The essential writings of Machiavelli (30 page)

CHAPTER TWENTY
O
N THE DANGERS TO A PRINCE OR REPUBLIC IN MAKING USE OF AN AUXILIARY OR MERCENARY ARMY

Had I not discussed at length in another of my works the uselessness of a mercenary and auxiliary army as opposed to the usefulness of one’s own, I would have extended my discussion further in this chapter.
¹⁸⁰
But as I have already discussed this matter extensively, I shall be brief. However, I did not think it appropriate to pass over it entirely, as I found in Livy so many examples of the use of auxiliary troops. Auxiliary troops are those which another prince or republic sends to help you, and which they pay and command. Turning to Livy’s text,
¹⁸¹
the Romans had in two instances routed Samnite armies with troops that they had sent to help the Campanians who were warring with the Samnites. Having freed the Campanians from the Samnites, the Romans returned to Rome, leaving two legions in their city of Capua as a defense force so that the Campanians would not fall prey to the Samnites again. These legions succumbed to idleness, which they came to enjoy so much that they forgot Rome and their duty to the Senate, and decided to take up arms and become masters of the territory they had so skillfully defended. In their view, the Campanians were not worthy of owning the land they could not defend.
¹⁸²
When Rome realized what was happening, it intervened, as I shall discuss in greater detail when I talk about conspiracies.
¹⁸³
Therefore I repeat: Of all the kinds of soldiers, auxiliary troops are the most harmful, because the prince or republic that resorts to them has no authority over them; only he who has sent the auxiliary troops does. As I have pointed out, auxiliary troops are sent by a ruler under the command of his own generals and banners, and are paid by him, as was the army that the Romans had sent to Capua. After a victory, such troops will in most cases prey on those who called upon them for defense as well as those whom they were there to fight. These auxiliaries will do this either through the malignity of the ruler who sent them, or because of their own ambitions. Though Rome had intended to uphold its treaties and agreements with the Campanians, those two legions had overcome the Campanians with such ease that Rome did not long hesitate to seize their government and territories. One could cite many examples, but I would like this one to suffice, along with that of the people of Rhegium, whose lives and lands were taken by a legion that the Romans had sent to defend them.
¹⁸⁴

Therefore, princes or republics must choose any means other than auxiliary troops to defend them if they have to depend on them entirely, because any pact or agreement with the enemy, no matter how harsh, will be easier to bear than this alternative. If one reads carefully about past events and examines present events, one will find that for every ruler who benefited from auxiliary troops there have been countless rulers who were deceived. An ambitious prince or republic cannot hope for a better opportunity to occupy a city or country than to be asked to send in his army to defend it. Consequently, anyone so ambitious as to call in an auxiliary army, not only in his own defense but in order to attack others, is seeking to acquire territory he cannot hold and which can easily be taken from him. But man’s ambition is so great that in order to satisfy a wish of the moment, he will not think of the evil that will soon enough descend upon him as a result. Nor do examples from ancient times move him in this or any other matter we have discussed, because if man took notice of them, he would understand that the more generosity he shows toward his neighbors and the more disinclination to occupy them, the more eager they will be to throw themselves into his arms.

180.
See
The Prince
, chapter 12, titled “Of the Different Types of Armies, and of Mercenaries,” and chapter 13, titled “The Auxiliary Army, the Citizen Army, and the Army That Combines the Two.”

181.
Livy, Book VII, chapter 33 and following.

182.
Livy (Book VII, chapter 38) writes: “The soldiers, beguiled by all the pleasures and delights around them, soon relinquished all memory of Rome. In the winter they gathered together to conspire on how they might seize Capua by illicit means. […] ‘Why should these lands, the most fertile in all of Italy, and this worthy city, belong to the Campanians, who cannot even defend their lives or their possessions? Why should Capua not belong to our victorious army, the army that drove away the Samnites with our sweat and blood?’”

183.
See Book III, chapter 6, p. 285.

184.
Polybius in
Histories
(Book I, chapter 7) writes: “The people of Rhegium, when Pyrrhus was crossing to Italy […] requested protection and help from the Romans. A Roman garrison of four thousand, under the command of a Campanian named Decius, entered the city and for a time preserved it and the people’s faith […] but attracted to the pleasant land and the private wealth of the citizens, they seized the city.”

CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX
I
NSULTS AND AFFRONTS GIVE RISE TO HATRED AGAINST THOSE WHO USE THEM, WITHOUT CONFERRING ANY BENEFIT

I believe that one of man’s most prudent courses of action is to abstain from threatening or abusing with words, because neither the one nor the other reduces the enemy’s strength: threats make the enemy more cautious, while verbal abuse will fan their hatred of you and make them think more actively of ways to harm you. One can see this in the example of the people of Veii, who, to the injury of war against the Romans, added the insult of dishonoring them with words.
¹⁸⁵
Any prudent commander will prevent his soldiers from doing this, as it only stirs up the enemy and inspires them to vengeance without in any way impeding their attack, so that dishonoring with words is in fact a weapon that turns against you.

A noteworthy example of this occurred in Asia: Cobades, commander of the Persian army, had been besieging the city of Amida for a long time and decided to retreat, worn out by the tedium of the siege. He was already decamping when the men of Amida came out onto the walls and, arrogant in their victory, unleashed every kind of abuse, insulting Cobades and his men and rebuking them for their cowardice and indolence. Cobades was so angered by the insults that he resumed the siege, and in his fury took and sacked the city within a few days. The same happened to the people of Veii, who, as I have said, were not content with waging war on the Romans, but also attacked them with words. The men of Veii climbed onto their stockades and shouted insults at the Romans, hurting them more with their words than with their weapons: and the Roman soldiers, who had initially been pressed into this war against their will, now compelled the consuls to take up the fight. Consequently the people of Veii, like the people of Amida, paid the penalty for their arrogance.

Hence good generals and statesmen must take every measure so that insults and invective are not used by the state or the army, neither among themselves nor against the enemy. If they insult the enemy, they run the risk of the trouble I have just mentioned, and if they insult each other it is even worse, unless they are careful, as wise men have always been. The Roman legions left stationed in Campania conspired against the Campanians, and the conspiracy gave rise to a mutiny, as I shall narrate in the proper place.
¹⁸⁶
The mutiny was then suppressed by Valerius Corvinus, and among the provisions in the agreement was that the severest penalties would be used against anyone who rebuked any of the soldiers for that mutiny
¹⁸⁷
During the Punic War, Tiberius Gracchus was given command of a number of slaves whom the Romans had armed because they were short of men. One of the first things he did was to introduce capital punishment for anyone who would hold the former slavery of any of these men against them. The Romans considered insulting a man or reproaching greater anger, whether the words were true or spoken in jest. “For him for a shameful matter extremely harmful, as has been mentioned above, because nothing would inflame his spirit so much nor generate when they draw excessively from the truth, sharp jests leave a bitter memory”
¹⁸⁸

185.
Livy (Book II, chapter 45) writes: “[The soldiers of Veii] rode right up to the Roman camp and challenged the Romans. When this had no effect, they shouted insults at army and consuls alike, declaring that the consuls were using internal discord as an excuse to cover up the cowardice of their men […] Right beside the ramparts and gates of the camp the Etruscans shouted comments, true as well as false, on the upstart nature and descent of the Roman race. The consuls remained calm, but the ignorant soldiers were filled with rage and shame […] So contemptuous and arrogant were the enemy’s taunts that all the soldiers crowded around the general’s tent, demanding battle.”

186.
See Book III, chapter 6 below. See also Machiavelli’s other discussions of the Campanians (pp. 243 and 285)

187.
Livy (Book VII, chapter 41) writes: “[The dictator] with the permission of the Senate had the populace, which was assembled in the Petilian Grove, swear that no proceedings would be brought against soldiers who had defected. He also asked the people to grant him the favor that they would never, either in jest or in earnest, reproach any of them.”

188.
Machiavelli presents in Latin an altered quote of Tacitus:
Nam facetiae asperae, quando nimium ex vero traxere, acrem sui memoriam relinquunt
. Tacitus in fact writes (Annals XV, 68):
[Nero] ferociam amici metuit, saepe asperis facetiis inlusus, quae ubi multum ex vero traxere, acrem sui memoriam relinquunt
. (“[Nero] feared the ferocity of his friend, who often mocked him with the kind of cruel humor that, when it draws too much on the truth, leaves a bitter memory”).

CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN
P
RUDENT PRINCES AND REPUBLICS SHOULD BE CONTENT WITH VICTORY, BECAUSE WHEN THEY ARE NOT, THEY USUALLY LOSE

Insulting the enemy usually arises from arrogance brought on by victory or a false hope of victory. This false hope makes men err not only in what they say but also in what they do. Once hope enters the heart, it causes man to go too far and risk losing a benefit that is certain in the hope of gaining an even better one that is, however, uncertain. This is a point that merits consideration, because men often let such hope lead them astray to the detriment of their city or state. As I cannot demonstrate my point as clearly with pure reasoning, I would like to demonstrate it with ancient and modern examples.

After Hannibal had routed the Romans at Cannae, he sent emissaries back to Carthage to inform them of his victory and request help.
¹⁸⁹
The Carthaginian senate deliberated, and Hanno, an old and prudent citizen, advised that Carthage use its victory wisely and make peace with the Romans. As victors, Hanno argued, the Carthaginians could negotiate a peace with optimal stipulations: It would be a mistake to wait for a defeat to negotiate peace. The Carthaginians’ intention should be to prove to the Romans that the Carthaginians were capable of defeating them, and having achieved victory, Hanno declared, they should not risk losing this opportunity in the hope of an even greater one. Hanno’s suggestion was not adopted, though later the Carthaginian senate, after the opportunity had been lost, saw only too clearly how wise his suggestion had been.

After Alexander the Great had conquered all the East, the Republic of Tyre became aware of Alexander’s importance. Tyre was illustrious and powerful in those days, as its city, like Venice, was on the sea. They sent emissaries to him, avowing that though they were prepared to honor him in every way, they were not prepared to accept him or his men on their land. Alexander was angered that a city would, unlike the rest of the world, close its gates to him. He rebuffed their offer, refused their conditions, and began a siege. Situated on the water, the city was well supplied with the provisions and ammunition necessary for its defense. Within four months Alexander realized that, to Tyre’s glory, this single city had taken up more of his time than many of his other conquests, and so he proposed a treaty, agreeing to all the conditions Tyre had initially stipulated. But the people of Tyre, swollen with pride, did not want to accept his offer, and even killed the emissaries he had sent. Alexander was outraged, and attacked Tyre with such fury that he conquered and destroyed it, killing and enslaving all its people.
¹⁹⁰

In 1512 a Spanish army marched into Florentine territory to return the Medici to power and levy tribute on the city. They had been summoned by citizens who had given them hope that the moment they set foot on Florentine land the inhabitants would take up arms in their support. When they marched in, however, they found no one there, and as they were short of supplies they attempted to reach an agreement with Florence. But swollen with pride, the people of Florence rejected this offer, which led to the loss of Prato and the fall of the Florentine government.

Therefore rulers who are attacked cannot make a greater mistake, when they are attacked by men far more powerful, than to refuse a treaty, particularly when it is offered to them. This treaty will never be so unfavorable that it will not in some way benefit the ruler who accepts it, and will be part of his victory. The people of Tyre should have been satisfied that Alexander accepted the conditions he had at first refused. It would have been a sufficient victory for them to have been able, weapons in hand, to make such a man bow to their will. The Florentines also should have been satisfied with the lesser victory of the Spanish army, ceding to some of their wishes without satisfying them all, because the intention of the Spanish army was to overthrow the government of Florence, sever its connection with France, and extract a tribute from the city. If of these three intentions the Spanish army had achieved the last two and allowed the Florentine people to keep their government intact, both sides would have had some honor and some satisfaction. Nor, if they could have kept their liberty, would the Florentine people have needed to care about their old alliance with France or having to pay a tribute to the Spanish army. The Florentines, even if they saw a bigger and almost certain victory within their grasp, put their fate at the discretion of Fortune, staking everything on one card, something a prudent man will do only as a last resort.

After sixteen years of glory, Hannibal left Italy, called back to Carthage to save his fatherland, where he found Hasdrubal and Syphax defeated, the Kingdom of Numidia lost,
¹⁹¹
and Carthage reduced to the limits of its city walls, with himself and his army as its last hope. Aware of this, he did not wish to risk the city until he had tried all other measures, and was not ashamed to beg for peace, judging that if his city were to have any hope, it was in peace and not in war. When the enemy turned this down, Hannibal decided to fight with all his might, judging that he might still be able to win, or if he lost, he would lose with glory
¹⁹²
If Hannibal, who was so valiant and skilled and had his army intact, sought peace before battle when he saw that in losing, Carthage would be enslaved, then what should another man with less valor, skill, and experience do? But men make the mistake of not being able to set limits to their hopes. They base themselves on these hopes without assessing their feasibility, and so come to ruin.

189.
A major battle (216
BCE
) of the Second Punic War in southeastern Italy in which Hannibal utterly defeated a Roman army of eighty thousand men, of whom only fourteen thousand escaped.

190.
In 332
BCE
, Alexander the Great, during his campaigns in Phoenicia, had laid siege to Tyre for eight months, finally capturing the city.

191.
Hasdrubal, Hannibal’s brother, had formed an allegiance with King Syphax of Numidia to fight the Roman forces in North Africa.

192.
Machiavelli is discussing the events described by Livy in Book XXX, chapters 16–31.