The Everlasting Empire (22 page)

In what follows, I shall first outline historical changes in the character of local elites and in their relations with the preimperial, the early imperial, and the late imperial state. I shall show that the process of establishing viable relations between these elites and the bureaucracy was a lengthy and painful one, and that it took more than a full millennium for the empire to learn how to harness local elites to its cause. Even then, as we shall see, tension between holders of social and of administrative power remained highly visible, and cycles of cooperation and contest between them shaped much of the political dynamics of the imperial age.

FROM ARISTOCRATIC TO BUREAUCRATIC STATE

In a once-influential study, Karl Wittfogel depicted China as perennially ruled by the omnipotent agro-managerial bureaucracy.
³
The accuracy of Wittfogel’s assessment for the entire imperial period is debatable, and in any case it is clear that he was completely wrong with regard to the formative period of Chinese civilization. Only in the Warring States period did an assertive and intrusive state that resembles Wittfogel’s model come into existence; while initially, most notably during the aristocratic Springs-and-Autumns period (771–453 BCE), the political structure was very loose. The polity of that age was but a hierarchical network of settle

-105-

ments run by hereditary nobles under minimal control from the central government. The nobles—an early version of local elites—did not just mediate between the regional lord and the local populace but to a considerable degree served as independent power-holders in their localities. Gradually they came to possess exclusive command over the material and human resources of their allotments, gained autonomy from the lord’s control, and contributed thereby to the systemic crisis of that age, mentioned in chapters 1 and 2. The first experience of the Chinese political system with powerful local elites ended therefore in disaster; and this legacy instigated lasting aversion to further devolution of state power to local potentates. For several centuries to come the trend was toward ever more efficient centralized bureaucratic control over society and abolition of the aristocratic elite’s power.

The reforms of the fifth-fourth centuries BCE brought into existence the Warring State, which represents a radically different model of rule. The statesmen’s desire to rein in forces of disintegration brought about a process of centralization and the penetration of the increasingly assertive and powerful bureaucracy deep into all social strata. The new state no longer tolerated independent loci of power and left nobody outside its direct control. It managed the economic lives of its subjects, registered them and tightly supervised their movements, and routinely mobilized them for a variety of labor and military tasks. It penetrated the entire society much as did the modern European state, which reached, in Eric Hobsbawm’s words, “down to the humblest inhabitant of the least of its villages.”
⁴
The government apparatus itself became increasingly centralized and much more tightly controlled, eliminating in the process any semblance of the autonomy local potentates had once enjoyed. With the absorption of the bulk of former aristocratic elites into the state bureaucracy, no powerful independent group remained to mediate between the officials and the lower strata.

Of all the competing Warring States, nowhere was the bureaucratic revolution as thorough and successful as in the state of Qin, which ultimately established the first unified imperial dynasty on China’s soil. The bureaucratic logic of Qin seems to have worked in the direction of complete absorption of any elite group—from the ruler’s kin to village elders—into the expanding state apparatus, or at least into the statemaintained hierarchy of status. One of the most important reforms underlying the rise of Qin was the replacement of the system of hereditary aristocratic ranks with a new one in which ranks were granted for merit and, with minor exceptions, were not fully inheritable. The state had thenceforth the exclusive right to determine the individual’s status, with its accompanying sumptuary and legal privileges; practically this meant that there was no space for autonomous elite groups. It is doubtful that

-106-

Qin succeeded fully in unifying the individual’s rank, wealth, and societal power, but the very desire of its leaders to craft this uniform hierarchy is indicative of their remarkable assertiveness and their strong aversion toward autonomous loci of authority. From the currently available textual and epigraphic data, it seems that Qin moved most decisively toward creating a “total power” state of the kind depicted by Wittfogel.
⁵

We still lack sufficient details about the sociopolitical structure of most other rival Warring States, but it seems that their development trajectory did not differ considerably from that of Qin, even though the process by which the hereditary aristocracy was replaced by the new elite might have been less sweeping. In none of these states do we know of an independent socioeconomic elite that could meaningfully have counterbalanced government power. The absence of a land market and strict control of the state apparatus over nascent industry and commerce hindered independent accumulation of wealth by individuals outside the state-mandated sociopolitical hierarchy; the vast majority of rich persons in the Warring States period were those whom the state allowed to amass riches. Thus while members of the
shi
stratum, discussed in the previous chapter, were intellectually and occupationally autonomous of individual power-holders, economically speaking they remained dependent on the ruler and his apparatus. Lacking independent sources of wealth, preimperial
shi
, in sharp distinction from their imperial-period descendants, had no visible role in local communities. There only a minor elite existed, represented by village elders; but even these were increasingly incorporated—in Qin, but possibly elsewhere as well—into the expanding state apparatus/

It is highly significant that during the formative age of Chinese political thought and political culture, no powerful independent elite existed on Chinese soil. It explains why—aside from a few incidental remarks, such as that cited in the epigraph—preimperial thinkers did not address the issue of state relations with the “grand families,” and did not provide the empire builders with either theoretical elaboration regarding the elite’s social role or practical means of maintaining proper relations between the officialdom and local elites. This inadvertent negligence may explain why the reemergence of powerful local elites in the aftermath of the imperial unification came to power-holders as a surprise, and why many centuries elapsed before a truly viable mode of state-elite relations was elaborated by the imperial literati.

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE IMPERIAL ARISTOCRACY

The First Emperor of Qin, who unified the Chinese world in 221 BCE, inherited what may have been the single most effective and powerful

-107-

bureaucratie mechanism in Chinese history prior to Mao Zedong’s era. In the wake of unification, he had duly attempted to expand Qin regulations and its sociopolitical system to the entire newly unified realm; and as recently unearthed materials from some of the remotest Qin localities suggest, the emperor may have been reasonably successful in his endeavor (see also chapter 1). However, maintenance of direct control of the state bureaucracy over the entire population was an enormously costly enterprise. Supporting the huge army of officials, clerks, scribes, postmen, and runners required for continuous flow of information throughout the vast realm—and all these, in addition to a plethora of military and civilian projects, strained the empire’s resources, contributing directly to the swift collapse of Qin in the wake of popular uprisings. The Han dynasty, established in the aftermath of the bloody civil war of 209–202 BCE, learned the lesson. Maintenance of direct control over the localities was possible but not feasible in the long run. A degree of relaxation was necessary.

Modification of Qin practices was a lengthy process, the details of which are still not very clear. The Han had inherited much of the administrative structure and legal system of Qin, but it seems that its early leaders were reluctant to utilize fully the power of their state. Relaxation of control over the populace, cessation of large-scale military and civilian projects, and proliferation of a laissez-faire economy: all these brought much-needed respite to the population.
⁷
A side impact of this policy was the reemergence of local elites as powerful economic, social, and political actors.

The reappearance of independent elites in the early Han period may have been directly related to the laissez-faire policy that the Han leaders adopted as a deliberate alternative to Qin rule. In particular, the Han permitted private entrepreneurs to replace the state in the lucrative fields of iron and salt production; allowed private minting of coins; and turned a blind eye to powerful families’ land accumulation. This last development was particularly consequential in the age when the nascent land market was being formed, as it allowed formation of large estates, the size of which was no longer related to the owner’s position within the state hierarchy. Gradually, a new social group came into existence: the so-called magnates (
haojie
), large landowners or entrepreneurs who became economic and social leaders in their localities. Initially, these magnates may have remained largely outside the Han administrative system, the upper echelons of which were staffed by the associates of the dynastic founder, Liu Bang, and by their progeny. It is possible, though, that magnates gained access to the lower levels of the administrative pyramid. In the course of a few generations, they became a formidable force for local officials to reckon with.
⁸

-108-

The renewed centralization and territorial expansion under Han Emperor Wu (r. 141–87 BCE) soon brought him into conflict with local magnates, whose wealth he coveted. Many of Emperor Wu’s initial steps were overtly coercive, such as reprisals against tax evaders, expropriation of individuals’ property based on trumped-up charges, and intimidation of magnates by the so-called cruel officials. More significant were other steps, aimed at reducing the magnates’ economic space, such as reintroduction of the salt and iron monopolies, and other, less successful attempts to expand the economic activity of the state apparatus.
⁹
Yet parallel to his assault on local magnates, Emperor Wu offered them a carrot: as mentioned in the previous chapter, he was the first to experiment with a system of recommendations cum examinations, which, for members of local elites, opened avenues of advancement into the central government. Thenceforth, members of the magnate families who adopted stateapproved behavioral norms, such as Confucianism-inspired “filiality and incorruptibility,” or those who learned to master the state-approved texts (the so-called Confucian classics) could expect promotion into intermediary or even high levels of the bureaucracy. This was the modest and yet historically significant beginning of the millennia-old alliance between the state and the local elites. Emperor Wu’s decision that local elites should not be eliminated but rather should be co-opted and utilized as the auxiliaries of the state apparatus remained the basic policy guideline throughout the Han period and beyond.

Han Emperor Wu’s initiative met with immediate success: many of the magnates and their kin responded enthusiastically, and an increasing number of them began entering government service. However, as the government learned shortly after Emperor Wu’s death, this incorporation of local elites into the imperial bureaucracy was a mixed blessing. The newly recruited officials who came from the local magnate families emerged as firm opponents of state economic activism, and supporters of a reversal from the more Qin-like policies of Emperor Wu to a noninterventionist looser model of “benevolent government,” which was associated in their eyes with the early Zhou dynasty.
¹⁰
The clash of views became evident as early as 81 BCE, during the fascinating court debates over the fate of the iron and salt monopolies, when recently promoted provincial literati presented a united front against the government’s assertive economic policies, causing a reduction in the scope of monopolies.
¹¹
Thus the more these literati came to dominate the court, the less supportive it became of aggressive centralization and expansion à la Emperor Wu.

The increasing power of local elites and of their representatives in the government became obvious during the reign of the idealistic reformer and usurper of the Han throne, Wang Mang (r. 9–23 CE). When Wang

-109-

Mang tried to emulate Emperor Wu’s assertive policies, he failed miserably, amid the magnate families’ strong resentment and dissident officials’ widespread sabotage. The strongest opposition was directed against his attempt to abolish the land market and restrict the size of latifundia, which, if implemented, would directly interfere with the magnates’ interests.
¹²
It became increasingly evident that the state apparatus was no longer representative of the court’s interest vis-à-vis the elites but, rather, leaned to the latter’s side. Thenceforth, only a few exceptionally powerful and determined leaders were able to turn the tide and utilize the government against elite interests; for the majority this was no longer an option.

The series of rebellions and civil wars that brought about the fall of Wang Mang provided yet another indication of the local elites’ increasing prominence. Among manifold rebellious and loyalist groups, the most notable were magnate-led militias, the appearance of which signaled the emergence of local elites as not just an economic power but also as an important military force. The restoration of the Han dynasty in 25 CE became possible only because of the founder’s reliance on these militias, which further strengthened the throne’s dependence on the magnates. The throne reciprocated by gradually abandoning economic activism, such as the state monopolies, and also by letting the manorial economy proliferate. Administratively, the state became less assertive as well; the tight control over the population eased, mass conscription was discontinued, and the interventionism of the Qin and early Han officialdom was replaced by much looser ways. This in turn increased the officials’ dependence on cooperation with the local magnates below.
¹³