The Everlasting Empire (26 page)

The Qing dynasty provides yet another example of the local elites’ resilience. The Manchu practice of relying on the military aristocracy— the bannermen—diluted the erstwhile power of Chinese local elites within the officialdom, allowing the Qing emperors to launch repeated assaults on the elites’ privileges and malpractices. The renewed power of the state apparatus was fully utilized by Yongzheng Emperor (see chapter 2), whose overhaul of the financial system enabled the formation of a much more vigorous and activist state than what had existed ever since Wang Anshi’s experiments.
⁵¹
Yet under Yongzheng’s lenient son, the Qianlong Emperor (r. 1736–1795), assaults on the elites’ power were discontinued, and the momentum of state activism was lost. By the nineteenth century the power of local elites was as strong as ever.
⁵²

In late imperial China, the onetime bifurcation between statism and elite-oriented political activities, observable under Wang Anshi, had all but disappeared. Despite ongoing elite malpractices and complaints against “evil gentry,” cooperation rather than openly expressed conflict was the norm. Late imperial thinkers and practitioners could advocate strengthening the elite at the expense of the clerical subbureaucracy, as Gu Yanwu (1613–1682) proposed; or they could seek potential new avenues for state activism, as advocated by the model statesman Chen Hongmou (1696–1771); but all agreed on the need to improve cooperation between the bureaucracy and the elites, their differences concerning details rather than essentials.
⁵³
Despite certain obvious disadvantages, the

-125-

imperial state opted to rely on the elites, because it could no longer survive without their cooperation. The symbiosis between the holders of political and of societal power had been reconfirmed once and for all.

THE THREE BONDS: IDEOLOGY OF
THE STATE-ELITE CONVERGENCE

The discussion above elucidates the persistent difficulty facing the state in establishing a modus vivendi with local elites: overreliance on their support meant giving free rein to the elites’ abuses, while oppression was too costly and required fundamental adjustment of the administrative system, a course that was ruled out after Wang Anshi’s debacle. This lack of institutional remedy for the state’s addiction to the elites’ support explains in turn the importance of ideological factors for ensuring smooth cooperation between the elites and the imperial state. Above I have briefly addressed how the Neo-Confucian idea of voluntary action from below contributed to the strengthening of the elites’ ties with the throne; now I want to explore the impact of another ideological construct on the relations between the state and the elites: the notion of congruence between patriarchal and monarchical authority, and the related idea that strengthening the family means strengthening the state, and vice versa.

The concept of the fundamental unity between the family and the state is so deeply rooted in Chinese imperial ideology that it is often viewed as a perennial feature of Chinese political culture. This was not always the case, though. In particular, during the aristocratic Springs-and-Autumns period, as powerful noble lineages routinely challenged the ruler’s authority, it was tacitly understood that lineage cohesiveness might be detrimental rather than conducive to sociopolitical stability.
⁵⁴
It was only after the replacement of the hereditary aristocracy with the
shi
stratum, and the parallel demise of powerful lineages, that family values were interpreted as supportive of political order, as exemplified in this saying by a disciple of Confucius: “Few are those who, being filial and fraternal, are still inclined to disobey superiors.”
⁵⁵
To be sure, there were dissenting voices, such as that of the great thinker Han Feizi, who cynically observed that “a filial son is the one who turns his back to the enemy”;
⁵⁶
but the overwhelming majority of known thinkers accepted the idea that the patriarch’s authority and the monarch’s were compatible and should be upheld in tandem.

The belief in the essential unity between the family and the state, and between filial piety and loyalty to the sovereign, had been strengthening since the beginning of the imperial era. Even the resurrection of large patrilineal families in the Han dynasty and thereafter did not bring about

-126-

state attempts to suppress kinship solidarity. To the contrary, the authorities promulgated the concept of filiality—and, by extension, commitment to one’s kin—as one of the primary requirements for an aspiring official. It was also under the Han dynasty that the idea of congruence between the monarch and the patriarch crystallized in the concept of the Three Bonds (
san gang
)—the relations between the ruler and his subjects, the father and his sons, and the husband and his wife (wives). The Three Bonds were interpreted as manifestations of the uniform hierarchical principle of human relations, the unshakable foundation of human morality and of sociopolitical order. Eminent imperial thinkers from Dong Zhongshu (ca. 195–115 BCE) to Zhu Xi provided metaphysical and religious underpinnings for the Three Bonds, elevating them to the position of supreme sociopolitical truth. Indeed, the supremacy of the Three Bonds in guiding human relations was not questioned until the very end of the imperial period.
⁵⁷

In the course of imperial history, the concept of the Three Bonds became the core of the value system of elites and commoners alike, the heart of what Liu Kwang-Ching defines as socioethical orthodoxy. Its power transcended the philosophical and religious beliefs of individual statesmen and literati. Their metaphysical or religious precepts could be contested, the authority of the canonical works questioned; but fundamental adherence to the Three Bonds remained unshakable. These core beliefs about the ruler and the family were disseminated throughout society through a variety of means: from legal codes to ritual regulations, from school textbooks to popular novels, from Daoist and Buddhist rites to works by leading philosophers. The Three Bonds became the unifying framework that held the imperial sociopolitical order intact.
⁵⁸

The proliferation of the Three Bonds ideology, and specifically the equation between filial piety and loyalty, are particularly interesting in the context of their contribution to the throne’s relations with the elites, especially in the late imperial period, when lineage cohesiveness became essential to the perpetuation of the elites’ power in many parts of China. The lineage patriarchs were the primary beneficiaries of the promulgation of family morality; and the state’s efforts to strengthen rather than weaken kinship values were essential to convince the lineage heads of the perennial congruence of their interests with those of the imperial regime.
⁵⁹
The state’s commitment to the promotion of family-oriented ideology appears to be one of the most significant features of Chinese imperial polity.

The empire mobilized a substantial portion of its formidable resources to strengthen the patrilineal family. Thus unfilial behavior and crimes against kin fell under the unpardonable “ten abominations,” the heinous

-127-

nature of which matched that of crimes against the throne. The state recognized the lineage as a legal entity, both for punitive purposes, upholding the shared communal responsibility of lineage members, and also in positive terms, granting lineage heads judicial power over their kin, including, occasionally, the right to execute an erring lineage member.
⁶⁰
It furthermore distributed manifold positive incentives to strengthen kinship organization: from granting corvée exemptions to members of “communal families,” who did not divide property for several generations, to conceding tax exemptions for charitable estates and other forms of common lineage property.
⁶¹
Filial sons were granted particularly preferential treatment, and at times (most notably during the Han dynasty, but also at later periods) a reputation for filiality could lead to one’s nomination for an official position. The Ministry of Rites additionally encouraged filial sons and chaste widows through granting them various insignia and partial tax exemptions; in the late imperial period the commendation took the highly visible form of towering commemorative arches, some of which remain visible in the Chinese landscape even today, despite massive destruction during the twentieth-century upheavals.
⁶²
Through all these means, the imperial state positioned itself as the primary guardian of the patriarchs’ interests—and they, in turn, had to guard the interests of the throne.

The commitment of the empire to the promotion of family values is often considered almost a natural by-product of its underlying Confucian ideology. Yet “natural” as it may seem to modern observers, this commitment was not free of problems. By recognizing the patriarch’s power, the state yielded some of its rights to penetrate the society to its bottom; by generously disseminating tax exemptions to the filial and the chaste, it gave up some of its income; by meticulously checking claims of filiality and chastity, it added another burdensome task to its bureaucracy. Even such an innocent regulation as the recognition of an official’s right to mourn his parents could become extremely burdensome, as it usually required approving mourning leave for the most important public servants.
⁶³
The imperial leaders agreed to bear this burden because it proved politically expedient. Insofar as society retained its belief in the essential unity of the Three Bonds, and specifically in the identity of filial piety and loyalty to the throne, it was expected that the state’s commitment to family values would be reciprocated with the parallel commitment of the elites to strengthening the emperor’s authority. This expectation was well founded, as can be seen from the following example.

At the very end of his reign, Zhu Yuanzhang finalized his endless experiments with communal self-rule by issuing the
Placard of the People’s Instructions
, which summarized his policy innovations. The document contained, among other material, “Six Injunctions”—the core of his mes

-128-

sage to the subjects, which had to be read in every village throughout the empire every five days:

Be filial to your parents, respect superiors, maintain harmony with
neighbors, instruct and discipline sons and grandsons, live and work in
peace and contentment, do not commit wrongful acts.
⁶⁴

It is most remarkable that the “Six Injunctions” do not address state concerns at all: they call for neither loyalty to the emperor nor obedience to the magistrate; actually they mention no political obligations whatsoever. This is not an occasional omission: in later versions of these admonitions, the so-called Sacred Edict (more precisely, “The Sage’s [e.g., Emperor’s] Edict”) promulgated by the Qing emperors, the structure remained the same: while the Qing rulers added brief references to the need to pay taxes and observe the law, the bulk of their injunctions reflected the emperors’ concern with the interests of the local community and its internal harmony rather than with its relation to state power.
⁶⁵
This concern of the state with the community’s internal order was duly reciprocated by the community leaders, who committed themselves to safeguarding the interests of the throne. Thus, in the sixteenth century, as the Ming literati revived the community compact ceremony, they introduced the theretofore unknown ritual of “Five Bows and Three Kowtows” commonly performed by all the participants before the wooden tablet bearing Zhu Yuanzhang’s maxims.
⁶⁶
The initiative to display the utmost loyalty to the throne came from below, as a natural complement to the community-oriented initiative that came from above. The ideological unity between the state and the elites had been reconfirmed.

EPILOGUE: STABILITY AND STAGNATION

The imperial state benefited enormously—economically, politically, and culturally—from its persistent cooperation with and co-optation of the local elites. The most immediate advantage stemming from this cooperation was the tremendous cut in administrative costs. Throughout much of the imperial period, and most notably in the second millennium CE, the imperial state successfully relegated to the elites many of its tasks related to welfare, public works, education, local security, and ideological indoctrination; at times it also heaped much of its judicial and tax-collecting burden on the shoulders of its willing aides. It is well known how costly these functions are for the modern state; in light of this we can appreciate how substantially elite voluntarism mitigated the workload of the imperial administration. Although the scope of this voluntarism and the degree of its social impact differed in time and space, we are justified in asserting that a significant portion of the Chinese population benefited

-129-

from elite philanthropy—a much greater portion than would have been possible had all the socioeconomic and cultural tasks undertaken by the elite been performed exclusively by the state apparatus.

No less remarkable were the political benefits the empire reaped from the co-optation of the elites. The throne developed a variety of means to attach the elites to its cause. Coercion and intimidation were, to be sure, perennially available tools, and at times, such as the beginnings of the Ming and Qing dynasties, state terror against local elites was an important means of curbing their unruliness; yet in general the carrot policy was more effective than that of the stick. The single most important asset of the imperial state in co-opting the elites was its possession of symbolic capital. An individual could attain high status in his community through a variety of means; but this status was generally unsustainable unless approved and confirmed by the imperial authority, either through examinations or otherwise. Hence most of the local elites were dependent on and firmly attached to the throne, acting as the guardians of the dynasty’s interests and protecting it against its enemies. On the whole, therefore, the elites played a stabilizing role in the political realm.
⁶⁷