actually killed considerably more. There were 106 prisoners taken;

127 rifl es, eight machine guns, and a heavy grenade launcher were seized.

The Germans and Croats themselves had lost fi fty-three dead, the vast

majority of whom were Croats, and eighty-two wounded. The division

announced, with a combination of pride and contempt, that “the pro-

portion of our own dead to the enemy’s was 1:14. The result would have

been better still if the Croatian troops too had learned that one must fi ght

off attacks instead of running away from them.”103

Even though some “Partisan” losses probably were down to genuine

combat, then, rather more of them were probably down to the killing of

noncombatants. This time, in contrast to before, divisional command

seems to have been unperturbed.

With the troops mired in miserable conditions and ferocious combat,

and divisional and regimental commanders making no attempt to rein in

their brutality, there was nothing to prevent that brutality’s threshold from

falling. Since the beginning of 1942 the 718th’s troops had been committed

to successive counterinsurgency operations that had been often fruitless,

frequently savage, and increasingly costly. Add to this the increasingly

severe counterinsurgency directives they were being issued, if not by the

division itself then certainly by higher command, and it would be surpris-

ing if the troops’ behavior had
not
become more ferocious.

The personal letters of Lieutenant Peter Geissler, of the 714th Infan-

try Division, illustrate the effects. Although soldiers’ letters as a source

should be approached cautiously,104 Geissler’s nevertheless provide vivid

and unsettling insights. It would not be too hyperbolic to conclude that

his experiences during the second half of 1942 progressively dragged

him down into his own personal hell.

At the outset of the summer Geissler already loathed the region and

everything about it: “Where we are, hell has broken loose!” he wrote

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209

on June 21. “There’s nothing to buy here, no meat, no oil, towns for the