Terror in the Balkans (42 page)

of thirty-six dead, between mid-January and mid-February. The con-

trast does need qualifying. For one thing, the 718th’s troops still seem to

have been killing large numbers of civilians; as before, the very relative

226
terror in the balk ans

nature of their “restraint” needs keeping fi rmly in mind. Furthermore, if

they still were not killing as many civilians as the 369th, this was partly

because they had less opportunity; the “Partisan” dead they recorded

were killed in the course not of major mobile operations, but of smaller-

scale operations and general security duties. Even so, some of the con-

trast is surely due to the greater restraint the 718th exercised. For though

the 369th and 718th suffered comparable losses during these periods, the

369th killed at least four times as many “Partisans” as the 718th.

Most strikingly, unlike the 369th, the 718th stood ready, immediately

after White I and its follow-up operation, to exchange prisoners with the

Partisans. There had been sporadic contact between Germans and Parti-

sans from as early as spring 1942. The fi rst signifi cant prisoner exchange

had taken place in Posusje, between Livno and Mostar, in September of

that year. It is unclear who made the fi rst move on that occasion; that it

was Tito is suggested by reports from the Partisans, who, perhaps seek-

ing a basis for prisoner negotiations with the Germans, were treating

their German prisoners well at this particular time.46

One reason why a number of senior German offi cers stood ready to

negotiate such exchanges was that they now believed Partisans should

be granted the status of proper combatants. Major General Benig-

nus Dippold, commander of the 717th Infantry Division, appeared to

express admiration for the Partisans’ fi ghting qualities when he declared

that “one must view the enemy as poorly-equipped troops, but not as

bandits.”47 There was undoubtedly a pragmatic motivation behind such

professions of gallantry. Recognizing that they were facing a genuine

military opponent, more astute offi cers realized that according the Par-

tisans proper combatant status made it more likely that both sides would

give quarter when taking prisoners. But this was still a profound about-

face from the German military’s usual view of insurgents. Some senior

fi gures, at least, were forming a saner perception of the challenge their

forces were facing.48 Yet there is no sign that the 369th Infantry Division

was contemplating similar measures at this time.49

Even higher command was reining in its subordinates to some extent.

Although Croatia Command had on January 12 issued extremely harsh

guidelines, the same directive also forbade attacks on women and chil-

dren. This was a clear contrast with Hitler’s order of December 16,

The Devil’s Division
227

1942.50 But much of the impetus, particularly for the 718th, came from

divisional command. That the 369th and the 718th Infantry Divisions

diverged so hugely on this score was down to three reasons.

It has already been established that a poor-quality unit, facing a hardy,

dangerous opponent in a harsh environment, was more likely to feel

vexed by its situation, and behave more ferociously in order to ease its

frustration and reassure its superiors. The further down the command

chain such a unit was, the sharper its experience of battle, and the more

vicious its likely response. Given the poor quality of the 369th’s units, it

would have been surprising if such a brutalizing malaise had
not
infected

its divisional command.

If Croatia Command’s reports are to be believed, the 717th Infantry

Division, despite having been offi cially upgraded to light division status,

was even weaker than the 369th when it went in to Operation White I.51

Yet the 369th gave ample cause for concern. A brace of reports issued

during January and February 1943 testifi es to its parlous manpower.

On January 23, for instance, General Neidholt reported that “through

borrowing and requisitioning the troops have acquired a huge amount

of baggage. They make for an extremely unmilitary looking picture on

the roads . . . (T)he troops are completely out of control.”52 Through-

out February the situation grew worse: “(troops and non-commissioned

offi cers) lie about uninterested on the trucks and give no salute. . . . The

morale reports show that a large number of the Croatian troops are just

fellow travellers without any understanding of the necessity of the bat-

tle against the Partisans.”53 Desertion became endemic.54 The 369th’s

situation was not helped during White I by the fact that the Luftwaffe

provided most of its assistance to other formations participating in the

operation, particularly the Prinz Eugen Division, and not to the 369th.55

In August 1943 the 369th’s intelligence section fi nally snapped out of

its dejection over the troops’ condition, and articulated some reasons

for it. It identifi ed problems born of national character; of the country’s

political and economic conditions; and of the ways in which the troops

were led, used, and treated. On the last of these scores, it maintained that

the troops’ morale was worst in units where German personnel were less

228
terror in the balk ans

numerous. But it also maintained that, once the rot to morale had hit in,

no amount of harsh German army discipline could arrest it.56

But perhaps the single main reason why the troops’ performance was

so affl icted was that the 369th was too slow to recognize and counter

the symptoms of worsening morale. The fact that General Neidholt’s

prior career had been less than dazzling may indicate that here was a

commander with an uncertain grip on the discipline and morale of his

division. Certainly, there was nothing intrinsic in a Croatian legionnaire

division’s makeup that made poor morale inevitable, at least in early

1943. For as will shortly be seen, poor morale was a pitfall the 373d Infan-

try Division, the 369th’s sister legionnaire formation, managed to avoid.

Whatever the reason, troops of such poor quality were clearly unable

to fi ght a counterinsurgency campaign successfully. The frustration both

the division and its troops doubtless felt can only have intensifi ed when

the White operations failed to achieve their objectives. Tito had had

advance warning of White I ten days before the operation even started.

He used this window of opportunity to systematically destroy roads and

bridges in the region, and thus further hamper Axis attempts to encircle

his forces effectively.57

By early 1943, in contrast, the 718th Infantry Division’s troops were

of considerably better quality than the 369th’s. Of course, their equip-

ment and manpower were still beset by defi ciencies. In this they were no

different to their comrades in any of the core German army counterin-

surgency divisions in Yugoslavia.58 But like its fellow “seven-hundred-

number” divisions, the 718th had been converted into a light division

in early 1943. In February the 718th’s command described the division’s

fi ghting power as “extremely good given its current combat strength.”59

It had positive things to say about the division’s training, artillery, pio-

neer companies, and supply, and about the morale of its troops. It was

certainly overstating things when it described the division’s ability to

carry out its tasks as “limitless.”60 But, clearly, its fi ghting power was

considerably higher than the 369th’s. And just as poorer fi ghting power

probably helped make the 369th more ferocious, so did the 718th’s supe-

rior strength probably help make it less so.

But this is not the full explanation. For one thing, the 718th’s situation

was hardly comfortable either. Following a very brief pause in December,

The Devil’s Division
229

Serbia Command reported in January that the pressure from the Parti-

sans in the 718th’s area was now greater than in any other German divi-

sional area in the NDH. Even though White I brought it some respite,

then, it was starting from a low base.61 Moreover, the 718th Infantry

Division’s moderation had already been apparent—even though it was

very relative, took time to develop, and dimmed for a time during Opera-

tion Jajce—before it became a light division. And even the ferocity of the

718th’s troops during the Jajce operations was smoothed by divisional

command’s indifference, rather than driven by a conscious attempt to

incite it. In other words, a division of poorer fi ghting power was not nec-

essarily always going to deport itself more ruthlessly.

By the same token, divisions that enjoyed greater fi ghting power were not

necessarily going to act with more restraint. This becomes clear when

comparing the 369th Infantry Division with the 373d.

Between May and July 1943, the 373d’s fi rst three months in the NDH,

the quality of its troops was considerably superior to that of the 369th’s.

Granted, they suffered shortages in specialist clothing and artillery for

mountain warfare, pack animals, suitable trucks, and interpreters.62 But

troop discipline and morale in the 373d was signifi cantly higher. An

after-action report by the division’s pioneer battalion commented on the

men’s “excellent” combat performance and their willingness to fi ght to

the end.63 At the end of June divisional command itself was similarly

upbeat about the troops’ mood.64 And the 373d, it seems, had itself to

thank. It credited itself with spotting the danger signs of sinking troop

morale, and moving immediately to counter them: “a noticeable dete-

rioration in discipline . . . was countered with appropriate measures.

The troops’ self-confi dence has risen, particularly in comparison with

Croatian (Army) units.”65 Not only was the troops’ morale healthy, but

their numbers also. In March the operations section reported that the

division’s roster of 10,730 men was actually fi fty-six more than it was sup-

posed to have.66

Yet if the 373d’s approach to its men’s discipline and morale was more

rigorous than the 369th’s, its approach to counterinsurgency was no less

harsh than the 369th’s. For an operation the division launched in the

230
terror in the balk ans

Cardaci region of southern Bosnia in early July, it directed that “suspect

persons are to be arrested. Those found with a weapon in their hands are

to be shot . . . Settlements which have aided the Partisans . . . are to be

razed to the ground. The bandits must be combated with ruthless harsh-

ness.”67 An order from mid-July, issued by the divisional commander

himself, Major General Emil Zellner, expressed the hope that “all units

under me or cooperating with me will continue to conduct themselves

with such ruthlessness against the Partisans in the cause of pacifying the

land . . . Our common struggle is against the disruption of order and the

Bolshevik-infected bandits!”68 Indeed, this directive contrasts not just

with those the 717th and 718th Infantry Divisions were producing at this

time, but even with those of the 369th. For ideological language as crude

as this, with all its talk of “Bolshevik infection,” is nowhere to be found

even in the 369th’s fi les during this period.69

Otherwise, though the condition of their troops was very different,

there was little difference in the pitiless attitudes of the divisional com-

mands of both the 369th and 373d. Whatever was hardening those atti-

tudes so intensely, then, it was more than just the condition of the troops.

Firstly, unlike the offi cers of the 717th and 718th Infantry Divisions, the

offi cers of the 369th and 373d Infantry Divisions were newcomers to the

NDH, to Bosnia, to the region’s labyrinthine interethnic relations, and to

counterinsurgency generally. This meant they had had no experience of

the complex reality on the ground. It also meant, by extension, that they

were less likely to see the need for a balanced, restrained, and insightful

approach, which engaged the population rather than terrorized it. Such,

after all, is the loathing with which regular forces have so often regarded

irregular forces, that the intricacies of cultivating a population caught

between Partisans and Germans were particularly likely to be lost on a

counterinsurgency unit that was “new to the game.” Granted, given the

interethnic mayhem besetting the region by this time, it is diffi cult to

conceive of how a relatively restrained approach might have succeeded

anyway. The point, however, is that some German army offi cers were

inclined to attempt something at least resembling such an approach,

while others were not.

The Devil’s Division
231

And there was greater chance of such an attempt coming from a unit,

such as the 718th Infantry Division, that had been stationed in one region

for a longer period.70 Following its experience of 1942, the 718th better

understood that it was the survival pressures civilians were facing, and