The Ka of Gifford Hillary (5 page)

The paper was not very long but very much to the point. It opened with the statement that in a conflict with the Soviet Union two sorts of war might be envisaged: orthodox and nuclear. In either type it was to be expected that, as far as Europe was concerned, and apart from isolated pockets of resistance, a decision would be reached very swiftly.

In an orthodox war, two factors weighed against us. Firstly, the forces of the Soviet Union and its satellites, on land and in the air, were much superior to those of the N.A.T.O. powers in Europe. Secondly, the forces of the Soviet Bloc would be directed by a single will, whereas those of the N.A.T.O. powers would almost inevitably suffer from the divided councils of numerous Governments; who, as had been demonstrated in the last war by that of France, whatever their undertakings to their allies, could not be restrained from entering into a separate peace. Therefore, a strong N.A.T.O. Army might delay, but could not prevent, the Russians arriving at Calais.

In consequence the dictum of the Allies’ Supreme Commander—that our only hope of emerging victorious from a full-scale war with the Soviets lay in our using thermo-nuclear weapons—could not be contested. Indeed, it compelled us to the further conclusion that, in the event of Soviet aggression, we must use nuclear weapons even if our enemies refrained from using them, and at once; otherwise such initial advantage might be gained as to cause us to lose the war almost overnight.

There was good reason to believe that in these new weapons we were ahead and, with the co-operation of the United States, could keep ahead of the Soviet Union. If we concentrated on them, there was a very real hope that rather than risk the total destruction of their economy the Soviets would never dare to launch a full-scale war against us; and that, should their Government prove irresponsible enough to do so, there would still be a good chance of our emerging as victors from the ruins. But, in order to build up a potential of sufficient magnitude to achieve either of the ends stated
above, the development of nuclear weapons, and preparations for their employment with maximum efficiency, must now be accepted by all three Services as an overriding priority.

Any endeavour to create a New Look of the strength required to act as a really powerful deterrent to aggression, while seeking to maintain an Old Look at all comparable to present standards, would be to play the enemy’s game. Taxation would be forced up to such heights that our economy would be disrupted. It was, however, estimated that a satisfactory New Look could be achieved if some two-thirds of the sum now expended on orthodox Naval and Military armaments could be diverted and added to that already allocated to the production of nuclear missiles, and the means of despatching them to their targets.

To achieve this re-allocation of expenditure it would be necessary to scrap the entire Naval building programme; to reduce production of heavy armoured vehicles to a point sufficient only to cover our present commitments in Germany; to abolish much other equipment in current use with the Army; to disestablish all Reserve formations in the United Kingdom which could never expect to reach the battlefield before a decision had been achieved, and to do away with both our Coast Artillery and Coastal Command.

It was appreciated that this question of going over to the New Look was giving as much concern to our Allies as to ourselves; and it was to be regretted that the United States, as the major arms producing nation among the N.A.T.O. powers, still seemed reluctant to give a lead in the matter. But that did not relieve us of our responsibility; and, as the strongest power in Western Europe, we were now being looked to for guidance by our own Continental Allies.

It was now a considerable time since the Supreme Commander’s dictum had been accepted in principle by the military advisers to the Allied Governments. For many months the staffs of S.H.A.P.E., and those of the Commanders in Chief who would come under it in the event of war, had been redrafting their plans on the assumption that thermo-nuclear weapons would be used by us as an immediate reply to Soviet aggression. But it was futile to rely on plans unless they had as their basis a definite assurance that the full resources to implement them would be forthcoming.

At present the rate of build-up of these resources was far from satisfactory, because the Government had not accepted the full implications of the Supreme Commander’s dictum. It had failed to face the question squarely; and, although it had allocated a considerable sum to the development of thermonuclear weapons, it had shirked the unpleasant task of scrapping or reducing many costly forms of armament which would prove of no value in nuclear war. Yet only by such economies could the development of the new weapons, and the means of despatching them to their targets, be accelerated to a degree which would enable us to smash our enemies so utterly and so swiftly that we might ourselves expect to survive with damage which, although heavy, would be by no means irreparable.

That this must be our aim was beyond question. Therefore the Supreme Commander’s dictum must now be accepted not only in principle but in practice; and the two senior Services must be called on to submit to drastic cuts in their establishments in order that the Air defence of the United Kingdom and the bombardment by Air of the Soviet Union might be rendered more effective, until such time as full development of guided missiles made both Fighter and Bomber aircraft also redundant.

It was appreciated that one of the major difficulties of bringing this about swiftly and effectively lay in the present practice whereby each Chief of Staff submitted an estimate of the expenditure to be allocated annually on his own Service, and fought tooth and nail for its acceptance. Since the New Look demanded such revolutionary changes it was strongly recommended that this method of procedure should be discontinued. Instead, the whole sum voted for national defence should be placed at the disposal of the Minister of Defence, and, after he had consulted with his advisers regarding priorities, it should be his responsibility to determine the types of weapon to be produced and the allocation of funds to each Service appropriate to its commitments resulting from these decisions.

The paper then expressed the opinion of the Court that the amalgamation of the three Services into one Royal Defence Force would call for much skilful negotiation, but, given goodwill in all concerned, should be practicable; and was infinitely
to be preferred to the only alternative, which called for the virtual dissolution of the Royal Navy, as such a measure would inevitably arouse great and natural protest, and possibly obstruction, throughout the whole kingdom.

It was suggested that the opposition could be overcome with a minimum of friction if the matter was taken out of the hands of the Services, and that a Royal Commission should at once be set up to examine the problem, then decide on a programme by which integration could be achieved with as little hardship as possible to all concerned.

The acceptance in practice as well as principle of a New Look policy meant that in any case the Navy must suffer severely. But an amalgamation of the Services would go a long way to softening the blow, as it should be possible to find employment in the new R.D.F. for all naval personnel other than the more senior officers, and the diversion of the pilots of the Fleet Air Arm to land-based aircraft would, after a comparatively short period of training, prove an invaluable reinforcement to our Air Power for the waging of a thermo-nuclear war.

The Army would not be called on to accept change to anything like such a degree. In addition to our commitment in Germany it was evident that a field-force must be maintained; so that a suitable contribution could be made to any U.N.O. Army formed to counter local Communist-inspired aggression of the Korean type, or for despatch to dependencies such as Cyprus in which organised terrorist activities broke out. This meant that a high percentage of its present units would have to retain, more or less, the Old Look; but it must be accepted that there would be a reduction in the types of weapon and organisation with which this field force would be equipped. Even so, the retention of such a force would entail the expenditure of at least four hundred million annually, as the economy in heavy weapons and elimination of certain Reserve formations would be more than offset by the necessity of continuing to maintain the majority of the Old Look training establishments.

With regard to Man-power, it was evident that all Arms required personnel with an ever greater degree of technical efficiency, and this could be achieved only by long-term service engagements. The aim should be for quality rather
than quantity, and in this the benefits of National Service were dubious. It was therefore recommended that a reduction of intake should be offset by a really worthwhile increase in pay for all ranks as an inducement to increased enlistment of regulars who would make the Service a career.

By the laying up of the majority of our war vessels, and the reduction of the Army’s heavy weapons, Reserve units, etc., it was estimated that we should save some three hundred and fifty million annually. This would enable us to pay for a greatly increased programme of nuclear weapon and aircraft production without placing a further burden on the taxpayer. But our object should be to reduce taxation if possible.

Should the full implications of the New Look policy be accepted and put into practice by the British Government, it could be regarded as certain that our Continental Allies would shortly follow suit by laying up the bulk of their Navies and making similar economies in their Land Forces. This would enable them to make very considerable, savings in their Defence budgets; but, unlike ourselves, they could not transfer their savings to the increased production of weapons for a thermo-nuclear war, because the processes of manufacturing such weapons had not been divulged to them.

That our Continental Allies should be placed in a position to relieve taxation while we could not do so would be manifestly unfair to the British people. It was therefore suggested that our Government should enter into discussion with the Governments of our Allies on the following lines, and, as an extension of the proposal, that the Minister of Defence should take over from the Service Chiefs the allocation of all funds voted for Defence purposes.

Instead of the present system, by which each country votes a sum annually for the maintenance of its Navy, Army and Air Force, the whole allocation for its Defence should be placed at the disposal of a new committee to be set up at N.A.T.O. The committee would consist of the Defence Ministers of all the countries concerned, and they would decide in conference how the total defence budget of the Continental Allies should be expended.

Thus, should Britain continue to be the only producer of thermo-nuclear weapons in Europe, she would no longer be automatically saddled with the whole of their cost. Such an
arrangement would moreover lead to increased efficiency in the forces of the N.A.T.O. powers, as from it would emerge a far greater degree of uniformity in arms and equipment than existed at present. Lastly, if all our Continental Allies reduced their Sea and Land Forces on the same scale as was proposed for ourselves, all the countries concerned should be able to grant some relief from taxation to their peoples, yet still contribute to a central N.A.T.O. fund sums which would enable a much greater allocation to be made for the production of nuclear weapons than Britain alone could afford. Indeed, with the combined military budgets of the European Allies at its disposal, it would not be unreasonable to expect the N.A.T.O. committee to devote one hundred million per annum to this purpose.

This, then, was the optimum solution to be aimed at. Could it be achieved, the N.A.T.O. nations would possess such overwhelming superiority in the Air and in destructive power that the likelihood of the Soviets challenging it must be remote; while, should they do so, the Allies might confidently expect to destroy all the principal cities of Russia within thirty-six hours and bring the war to a victorious conclusion so swiftly that they would have sustained only comparatively minor damage themselves.

As I put the paper down, Sir Charles asked: ‘Well, what d’you think of it?’

I sighed. ‘It’s pretty tough on the Navy.’

‘I know. If the New Look goes through, I’ll never again be able to look any of my sailor friends in the face. But we must be realistic. To allow ourselves to be influenced by sentiment would be to betray the nation. The point is, do you agree with the main conclusions in that paper or not?’

‘I do. How can one help doing so? The whole thing is so damnably logical.’

He stood up, came round to collect my glass, poured another ration of brandy into it, handed it back and said with a smile: ‘You’re going to need that, Hillary. The admission you have just made entitles me to make to you the request I have in mind. Of course, you’ve complete liberty to refuse it; but I hope you won’t.’

Sitting down in the corner of the sofa opposite to me, he stretched out his long legs and went on: ‘As I’ve already said,
when this thing goes before the House, as it must if we are to combine the three Services, there is going to be the very devil of an uproar. Even the cockneys, whose only experience of the sea is a trip to Brighton, are going to wave their wooden legs in defence of the Navy. “All the nice girls love a sailor” too, so even the women will be against us. As for the Admirals past and present, just think of the opposition they will stir up. That’s the trouble. There is a very real danger that the Bill will be thrown out; and you know what that would mean?’

‘If the Government were defeated on such a major issue, it would have no alternative but to resign and go to the country.’

‘Yes, and that would be bad enough; but far worse would follow. If we went out on that issue we’d have to fight the Election on it; and as the People are far more sentimental than the House it is a hundred to one that we would remain out. That would result in the status quo being maintained and the New Look being shelved indefinitely. If that happens, within another five years we’ll be completely at the mercy of the Russians.’