The Everlasting Empire (38 page)

5. See more in Pines,
Envisioning Eternal Empire
, 17–20; idem, “The Question of Interpretation,” 4–23.

6. This and subsequent discussion is largely based on Pines, “ ‘The One that Pervades All.’ ”

7. For the dynamics of international relations during the Springs- andAutumns period, see Pines,
Foundations
, 105–135; for the cultural cohesiveness of the Zhou aristocratic elites, see Falkenhausen,
Chinese Society
.

8.
Chunqiu Zuo zhuan
, Xiang 29:959.

9. For details of the “disarmament conferences,” see Kano, “Chuˉ goku.”

10.
Zhanguo ce
, “Qin ce 1” 3.2:74.

11. For military developments of the Warring States period, see Lewis, “Warring States,” 625–629; idem,
Sanctioned Violence
, 53–96.

12. See, e.g., Pines et al., “General Introduction,” for Qin; and articles in Cook and Major,
Defining Chu
, for Chu. It should be recalled, however, that during the Warring States period, the centrifugal tendencies were counterbalanced by forces of renewed cultural integration, promulgated by members of the educated elite; see more below in the text.

13. The following discussion largely elaborates upon Pines, “ ‘The One That Pervades All.’ ”

14. See Lewis,
The Construction of Space
, 192–212.

15.
Lunyu
, “Ji shi” 16.2: 174.

16.
Mozi
, “Shang tong shang” III. 11:109–110.

17. See
Boshu Laozi
, 25: 351, and Pines,
Envisioning Eternal Empire
, 36–44.

18.
Mengzi
, “Liang Hui Wang A” 1.6: 12–13.

19.
Shang jun shu
, “Qu qiang” I.4: 27.

20. See
Mengzi
, “Li Lou A” 7.14:175;
Shang jun shu
, “Hua ce,” IV.18: 107.

21. This notion is most vividly seen in the recently unearthed manuscript
Rong Cheng shi
, which was apparently produced in the state of Chu ca. 300 BCE. See translation and analysis of this text in Pines, “Political Mythology”; cf. idem, “Imagining the Empire?”

22. See Lewis,
The Construction of Space
.

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23.
Xunzi
, “Wang zhi” V.9: 171.

24. For attitudes toward Qin, see Pines, “Biases.” Our sources contain only two references to attempts to restore the vanquished states, Zhao and Chu, and the rebellion in the conquered lands of the state of Han (not to be confused with the later Han dynasty). Paleographic sources suggest that small- scale resistance, particularly in the Chu territories, might have continued throughout the Qin era.

25. Modified from Watson,
Records
[Qin], 80–81.

26. For citations from the Qin steles, see Kern,
The Stele Inscriptions
, 14, 21, 32, 39, 49 (I modify Kern’s translation). For the Qin marketplace propaganda, see Wang and Cheng,
Qin wenzi
, 63–69; Sanft, “Communication and Cooperation.”

27.
Shiji
6:239; cf. Watson,
Records
[Qin], 44.

28. See Giele, “Signatures,” 363–364. Qianling County, from which the unearthed documents come, was inhabited by over 250,000 persons (Zhang Chunlong, “Liye”).

29. For the Qin transportation system, see Sanft, “Communication and Cooperation”; for the potentially negative impact of Qin’s tightly organized administrative system on the dynasty’s viability, see Shelach, “Collapse or Transformation?”

30. For Xiang Yu, see Watson,
Records
[Han], I: 17–48; for the course of the early Han recentralization, see Loewe, “The Former Han Dynasty,” 110–152.

31. For the evolution of the system of provincial rule, see Guy,
Qing Governors
, especially pp. 21–46.

32. See details in Wechsler, “T’ai- tsung,” 210–212.

33. See details in Twitchett, “Hsüan- tsung,” and Graff,
Medieval Chinese Warfare
, 205–226.

34. See Peterson, “Court and Province,” for this and the next passage.

35. For financial reforms, see Twitchett,
Financial Administration
; for the Uighur role in the dynasty’s survival, see Mackerras,
The Uighur Empire
.

36. Peterson, “Court and Province.”

37. See Somers, “The End of the T’ang.”

38. See, e.g., Wang Gungwu,
Divided China
, 7–82; Wang shows that even individual prefectures could maintain a high degree of autonomy in the age of Tang’s collapse, which suggests much higher degree of disintegration than, e.g., in the Warring States period.

39. For Zhu Wen’s career, see ibid., 46–116; for his legitimation efforts, see Fang Cheng- hua, “The Price of Orthodoxy.” For general discussions of dynastic legitimacy, see Wechsler,
Offerings
; Chan,
Legitimation
; cf. Rao Zongyi,
Zhongguo shixue shang zhi zhengtong
. It is important to distinguish between what may be dubbed “cultural legitimation,” as discussed in these studies, and “practical legitimation,” which in the ages of division was attained primarily by those with demonstrable ability to reunify the realm. See more in the text below.

40. For the history of southern regimes in the tenth century, see Clark, “The Southern Kingdoms”; see also Worthy, “Diplomacy for Survival.”

41. Standen,
Unbounded Loyalty
, 42. Standen’s study focuses primarily on frontier crossing between Northern Chinese regimes and the Khitan Liao state; but her observations are easily applicable to other frontiers as well, and also to other periods of disunion.

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42. One of these symbolic demonstrations of one’s aspiration to unify the realm was enfeoffing one’s relatives and generals with territories that were situated deep within the enemy’s jurisdiction. For instance, leaders of southern regimes during ages of disunion routinely appointed princes of Qi, Qin, or Jin, that is, territories in the north. Few modern scholars pay attention to this “symbolic aggression,” yet it would be the equivalent of, say, the Russian Federation appointing the governor of Alaska or of Finland. Naturally, these actions— which were fairly common— precluded the possibility of long- term peaceful coexistence among rival regimes.

43. Cited, e.g., in
Mengzi
, “Wan Zhang A” 9.4: 215.

44. See, e.g., an example depicted by David Graff, “Dou Jiande’s Dilemma.” A similar “unification momentum” was achieved by Li Cunxu of the Later Tang dynasty (r. 923–936) in 923, but, as mentioned above in the text, he failed to capitalize on his initial success, and his realm disintegrated.

45. See Standen, “The Five Dynasties,” 112–132; Lau and Huang, “Founding and Consolidation,” 206–247. For the Southern Tang regime, see Kurz, “The Yangzi”; Ren Shuang,
Nan Tang
.

46. Ouyang Xiu,
Historical Records
, 62: 504.

47. Mather,
Biography of Lü Kuang
, 25. Charles Holcombe, “The Last Lord of the South,” makes a similar observation with regard to elites of southern (“native Chinese”) states of the same period: even after the Southern Dynasties had existed independently for two and a half centuries (318–589), “there was surprisingly little evidence of … long- term southern separatist sentiment” in the aftermath of the Sui conquest of 589; the southerners acquiesced in the northern triumph with “surprising alacrity” (p. 101).

48. For the early history of the term
jiu zhou
and its geographic scope, see Dorofeeva- Lichtman, “Ritual Practices”; throughout the imperial age this term was occasionally employed to distinguish between China proper and the nomadic realm in the north.

49. For an extreme view of China’s supposed “racism,” see Dikötter,
The Discourse of Race
, 1–30; for a more balanced approach, see Townsend, “Chinese Nationalism.”

50. See Pines, “Beasts or Humans” and “Imagining the Empire?”; Goldin, “Steppe Nomads.”

51. For nomads, see Di Cosmo,
Ancient China
. If preimperial thinkers were aware of the existence of other major civilization beyond the East Asian subcontinent, this awareness is not attested to in our sources.

52. Cited with modifications from Kern,
The Stele Inscriptions
, 32–33. Those “whose doors face north” are dwellers in the areas to the south of the Tropic of Cancer, where people reportedly “open their door north to face the sun” (33n76).

53. For the peculiar mind- set of the First Emperor, see Pines, “The Messianic Emperor.”

54. For the Great Wall, see Di Cosmo,
Ancient China
, 138–158. I rely heavily on Di Cosmo’s analysis of the Xiongnu interaction with the Qin and Han empires.

55. For the nomads and their long- term interaction with China, see, e.g., ibid.;

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Barfield,
The Perilous Frontier
; Jagchid and Symons,
Peace, War, and Trade
. For a broader perspective, see Khazanov,
Nomads and the Outside World
.

56.
Han shu
, 48: 2240.

57. See details in Di Cosmo,
Ancient China
, 190–206.

58. For the
Gongyang zhuan
, see Gentz,
Das Gongyang zhuan
; for its impact on Emperor Wu’s policy, see Chen Suzhen,
Handai zhengzhi
, especially pp. 222– 246. The
Gongyang zhuan
explicitly identifies progressive expansion into the alien periphery as the proper task of the True Monarch. See
Chunqiu Gongyang
, Cheng 15, 18: 2297; cf. Xi 4, 10: 2249; and Pines, “Imagining the Empire?” 79–81.

59. On Han foreign relations, see Yü Ying- shih, “Han Foreign Relations,” especially pp. 381–383 on the “tribute system.” The nature of this system and its usefulness as an analytical tool in the understanding of China’s foreign relations is subject to continuous dispute, which cannot be adequately dealt with here. For the classical presentation of the system, see Fairbank, “A Preliminary Framework”; cf. Rossabi, “Introduction.”

60. For the Southern Tang courtiers’ self- congratulatory rhetoric following the arrival of the Khitan “tribute” (actually trade) mission, see Ren Shuang,
Nan Tang
, 108; for the importance of the tribute rhetoric for masking the dynasty’s weakness vis- à- vis foreign polities, see Wang Gungwu, “The Rhetoric of a Lesser Empire.”

61. Wang Gungwu, “The Rhetoric of a Lesser Empire.”

62. See Goncharov,
Kitajskaia Srednevekovaia Diplomatiia
.

63.
Qing Shizong shilu
, 83, cited from Liu Zehua,
Zhongguo de Wangquanzhuyi
, 19. For the context of the controversy that spurred the emperor’s statement, see Spence,
Treason by the Book
, 116–134.

64. For fuctuations in Yongzheng’s foreign policy, see Dai,
The Sichuan Frontier
, 92–100.

65. For the Qianlong Emperor’s polemic with his critics, see Millward,
Beyond the Pass
, 20–43, especially 38–40. Millward illustrates there how in the process of the Qing territorial expansion the borders between “internal” and “external” realms were continuously redrawn. For more about the Qing expansion policy, see Perdue,
China Marches West
; Dai,
The Sichuan Frontier
.

66. See Honey, “Stripping Off Felt and Fur.”

67. See Golden, “Imperial Ideology”; Di Cosmo, “State Formation,” especially p. 20; Biran and Amitai, “Introduction.” For the evolution of the nomads’ political ideology in the aftermath of Chinggis Khan (ca. 1162–1227), see Elverskog,
Our Great Qing
, 14–62.

68. For the military history of that age, see Graff,
Medieval Chinese Warfare
, 54–120; for Fu Jian’s reign, see Fang Xuanling,
The Chronicle of Fu Chien
; for more details, see Wang Zhongluo,
Wei Jin
.

69. For the complexity of Liao relations with the North China political and military leaders, and for its occupation and subsequent abandonment of Kaifeng, see Standen, “What Nomads Want.”

70. See Tao Jing- shen,
Two Sons of Heaven
. For a detailed account of Liao history, see Twitchett and Tietze, “The Liao.”

71. For the impact of the Xi Xia on Song- Liao relations, and for Song at

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tempts to avoid recognition of the Tangut leader as yet another emperor, see Tao Jing- shen,
Two Sons of Heaven
.

72. For the recognition of Liao’s exceptionality, see Tao Jing- shen, “Barbarians or Northerners”; for the bifurcation between rhetoric and reality, see Wang Gungwu, “The Rhetoric of a Lesser Empire.”

73. For these essays, see, respectively,
Zizhi tongjian
69: 2187; Ouyang Xiu,
Zhengtong lun
. See discussion in Pines, “Name or Substance?”; cf. Rao Zongyi,
Zhongguo shixue shang zhi zhengtong
.

74. For “irredentism” as a prime mover of late Northern Song politics, see Smith, “Irredentism as Political Capital,” and idem, “Shen- Tsung’s Reign.” For Huizong’s disastrous foreign policy, see Goncharov,
Kitajskaia Srednevekovaia Diplomatiia
.

75. For the end of the Song resistance, see Davis,
Wind against the Mountain
.

76. See Biran,
Chinggis Khan
, 137–162.

77. The importance of the concept of unification in Mongol propaganda and in their legacy is discussed by Timothy Brook in “Unification as a Political Ideal.” Brook even opines that the very notion of Great Unity originated with the Mongols.

78. See, e.g., Duara, “Provincial Narratives,” 184; Schafer, “The Yeh Chung chi,” 148.

79. De Crespigny,
Generals of the South
, 512.

80.
Song shu
, 95: 2359; the last sentence refers to the
Laozi’
s political idyll (
Boshu Laozi
80: 150–155).

CHAPTER 2
THE MONARCH