The essential writings of Machiavelli (8 page)

CHAPTER THIRTEEN
T
HE AUXILIARY ARMY, THE CITIZEN ARMY, AND THE ARMY THAT COMBINES THE TWO

An auxiliary army is also a worthless army. It is the kind that a powerful figure brings with him when you call upon to help defend you. Pope Julius did this in our times. In the campaign of Ferrara, the pope witnessed the miserable performance of his mercenary army and turned to an auxiliary one, reaching an agreement with King Ferdinand of Spain to come to his aid with troops. Such troops can be useful and good in themselves, but will almost always prove harmful to him who summons them. If this army loses, he ends up dissatisfied, and if it wins, he ends up its prisoner. Even though history is full of examples, I prefer to cite the contemporary example of Pope Julius II, whose decision to turn to Ferdinand of Spain for help could not have been more ill advised. The pope was so eager to gain Ferrara that he threw himself into the arms of a foreigner. But Fortune happened to be on the pope’s side, and hence he was not compelled to taste the bitter fruit of his decision, for after his auxiliary army was defeated at Ravenna
⁵³
the Swiss routed the victorious French, much to his surprise and everyone else’s. The pope was not taken prisoner by the enemy, since they had fled, nor by his auxiliary troops, since his ultimate victory had been gained not by them but by another army. The Florentines, having no army at all, had engaged ten thousand Frenchmen to conquer Pisa, which exposed them to more danger than they had ever faced before. The Emperor of Constantinople, in order to fend off his neighbors, had brought ten thousand Turks into Greece, and once the war was over these Turks did not want to leave. This was the beginning of Greece’s enslavement to the Infidel.

In short, anyone ready to lose battles should avail himself of such troops, because they are far more dangerous than mercenaries. For if you use auxiliary troops the cards are stacked against you, since they are united under the command of an outsider. But for mercenary troops to harm you, even if they are victorious, takes a certain amount of time and the right opportunity. Mercenary troops are not a single body, as it is you who assemble them and pay them. An outsider whom you appoint as their commander cannot establish his authority quickly enough to do you harm. In essence, the most dangerous aspect of mercenaries is their indolence, while that of auxiliary troops is their prowess. Wise princes have always avoided auxiliary troops and relied on their own. They have preferred defeat with their own army rather than victory with that of another, judging that a victory won with another’s army is not a true victory.

I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. He entered the Romagna at the head of an auxiliary army made up entirely of Frenchmen, and with it took Imola and Forlì. But the moment he felt that this army was not reliable, he turned to mercenaries, considering them less dangerous, and hired the Orsini and the Vitelli. When he subsequently saw that they too were unreliable, disloyal, and dangerous, he destroyed them
⁵⁴
and went back to using his own men. It is easy to see the difference between these types of armies, considering Cesare Borgia’s standing when he had only the French, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and when he was self-sufficient with his own soldiers. Then his standing increased. His reputation was at its height when men saw him in every way as the master of his own army.

Though I intended to focus on recent Italian examples, I do not wish to pass over Hiero of Syracuse, as I have already mentioned him.
⁵⁵
The Syracusans had made him general of their army, and he was quick to see that the mercenary troops, much like our own Italian condottieri, were useless. As he felt that he could neither keep them nor dismiss them, he had them slashed to pieces.
⁵⁶
After that, he made war using his own troops and not those of others. I also wish to cite an example from the Old Testament. David stepped forward to fight Goliath, the Philistine challenger. Saul offered him his own armor to give him courage, but no sooner had David put it on than he cast it off again, saying that he could not make use of his own strength with another’s armor. He wanted to face the enemy with his own slingshot and knife. In short, the arms of another will either fall off your back, weigh you down, or hamper you.

Louis XI’s father, King Charles VII, who freed France from the English
⁵⁷
with the help of Fortune and his skill, recognized the importance of having his own army. He issued a decree in his kingdom to enlist an infantry and a cavalry. After him, his son Louis disbanded the infantry and began hiring Swiss mercenaries. This mistake, followed by others, has led, as we have seen, to the many dangers France has had to face. Having given power to the Swiss, Louis undermined his own, because he disbanded his infantry and made his cavalry dependent on the mercenaries’ skill. And the cavalry, once accustomed to fighting alongside the Swiss, felt it could not win without them. As a result, the French cannot stand up to the Swiss, but neither are they willing to face others on the battlefield without them. Hence the French army has become mixed—in part mercenary, in part French citizens—which is still better than an army that is entirely auxiliary or mercenary, but far inferior to an army made up entirely of one’s own citizens. This example should suffice, because France would have been undefeatable had King Charles’s decrees been followed and developed. But man’s scant prudence will make him relish a dish that appears delicious while it conceals poison within.

A prince who does not perceive the ills in his principality as they arise is not truly astute. Such astuteness is afforded to few. If one considers the beginning of the decline of the Roman Empire, one will find that it began when Goth mercenaries were hired. It was then that the strength of the Roman army started to flag. All the skill and valor that was sapped from the Romans went to strengthen the Goths. Thus I conclude that no principality is safe without its own army. It is entirely at the mercy of Fortune, having failed to preserve the valor that will defend it in adversity. Wise men have always held to the maxim
quod nihil sit tam infirmum aut instabile quam fama potentiae non sua vi nixa.
⁵⁸
And “your own power” is an army composed either of your subjects, your citizens, or your dependents. Anything else constitutes a mercenary or auxiliary army. How one’s army should be organized is easy to see if one weighs the four examples I have cited above
⁵⁹
and if one takes into account the method by which Philip of Macedon, the father of Alexander the Great, and many republics and principalities armed themselves—a method I fully support.

53.
In April 1512, the French army fought a battle with the Spanish, Venetian, and papal troops outside Ravenna. The French were victorious, but were then forced by the Swiss (then the pope’s main allies) to evacuate Milan. In 1513 the Swiss routed the French at Novara.

54.
At Sinigallia in 1502. See “How Duke Valentino Killed the Generals Who Conspired Against Him.”

55.
See chapter 6.

56.
Polybius,
Histories
, Book 1, chapter 9: “Finding the old mercenaries disaffected and seditious, he led an expedition against the barbarians who had occupied Messene. […] But he held back his citizen cavalry and infantry at a distance and under his personal command, as if he meant to use them to attack another side, but sent the mercenaries on ahead, allowing them to be completely slaughtered by the barbarians.”

57.
King Charles VII of France (1403–61) was the father of Louis XI (1423–83). King Charles drove the English out of France (with the aid of Joan of Arc), and instituted sweeping reforms in his army by a series of ordinances, improving its recruitment and efficiency.

58.
An altered quotation from Tacitus’s
Annales
. 13.19.1:
Nihil rerum mortalium tam instabile ac fluxum est quam fama potentiae non sua vi nixae
. (No human matter is as unstable and changeable as the reputation of power that has no support of its own.)

59.
Cesare Borgia, Hiero of Syracuse, David, and Charles VII of France.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN
O
F A PRINCE’S DUTIES CONCERNING THE MILITARY

A prince must therefore have no other thought or objective, nor dedicate himself to any other art, but that of war with its rules and discipline, because this is the only art suitable for a man who commands. It is such a powerful art that it will maintain the position of one who is born a prince, but will also often raise mere private citizens to that rank. Princes who give more thought to luxury than to arms often lose their principality. In fact, the quickest way to lose a principality is to neglect the art of war, and the best way of acquiring one is to be a master in this art.
⁶⁰

Francesco Sforza, from being a private citizen, became Duke of Milan because he was armed, while his sons after him, shrinking from the hardships of military life, ended up as private citizens after having been dukes. Furthermore, being unarmed makes you, among other things, despised, which is one of the infamies from which a prince must shield himself, as I will discuss later.
⁶¹
There is no comparison between an armed man and an unarmed one. It is not reasonable to think that an armed man might be compelled to obey an unarmed one, or that an unarmed man might be safe among the armed mercenaries he has hired. The unarmed prince will always be wary of these mercenaries, whereas they will harbor disdain for him. There is no way for them to work well together. Hence, beside the other misfortunes already mentioned, a prince who does not understand military matters will not be respected by his soldiers and cannot trust them.

The prince must therefore never shift his attention from the exercise of war, even in times of peace, and he must do this both in action and in mind. As for action, he must not only keep his troops well trained and organized, but must also himself continuously go out hunting, keeping his body accustomed to hardship, while learning the lay of the land: how the mountains rise and the valleys dip, how the plains lie, and the nature of the rivers and marshes. He must do this with the greatest application, for such knowledge is useful in two ways. First, he will familiarize himself intimately with his own country and understand how to defend it; second, with the knowledge and experience of his own terrain, he will more easily get to know any foreign terrain he might have to explore, because any hill, valley, river, plain, or marsh that exists in Tuscany will resemble those of other provinces. In short, familiarizing one with the terrain of one’s own province helps to familiarize one with the terrain of other provinces as well. A prince who lacks this knowledge lacks the most essential quality in a general, because this will train him how to hunt the enemy, choose a campsite, lead troops, and direct them in the field and in besieging towns.

Among the things Prince Philopoemen of the Achaeans has been praised for by writers is that in times of peace he thought of nothing but ways of waging war.
⁶²
When he was out riding in the country with his friends, he often stopped and reasoned with them: “If the enemy were up in those hills and we were here with our army, who would have the advantage? How could we attack without breaking formation? If we wanted to retreat, how would we do that? If they were to retreat, how would we pursue them?” And as Prince Philopoemen and his companions rode on, he would lay out all the circumstances that could befall an army. He would listen to the opinions of the others and share his opinions with them, which he would back up with detailed explanation, his aim being that through continuous deliberations, nothing unforeseen for which he might have no remedy would ever occur in battle.

As for the exercise of the mind, a prince must read histories and study the actions of great men so he can see how they conducted themselves in war and examine the reasons for their victories and defeats, in order to imitate the former and avoid the latter. Above all, the prince must follow the example of some great man of the past, who in turn followed the example of another great man who had been praised and honored before him, always keeping his predecessor’s deeds and actions in mind. For it is said that Alexander the Great imitated Achilles, that Caesar imitated Alexander, and that Scipio imitated Cyrus. Anyone who reads Xenophon’s life of Cyrus can see in Scipio’s actions how much glory his imitation of Cyrus brought him, and to what extent Scipio conformed with what Xenophon wrote about Cyrus in matters of chastity, openness, humanity, and liberality.

A wise prince must observe such methods, and never remain idle in times of peace but vigorously take advantage of them so he can be ready for times of adversity, so that when Fortune changes, she will find him prepared to resist her.

60.
See note 48 above.

61.
See chapter 19.

62.
Philopoemen (c. 252–182
BCE
) was a renowned general of the Achaean League, known for his innovations in Greek military tactics. Machiavelli closely follows Livy’s text (Book XXXV, chapter 28): “Philopoemen had a great talent for directing a campaign and choosing advantageous positions, which was the result of his experience acquired through much reflection in times of peace as well as war.”