The Israel-Arab Reader (53 page)

And as for the Reagan plan, it was proposed on the day on which the last batch left Beirut. We heard the clauses of the plan when we were at sea. Its discussion in the
Fatah
movement began; we discussed its positive and negative sides. Through a simple political reading of the plan we find that it denies the existence of the Palestinian people and not only the Palestinian question. It also says no to the Palestinian state, no to the PLO, no to Jerusalem and its return, and yes to the settlements and to changing the borders. Despite all this, some voices within
Fatah
said there were positive points in the plan—that it recognized for the first time that the West Bank and Gaza Strip were under occupation. Is there anything new in this? Is there any justice in this? . . .

After the Reagan plan we plunged into a new whirlpool, the plan for a confederation with Jordan. We began to discuss the details before the state had been established—instead of first establishing the state and then discussing the confederation, which would be a direct result of establishing the state. Without going into all the details of this matter, I say that so far no clear decision has been made on this matter. We have not closed the door on it; it remains unresolved. There should be clear agreement that talks on a confederation are to be held after the establishment of an independent state. . . .

It is not a question of numbers. If it had been so I would have addressed an appeal to all our
fedayeen
and they would all have joined us. We are an indivisible part of
Fatah.
We are the conscience of
Fatah
who have raised their voice and thought aloud, and express the broad faithful base. . . . Therefore, it is necessary to stop and examine what we have achieved. What has this revolution achieved? Is it capable of shouldering the responsibility in confronting these big plans in light of its current reality or should it rearrange itself in a proper manner so that it can confront the coming stage? We say that the . . . National Council when it said yes to many of the political issues is neither a revolutionary nor a clear act. Political clarity is the major base. We understand that in the stages of retreat revolutionary movements adhere more closely to principles and bases.

What should I say to my father who fought in 1936 before the occupation of Palestine and the establishment of the Israeli state? What should I say to those who fought during these years to prevent the establishment of such a state? Are we fighting in order to recognize Israel? This is not reasonable, not reasonable and strange. These issues should be reexplained and corrected. Lastly, is it fair that the Central Committee issues decisions to put us under the command of the commander in chief together with Abu Hajim and Al-Haj Isma'il? Is it fair that it issues decisions to freeze our activity? . . .

. . . Frankly and without exaggerating or underestimating what has been described as a rebellion, mutiny, or split within the
Fatah
movement, we ask: What did really happen, what were its causes, and what repercussions is it likely to have?

Answer: The group involved, including Abu Musa, Qadri, Abu Salih, and others, originally held political views characterized by rejection of the Fez resolutions and other policies. . . . This group, even before Fez, adopted certain political attitudes based on an idealistic rejection of everything or on conditional approval of many things. For example, Brother Abu Salih said that he would support the Fez summit [plan] if it included setting up a Palestinian state and would oppose it if it did not. So, fundamentally, this group has been adopting a certain political attitude for years. We could say that this attitude began to crystallize after the September events, and it has been applied to Jordan and to the recent Fez resolutions. The group included Naji 'Allush, Abu Nidal, and many others. Some of them left the movement and some continued to work within its framework. Even at the recent PNC meetings in Algiers, Abu Musa adopted certain attitudes which stemmed from a comprehensive theory which everyone wished it was possible to implement, even partially. The reason behind the declarations made in Al-Biqa' was certain military organizational decisions made with the approval of the Military Council. They believe that some of these decisions should not have been made, especially the appointment of Abu Hajim as officer in charge of the Al-Biqa' area and Al-Haj Isma'il as officer in charge of the north. Their position developed into a mutiny in the sense that they rejected the new military organizational steps. It was not made on political grounds, although the political aspect later came into it.

As far as discipline is concerned, this matter is serious. Democracy may be required on such matters, but at the level of the Central Committee, not the level of military officers. . . . That is the declared principle of the matter. The other fact is that, very regrettably, Brother Abu Salih overstepped the mark in
Fatah
's democracy when he extended a hand for funds from a source outside
Fatah
and cooperated with two Arab states. . . . That money was paid before the PNC conference and it was agreed that five issues would be used to cause a split. They included rejection of the Fez summit, rejection of agreement with Jordan, and rejection of the Reagan initiative. There was no problem there, but to give the dissension a national character they were to use these points and, in the event of failure, they were to raise the issue of the dialogue with Israeli democratic forces. . . .

Another issue had also been raised to cause disunity. That issue was the differences with Syria. . . . I believe that national unity is not unity of the organizations but rather unity of the people behind the leadership and the goals. This does in fact exist because the Palestinian people are united regardless of whether there is a leadership or not. It was the Palestinian people, not an organization or a leadership, who foiled the settlement plots in the fifties. This matter is too great to be undermined. The people are much more united than the organizations. The organizational numbers do not broadly and accurately reflect the real attitudes of the people. One organization or another may have some support here or there, but Abu 'Ammar's leadership is unquestionable and
Fatah
's political line represents the mainstream. That is why I consider agreement among the organizations to be agreement among the instruments of work—and not national unity because unity is there. Our problem with the unity of the instruments is that some of them are not Palestinian, even though they are identified as such, because they do not take Palestinian orders. National unity or front relations under the National Charter, and in fact under any front regulations anywhere in the world, means agreement on a minimum plan of action with the minority accepting the views of the majority. It is very regrettable that the minority does not accept the opinion of the majority. . . .

Brothers and sisters, the convocation of your council in Amman represents the unity of your will and the will of your people in the occupied homeland and elsewhere. It also represents the cohesion of the efforts and wills of two fraternal peoples, which have been demonstrated by their confrontation of the common challenge and danger. It is a natural return to what should and would continue to be. The Jordanian people have, more than and before anyone else, shared with the Palestinian people their sorrows, sufferings, and sacrifices and also carried with them their hope, determination, and resolution to regain their legitimate national rights on the land of Palestine. Jordan, and with it my family, have more than and before anyone else stood by the Palestinian people in confronting the Zionist danger in the early days just as we are confronting it today while it is at its peak. We are not saying this in order to outbid, maneuver, or seek praise, but to affirm an objective fact that has been made evident by actual participation in facing the common danger. . . .

I personally opened the first session of the PNC on May 28, 1964 in Jerusalem. I told your brother representatives of the Palestinian people in that meeting, among other things, that your convention represented a unique, historic event in the entire history of the disaster. I said that it was the first meeting of the heroic struggler Palestinian people despite all the designs to scatter them to all the four corners of the globe. So you can see from the historical facts that we—as a Hashemite family and a country— have never disavowed, God forbid, the Palestinian identity and aspirations or tried to dominate Palestine and its people.

Brothers and sisters: Following Israel's occupation of the West Bank in 1967, we in Jordan and our brothers in Egypt devoted our efforts to achieving two objectives: first, rebuilding our Armed Forces which were destroyed by the war; and second, working politically for the sake of regaining the territory that was occupied by force. We cooperated with sister Egypt in issuing UN Security Council Resolution 242 which formed the basis of our political actions. The late leader President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir urged me during our first meeting after the June war to do anything and exert every effort to regain the occupied territory. I did not need anyone to tell me to do that. By God, I have never showed cowardice and will not show cowardice when it comes to defending Jerusalem and Palestine. I have done all I could with God's help. I have spared no effort and pursued every course.

In the meantime, however, the PLO emerged as an effective party in the Palestinian arena. Its growth produced a natural tendency among the Palestinian people to manifest their national identity on their land. Their effort to regain the occupied territory was marred by doubts about the possibility of establishing their national authority on the land of Palestine once Jordan had regained the West Bank. A clear Palestinian trend evolved to relieve Jordan of this responsibility. This trend was nourished by an illusion that the restoration of the territory was around the corner. It was also nourished by all those who considered the Jordanian-Palestinian relationship as committing all Arabs equally to the fate of the Palestine question and to the duty of saving it, and, consequently, everyone who preferred to place the direct and primary responsibility on the Palestinian people, thereby placing the Arabs in the second rank. [sentence as heard] This was what we resisted as much as we could and considered as a relinquishment of a sacred duty at a time which did not permit such a thing. One could have imagined such a trend, if it had come before the entry of the Arab armies into the land of Palestine in 1984. But for this trend to come after all of the Palestinian territory had fallen to Israel, then it cannot but be construed as an attempt to let down the Palestinian people.

As a result of this, a secret conflict began between Jordan and the PLO. Because of the confused vision, this conflict led to a collision that resulted in regrettable incidents. We in Jordan faced a dilemma. If we capitulated to this approach, we would have improved the position of the enemy, who employed any pretext, however flimsy, in order to deceive world public opinion, strengthen its false claims, and annex the occupied territory. If we had continued our political work as we began it following the 1967 war, without paying attention to our Palestinian brothers' fear, our brothers' doubts concerning our aims would have increased. . . .

Brother and sister PNC members, the years go by, more than 17 years have passed, and the West Bank and Gaza Strip are still under occupation. The enemy continues to plan and implement. Jerusalem remains steadfast, patiently moaning whenever a Jewish castle is built upon it. The Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock are being threatened with demolition and destruction and declared open to everyone by the delusions and thoughts of the fanatic. The holy and cherished land is being swallowed up every day through confiscation and appropriation or on the pretext of security and planning. The national character of the Palestinian economy is obliterated after becoming part of Israel's economy.

The future is just like the present, shrouded with doubt, anxiety, and uncertainty. As for the kinfolk, may God help them; despite every form of institutionalized pressure against them they remain steadfast. How long will we watch as the enemy exploits the time by greedily swallowing up another part of the remaining land every day while we wildly and thoughtlessly waste the time in arguments and vituperation. How long shall we heed those among us who say: Leave it for future generations. Is this not a clear abdication of responsibility? Is each generation not responsible for the era in which it lives? What makes them believe that the circumstances of future generations will be more conducive to achieving what they are avoiding to achieve? Can they stop time and progress for the enemy, and keep time and progress moving for themselves? What wisdom or morality is there in leaving future generations a heavy legacy more likely to grow than recede? Will the Palestinians, who are lost and suffering in the occupied land, accept such arguments when they know better than anyone else the meaning of giving the enemy more time and the impact of this on their existence and future?

The least that can be said of this argument is that it is escape from responsibility. The least that can be said of the advocates of this argument is that they are those who believe that the world is synonymous with their own existence. This is not the way the world works. Each generation has its own responsibilities. The justifications of the existence of any ruler depends on the wise and courageous fulfillment of his responsibilities and the sincere and vigorous implementation of his duties. If time has any meaning it is in properly using it and not in suspending it. . . .

Perhaps you share with me the view that the picture is bleak, and, consequently, requires a new outlook and course. The new outlook must necessarily start with defining future action. Perhaps the natural starting point is to emphasize the special relationship between Jordan and Palestine—a relationship forged by the purely objective factors of history, geography, and demography which have placed the two fraternal countries and peoples since the turn of the century in the same boat of suffering, hope, interest, harm, history, and destiny.