The Everlasting Empire (29 page)

Neither Mengzi nor Xunzi wrote “for the masses”; their views concerning legitimate rebellion were aimed at warning the rulers rather than providing future mutineers with ideological justifications. However, the concept of “righteous rebellion” eventually proliferated throughout society and became a powerful weapon in the hands of insurrectionaries. Countless rebel movements of varying ideological affiliations routinely claimed Heaven’s support, and the adjective “Heavenly” or “approved by Heaven” (
fian
) became the most common element of the rebel leaders’ self-appellations. Thus these leaders clearly appealed to the common denominator of Chinese political culture: the belief in the justifiability of insurrection against an unrighteous regime. It appears, in sum, that Meadows’s observation was quite accurate: the right to rebel was indeed ingrained in the Chinese political tradition—and it was the only “right” through which the oppressed and the dispossessed could gain some leverage vis-à-vis the ruling elites.

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THE QUESTION OF EQUALITY

One of the persistent features of popular uprisings in Chinese history is the rebels’ adoption of strongly egalitarian slogans.
¹⁷
Calls such as “Level the noble and the base, equalize the rich and the poor!” were voiced repeatedly, suggesting the rebels’ assault on two pillars of political order: social and economic hierarchy. These slogans had clear practical implications: by assaulting the elites and ennobling their own followers, the rebel leaders were “leveling the noble and the base”; while by violently reallocating wealth, and, infrequently, by reforming taxation and landownership patterns, they tried to “equalize the rich and the poor.” These slogans and practices were of particular interest to modern Chinese and Soviet scholars engaged in the analysis of class consciousness among the socalled peasant rebels; and lively debates ensued as to whether or not this egalitarian outlook was subversive of the extant (“feudal”) sociopolitical order.
¹⁸
Other observers identify these assaults on the socioeconomic hierarchy as a manifestation of the rebels’ perceived “heterodoxy.”
¹⁹
Countering this view, I shall try to demonstrate that, like the idea of rebellion itself, the rebels’ egalitarianism was rooted in the mainstream political tradition, and this connection legitimated some of the rebels’ radical slogans and practices.

The existence of egalitarian trends within the establishment ideology is ostensibly at odds with the established image of Chinese political culture. After all, it is well known that mainstream Chinese thought was highly elitist, built around the dichotomy between “superior” and “petty” men (see chapter 3), and that strict maintenance of the sociopolitical and economic hierarchy was considered essential for the society’s survival (see the discussion of the Three Bonds, in chapter 4). Egalitarian trends, when observed in the writings of preimperial thinkers, are often termed “heterodoxy” and are associated with ideological rivals of Confucius, such as Mozi and Laozi.
²⁰
But this perspective does not take into account certain ideological traits even within the so-called Confucian school that moderated the thinkers’ staunch elitism. The first and most important of these was the broad belief that human beings are fundamentally equal in terms of their potential. According to this view, status distinctions reflected differences in the realization of one’s potential, but they were neither inborn nor immutable. This view was put forward with great clarity by one of the staunchest supporters of social hierarchy, Xunzi:

A petty man can become the superior man, but he is indisposed to
become a superior man; a superior man can become the petty man, but
he is indisposed to become a petty man.
²¹

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Xunzi’s message is clear: if he were disposed to become a superior man, the petty man could transcend his original status. There is nothing absolute in social barriers; actually, social mobility is no less important for the society’s functioning than is observation of strict hierarchy. Xunzi clarifies:

Although a man is the descendant of kings, lords,
shi
, and nobles, if he
does not observe the norms of ritual and propriety, he must be relegat-
ed to the status of a commoner; although he is a descendant of a com-
moner, if he accumulates learning of the texts, rectifies his behavior,
and is able to observe the norms of ritual and propriety—then he must
be elevated to the rank of high ministers,
shi
, and nobles.
²²

I have purposely selected Xunzi’s citations to illustrate the pervasiveness of preimperial thinkers’ belief in the changeability of one’s status. Xunzi was renowned for his exceptionally rigid insistence on the need to observe social gradations; yet even this strict elitist was unequivocally committed to the idea of social mobility, which rendered status distinctions among human beings relative and reversible rather than absolute. The idea that “neither should the officials be perpetually esteemed, nor the people forever base,”
²³
reflects the fundamental consensus of the Warring States period and is mirrored in contemporaneous social praxis. In that extraordinarily dynamic age, an ambitious commoner had indeed multiple avenues of upward social mobility, most notably due to military merit or economic success. Intellectuals, alternatively, emphasized the importance of learning as the best means of climbing the social ladder; as mentioned in chapter 3, many of them took pride in their supposedly base social origins and presented themselves as entirely self-made men. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the desirability of social mobility became part of the “genetic code” of Chinese political culture from the Warring States period on.

It is with this understanding in mind that we shall now address the rebels’ slogan “Level the noble and the base.” With the imperial unification and subsequent stabilization of society, lowly commoners’ opportunities for social advancement began disappearing. Thereafter, rebellions appear to have provided an alternative route for satisfying the ambitions of those from the bottom of society. The desire to invert the social pyramid and elevate “the base” is vividly evident already in the first known popular uprising. Chen She (d. 208 BCE), who initiated the revolt against the Qin, reportedly tried to entice his fellow soldiers to rebel by appealing to their ambitions: “We shall die but shall attain great Name. Kings, lords, generals, and chancellors—are they sown?”
²⁴
Chen She implied that many kings and lords are self-made, and it is clear that this hope to

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ascend the social ladder, rather than pure hatred of Qin or (nonexistent in his case) economic slogans, was the prime mover of his uprising—and many others.

The rebels’ attempt to overhaul the sociopolitical hierarchy of their day was manifested primarily in two types of action: excessive violence against officials and elite members, on the one hand, and lavish distribution of elevated positions and noble titles to their followers, on the other. At times, attempts were made to enhance social mobility institutionally: thus the Taiping leaders introduced a new type of civil service examinations, which allowed an incomparably higher proportion of candidates to succeed than was possible in the normal imperial system.
²⁵
It is significant, however, that no rebel regime ever attempted to abolish social distinctions in general. The rebels tried to reshuffle the sociopolitical pyramid by opening new avenues for upward and downward mobility—but they did not intend to dismantle it altogether and to “level the noble and the base” literally.
²⁶
Therefore, their goals (although not their means) remained well within the framework of traditional rules of the game. Massive elevation of have-nots was ideologically legitimate, and elite members had a moral right to collaborate with rebel leaders, even if those leaders came from the very bottom of society. Such cooperation might have been unthinkable in more rigidly pedigree-based societies; yet in China, with the pervasive belief that “the people would not remain base forever,” it was entirely acceptable.

Turning to the second aspect of egalitarian thought, demands for economic equality, we stand on shakier ground with regard to its acceptability to the elite. Clearly, mainstream Chinese thought favored a strict economic hierarchy, which ideally should match the sociopolitical one. The very ritual system that regulated the life of the elites during much of the preimperial period, and became the cornerstone of Confucian thought, was based on gradations of sumptuary privileges. Everybody’s consumption in life and death had to reflect his social rank; equality was unacceptable. Yet, this said, strong indignation was voiced against excessive inequality as well. In texts of the Warring States period we find a few surprising statements in favor of equal distribution of wealth—at least insofar as concerns distribution of wealth within the lower strata. These statements are scattered even through mainstream texts, such as the
Analects
of Confucius and the
Mengzi
;
²⁷
they are asserted more strongly in the writings of such thinkers as Mozi, who spoke of an ideal state of affairs in which the people would “work for each other” and share surplus commodities.
²⁸
The egalitarian vision is most vivid in a short passage incorporated into a Confucian canonical compendium,
Records of Rites
(
Liji
):

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When the Great Way was implemented, All-under-Heaven belonged to
all. The people selected the worthy and the able; their words were
trustworthy, and they cultivated amicability. Thus men were not at-
tached to their parents only, nor did they treat as children only their
own sons. The old were provided for until their natural death; the
able-bodied were employed, the young were provided for growing up.
They pitied widows, orphans, childless, disabled and sick, nourishing
each of them. Males had their allotment; females had their homes.
They detested throwing away extra commodities, but nor did they
hoard these for themselves alone; they detested not utilizing their la-
bor, but nor did they work for themselves alone. Hence scheming was
blocked and did not rise; robbers, bandits, and rebellious criminals did
not act. Hence the outer doors remained open and were not shut. This
is called the Great Uniformity (
Da tong
).
²⁹

This short passage became the major source of inspiration for a variety of utopian-minded thinkers both from within the establishment and from the rebel ranks; the concept of
Da tong
was associated with such diverse personalities as the Khitan emperor Yelü Deguang (r. 928–947), the Taiping rebels, the major late imperial reformer Kang Youwei (18581927), and the twentieth-century revolutionaries, including Sun Yatsen (1866–1925) and Mao Zedong (1893–1976).
³⁰
The very fact that this section survived in the Confucian canon indicates much broader tolerance of egalitarian ideals by establishment thinkers than we would intuitively assume.

Ideas of economic equality never became mainstream establishment ideology, but they had a deep and persistent impact on both the leaders and the led. As mentioned in chapters 2 and 4, as early as the Han dynasty (and most notably during Wang Mang’s interregnum) attempts were made to limit inequality by capping the size of large landholdings; later, the desire for economic fairness underlay the introduction of the “equal field” system in the late fifth century. Opposition to excessive inequality permeates the political thought of many establishment literati, who repeatedly expressed their indignation over the economic polarization in which “the rich amass fields in thousands while the poor have not enough land to stick the point of an awl.” Wang Anshi’s hatred of “engrossers,” mentioned in chapter 4, reflects a similar sentiment. This clear dissatisfaction among the proprietary classes with excessive gaps between the rich and the poor explains why the radical egalitarianism of certain rebel groups was not considered outright heretical and did not preclude cooperation of elite members with the rebels. Radical as they were, slogans in favor of equalization of wealth remained within the framework of legitimate political discourse.

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The partial overlap between rebel and the establishment ideologies discussed in this and the previous section had a complex impact on the rebels’ cause. First, it provided a degree of ideological justification for the rebels, which served their cause well and facilitated massive mobilization to their ranks. Second, it rendered rebellion less “revolutionary,” to borrow Meadows’s distinction—that is, radical as they were, the rebels’ slogans did not put them outside the pale of acceptable rules of the political game. This brings us to the third observation: the semilegitimacy of the rebellion was also an essential precondition for its eventual co-optation into the existing sociopolitical order. In what follows, by analyzing the trajectories of some of the rebellions, we shall see how these ideological factors influenced actual political processes.

AGENTS OF DISORDER

A reader of Chinese historical and literary sources cannot but be overawed by the almost apocalyptic dimensions of mass rebellions. The reasons for their exceptional destructiveness will be addressed later; here I want to focus only on the exorbitant cost of rebellions for their instigators and leaders. While a few of the rebel leaders succeeded either in establishing a dynasty or at least in attaining a prestigious position in exchange for timely surrender, countless more were exterminated: the lucky ones perished in battle; the less fortunate ones were seized, tortured, and executed with unspeakable cruelty, often together with their kin, followers, and even neighbors. What, then, prompted charismatic men and women to defy the government against all odds? Who were the “agents of disorder” who repeatedly triggered unrest under any major dynasty? In analyzing the social and ideological background of the would-be rebels, we shall move one step further away from the simplistic “government-rebels” dichotomy.