The essential writings of Machiavelli (37 page)

COSIMO:
You have reduced the profession of soldiery to almost nothing, while I had supposed it to be the most excellent and honorable of professions. You must clarify this, because if it is as you say, how can one explain the glory of Caesar, Pompey Scipio, Marcellus, and the many other Roman generals who are so famous they are celebrated as gods?

FABRIZIO:
I have not yet finished discussing everything I proposed on two matters: first, that a good man cannot take up soldiery as his profession, and second, that a well-ordered republic or kingdom would never permit its subjects or citizens to exercise soldiery as a profession. As for the first matter, I have in fact told you everything that occurred to me, so it remains for me to speak of the second, with which I shall reply to your question concerning the Roman generals. Pompey and Caesar, and almost all the generals in Rome after the last Punic War, gained fame as valiant men, not as good men. Those who had lived before them, however, had acquired glory as valiant and good men, which happened because they did not take up the practice of war as their profession, while it was the profession of Pompey, Caesar, and the generals of their times. As long as the Roman Republic was uncorrupted, no great citizen ever attempted to gain power during times of peace through soldiery, breaking laws, despoiling provinces, imposing himself in every way, and usurping and tyrannizing his state. Nor did anyone of lower rank think of violating his oath to Rome, entering into conspiracies, and, without fear of the Senate, joining the ranks of someone seeking to be tyrant simply in order to be able to live by soldiery in peaceful times as well as in times of war. Those who were generals were content with triumph during wartime and very happy to return to private life, while those who were regular soldiers had a greater desire to lay down their arms than they had had to take them up. Everyone returned to the profession by which he made his living, and nobody hoped to live off plunder and the profession of war.

Marcus Attilius is an example of a great citizen of that kind. He was general of the Roman armies in Africa and on the point of defeating the Carthaginians when he asked the Senate for permission to return home to look after his estates, which were being ruined by his laborers. It is clear as day that if Marcus Attilius had practiced war as his profession, intending to profit from it—there being so many provinces he could plunder—he would not have asked permission to return home to take care of his fields. Every single day he was on the campaign he could have seized more than their entire value. But as these good men, who did not practice soldiery, expected nothing of war except hardship, danger, and glory, once they had sufficient glory, they wanted to return home and live by their professions. As for men of lower rank and the common soldiers, they too acted the same way. They gladly withdrew from warfare, for when they were not fighting they desired not to fight, and when they were fighting they wanted to be discharged. This can be verified in many ways, particularly as it was among the first privileges the Roman populace gave to a citizen, that he should not be constrained to fight against his will. Therefore while Rome was a well-ordered state, which it was up to the time of the Gracchi,
¹⁴
it did not have a single soldier who took up soldiery as a profession. Only a few soldiers were bad, and they were severely punished.

A well-ordered state should use military training in times of peace as an exercise, and in times of war as a necessity and for glory. The state alone should be allowed to use it as a profession, as Rome did. Any citizen who has other aims in using the military is not a good citizen, and any state that acts otherwise is not a well-ordered state.

COSIMO:
I am very pleased and satisfied with what you have said up to now, and I like your conclusion. I believe that what you say is true when it comes to republics; but I am not certain if the same can be said of kings, because I believe a king would want to surround himself with men who have taken up soldiery as their profession.

FABRIZIO:
A well-ordered kingdom must avoid the soldierly profession even more, since those men corrupt the king and are the ministers of tyranny. And do not counter what I say with an example of some kingdom from our times, because I cannot accept these as well-ordered kingdoms. A well-ordered kingdom does not grant its king absolute power, except over the army, because it is only for the army that quick decisions and hence absolute power are necessary. In other matters, the king should not be able to do anything without counsel, and those who advise him must fear that there might be a counselor close to him who desires war in times of peace because the counselor cannot live without it. But I would like to show some indulgence here, by seeking not a kingdom that is entirely good, but one like those that exist today, where the king has to fear those who make war their profession, because the backbone of every army is without doubt the infantry. If a king does not organize his army so that in a time of peace his infantrymen are happy to return home and live by practicing their own professions, the king will inevitably come to ruin, for no infantry is more dangerous than one composed of men who make war their profession. In the latter case, the king is forced either to make war continuously, or to pay his infantry continuously if he does not want to risk their seizing his kingdom from him. As it is impossible to wage war all the time, and also impossible to pay an infantry all the time, the king is faced with losing his kingdom.

As I have said, the Romans, while they were still wise and good, never permitted their citizens to take up soldiery as a profession, notwithstanding that they could have employed them continuously, as the Romans were continuously at war. They sought, however, to avoid the damage that the continuous practice of soldiery could do, and since the circumstances did not vary, they kept varying the men and continued temporizing, so that the legions were entirely renewed every fifteen years. Thus they made use of men in their prime, which is from the age of eighteen to thirty-five, during which time a man’s eyes, hands, and legs work in unison. Nor did they wait for the soldiers’ strength to diminish or their penchant for evil deeds to grow, as the Romans did later in corrupt times. Augustus and then Tiberius,
¹⁵
thinking more of their own power than of the public good, began to disarm the Roman populace in order to control them more easily, and kept the same armies continually at the frontiers of the empire. Since they believed that these armies would not hold the Roman populace and the Senate in check, they set up an army called the Praetorian Guard, which remained near the walls of Rome and acted like a fortress hovering over the city. The emperors began freely permitting men to practice soldiery as their profession, and this soon resulted in their becoming arrogant, dangerous to the Senate, and harmful to the emperor. As a result, many emperors were killed because of the armies’ arrogance in giving and taking away power as they pleased, several armies creating a number of emperors simultaneously. This ultimately resulted in the division of the Roman Empire, and finally its ruin.

Therefore, if kings want to live securely, they must have an infantry composed of men who, when it is time for war, will willingly march forth out of love for the king, and afterward, when peace comes, even more willingly return home. This will always happen if the king selects men who know how to live by a profession other than soldiery. When peace comes, the king should expect his leaders to return to governing their people, his gentlemen to return to the cultivation of their possessions, and his infantry to their particular trades. The king must want them all to make war willingly in order to have peace, and not seek to break peace in order to have war.

COSIMO:
Your reasoning strikes me as well considered. Nevertheless, as it is almost contrary to what I have believed until now, my mind is not yet purged of all doubt. I see many lords and gentlemen providing for themselves in times of peace through training for war, as do other condottieri like yourself who are funded by princes and states. I also see almost all cavalrymen retaining their stipends after a war, and I see many infantrymen remaining within the garrisons of cities and fortresses. So it does appear to me that there is a place for every soldier during times of peace.

FABRIZIO:
I cannot imagine you would believe that all soldiers have a place in time of peace. The small number alone of men who remain in the garrisons and fortresses should suffice to remove any doubts you may have. What is the proportion of infantry needed in war to that needed in peace? A fortress and a city are guarded in times of peace, but much more so during times of war. Not to mention that the large number of soldiers kept in the field during wartime are all let go in times of peace. And as for the armed guards of the state, who are small in number, Pope Julius and you Florentines have proved to what extent one must fear men whose only profession is war. You Florentines have removed them from your garrisons because of their insolence and replaced them with the Swiss, who are born and raised under strict laws and selected by their communities in fair elections. So you must reconsider the idea that there really is a place in peacetime for every soldier. As for the cavalrymen who stay enlisted after a war, the problem seems more difficult; nevertheless, anyone considering the matter carefully will easily find the answer, for the method of retaining cavalrymen is corrupt and unsatisfactory. The reason is that they are men for whom soldiery is a profession, and this consequently gives rise to a thousand problems every day in the cities in which they are stationed, if they are backed up by sufficient numbers. But as they are few, and unable to gather into an army on their own, they usually cannot cause serious damage; but still they have done so many times, as I have said of professional soldiers such as Francesco Sforza and his father, and of Braccio da Montone. In short, I do not approve of the practice of keeping cavalrymen. It is corrupt and can cause great evils.

COSIMO:
Would you prefer to do without them? Or if you were to keep them, how would you go about it?

FABRIZIO:
I would use conscription. Not the way the King of France
¹⁶
does, because his cavalry is as dangerous and insolent as ours. I mean the kind of conscription practiced by the ancients, who created a cavalry from among their subjects, and in times of peace sent them back to their homes to live off their own professions, as I shall talk about at greater length before I finish this discussion. So if the cavalry can continue living by means of soldiery even when there is peace, it stems from corrupt institutions. As for the stipends granted to generals such as myself, I declare that this is just as corrupted, because a wise state will not grant a stipend to a professional general. It will use its own citizens as leaders in war, and in times of peace expect those citizens to return to their professions. Hence a wise king, too, will not grant stipends, or if he does, they ought to be either as a reward for some exceptional deed or because the king wishes to benefit from such a man in peacetime as well as in war. You have mentioned my case, and so I will propose myself as an example. First I would like to say that I have never practiced war as a profession, as my profession is to govern my subjects and to defend them.
¹⁷
For me to defend them, I must love peace and know how to make war. My king
¹⁸
does not reward and esteem me for my knowledge of war, but more importantly for my knowledge and counsel during peacetime. No wise king seeking to govern prudently should want someone next to him who is not of this kind, for the king will be led astray if he surrounds himself with too many lovers of peace or too many lovers of war. I cannot say more in this first discussion. Should this not suffice, you must seek someone else who might satisfy you. But I trust that you now see the many difficulties involved in introducing ancient methods into the wars of our times, the preparations a wise man must make, and what opportunities he can hope for to execute them.

2.
Fabrizio Colonna (d. 1520) was a nobleman of the powerful Colonna family and a mercenary general for King Ferdinand the Catholic (1452–1516), King of Aragon, Sicily, Castile, and Naples.

3.
Lorenzo de’ Medici, to whom Machiavelli dedicated
The Prince
, was the ruler of Florence. His uncle, Pope Leo X (Giuliano de’ Medici), made him Duke of Urbino.

4.
Cosimo Rucellai (1494–1519), the host at the gardens of the Orti Oricellari.

5.
The three young men were frequent guests at the meetings in the Orti Oricellari (the gardens of Cosimo Rucellai) and were close friends and admirers of Machiavelli. Zanobi Buondelmonti (1491–1527) was a wealthy Florentine merchant, banker, and patron of the arts. The
Discourses
are dedicated to him and Cosimo Rucellai, and
The Life of Castruccio Castracani
is dedicated to him and Luigi Alamanni.