The Israel-Arab Reader (96 page)

Abu Mazin: One cannot say that implementation has been 100 percent good or 100 percent bad. This experiment is new to us from beginning to end. We are ruling ourselves for the first time. There are many complex problems. Like other newly liberated peoples, we are facing specific relevant obstacles, but I say that we have the advantage of having a foothold and yet unexploited qualifications. Some other nations achieved independence with not even 5 percent of their population able to read and write. We enter the phase of independence with less than 5 percent illiteracy. That is the difference which justifies better expectations for us. But let me sum up what has been happening as follows: Over the past 50 years the clock was ticking but now, after Oslo, it is moving forward and the train is moving forward on its tracks. We may not reach the final station in one or several years but we will reach it eventually. For 50 years before Oslo the Palestinians used to leave the homeland. After Oslo their direction was reversed and they have begun returning to the homeland.

... That is why this experiment of negotiation, reconstruction, repatriation, and everything else is a unique experiment. Inasmuch as I maintain that we have great capabilities and qualifications, I also blame us for the mistakes that are bound to occur sometimes.

I am not in favor of negotiations through the media where every time we come out of a negotiation session we hold a press conference and say what went on in the negotiations. That method is harmful to the negotiators and the negotiations. Why? Because each side wants to appear to its public as the side which made no concession and would want to stick to certain forms which it would abandon inside the negotiating chamber. . . .

My feeling is that with that agreement we got the maximum possible to put the Palestinian people on the road to independence. But I always tell my brothers: We should not exaggerate what we achieved lest we lose it, and we should not underestimate what we achieved lest we waste it. There is no harm in being a little late because we have no right, in the interest of time, to accept just any solution with a low ceiling. . . . We have time and there is no need to rush. We were late before, so let us be a little late again. What is the problem, if we want to achieve a solution to our advantage? Furthermore, we are negotiating for our rights. I say that the Oslo agreement is not an ideal agreement. It does not give us what we want but it also does not give them everything they want. As we have signed the agreement I am not prepared to concede any right guaranteed for me under the agreement.

The following are steps to facilitate implementation of the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip of September 28, 1995 (the “Interim Agreement”) and other related agreements including the Note for the Record of January 17, 1997 (hereinafter referred to as “the prior agreements”) so that the Israeli and Palestinian sides can more effectively carry out their reciprocal responsibilities, including those relating to further redeployments and security respectively. These steps are to be carried out in a parallel phased approach in accordance with this Memorandum and the attached time line. They are subject to the relevant terms and conditions of the prior agreements and do not supersede their other requirements.

With regard to the terms of the Interim Agreement and of Secretary Christopher's letters to the two sides of January 17, 1997 relating to the further redeployment process, there will be a committee to address this question. The United States will be briefed regularly.

In the provisions on security arrangements of the Interim Agreement, the Palestinian side agreed to take all measures necessary in order to prevent acts of terrorism, crime and hostilities directed against the Israeli side, against individuals falling under the Israeli side's authority and against their property, just as the Israeli side agreed to take all measures necessary in order to prevent acts of terrorism, crime and hostilities directed against the Palestinian side, against individuals falling under the Palestinian side's authority and against their property. The two sides also agreed to take legal measures against offenders within their jurisdiction and to prevent incitement against each other by any organizations, groups or individuals within their jurisdiction. Both sides recognize that it is in their vital interests to combat terrorism and fight violence in accordance with Annex I of the Interim Agreement and the Note for the Record. They also recognize that the struggle against terror and violence must be comprehensive in that it deals with terrorists, the terror support structure, and the environment conducive to the support of terror. It must be continuous and constant over a longterm, in that there can be no pauses in the work against terrorists and their structure. It must be cooperative in that no effort can be fully effective without Israeli-Palestinian cooperation and the continuous exchange of information, concepts, and actions. Pursuant to the prior agreements, the Palestinian side's implementation of its responsibilities for security, security cooperation, and other issues will be as detailed below during the time periods specified in the attached time line:

The two sides agree that their security cooperation will be based on a spirit of partnership and will include, among other things, the following steps:

2. PLO Charter

The Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Central Council will reaffirm the letter of 22 January 1998 from PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat to President Clinton concerning the nullification of the Palestinian National Charter provisions that are inconsistent with the letters exchanged between the PLO and the Government of Israel on 9-10 September 1993. PLO Chairman Arafat, the Speaker of the Palestine National Council, and the Speaker of the Palestinian Council will invite the members of the PNC, as well as the members of the Central Council, the Council, and the Palestinian Heads of Ministries to a meeting to be addressed by President Clinton to reaffirm their support for the peace process and the aforementioned decisions of the Executive Committee and the Central Council. . . .

4. Human Rights and the Rule of Law Pursuant to Article XI