The Good Spy: The Life and Death of Robert Ames (71 page)

  
1
“Terrorist targets had shifted”:
Persico,
Casey
, p. 316.

  
2
The intercepts merely hinted:
Ibid., p. 316; Ronen Bergman asserts, “The NSA also picked up phone calls from the Revolutionary Guards in Baalbek requesting a green light for the attacks from the embassy in Damascus.” Ronen Bergman,
The Secret War with Iran: The 30-Year Clandestine Struggle Against the World’s Most Dangerous Terrorist Power
(New York: Free Press, 2008), p. 71. See also Woodward,
Veil
, p. 231. Woodward writes about Jack Anderson’s scoop.

  
3
twenty-one thousand pounds of TNT:
Steven O’Hern,
Iran’s Revolutionary Guard: The Threat That Grows While America Sleeps
(Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2012), p. 56. O’Hern is citing a Department of Defense commission report on the marine-barracks bombing.

  
4
“We all believe Iranians did this bombing”:
Reagan,
Reagan Diaries
, p. 278.

  
5
“We were too paralyzed by self-doubt”:
George Shultz, interview, Martin Smith and Peter Taylor BBC documentary,
States of Terror
.

  
6
“It criticized the State Department’s security policies …”:
Frederick Hutchinson, interview, December 5, 2011.

  
7
But they were released two days later:
Thomas Friedman, “Lebanon Holding 4 in Embassy Attack,”
New York Times
, April 21, 1983, and “Lebanon Frees 4 Witnesses Held in Bombing,”
New York Times
, April 22, 1983.

  
8
“principal grunt on the ground …”:
Frederick Hutchinson, interview, December 5, 2011.

  
9
“took part without hesitation …”:
Mark Bowden, “The Dark Art of Interrogation,”
Atlantic
, October 2003.

10
“appears to have been a double, triple, a geometric-multiple agent …”:
Christopher Dickey, “Snowland: Calling Captain Crunch,”
Newsweek
, April 17, 2003. See also
Captain Crunch
, a History Channel DVD released on November 25, 2005, in which Keith Hall describes his experiences in Beirut.

11
Hall taped Nimr’s confession:
Robert Baer says he read the Hall report and thought it “ludicrous.” Robert Baer, e-mail to author, April 26, 2013.

12
Nimr had died in his jail cell:
Baer,
See No Evil
, p. 71. Baer does not write about Captain Crunch, and he doesn’t name Elias Nimr as the suspect who died. But he does confirm that “Lebanese investigators beat a suspect to death during questioning.” Robert Hatem, an associate of Elie Hobeika, the intelligence chief for the Lebanese Forces, claims in his memoirs that Hobeika had Elias Nimr killed in his jail cell. Hatem,
From Israel to Damascus
, p. 31.

13
“No one was punished for it”:
Bowden, “Dark Art of Interrogation.”

14
“Iran ordered it”:
Baer,
See No Evil
, p. 267.

15
“I was asked to keep tabs …”:
Sam Wyman, interview, July 27, 2010.

16
“We still do not have actual knowledge …”:
Roger Morris, “A Death in Damascus,”
Counterpunch
, February 25, 2008.

17
born on July 12, 1962:
Bilal Y. Saab, an academic who interviewed some of Mughniyeh’s relatives, reports that Mughniyeh was actually born on January 25, 1962. O’Hern,
Iran’s Revolutionary Guard
, p. 49; Bilal Y. Saab, “Imad Mughniyeh: Lebanese by Birth, Palestinian by Heart,” Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst,
Jane’s Defense Weekly
, April 11, 2011; Bilal Y. Saab, “Israel, Hizb Allah, and the Shadow of Imad Mughniyeh,”
Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel
, June 1, 2011.

18
“very smart”:
Blanford,
Warriors of God
, p. 28.

19
“Imad stood out from the others”:
Ibid., p. 28. Naqqash remained a lifelong friend of Mughniyeh.

20
Mughniyeh was recruited:
Baer,
See No Evil
, p. 99; O’Hern,
Iran’s Revolutionary Guard
, pp. 49–51; Saab, “Imad Mughniyeh”; Blanford,
Warriors of God
, pp. 27–29, 46, 73.

21
first visit to postrevolutionary Iran:
Saab, “Imad Mughniyeh.” Saab’s source for Mughniyeh’s 1979 trip to Iran is Ibrahim Al-Amin, editor-in-chief for the Lebanese newspaper
Al-Akhbar
.

22
hijacking of TWA Flight 847:
O’Hern,
Iran’s Revolutionary Guard
, p. 63. O’Hern reports that the FBI identified Mughniyeh’s fingerprint from a bathroom on the plane.

23
“When in doubt …”:
Roger Morris, “Death in Damascus.”

24
“gather information and details …”:
Jaber,
Hezbollah
, p. 82.

25
“He wanted some explosives”:
Blanford,
Warriors of God
, p. 53.

26
“We knew Mughniyeh was later responsible …”:
Yoram Hessel, interview, Tel Aviv, October 10, 2012.

27
Mughniyeh drove to Damascus:
Jaber,
Hezbollah
, p. 82. See also Bergman,
Secret War with Iran
, p. 70.

28
“Imad was a very handsome young man …”:
Mustafa Zein, interview, Amman, October 8, 2012.

29
“He’s no great saint …”:
Bergman,
Secret War with Iran
, p. 68. In 1983, Mughniyeh married Sa’ada Badr al-Din, a sister of Mustafa Badr al-Din, a Force 17 officer and later a military commander for Hezbollah. But he later acquired a second wife and set her up in a nice apartment in the Hamra district of Beirut.

30
Mughniyeh underwent plastic surgery:
Thomas,
Gideon’s Spies
, pp. 658–63.

31
But this piece of his legend is apocryphal:
Blanford,
Warriors of God
, p. 355.

32
“Mughniyeh is probably the most intelligent, most capable operative …”:
David Kohn, “Shadow Warriors,”
CBS News
, February 11, 2009.

33
“very shrewd, very talented …”: Meir Harel
, interview, Tel Aviv, October 18, 2012.

34
The Iranians even gave him citizenship:
Jaber,
Hezbollah
, p. 119.

35
“Operation Bob Ames”:
Harry C. Batchelder Jr., “Sentencing Memorandum on Behalf of Mustafa Zein,” 88 Cr. 99 (J.E.S.) United States District Court Southern District of New York,
United States v. Mustafa Zein
, p. 39.

36
He passed these photos to the CIA:
Ibid., p. 46.

37
“When Bandar saw the news account”:
Woodward,
Veil
, pp. 396–98.

38
Zein also believes that Casey ordered the assassination attempt:
Mustafa Zein, e-mail to author, June 12, 2013; For more on the B’ir al-Abed car bombing, see Persico,
Casey
, p. 443; Blanford,
Warriors of God
, pp. 74–75; Odd Karsten Tveit,
Goodbye Lebanon: Israel’s First Defeat
(Oslo: H. Aschehoug, 2010, 2012), p. 101; Bergman,
Secret War with Iran
, pp. 71–73.

39
“It was
[
Ali Reza
]
Asgari’s operation”:
Mustafa Zein, memo, March 2011. Asgari was brought to America in February or March 2007 and debriefed in a CIA safe house outside Washington, D.C. He was admitted to the United States under Public Law 110, which allows the CIA to bring into the country up to one hundred foreign nationals annually.

40
A suicide driver was found:
Robert Baer makes a circumstantial case that the suicide driver was a young Shi’a Lebanese man named Muhammad Hassuna. Baer,
See No Evil
, pp. 120–22.

41
The court determined:
Judge Bates cited the testimony of Ambassador Robert Oakley, who said it was “very clear that Islamic Jihad [Hezbollah] was behind the bombing in 1983.” Civil suit testimony,
Anne Dammarell v. Islamic Republic of Iran
, quoted in John D. Bates, U.S. District Judge, Memorandum of Opinion,
Findings and Conclusions, September 8, 2003, p. 21, courtesy of Stu Newberger. Ambassador Oakley further expressed “confidence that the government of Iran was involved directly in the Hezbollah organization, which was created, armed, trained, protected, and provided technical assistance by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.” Another expert witness, Dr. Patrick Clawson, estimated that Iran had spent in the range of $50 million to $150 million in 1983 on various terrorist projects (pp. 5–8).

42
raw, “bulk” form of PETN:
See Warren Parker, expert testimony,
Deborah D. Peterson, Personal representative of the Estate of James C. Knipple, v. The Islamic Republic of Iran
, Civil Action No. 01-2684, filed May 30, 2003, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, p. 17. Parker was testifying about the PETN used in the October 23, 1983, attack on the U.S. marine barracks, but the same type of PETN was used in the U.S. embassy attack.

43
“a 24-karat gold document”:
Admiral James A. Lyons, testimony,
Deborah D. Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran
, p. 13. See also Col. Timothy J. Geraghty,
Peacekeepers at War: Beirut 1983—The Marine Commander Tells His Story
(Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2009), pp. 181, 185–86.

44
in Baalbek, serving there until late January 1984:
This key fact comes from the 2007 Farsi memoirs of Iran’s ex-president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who reports that on January 24, 1984, Ambassador Ali Akbar Mohtashamipur complained to him about the “disorderly state of the Guards [in Lebanon] since Kan’ani left” (
http://namehnews.ir/News/Item/19721/2
). Courtesy of Ali Alfoneh, e-mail to author, February 18, 2013.

45
“They got the order …”:
“Mahmoud,” testimony,
Deborah D. Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran
, p. 15.

46
“The Beirut embassy operation was directed …”:
Vincent Cannistraro, e-mail to author, March 1, 2013.

47
Mustafa Mohammed Najjar:
Geraghty,
Peacekeepers at War
, pp. 199–201. Geraghty writes that Najjar was commander of the IRGC in Baalbek when a truck bomb struck the marine barracks in October 1983. But he also names Ali Reza Asgari as another IRGC officer who was involved in this attack.

48
“I remember learning …”:
Ambassador Robert Dillon, civil suit testimony, April 7, 2003,
Anne Dammarell v. Islamic Republic of Iran
.

49
“managed to slip away”:
Bergman,
Secret War with Iran
, p. 104.

50
On April 7, 1995, the CIA learned:
Ibid., p. 244.

51
“Imad Mughniyeh came to Khartoum …”
Ibid., p. 224.

52
“suicide bombers could be devastatingly effective”:
Lawrence Wright,
The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), pp. 173–74.

53
Later, Bin Laden sent his agent:
Ibid., p. 186.

54
“just allegations …”:
Nicholas Blanford, “Hizballah Mourns Its Shadowy Hero,”
Time
, February 13, 2008.

55
Mughniyeh had played a key role:
Blanford,
Warriors of God
, pp. 466–67.

56
He died instantly:
Ian Black, “Profile: Imad Mughniyeh,”
Guardian
, February 13, 2008;
BBC News
, February 13, 2008; Anthony Shadid and Alia Ibrahim, “Bombing Kills Top Figure in Hezbollah,”
Washington Post
, February 14, 2008. See also Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv,
Spies Against Armageddon
(New York: Levant
Books, 2012), p. 303; Blanford,
Warriors of God
, p. 465; Bergman,
Secret War with Iran
, pp. 379–80.

57
“Mughniyeh was assassinated …”:
Vincent Cannistraro, e-mail to author, March 1, 2013.

58
“His was a rare case …”:
Ronen Bergman, interview, Tel Aviv, October 11, 2012.

59
“What they don’t know …”:
Shadid and Ibrahim, “Bombing Kills Top Figure.”

60
postage stamp in Mughniyeh’s honor:
“Iran: First-Class Stamp Honors Militant,”
New York Times
, March 11, 2008.

61
“His prayer mat is here …”:
Robert F. Worth, “Hezbollah Shrine to Terrorist Suspect Enthralls Lebanese Children,”
New York Times
, September 2, 2008.

62
born on January 10, 1957:
Some sources say he was born on November 1, 1952. In the mid-1980s he married Zyba Ahmadi. Later, he acquired a second wife. He has four daughters and one son by his first wife.

63
Asgari accompanied Iran’s minister of defense:
Bergman,
Secret War with Iran
, p. 59. The two other officers were Col. Sayed Shirazi and Mohsen Rezai, the commander of the Revolutionary Guard.

64
“from Kurdistan to Lebanon”:
Brig. Gen. Esmaeil Ahmadi-Moghaddam, press statement, Fars News Agency, December 15, 2012:
www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13910925001246
(in Farsi),
www.mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/178155
. See also
www.ashoora.ir/archive-article/tarikhche-hezb-allah/vorode-sepah-enghelab-be-sahne-lobnan/menu-id-41
.

65
“establishment of Hezbollah …”:
Fars News Agency, December 15, 2012,
www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13910925001246
. Farsi-language press sources also establish that Asgari was a close friend of Seyed Abbas Musavi, later secretary-general of Hezbollah. When Musavi was assassinated by the Israelis in April 1992, Asgari attended the funeral:
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache
:
http://www.mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/23943/%D8%B9%DA%A9%D8%B3-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B3%DA%AF%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86
. I am in debt to Amir Hossein Etemadi for this research in Farsi-language sources. Amir Hossein Etemadi, e-mail to author, April 18, 2013. See also Bergman,
Secret War with Iran
, pp. 59–60. See also Gareth Smyth, “Mystery of Former Iranian Minister Deepens,”
Financial Times
, March 11, 2007. Smyth reports, “Mr. Asgari was the commander in the 1980s of a small group of Revolutionary Guards sent to Lebanon to train and organize opposition to the Israeli occupation.”