The Fall of Carthage (75 page)

Polybius
3.
110.
2-11,
Livy
22.
44.
1-3.

Near
desertion
of
the
Spanish,
Livy
22.
40.
7-8,
but
see
P.
Erdkamp,
'Polybius,
Livy
and the
Fabian
Strategy',
Ancient Society
23
(1992),
pp.
127-47.
For
the
conversation
with Gisgo
see
Plutarch,
Fabius Maximus
15.
2-3.

Polybius
3.
112.
1-5,
livy
22.
44.
4-45.
4.
As
Connolly
(1981),
p.
184
points
out,
the spur
on
which
San
Ferdinando
di
Puglia
now
lies
stands
out
as
the
most
obvious
spot
for Hannibal's
camp.

Livy
22.
45.
5
claims
that
Varro
did
not
consult
Paullus.
For
the
suggestion
that
Paullus was
in
fact
in
command
see
Connolly
(1981),
pp.
184-6.

At
Metaurus,
the
consul
G.
Claudius
Nero
controlled
the
right,
the
praetor
L.
Porcius Licinus
the
centre
and
the
other
consul
M.
Livius
Drusus
Salinator
the
left,
in
spite
of the
fact
that
the
battle
was
fought
under
his
command,
Livy
27.
98.

For
the
Roman
deployment
see
Polybius
3.
113.
1-5,
Livy
45.
5-8.

Aemilius
Paullus
sent
the
triarii
to
protect
the
baggage
and
begin
construction
of
a camp
and
kept
the
rest
of
the
army
to
cover
them
before
Pydna,
Livy
44.
37,
and Merula
ordered
his
triarii
to
guard
the
baggage
when
he
encountered
the
Boii
on
the march
in
193
BC
,
Livy
35.
4.
However,
in
each
case
the
commander
had
not
planned
to fight
a
battle.
Lazenby
(1978),
p.
79
suggests
that
the
10,000
men
consisted
of
one legion
and
its
ala.

Hannibal's
deployment
see
Polybius
3.
113.
6-114.
8,
Iivy
22.
46.
1-7.

Polybius
3.
115.
1-4,
Livy
22.
47.
1-3;
Paullus
wounded,
Livy
49.
1.

Livy
22.
47.
5.

Polybius
3.
115.
5-116.
4,
Livy
22.
47.
4-10.
For
the
use
of
Corps
and
Division
sized columns
by
Napoleon's
army
and
their
inherent
problems
see
J.
Elting,
Swords Around a Throne
(London,
1988),
pp.
536-7.

livy
claims
that
500
Numidians
pretended
to
desert,
22.
48.
2-4,
but
in
Appian's version
it
is
500
Celtiberians
who
do
so,
The Hannibalic War 22.

Polybius
116.
5-8,
Livy
22.
48.
1-6.

Polybius
116.
9-117.
12,
Livy
22.
49.
1-18.
For
a
discussion
of
the
figures
see
Lazenby (1978),
pp.
84-5.
For
a
vivid
attempt
at
depicting
the
final
stages
of
the
battle
see

M.
Middlebrook,
The First Day
of
the Somme
(1971),
pp.
262-4.

Iivy22.
51.
5-9.

Polybius
3.
117.4-5.

Livy
22.
52.
4,
7,
53.
1-54.
6.

Livy
22.
51.
1-4.

Field
Marshal
Sir
Bernard
Mongomery,
A History
of
Warfare
(London,
1968),
p.
97.
For the
argument
against
Livy's
judgement
see
Lazenby
(1978),
pp.
85-6
and
'Was
Hannibal Right?',
in
T.
Cornell,
B.
Rankov,
and
P.
Sabin
(edd.)
The Second Punic War: A Reappraisal,
British
Institute
of
Classical
Studies
Supplement
67
(London,
1996),
39-48.
The view
is
not
new;
Delbruck
(1975),
pp.
336-44
came
to
much
the
same
conclusion.

Livy
22.
58.
1-9.

Revival
of
exchange
system
from
First
Punic
War,
Livy
22.
23.
6-8,
Plutarch,
Fabius Maximus
7;
for
Cincius
Alimentus,
Livy
21.
38.
3.

Hannibal
fighting
for
honour
and
power,
Livy
22.
58.
3.

Polybius
6.
58.
1-13,
Livy
22.
58.
9-61.
10.

Postumius'
disaster,
Polybius
3.
118.
6,
Livy
23.
24.
6-13.

Livy
22.
57.
10-12,
23.
14.
1-4.

N.
Rosenstein,
Imperatores Victi
(Berkeley,
1990),
pp.
139-40,
Livy
22.
61.
14-5.

Livy
22.
56.
4^5,
57.
2-9,
cf.
Polybius
6.
56.
6-12.