The Pope and Mussolini (49 page)

When Ciano told Mussolini he could not predict what the pope might say next, the Duce’s mood darkened. “I do not underestimate his powers,” he said, “but he must not underestimate mine.” Had the pope not learned his lesson seven years earlier in the battle over Catholic Action? “A signal from me,” warned the Duce, “would be enough to unleash all the anticlericalism of this nation.”
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As in the past, Roberto Farinacci, the most fascist of Fascists, was more than eager to help Mussolini pressure the pope. In the pages of his Cremona-based newspaper
Il Regime fascista
, he denounced Pius XI for criticizing the racial campaign.
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Rushing to the pope’s defense, Cremona’s bishop sent Farinacci a long letter. The pontiff, he explained, had had no intention of criticizing the Fascist racial program. In objecting to “racism,” he had meant only to condemn the pagan ideology that the Nazis had embraced. “And when some Catholic writer claimed that Italian Catholic Action could not, on principle, accept racism, he was speaking only of German racism. He was not speaking of an Italian racism.” The pope was certainly not condemning a healthy defense of the Italian race against the danger posed by Italy’s Jews. If people had been misled into thinking the pope and Church had opposed the racial campaign, it was no doubt because “the anti-Fascists and the Jews have an interest in twisting the meaning of the pope’s words to benefit their anti-Fascism.”
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Farinacci responded in his newspaper. In launching the anti-Semitic campaign, he explained, Mussolini was simply following Church teachings:
“The Jews, tied to a well-organized International, have throughout the world declared themselves anti-Fascist and therefore both anti-Italian and anti-Catholic. If this pontiff has some philo-Semitic weaknesses, we cannot deny that other popes were the precursors of Fascism in dealing with the racial problem. Even today I can assure you that on this question many cardinals do not share the attitude of the pope and of
L’Osservatore romano
.”
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While Farinacci fanned the flames, the pope turned once again to Tacchi Venturi to broker a deal, just as he had in the earlier crisis over Catholic Action. The Jesuit met with the Duce on August 8, bringing with him a memo recording the pope’s thoughts. He read it aloud and, after discussing the pope’s views with the dictator, left the memo with him.

Two “very grave” matters had upset the pope, said the memo. The first was the “painful” situation in which Catholic Action found itself. The Italian press was filled with calumnies aimed at the organization, and in some areas not only its leaders but even its members were at risk of being harassed. In many parts of the country, Fascist Party members were being told they had to give up their Catholic Action membership if they wanted to remain in the party. Tell Mussolini, instructed the pope, “that as in the anxious days of July 1931, now again, after seven years, We send you [Tacchi Venturi] back to him as our trusted representative with full confidence that he will know how to understand you and He who sends you.” If Mussolini thought it helpful, added the pope, he would meet with him personally to find a solution.

The second of the two “painful” matters set out in the memo concerned the “Jewish question.” “We recognize,” said Pius, “that it is up to the nation’s government to take those opportune measures in this matter in defense of its legitimate interests and it is Our intention not to interfere with them.” But the pope felt duty-bound to appeal to Mussolini’s “Christian sense” and warn him “against any type of measures that were inhumane and unchristian.” He then turned to the question of Jewish converts and the Jews who, with Church dispensation, married Catholics. He reminded Mussolini that under the concordat it was
canon law alone that determined if these marriages were valid, and he must do nothing to infringe on this right.

Pius concluded by recalling that while the Church, and the popes in the domains over which they ruled, “took care to rein in the children of Israel, and took protective measures against their evil-doing,” they never mistreated them. Even though the powerful liturgy of Easter Friday called the Jews “perfidious,” he observed, the popes had never forgotten that it was the Jews from whom Jesus Christ, the world’s Redeemer, came.
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Tacchi Venturi discussed all this with Mussolini at their meeting and then filled the pope in on the Duce’s reactions to his pleas. Pius sent him back to the Duce the evening of Friday, August 12, bearing another memo. This time Tacchi Venturi handed the pope’s text to Mussolini to read before they began their discussion. The pope had been pleased to hear that Mussolini had no intention of moving against Catholic Action, as long as it remained within its agreed-upon limits, and he was heartened by “the moderation and the spirit of reasonableness with which you say you wish to proceed with the Israelites.” His text made no further mention of the Jews, focusing entirely on his remaining concerns about Catholic Action. The pope hoped that a new accord could be reached to bring the Catholic Action dispute to a peaceful conclusion, but this could happen only if Mussolini first took three actions: remove the anticlerical Fascist Party head of Bergamo; reinstate Catholic Action members who had been stripped of their Fascist Party membership; and reinstate those who had lost their government jobs because of their Catholic Action activities.

“Without these preliminaries,” Tacchi Venturi, speaking on the pope’s behalf, told him, “I believe, O Duce, that our calm discussions will—to my great pain—not easily have the same happy result as those of August 1931.” He ended by reminding Mussolini how valuable Church backing had been to the dictator, “not the least important reason for the Italian victory in Ethiopia.” So crucial was the Vatican’s support of the Fascist regime, argued the pope’s emissary, that “all the
earthly and infernal forces of cosmopolitan anti-fascism” would do anything they could to end it.
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Almost a month had now passed since the announcement of the new racial doctrine. While Jews worldwide were very nervous about what would come next, they still hoped that Italy’s anti-Semitic posturing would remain without much practical effect. Italy’s 46,000 Jews lived largely in cities of the north and center. The largest community by far was in Rome, with 11,000, followed by Milan with almost 7,000, and Trieste, the northeastern port city, with nearly 5,000. Jews were much more literate than the general population, and while practically half the Italian population were farmers, it was rare to find a Jew tending the soil. But Italy’s Jews were far from uniformly well off. While the census listed their largest occupational category as “commerce,” this covered everyone from impecunious street vendors to prosperous merchants. Rome’s Jewish community was not wealthy. Many of its members depended on Jewish charity to survive.
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Unfortunately for Italy’s Jews—both rich and poor—Mussolini was all too serious about translating his racial rhetoric into action. But he knew it would not be easy to generate popular enthusiasm for an anti-Semitic crusade that came as a complete surprise to most Italians. If the pope were to publicly oppose him, it might seriously undermine the campaign.

“Three Points of an Agreement Happily Reached the Evening of August 16, 1938, Between His Excellency the Honorable Mussolini and Father Tacchi Venturi, S.J., in order to Restore Good Harmony between the Holy See and the Italian Government that was Disturbed in Recent Weeks.” This was the title of the three-page typed document that the pope’s Jesuit envoy sent the next day to Cardinal Pacelli. Mussolini had dictated the text, and Tacchi Venturi had written it down. Its terms closely reflected the points that the pope had proposed to the Duce over the previous week.

Of the agreement’s three points, the first dealt with the Jews, and the second two with Catholic Action. Point two pledged that Catholic
Action would be allowed to continue its activities in full, unmolested, and that those Catholic Action members who lost their Fascist Party membership would have it restored. In point three Mussolini agreed to the pope’s demand that he dismiss Bergamo’s party head.

Father Tacchi Venturi’s agreement with Mussolini on the treatment of the Jews was spelled out in point one under the heading “The Problem of Racism and Judaism.” Mussolini pledged that the new anti-Jewish laws would be no harsher than those that the popes themselves had imposed for centuries on the Jews. In fact, some of the restrictions the popes had enforced in the Papal States were specifically to be excluded. The text read:

As for the Jews, the distinctive caps—of whatever color—will not be brought back, nor the ghettoes, much less will their belongings be confiscated. The Jews, in a word, can be sure that they will not be subjected to treatment worse than that which was accorded them for centuries and centuries by the popes who hosted them in the Eternal City and in the lands of their temporal domain.

This was the dream of the Jesuits of
La Civiltà cattolica
, one shared by Tacchi Venturi and by the Jesuit superior general. The Jews would at last be subject to restrictions aimed at protecting Christian society from their noxious influence. The Vatican’s unofficial journal had been urging these measures on Europe’s governments for decades.

In exchange for Mussolini’s promise to remain within the bounds of Church-supported restrictions on the Jews, the Holy See would agree not to criticize the upcoming anti-Semitic laws, as the third and final paragraph of the section stated:

“Having said that [i.e., that the restrictions on the Jews would not be worse than those imposed in the Papal States], it is the strong wish of the Honorable Head of the Government that the Catholic press, the preachers, Catholic speakers, and the like abstain from discussing this topic in public. The Holy See, and the Holy Pontiff himself, do not lack
the means to come to an understanding directly with Mussolini via private means and to offer him those observations believed to be opportune for the best solution of the delicate problem.”
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Tacchi Venturi was pleased. The agreement recalled the last time the pope and Mussolini had hurled threats at each other, in 1931. Then, too, a break had seemed perilously near. After others had failed, he had been called in and negotiated an amicable settlement with Mussolini, signing on the pope’s behalf. This time, too, the Fascist threat against Catholic Action was averted.

That same week the Vatican daily newspaper weighed in on the need for government action against the Jews.
L’Osservatore romano
recalled that over the centuries the popes had restricted Jews’ rights in order to protect Christians. In a passage that would be quickly picked up in newspapers throughout Italy, the paper explained that while the popes had always shown compassion in dealing with the Jews, this should not be misunderstood:

But—to put things straight—this does not mean that the Jews might abuse the hospitality of Christian countries. Along with protective measures there were decrees of restriction and persecution in their regard. The civil ruler was in agreement with the Church in this.… While the Christians were forbidden to force the Jews to embrace the Catholic religion, to disturb their synagogues, their Sabbaths, and their feast days, Jews, on the other hand, were forbidden to hold any public office, civil or military, and this debarment was extended to the sons of converted Jews. These precautions related to professional activities, teaching and even trade.
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The Vatican newspaper thus offered a blueprint of the anti-Semitic laws that Mussolini would begin enacting less than three weeks later.

On Thursday morning, August 18, Tacchi Venturi went to Castel Gandolfo to show the agreement to the pope. He knew he would have to handle the pontiff carefully—the pope’s anger could explode at any
moment. But the Jesuit knew that with enough time, a way could usually be found to win him over or at least ensure that he went along.

As it turned out, he had good reason to fear the pope’s wrath. Tardini, who joined them in the pope’s study a few minutes after eleven, noticed the tension. Something was wrong, but he did not know what it was.

On their way back to the Vatican, Tacchi Venturi showed Tardini the agreement and told him the pope was upset about the first of the three points, the one dealing with the Jews. “
Quidquid recipitur pro modum recipientis recipitur
,” said Tacchi Venturi. The phrase, identified with medieval Christian philosophy, translates as “One perceives according to one’s mode of perception.” The pope, the Jesuit complained, insisted on seeing things through dark lenses. He had apparently been especially upset by the agreement’s explicit reference to the way the popes had treated the Jews in the past. Although he had made the same point in his earlier communication with the Duce on the Jews, he would not want to identify what Mussolini was about to do with the actions of his predecessors.
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Despite Pius XI’s outburst, Tacchi Venturi told Tardini he hoped the pope would calm down and realize that the agreement was good for the Church. He had shown the draft to Cardinal Pizzardo, in the waiting room outside the pope’s office; he hoped Pizzardo would help persuade the pontiff to accept the deal.
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Both Mussolini and those around the pope were eager to see an agreement reached. In letters to his prime minister, the French ambassador Charles-Roux reported that the polemics over the racial campaign were dying down; Catholic Action was the one remaining bone of contention. “As for anti-Semitism,” wrote the ambassador, “the tactic employed by the Italian government is skillful, and can only leave the Vatican to stay silent.” The Italian papers were filled with articles detailing how, when the popes had held temporal power, they had discriminated against the Jews. On August 17 several newspapers ran articles under the title “How the Popes Treated the Jews,” citing
L’Osservatore romano
’s story earlier in the week.
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The day Mussolini and Tacchi Venturi drafted their agreement, Dino Alfieri, minister of popular culture, called in the directors of Rome’s newspapers and the Rome-based correspondents of other Italian papers. His message: tone down the polemics against the Vatican, because “it looks like everything is being taken care of.”
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