The essential writings of Machiavelli (22 page)

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR
S
TATES THAT ARE WELL ORGANIZED INTRODUCE REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS FOR THEIR CITIZENS, BUT NEVER LET THE GOOD DEEDS EXCUSE THE BAD

Horatius’s merit was great, as evidenced by his skill in defeating the Curiatii. But as he killed his sister, his sin was atrocious, and the murder so infuriated the Romans that they wanted to condemn him to death despite his merit having been so great and so recently demonstrated.
⁸³
Whoever considers this matter cursorily might regard it as an example of the ingratitude of the populace. But if one examines the matter more closely and gives some thought to the institutions that a state must have, one will sooner blame the populace for ultimately absolving Horatius than for having wanted to condemn him for his deed. The reason is that no state that is properly set up will ever allow a citizen’s merits to cancel out his demerits. A state ensures rewards for a good deed and punishment for a bad one. In other words, having rewarded a man for having done something good, the state must also punish him if he acts badly, and this without regard for any past good deeds. If this system is observed, a city will live in freedom for a long time; otherwise, it will rapidly come to ruin. Citizens who have committed a notable deed for the state are given the status that this deed brings them, but if they then become overweening and confident that they can commit bad deeds without fear of punishment, they will soon become so insolent that every form of civil life will disappear.

If one wishes to punish evil deeds it is also necessary to offer rewards for good deeds, as we have seen was the case in Rome. Even if a state is poor and can give only a little, it must not abstain from doing so, because any small gift given to reward a good deed, regardless of how great the deed might be, will be esteemed by him who receives it as an honorable and great reward. The story of Horatius Codes is well known, as is that of Mucius Scaevola: The first held off the enemy at a bridge until the bridge was destroyed, the other burned his hand for failing to kill Porsenna, the King of the Etruscans. The public gave each of these men a plot of land for their deeds.
⁸⁴
The story of Manlius Capitolinus is also noteworthy:
⁸⁵
He saved the Capitol from the Gauls who were besieging it, and was given as a reward a small measure of flour by his fellow citizens, who were besieged alongside him. This was a great reward if one considers the ill fortune that had befallen Rome.
⁸⁶
And yet when Manlius, moved either by envy or his evil nature to stir up sedition in Rome, tried to rouse the populace in dissension, he was cast down from the same Capitol that he had saved with so much glory, without regard for his past merits.

83.
In Roman legend, there were two sets of warring triplet brothers, the Roman Horatii and the Alban Curiatii. After two of the Horatii triplets were killed, the third—the Horatius whom Machiavelli mentions—killed the Curiatii triplets single-handedly. His sister, who was betrothed to one of the Curiatii, could not conceal her grief and was killed by Horatius.

84.
Machiavelli writes
due staiora
, two bushels, meaning the amount of land that can be sown with two bushels of grain.

85.
See chapter 8 above, in which Machiavelli discusses Manlius Capitolinus’s envy of Marcus Furius Camillus and Manlius’s subsequent sedition.

86.
Livy writes in Book V, chapter 47: “Each brought half a pound of grain and a dram of wine to his quarters, which had been set up in the fortress. It does not sound like much, but the scarcity made it a prodigious evidence of their affection.”

CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE
O
N HOW A RULER WHO WANTS TO REFORM AN OLD SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT IN A FREE STATE MUST KEEP AT LEAST A VENEER OF THE OLDER INSTITUTIONS

A ruler who desires to reform the government of a state and wants the government to be accepted and maintained to the satisfaction of everyone will have to keep at least a veneer of the old ways, so that it will not seem to the populace that the institutions have changed, even if the new institutions are completely different from the old ones. Men cherish something that seems like the real thing as much as they do the real thing itself: In fact, they are often more affected by that which seems than by that which is.
⁸⁷
When they achieved liberty at the beginning of the republic, the Romans knew that in creating two consuls instead of one king, they would not want them to have more than twelve lictors,
⁸⁸
so that they would not surpass the number that had ministered to the king. There was also an annual sacrifice in Rome that had been offered only by the king, and since the state did not want the people, for want of a king, to lack any of the old practices, they created a “king” of the sacrifice, and made him subordinate to the high priest.
⁸⁹
In this way the populace was satisfied by the sacrifice, and never had a reason, through its absence, to desire the return of the kings. This path must be followed by all who wish to eliminate an old way of life in a state and introduce a new and free way of life: because as new things change men’s minds, one must do one’s utmost to keep as much of the old as possible. If new magistrates differ in number, authority, and duration of office from the old ones, they should at least retain the titles that they had. This, as I have said, must be done by a legislator who wishes to set up a vital civic system, either by way of a republic or kingdom. But he who wishes to create a despotism, which the ancient authors called “tyranny,” will have to make everything new, as I will discuss in the following chapter.

87.
See also
The Prince
, chapter 18: “Though a prince need not have all the good qualities that I have mentioned, it is most necessary for him to appear to have them.”

88.
Functionaries who walked before the consuls when they appeared in public, carrying the fasces, a bundle of rods bound together around an ax as an emblem of authority.

89.
Livy writes in Book II, chapter 2: “Certain public rites had always been performed by the kings in person, and so that the lack of a king be nowhere regretted, a ‘King of Sacrifices’ was created. This office was made subordinate to the high priest, lest the combination of office and name threaten the people’s liberty, which at that time was a leading fear.”

CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX
O
N HOW A NEW PRINCE MUST MAKE EVERYTHING NEW IN A CITY OR STATE HE HAS TAKEN

A man who becomes the ruler of a city or state and does not follow the path of a monarchy or republic in establishing a civic life will find that, as a new ruler, the best way to keep this city or state is to make everything in it new. This is even more advisable when his footing is weak. In other words, he must create a new government with new offices that have new names and new powers and are occupied by new men. He must make the rich poor and the poor rich, as David did when he became king: “He has filled the hungry with good things and sent the rich away empty”
⁹⁰
Furthermore, he must build new cities and demolish those already built, move inhabitants from one place to another, and not leave a single thing intact in all the land. There must be no rank, institution, government, or wealth of which the owner does not acknowledge that it comes from the prince. The prince must take as his model Philip of Macedon, the father of Alexander the Great, who by these methods turned himself from a small king into the King of Greece. Justinius, writing about Philip, says that he moved men from province to province the way shepherds move their flocks.
⁹¹
These methods are very cruel and hostile to every way of life, not only the Christian, and a ruler should avoid them and prefer to live as a private citizen rather than as a king who unleashes so much ruin on people. Nevertheless, if he wishes to remain in power, a prince who does not want to choose the good course must choose the course of evil. Men, however, usually take a middle course that is most destructive, because they do not know how to be entirely good or entirely bad, as I will discuss in the following chapter.

90.
Machiavelli quotes the Bible, Luke 1:53, in Latin:
Esurientes implevit bonis et divites dimisit inanes
.

91.
In
Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus
, Justin writes (Book VIII, chapter 5): “Just as shepherds drive their flocks at times into winter pastures, at times into summer pastures, so he transplanted people and cities from one place to another.”

CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN
O
N THE RARITY OF MAN BEING ENTIRELY GOOD OR ENTIRELY BAD

When Pope Julius II went to Bologna in 1505 in order to drive out the Bentivogli,
⁹²
who had been princes in that city for a hundred years, he also wanted to remove Giampaolo Baglioni from Perugia, of which he was tyrant, as the pope conspired against all the tyrants who were occupying the lands of the Church. Arriving before Perugia with that spirit and intent known to all, he did not wait to enter the city with his army that would have protected him, but entered unarmed, even though Giampaolo was inside with the many men he had gathered to defend him. Thus the pope, escorted only by his personal entourage, and driven by the rage with which he conducted all his affairs, put himself in the hands of his enemy Giampaolo, who then meekly followed him out of the city, leaving behind a governor who would do justice in the name of the Church. The prudent men who attended the pope commented on the pope’s recklessness and Giampaolo’s cowardice,
⁹³
nor could they understand why Giampaolo had not, to his everlasting fame, crushed his enemy the pope and enriched himself with plunder, since all the cardinals in the pope’s entourage carried much wealth with them. Nor could they believe that he had refrained out of goodness or conscience: There could hardly have been any pious respect in the heart of a ruthless man who kept his sister as mistress and who had killed his cousins and nephews in order to rule.
⁹⁴
So the consensus was that men often do not know how to be perfectly good or honorably evil, and when an evil deed has grandeur or is in some part generous, a man will often not know how to carry it off.

Thus Giampaolo, who was unconcerned about committing incest and ostentatiously murdering his family, did not know how, or to put it better, did not dare, when the perfect opportunity presented itself, to pull off a feat for which everyone would have admired him, making a name for himself to all eternity for being the first to show the prelates how little those who live and rule as they do should be esteemed. The greatness of this feat would have surpassed any infamy or danger that could have sprung from it.

92.
Giovanni Bentivoglio (1443–1508) had been Gonfalonier of Bologna until Pope Paul II made him chief senator for life in 1466. Pope Julius II, however, excommunicated and ousted him from Bologna in 1506.

93.
Machiavelli was in Pope Julius II’s retinue at Perugia.

94.
Giampaolo Baglioni (c. 1470–1520). In 1500, when his uncle Guido Baglioni was ruler of Perugia, Giampaolo’s cousins Carlo and Grifonetto attempted to seize power by assassinating all the other members of the family. Giampaolo violently suppressed their attempt and seized power himself.

CHAPTER TWENTY-NINE
O
N WHO IS MORE UNGRATEFUL, A POPULACE OR A PRINCE

It seems to me relevant to our subject to examine who has shown greater instances of ingratitude, a populace or a prince. So that we can weigh this question more effectively, I would like to suggest that the vice of ingratitude is sparked by either avarice or suspicion. If a populace or a prince has sent a general on an important campaign through which he will attain much glory if he is victorious, the prince or populace must reward the general when he returns. But if instead, when the general returns, he is dishonored or harmed and not given the reward he deserves out of parsimony or greed, then this is an unforgivable error that carries with it everlasting infamy. Yet many princes have committed this error, and Tacitus gives us the reason in the line: “Man is much more inclined to requite wrongs than reward any benefit done to him, because gratitude is burdensome, while revenge seems to offer gain.”
⁹⁵
But when the reason that a prince or populace does not reward the victorious general but harms him is not parsimony, but suspicion, the prince or the populace can be excused. One reads much about this kind of ingratitude. It happens because the general, who with exceptional skill and prowess has acquired an empire for his prince—conquering his enemies, and covering himself with glory and his soldiers with riches—will unavoidably gain so much standing with his soldiers, his enemies, and even the prince’s citizens that the general’s victory cannot augur well for the prince who sent him. Because man’s nature is ruthless and suspicious, and will not set limits to its aspirations, it is inevitable that the suspicion immediately sparked in a prince after his general’s victory will be triggered by some arrogant action or remark of the general. Consequently, the prince cannot think of anything but how to secure himself against the general, and to do this will consider killing him or taking away the standing and reputation he has gained with the army or populace, demonstrating that this victory was the result not of the general’s skill and courage but of Fortune, the cowardice of the enemy, or the judicious tactics of the other commanders involved in the battle.

When Vespasian was in Judea his troops declared him emperor.
⁹⁶
Antonius Primus, who was leading another army in Illyria,
⁹⁷
formed an allegiance with him and marched on Italy against the Emperor Vitellus, who was reigning in Rome. With great skill Antonius Primus destroyed two of Vitellus’s armies and occupied Rome, so that when Mucianus, who had been sent by Vespasian, arrived in Rome, he found that Antonius had skillfully seen to everything and that every difficulty had been overcome. Yet Antonius’s reward was that Mucianus immediately stripped him of command of the army, and little by little took away any authority he had in Rome. Antonius turned to Vespasian, who was still in Asia, but he stripped Antonius of all military rank, and Antonius later died in quite desperate circumstances. The histories are filled with such examples. In our own times we all know with what skill and application Gonsalvo Ferrante fought in the Kingdom of Naples for King Ferdinand of Aragon against the French. Gonsalvo Ferrante was victorious over the French and conquered Naples, but the reward for his victory was that King Ferdinand immediately came to Naples, stripped him of his command, took from him his fortresses, and then brought him back to Spain, where he soon died in obscurity.

This suspicion in princes is so natural that they cannot avoid it, which makes it impossible for them to show gratitude to a general who has been victorious and has made great acquisitions under their flags. If a prince cannot avoid this, it is no miracle that a populace cannot either, because if a state living in freedom has two goals—one to acquire territory, the other to remain free—it stands to reason that it will err from excessive zeal in achieving either of these goals. Regarding the errors that a state makes in its attempts to acquire territory, I shall discuss those at an appropriate point.
⁹⁸
As for the errors it makes to secure its freedom, there are, among others, harming the citizens it ought to reward, and suspecting those it should trust. In a republic that has become corrupted, these methods are a cause of great evil, and many times such a republic is quick to turn into a tyranny, as happened in Rome with Caesar, who seized by force what ingratitude had denied him. Nevertheless, in a republic that is not corrupted, these methods are the cause of much good: They ensure that the republic stays free, since men, out of fear of punishment, tend to remain good and less ambitious for power. It is true that, for the reasons I have discussed above, Rome proved the least ungrateful among all the peoples who ever had an empire. It can be said that the only example of Rome’s ingratitude was that to Scipio, because Coriolanus and Camillus were exiled on account of their offenses against the plebeians.
⁹⁹
Coriolanus was never forgiven, because he had always been hostile toward the populace, while Camillus was not only called back from exile, but subsequently venerated for the rest of his life as if he were a prince. The ingratitude shown Scipio, however, arose from suspicion that the citizens began to have of him such as they had never had of others. This was because of the greatness of the enemy whom Scipio had defeated,
¹⁰⁰
the standing that a victory after such a long and perilous war had secured him, the speed of this victory, and the favors that his youth, prudence, and other memorable qualities had acquired for him. These were so many factors that even the Roman magistrates were afraid of his power, which displeased wise men as a thing unheard of in Rome. Scipio’s position seemed so extraordinary that Cato the Elder, who was known for his saintly temperament, was the first to attack him, maintaining that a state could not call itself free if one of its citizens was feared by the magistrates. Had the people of Rome followed Cato’s opinion in this case, they would have deserved the excuse that I offered above for those princes and populaces that are ungrateful out of suspicion. Concluding this discourse, I would like to emphasize once more that the vice of ingratitude occurs either from parsimony or suspicion. But we will find that a populace never shows ingratitude out of parsimony, and they are less inclined than are princes to show ingratitude out of suspicion, since a populace has less reason to be suspicious, as I will discuss below.

95.
Machiavelli quotes Tacitus,
Histories
, Book IV, chapter 3, in Latin:
Tanto proclivius est iniuriae quam beneficio vicem exolvere, quia gratia oneri, ultio in quaestu habetur
.

96.
Vespasian was Roman emperor from 69 to 79 CE. Tacitus, in
Histories
, Book II, describes his rise from humble origins to the throne.

97.
According to Tacitus (Book II, chapter 86), Antonius was not in Illyria, but in Pannonia.

98.
In the following chapter.

99.
For Coriolanus, see chapter 7 above; for Camillus, chapter 8 above.

100.
The enemy was Hannibal.