The Israel-Arab Reader (56 page)

On 15 August 1985, a meeting was held at our prime minister's residence in Amman attended by the prime minister, the chief of the Royal Hashemite Court, the minister of the court and the foreign minister from the Jordanian side, and Yasir Arafat, accompanied by Khalil al-Wazir, Abd al-Razzaq al-Yahya and Muhammad Milhim from the Palestinian side. During that meeting, the prime minister again asked Arafat whether he was clear on the method of proceeding, particularly with regard to the second phase—PLO readiness to accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Arafat reaffirmed his acceptance of all steps and arrangements agreed upon between us, including the PLO's readiness to accept the abovementioned resolutions.

In light of Arafat's reply, we informed the U.S. Administration that the suspicions it had on this subject were not justified and that we were awaiting their positive reply concerning the date of the meeting between U.S. officials and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.

On 7 September 1985, we received the U.S. reply, which said that it was not possible to hold the meeting, thus terminating this scenario before the first step, originally expected in June, was taken. This came at the time we were preparing for a visit to New York to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the United Nations, and to Washington to discuss bilateral issues and the peace process with the U.S. Administration.

Assessment of the situation, prior to the visit, led us to believe that we could pursue our dialogue with the United States by concentrating this time on the second phase of the process, the international conference, since not much progress had been achieved on the issue of Palestinian representation. Our reading of the U.S. position led us to believe that further discussions could take place on that other issue, which was last discussed in May 1985. I mentioned earlier that from the beginning our dialogue with the Americans had dealt with two issues separately: Palestinian representation and the international conference, with emphasis on the subject of Palestinian representation.

I will now turn to our efforts on the second issue, the convening of an international conference.

In May 1985, in our discussions with the U.S. Administration in Washington, we raised the issue of convening such a conference because we considered it to be the venue for all parties concerned to meet, including the PLO. The U.S. position was a flat rejection of an international conference. Instead, the United States proposed that, after the PLO was brought into the peace talks, a meeting should be set up between Israel and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, under the auspices of the United States, to be held in a U.S. city. Upon learning this, we decided to cut our visit short and reaffirmed to them our definite and unequivocal rejection of seeking a unilateral approach similar to that of Camp David in the negotiations.

The U.S. Administration then changed its position and proposed that the talks could be held at the United Nations in Geneva. Once again, we informed the U.S. Administration that we rejected this proposal, like the one before it, as we did not see that the problem was one of where the talks should be held. We reiterated that Jordan's unwavering position was that it sought to reach a comprehensive settlement through the convening of an international conference attended by all the parties to the conflict, including the permanent members of the Security Council. As a result, the U.S. Administration reconsidered its proposal and promised to seriously ponder the issue of convening an international conference. We accepted this and continued our discussions concerning the issue of Palestinian representation.

During talks in Washington in October 1985, we again raised the issue of an international conference after having proposed it to the administration prior to our departure for the United States. Meetings were held between Jordanian and U.S. officials in Washington. The United States submitted a proposal concerning the international conference, which, after careful examination, seemed to suggest a conference in name only. We on the other hand insisted that the conference should have clear powers.

Among the various U.S. suggestions was the inclusion of the Soviet Union in the conference only after it restored diplomatic relations with Israel, because this was an Israeli condition. We argued for the rejection of this approach for the following reasons:

After extensive discussions lasting three days, the United States accepted the following points which we proposed:

We continued our intensive discussions with the U.S. Administration concerning the powers of the conference and we insisted that it should not be a conference in name only, but rather that it should be one that was effective and had a clear mandate. Despite prolonged discussions, we did not reach a final understanding with the U.S. Administration regarding this issue. We agreed to continue our discussions on this central point, and considered that what we had agreed upon constituted a basis from which to proceed. While we were still in Washington, the cycle of terrorism and counterterrorism began with the Larnaca incident, followed by the Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis. This had a negative effect on the peace process and our efforts were once again jeopardized by fears and suspicions.

Upon our return to Amman in October 1985 we informed the Palestinian leadership of what we had accomplished during our talks in Washington. We informed them that the PLO would be required to accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in order to be invited to the international conference, to accept the principle of participating in negotiations with the Government of Israel as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation within the context of the international conference, which would be convened to establish a comprehensive settlement, and to renounce terrorism. We also informed the Palestinian leadership that our discussions with the U.S. Administration regarding the question of the mandate of the conference were still inconclusive, and that further discussions would follow. We made it clear to the Palestinian leadership that a written statement of acceptance was needed from them, while leaving them to choose the appropriate time to announce that approval. The written acceptance was needed so that we could encourage the U.S. Administration to proceed earnestly to convene an international conference and to reassure them that the PLO was anxious to participate in the peace process. We had already made clear to the U.S. Administration that Jordan would not attend the conference unless invitations were extended to the PLO, sister Syria, and all other parties involved in the conflict, because we are after a comprehensive peace.

We also promised the Palestinian leadership that their acceptance would be kept confidential and shown only to the concerned U.S. officials until they themselves decided to announce it.

On 7 November 1985, after talks with President Husni Mubarak, Yasir Arafat issued a statement in Cairo denouncing terrorism in all its forms, irrespective of its source. The PLO Executive Committee then held a meeting in Baghdad, and as we were not officially notified of its decisions, we awaited Arafat's visit to Amman to hear from him, once again, the final position of the PLO on Security Council Resolution 242.

Meanwhile, I made a private visit to London on 7 January 1986 for medical reasons. While I was there, the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs [Richard Murphy] arrived in London with a U.S. delegation. He requested to see me to continue our discussions regarding the issue of the international conference. We held two rounds of talks in London, the first attended by the prime minister and the chief of the Royal Court on 18 January, and the second, on 20 January, attended by the chief of the Royal Court. Throughout both meetings the discussions focused on defining the mandate of the international conference and the participation of the PLO, as both issues had become interwoven as a result of progress achieved in the peace process. The American position had developed to the extent of agreeing to the right of the concerned parties to submit any disagreements between them to the conference. However, we could not reach full agreement regarding the role of the conference in settling disputes among the negotiating parties.

Concerning the issue of PLO participation in the conference, the American delegation reiterated its previous position requiring that the PLO should first accept Security Council Resolution 242 in order for the United States to start a dialogue with it. The United States did not commit itself to accepting the inviting of the PLO to the conference. Our reply was that we wanted the United States to agree to have the PLO invited to participate in the conference if it accepted Security Council Resolution 242. This point became the subject of extensive discussions, during which I asked for a clear American position to relay to the PLO. The American delegation agreed to take this up at the highest level on its return to Washington.

On 21 January 1986, I returned to Amman having achieved these results on the issues of an international conference and PLO participation. On 25 January 1986, our efforts bore fruit when I received a final reply from the U.S. Administration concerning PLO participation in the international conference. Their reply came in a written commitment which said:

When it is clearly on the public record that the PLO has accepted Resolutions 242 and 338, is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel, and has renounced terrorism, the United States accepts the fact that an invitation will be issued to the PLO to attend an international conference.

The United States would then start contacts with the Soviet Union with the purpose of having them participate, together with the other permanent members of the Security Council, in the international conference, which would be convened by the secretary general of the United Nations.

On that same day, Arafat arrived in Amman with a Palestinian leadership delegation. We held four extensive meetings in four days. I presided over three of these meetings. The discussion concentrated on the subject of American assurances and the PLO's position regarding those assurances. We assumed that the PLO would accept these since:

But our brothers in the Palestinian leadership surprised us by refusing to accept Security Council Resolution 242 within this context, while acknowledging what they described as our “extraordinary effort,” which had caused a significant change in the U.S. position, and which would not have been possible had it not been for the respect, credibility and trust which our country, Jordan, enjoyed in this world.

In spite of this, we continued our discussions with the PLO leadership in the hope of convincing them that their acceptance would cement a very important link in peace efforts leading to an international conference, which in the unanimous view of the Arabs and all peace-loving peoples constitutes the major venue for the establishment of a comprehensive, permanent, and just peace. It is towards the objective of convening such a conference that we have worked tirelessly for the past nine years, but to no avail. Now that the opportunity presented itself, we hoped that it would not be wasted like other missed opportunities if we were to remain faithful to our goals of saving our people and liberating our land and Holy Places.

The answer of the brothers in the Palestinian leadership was that they wanted an amendment to the proposed text in return for acceptance of Resolution 242. The amendment would require the addition of a statement indicating the agreement of the United States to the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to self-determination within the context of a confederation between Jordan and Palestine, as stated in the February 11 accord. We reminded the Palestinian leadership that the subject of self-determination within the context of a confederation was a matter for Jordanians and Palestinians and that no other party had anything to do with it. Nothing was to be gained from the support of this or that state as long as we ourselves were committed to this text. The important thing was to achieve withdrawal first, then to proceed with what we had agreed upon. We reminded them that this had always been our position and that it had been clear all along, starting from my opening address in Amman at the 17th PNC session, in which I referred to the proposed Jordanian-Palestinian relationship, and continuing through all our discussions to date.