The essential writings of Machiavelli (26 page)

CHAPTER FIFTY-THREE
O
N HOW, DECEIVED BY A FALSE KIND OF GOOD, THE POPULACE OFTEN DESIRES ITS OWN RUIN, AND HOW EASILY IT IS MOVED BY GREAT HOPES AND BOLD PROMISES

After the city of Veii was defeated, the populace of Rome came upon the idea that it might be good if half the Romans went to live in Veii.
¹²⁷
They reasoned that as Veii was rich in territory and buildings and was also close to Rome, half the population of Rome could be made richer without great upheaval. The Senate and the wiser Romans, however, considered this so futile and dangerous that they openly declared they would rather face death than consent to such an idea. Consequently, when the matter came up for debate, the plebeians were so incensed against the Senate that arms and bloodshed would have ensued had not the Senate used some elderly and esteemed citizens as a shield, the reverence the plebeians had for them putting a halt to the clamor.
¹²⁸
Two things are of note here. First, the populace will often be misled by a deceptive appearance of good, and consequently end up desiring its own ruin; for if the populace is not made to understand what is good and what is bad by someone it trusts, endless danger and harm can come to a state.
¹²⁹
And when fate has it that the populace does not have faith in anyone, as sometimes happens, having been duped in the past by men or events, this inevitably leads to ruin. In his discourse
De monarchic
, Dante says that the populace at times shouts: “Long live their death! Death to their life!”
¹³⁰
Because of this lack of faith, states sometimes do not reach good decisions, as I have said above about the Venetians: When all their enemies came together and assaulted them, the Venetians did not manage to decide, before they were ruined, to give back territories they had occupied (which had given rise to the conspiracy of princes
¹³¹
and the war that was waged against them), even though giving back these territories would have won over some of their enemies.

Therefore, in considering what it is easy to persuade a populace of, or what is difficult, the following distinction can be made: What you must persuade it of appears at first glance a gain or a loss, or appears courageous or cowardly. And when the populace sees a gain in the matters placed before it, even if there is a loss hiding behind these matters, it will always be easy to persuade it to follow that path as long as it seems courageous, even if it leads to the ruin of the republic. Likewise, it will always be difficult to convince the populace about those decisions where there is seeming cowardice or loss, even if behind them there is hidden security and gain. My point is confirmed by countless examples, Roman and foreign, ancient and modern. From this arose the bad opinion in Rome concerning Fabius Maximus,
¹³²
who could not persuade the Roman populace that it would be good for the republic to proceed slowly in the Punic War, and to endure Hannibal’s attacks without confronting them. The populace considered this option cowardly, and did not see the value hidden behind it, nor did Fabius Maximus present enough reasons to convince them. The Roman populace was so blinded by its opinion that even though it had committed the error of authorizing Fabius’s Master of the Horse
¹³³
to fight Hannibal, though Fabius was against it, the Roman army would have been destroyed if Fabius had not with his prudence saved the day. But the Roman populace did not learn from this, and went ahead and made Varro consul for no other merit than his promises in Rome’s public places and squares to defeat Hannibal if he were given the authority to do so.
¹³⁴
The result was the utter disaster at Cannae and the near destruction of Rome.

I would also like to put forward another Roman example: Hannibal had been in Italy for nine or ten years, killing Romans throughout the land, when Marcus Centennius Paenula, a man of very humble origins (though he did hold a position of rank in the army), came to the Senate and declared that if he were given the authority to gather an army of volunteers anywhere in Italy he pleased, he would in short order deliver Hannibal dead or alive.
¹³⁵
The Senate saw his demand as extremely rash, but felt that if it were to turn him down and the populace were to find out, much turmoil and resentment against senatorial order would have ensued. So Paenula’s request was granted, as the Senate preferred to put all those who followed him in danger than to spark new anger in the people, knowing that such a decision would be popular and how difficult it would be to dissuade the people from it. So Paenula marched out with a disorderly and unruly rabble to find Hannibal, and at the very first encounter was routed and killed along with all the men who followed him.

In Greece, in the city of Athens, a most grave and prudent man by the name of Niceas could not persuade the populace that it was a bad idea to invade Sicily, so when this idea was adopted against the wishes of the wise, the result was the complete destruction of Athens. When Scipio was made consul and wanted to conquer Africa, promising the destruction of Carthage, the Senate was unresolved, as Fabius Maximus was against it. So Scipio threatened to put the matter before the people, knowing very well how they liked such enterprises.

One could also give examples from our own city of Florence: Ercole Bentivoglio, along with Antonio Giacomini, commander of the Florentine troops, after having routed Bartolommeo d’Alviano at San Vincenti, besieged the city of Pisa. This campaign had been agreed to by the populace following the bold promises of Ercole Bentivoglio, even though many wise citizens condemned it. But the wise could do nothing, forced as they were by the will of the people, which was based on the rash promises of the commander. Hence I suggest that there is no easier way to ruin a republic where the populace has power than to engage it in bold campaigns, because where the populace carries weight in the deliberations, bold campaigns will be always accepted: Whoever might be of a different opinion will not be able to do anything about it. But if this causes the ruin of the state, it also causes—and this even more often—the ruin of the citizens in charge of such enterprises, because when the populace has taken victory for granted, when the defeat comes it does not accuse Fortune or the circumstances of war but the commander’s wickedness and ignorance. In most cases he is then killed, imprisoned, or banished, as happened to countless Carthaginian generals and many Athenians. Previous victories are of no use to them because their present defeat cancels everything. This was the case with our Florentine general Antonio Giacomini, who, failing to conquer Pisa as he had promised and as the populace had been certain he would, fell into such disgrace with the people that, despite his countless successes in the past, he remained alive more because of the indulgence of those in power than that of the people.

127.
Rome defeated Veii, a wealthy and important Etruscan city-state that lay ten miles northwest of Rome (modern Veio), after a decade-long siege in 395
BCE
. Machiavelli is closely following the text of Livy (Book V, chapter 24).

128.
Machiavelli closely follows Livy’s text (Book V, chapter 25).

129.
The second thing of note is discussed at the beginning of the following chapter.

130.
In fact, Dante’s
Il Convivio (The Banquet)
, I, 2.

131.
Machiavelli is referring to the League of Cambrai, formed in 1508 by Pope Julius II with the Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian I, Louis XII of France, and Ferdinand II of Aragon against Venice, with the aim of dividing its territorial possessions among them.

132.
Fabius Maximus Quintus (d. 203
BCE
) was a Roman commander and statesman whose cautious delaying tactics during the war against Hannibal gave Rome time to recover its strength and take the offensive. Machiavelli is discussing the events described by Livy in Book XXII, chapters 25–27.

133.
Fabius’s effective delay tactics sparked controversy in Rome and a quarrel with Minucius Rufus, his Master of the Horse and second in command. In an unprecedented action, the people of Rome then divided the command between Minucius and Fabius.

134.
The Roman consuls of 216
BCE
, Lucius Aemilius Paulus and Gaius Terentius Varro, set out to meet Hannibal in the disastrous Battle of Cannae with eighty thousand men, of whom only fourteen thousand escaped. (Livy, Book XXII, chapter 35.)

135.
Livy (Book XXV, chapter 19) comments: “The promise was foolish, but just as foolish was the credence it received. As though the skills of an ordinary soldier could be the same as those of a commander.”

CHAPTER FIFTY-FOUR
O
N THE EXTENT TO WHICH A MAN OF GRAVITY AND RESPECT CAN HALT AN AROUSED MULTITUDE

The second thing of note concerning my discussion in the previous chapter is that nothing is as effective at halting an aroused multitude as its reverence for a man of gravity and authority who confronts them. Virgil does not say without reason:

Yet if they see a man who is revered through goodness and merit,
they will fall mute and crowd around him to listen to his words.
¹³⁶

Therefore a man who is given command of an army, or who finds himself in a city where there is turmoil, must step before the crowd with as much dignity as he can, surrounded by all the insignia of his rank, in order to make himself more revered. A few years ago Florence was divided into two factions, the Frateschi and the Arrabbiati, as they called themselves.
¹³⁷
These factions came to blows and the Frateschi were crushed. Among them was Pagolantonio Soderini, a citizen of repute in those days, and during the turmoil the armed mob headed to his house to sack it. His brother Francesco, then the Bishop of Volterra and today a cardinal, happened to be there, and the instant he heard the clamor and saw the crowd, put on his most venerable garment and over it the episcopal vestment. He confronted the armed crowd, and by his august presence and words managed to stop them. This incident was admired and celebrated throughout the city for many days.

Hence I conclude that the best and most certain way of halting an aroused multitude is the presence of a man who appears venerable and is revered. Thus, to return to the incident discussed in the previous chapter, it can be seen with what obstinacy the Roman plebeians entertained the idea of moving to Veii because they judged it sensible and did not perceive the dangers it concealed, and how there would have been endless turmoil and upheaval had the Senate not used grave and revered men to halt the plebeians’ frenzy.

136.
Machiavelli quotes Virgil’s
Aeneid
, 1.151-52, in Latin:
Tum pietate gravem ac meritis si forte virum quem/Conspexere, silent, arrectisque auribus adstant
.

137.
The Frateschi were the followers of Savonarola, the Arrabbiati opposed him.

CHAPTER FIFTY-FIVE
O
N HOW EASILY THINGS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED IN A STATE WHERE THE POPULACE IS NOT CORRUPTED, AND ON HOW ONE CANNOT CREATE A PRINCIPALITY WHERE THERE IS EQUALITY, OR A REPUBLIC WHERE THERE IS NO EQUALITY

I have already discussed at length what is to be feared or hoped for from a corrupted state,
¹³⁸
but it nevertheless strikes me as fitting to consider a decision of the Roman Senate concerning Camillus’s vow to give Apollo one-tenth of the spoils gathered from the people of Veii.
¹³⁹
These spoils had come into the hands of the Roman plebeians, and as the Senate was unable to check their value, it passed an edict that everyone should deliver to the treasury a tenth of what they had plundered. To the plebeians’ relief, however, the Senate ultimately decided on a different course of action, having settled on another way of pleasing Apollo, and this decision was not carried out.
¹⁴⁰
Nevertheless, it is evident to what extent the Senate had confidence in the plebeians’ honesty, and how it thought that no one would refrain from delivering exactly what the edict commanded. It is also evident that the plebeians did not think of cheating by giving less than they owed, since they strove instead to free themselves of the edict by voicing their outright indignation at it. This example, along with many others already cited, shows how much honesty and pious integrity this populace possessed, and how much good one could expect of it. In fact, nothing good is to be expected where such honesty is lacking, as we see from the states of our era which are so corrupted—Italy above all others. Even France and Spain have some of that corruption, though one does not see as much tumult in those countries as Italy faces every day. In those other countries this does not come so much from the populace’s honesty, which is to a large extent absent, as it does from their having a king who keeps them united, not only through his expertise and skill, but with the help of institutions that are not yet corrupted. This honesty and pious integrity are very apparent in Germany, with the result that many of its states are free, and observe their laws, so that no one dares occupy them, from within or without.
¹⁴¹
In order to demonstrate how true it is that there is a good measure of this ancient honesty in the German states, I would like to give an example similar to the one cited above concerning the Roman Senate and plebeians. When the German states need to spend an amount of money for the benefit of the public, the empowered magistrates or councils solicit from all citizens one or two percent of what each has in revenue. When this decision has been made according to the institutions of the state, each citizen presents himself before the tax collectors and, taking an oath to pay the proper sum, drops whatever his conscience compels him to donate into a box set up for that purpose. The man who pays is the sole witness of the amount he pays. From this we can conjecture how much honesty and pious integrity is still present in these men, and it must be assumed that everyone pays the correct sum, otherwise the tax revenue anticipated based on previous collections would not have tallied with the amount received. Should the amounts not tally, the deception would be discovered and another method of collection would have been instituted. Such honesty is all the more admirable in our times, when it has become rarer. In fact, it now seems to exist only in Germany.

There are two reasons for this. The first is that the Germans have not had extensive contact with their neighbors, because neither they nor their neighbors travel to each other’s lands; each is content with his goods and produce, and happy enough to clothe himself in the wool his land provides. This has removed the reason for any contact and the source of any corruption, because the Germans have not been able to pick up French, Spanish, or Italian customs, these nations taken together being the corruption of the world. The second reason is that the states that have an uncorrupted and vital civic order do not allow for any of their citizens to act or live in the manner of a “gentleman”: In fact the citizens maintain equality among themselves and are great enemies of the gentlemen and men of substance of that land. If by chance they get their hands on any of these worthies, they are killed as the source of corruption and the reason for turmoil.

I shall clarify what the title “gentleman” signifies. A gentleman lives in idleness and luxury off the profits of his possessions; he does not concern himself with the cultivation of the land, or submit himself to any of the toil necessary to live. In every state and land such men are pernicious, but even more pernicious are those men who have even greater fortunes, with castles and subjects who obey them. The Kingdom of Naples, the Papal States, the Romagna, and Lombardy are filled with both these kinds of gentleman. This is the reason that no republic or vital civic order has ever come about in those lands, because men of this kind are entirely hostile to any form of civil life. To introduce a republic into such states would be impossible, but if someone wanted to reorganize them entirely—that is, if someone were to serve as arbitrator—his only recourse would be to establish a kingdom. This is because where there is so much corruption that laws are not sufficient to halt it, one must combine laws with a larger force. This larger force must be a royal hand that with extreme and absolute authority restrains the excessive ambition and corruption of the powerful. This idea is supported by the example of Tuscany, where for a long time three republics—Florence, Siena, and Lucca—existed over a relatively small territory. Although the other states of Tuscany are in a sense subservient to them, it is evident from their spirit and their institutions that they maintain, or at least would like to maintain, their liberty. This has come about because in Tuscany there is no lord of the castle and very few if any gentlemen, but rather the kind of equality that would enable a ruler with foresight and some knowledge of ancient civilizations to introduce civic life. Yet the ill fortune of Tuscany itself has been so great that up to our times this task has fallen to no man who has known how to do this, or has been able to accomplish it.

It is therefore possible to draw the following conclusions from this discourse: He who wishes to set up a republic in a state that has many gentlemen cannot do so unless he first eliminates them all, and he who wishes to set up a kingdom or principality where there is great equality cannot do so unless he raises many of the restless and ambitious spirits out of that equality and makes them gentlemen in fact and not just in name, giving them castles and possessions and favoring them with property and men. Placed in their midst, the new ruler will then maintain his power, while they, through him, will satisfy their ambitions. The rest of the citizenry can be compelled to bear the yoke that force and force alone will make them bear. With this method there will be a balance between the citizenry who oppress and the citizenry who are oppressed, and so all men will remain within their rank. Turning a state suited to be a kingdom into a republic, or one suited to be a republic into a kingdom, is a task for a man of rare intellect and power: Many have tried but few have succeeded. The magnitude of the task partly bewilders and partly hinders them, so that they inevitably fail in the very first stages of their attempt.

My argument that one cannot set up a republic where there are gentlemen might appear to be challenged by the example of the Venetian Republic, in which only gentlemen have any standing. My only reply to this is that the Venetian example does not conflict with what I have said, because the gentlemen of Venice are gentlemen in name more than in actuality, as they do not draw great revenues from their possessions. Their great wealth is founded on commerce and trade. What is more, none of these gentlemen owns a castle or has any jurisdiction over others. In Venice, the appellation of “gentleman” is one of dignity and rank and without any of the characteristics associated with gentlemen in other states. Just as the citizenry of all republics are divided into various appellations, so is Venice divided between gentlemen and commoners. Venetian gentlemen hold or can hold any office, while commoners are entirely excluded. This, however, does not create unrest in Venice, for reasons that I have already discussed.
¹⁴²
Thus you can found a republic where great equality exists or has existed, or set up a principality where there is great inequality. Otherwise you will create a system that lacks balance and will not endure.
¹⁴³

138.
In chapters 16–18 above.

139.
Livy writes (Book V, chapter 21) that before setting out to conquer Veii, Camillus had sworn to give Apollo one-tenth of the plunder, should he be successful.

140.
Livy writes (Book V, chapter 25) that it was decided that as Rome had gained the territories of Veii, one-tenth of their worth would be estimated and the money taken from the treasury. “But when it turned out that the money was not enough […] the matrons brought jewelry to the treasury.”

141.
On the freedom of German cities see also
The Prince
, chapter 10, titled “Of How the Strength of Principalities Is to Be Measured.”

142.
See chapters 5 and 6 above.

143.
Machiavelli means a system that will lack proportion between those who rule and those who are ruled.