The Pope and Mussolini (77 page)

49.
Pacelli added, “I have full faith however that your good offices will want to ward off this evil.” ASMAE, AISS, b. 21, Pacelli a De Vecchi, 22 marzo 1933.

50.
ASMAE, AISS, b. 21, De Vecchi a Pacelli, 7 aprile 1933.

51.
Let De Vecchi know, the pope told Pacelli, “that the Holy Father has viewed this news with great pleasure.” ASV, AESS, pos. 430a, fasc. 348, f. 25, 8 aprile 1933.

CHAPTER 15: HITLER, MUSSOLINI, AND THE POPE

1.
E. Mussolini 1957, p. 143; Kershaw 1999, p. 343. A few days after the March on Rome, Hermann Esser, one of Hitler’s main lieutenants, told a packed rally, “Germany’s Mussolini is called Adolph Hitler.” Kershaw 1999, p. 180.

2.
DDI, series 7, vol. 13, n. 61, Renzetti a Chiavolini, 31 gennaio 1933.

3.
DBFP, 1919–39, series 2, vol. 5, n. 444, Graham to Wellesley, October 11, 1933; DDF, series 1, vol. 4, n. 293, Chambrun à Paul-Boncour, 11 octobre 1933.

4.
Pacelli’s notes of his conversation with French ambassador Charles-Roux are at ASV, AESS, pos. 430b, fasc. 359, f. 35, “L’Ambasciatore di Francia.,” 1 febbraio 1933. Mussolini’s chief of cabinet reported secondhand on a conversation in which Pacelli said that Hitler “had performed a great service for Germany because he has permitted a strong government,” but added that he thought Hitler himself would not last. DDI, series 7, vol. 13, n. 13.

5.
In 1931
La Civiltà cattolica
reported the concerns voiced by many German bishops about ultra-nationalist Nazi ideology: “Il ‘Nazionalsocialismo’ in Germania,” CC 1931, II, pp. 309–27.

6.
ASV, AESS, pos. 430b, fasc. 359, f. 55, “L’Ambasciatore di Germania,” 24 febbraio 1933.

7.
The pope spoke these words to Fontenay on his final visit as French ambassador. MAESS, vol. 37, 3–4, Fontenay à président du conseil, 14 juin 1932.

8.
MAESS, vol. 37, 63–66, Charles-Roux à ministre des affaires étrangères, 7 mars 1933.

9.
“The present Pope takes the view that the most serious and immediate danger to the Church is the spread of Communism. His first concern is to combat this menace and he is doing so in every country with all his strength.” FCRSE, C2887/2887/22, Mr. Kirkpatrick, British legation to the Holy See, to Sir John Simon, London, March 20, 1933.

10.
Kent 1981, pp. 154–55. Wolf (2010, pp. 155–68) reviews the evidence behind the pope’s decision to get the German bishops to support Hitler in March 1933.

11.
MAESS, vol. 37, 70–77, Charles-Roux à ministre des affaires étrangères, 20 mai 1933.

12.
Wolf 2010, pp. 174–75.

13.
A proud Catholic, von Papen had befriended Pacelli years earlier in Germany. He had often hosted him at the Guards Cavalry Club, where he introduced him to many of Germany’s leading conservatives. CC 1933 IV, p. 89; Wolf 2010, pp. 174–75; Ventresca 2013, p. 62.

14.
Ventresca 2013, pp. 75–79.

15.
Wolf 2010, p. 178.

16.
Ibid., pp. 227–28.

17.
ASMAE, AISS, b. 77, “Il punto di vista cattolico di fronte al sistema Tedesco di concepire la Chiesa,” 19 ottobre 1933.

18.
As recorded in Pacelli’s notes. ASV, AESS, fasc. 430a, fasc. 349, ff. 27r–27v, 30 dicembre 1933. The Italian ambassador to Germany was also reporting in December the growing conflict between the Catholic Church and the German government, especially in dealing with youths. ASMAE, APG, b. 13, “S. Sede e Governo germanico,” 27 dicembre 1933.

19.
According Italy’s ambassador in Berlin, Monsignor Orsenigo had reached an understanding with the Nazi leaders. He was doing all he could to thwart the opponents of the Vatican-Nazi collaboration, both those within the Nazi hierarchy and those in the Vatican. ASMAE, AISS, b. 35, ff. 70–71, ministero degli affari esteri a De Vecchi, 25 gennaio 1934.

20.
Giorgio Angelozzi Gariboldi quoted in Biffi 1997, p. 99.

21.
ACS, MCPG, b. 157, 19 maggio 1928.

22.
Biographical details on Orsenigo are taken from Biffi (1997). See also Godman 2004, pp. 30–31.

23.
Pacelli had opposed the move, fearing it would do more harm than good. Wolf 2010, pp. 245–52; Godman 2004, pp. 48–50.

24.
In December 1934 Mussolini, unafraid of criticizing the Nazis, boasted to the French magazine
Le Figaro
of his close relations with the Vatican and faulted the Nazi regime for its misguided religious policies. MAESI, vol. 267, 49–53, Charles-Roux au ministère des affaires étrangères, 26 décembre 1934.

25.
On May 25 the pope instructed Pacelli to tell Mussolini that he prayed for him morning and night. The pope wanted Mussolini to get Hitler to recognize the Church’s right to provide the moral and spiritual education of young people. ASV, AESS, pos. 430a, fasc. 350, f. 29.

26.
ASMAE, AISS, b. 35, “Udienza dal Cardinale Segretario di Stato—Venerdì 1 giugno 1934,” “Udienza da S.E. il Capo del governo—Lunedì 4 giugno 1934,” “Udienza dal Cardinale Pacelli—Martedì 5 giugno 1935.” The Goebbels passage is taken from his novel
Michael
(Steigmann-Gall 2003, pp. 20–21). Faulhaber’s report is quoted in Wolf 2010, pp. 162–63. On June 15, the day of the meeting of the two dictators, De Vecchi met with Pacelli to reassure him that Mussolini would be forcefully raising the pope’s points. ASV, AESS, pos. 430b, fasc. 361, ff. 32/33, “L’Ambasciatore d’Italia,” 15 giugno 1934.

27.
Mussolini was also concerned about the German-speaking population of Italy’s Alto Adige region, which Italy had acquired following the First World War, and whose allegiances were in doubt.

28.
DDI, series 7, vol. 14, n. 112, “Colloqui fra il capo del governo,. Mussolini, e il cancelliere federale austriaco Dollfuss, Riccione,” 19–20 agosto 1933; Lamb 1997, pp. 100–1.

29.
DDI, series 7, vol. 14, n. 246, “Appunto,” 3 ottobre 1933.

30.
Kershaw 1999, p. 282. On the political uses of Mussolini’s body, see Luzzatto’s (1998) excellent book.

31.
Rauscher 2004, pp. 193–94.

32.
De Felice (1974, p. 494) disputes the common view that Mussolini’s German was too weak to understand Hitler, quoting Hitler’s Italian translator: “The Duce usually spoke German, with a heavy accent, very slowly, carefully articulating every syllable, and it was clear that he spoke it willingly.”

33.
Milza 2000, pp. 694–96.

34.
De Felice 1974, p. 505.

35.
ASV, AESS, pos. 430b, fasc. 361, ff.52/53, “L’Ambasciatore d’Italia,” 6 luglio 1934.

36.
DDI, series 7, vol. 15, n. 469, “Colloquio fra il Capo del Governo … e … De Vecchi,” 2 luglio 1934.

37.
ASMAE, AISS, b. 35, Mussolini a De Vecchi, 22 giugno 1934.

38.
Lamb 1997, pp. 106–7.

39.
ACS, MCPG, b.158, “Riservato, da fonte Vaticana,” Roma, 26 luglio 1934.

40.
Ventresca 2013, p. 85.

41.
Quoted in Fattorini 2007, p. 110n8. According to Orsenigo, the bishops voiced no objection to Hitler’s claim. Duce 2006, pp. 32–33, based on Orsenigo’s March 7, 1933 report to Pacelli. The bishop of Osnabrück said that at the meeting Hitler spoke “not a word against the church, only appreciation for the bishops.” The themes used by the Nazis to vilify the Jews (Herf 2006, pp. 37–41) were largely the same as those pushed by the Vatican’s unofficial journal
La Civiltà cattolica
. From the 1920s, Hitler and his sidekick Joseph Goebbels had warned of a Jewish conspiracy against Western civilization and of Jewish control of high finance, the press, and Bolshevism. It was all aimed at reducing Christians to the Jews’ servants.

42.
ASV, AESG, pos. 643, fasc. 158, ff. 14r–19r. See also Hubert Wolf’s (2010, pp. 184–90) discussion of the case.

43.
Wolf 2010, p. 190.

44.
“Anti-Semitic struggle has assumed an official government character. Intervention Representative of Holy See would be equivalent to a protest against a government law.” ASV, AESG, pos. 643, fasc. 158, f. 5r. And a few days later: “Unfortunately the anti-Semitic principle has been accepted and sanctioned by the entire government, and this fact will unfortunately remain as an ignoble stain on the very first pages of the history that German National Socialism—not without its merits—is writing!” ASV, AESG, pos. 643, fasc. 158, 6r–6v, 11 aprile 1933.

45.
The remarkable correspondence between Ambassador Vittorio Cerruti and Mussolini at the end of March and early April 1933 records these frenetic attempts. ASMAE, Gab., b. 668. The Duce’s telegram to Cerruti is reproduced in DDI, series 7, vol. 13, n. 327, Mussolini a Cerruti, 30 marzo 1933. The telegram containing the Duce’s message to Hitler is found in the ASMAE file, labeled “absolute precedence, personal for His Excellency Cerruti.” Cerruti’s wife, whom he met in Vienna, was Hungarian and, although she does not discuss it in her memoir, was apparently from a Jewish family. Cerruti 1953. Pacelli knew that the Duce was voicing this criticism, as did, most likely, the pope himself.

46.
ASV, AESG, pos. 643, fasc. 158, f. 5r, Orsenigo a Pacelli, 9 aprile 1933. The (undated) note regarding Mussolini’s protest is at AESG, pos. 643, fasc.158, f. 8r. Mussolini met with Chaim Weizmann, the Zionist leader, in late April. Weizmann described the campaign of Nazi persecution of the Jews in these early weeks of Hitler’s rule, and told of his plan to try to get permission to have large numbers of Germany’s Jews migrate to Palestine. DDI, series 7, vol. 13, n. 480, “Colloqui fra il capo del governo … Mussolini e Chaim Weizmann,” 26 aprile 1933. The next month an Italian envoy to Germany reported back to Mussolini that the Nazi leaders were beginning to have second thoughts about their anti-Semitic campaign, given the bad publicity it was generating. “Thus,” he wrote, “the Duce, whose thought I clearly laid out to Hitler both in the past and recently, is beginning to be shown to have been right.” If, as he thought likely, Hitler was about to soften the restrictions on the Jews, the Jews would have Mussolini to thank. DDI, series 7, vol. 13, n. 595, Renzetti a Chiavolini, Berlino, 14 maggio 1933.
   Remarkably, in reaction to Mussolini’s pleas, Franz von Papen, German vice chancellor, meeting with the Duce in Rome on April 10, assured him that he recognized “that the campaign against the Jews was an error.” Mussolini also took advantage of the meeting to stress the importance for the new Nazi regime of maintaining good relations with the Holy See. DDI, series 7, vol. 13, n. 401, “Colloquio fra il Capo del Governo e Ministro degli Esteri, Mussolini, e il Vice Cancelliere del Reich, Papen,” Roma, 10 aprile 1933. The next day both von Papen and Hermann Göring, Hitler’s henchman and president of the Reichs tag, met with the pope at the Vatican. We have no account of what was said;
L’Osservatore romano
simply reported that the meetings had taken place, offering no comment or explanation. “Nostre informazioni,” OR, 13 aprile 1933, p. 1.

47.
Neither the Vatican nor the German bishops’ organization protested the Nuremberg Laws; nor did they voice any opposition to the renewed Nazi campaign to demonize the Jews. Wolf 2010, p. 217.

48.
Taking up this theme at the 1935 Nuremberg Rally, Joseph Goebbels spoke of the Jews’ secret plan for “international Jewish world domination.” Herf 2006, pp. 41–42.

49.
Ledóchowski addressed the letter to Pacelli, hoping he would convince the pope of the need for the encyclical. At the time, the Nazi government was mounting a highly publicized trial of Jesuits, charging them with illegally exporting funds abroad, but strikingly, the Jesuit leader was defending Hitler. In July, in talking to Pignatti, Ledóchowski blamed Goebbels and Rosenberg—noted enemies of the Catholic Church—for the problems, telling the Italian ambassador that he thought it very possible that Hitler did not approve of the campaign against the religious orders that was then under way. ASMAE, APG, b. 33, fasc. 1, Pignatti al ministero degli affari esteri, “Processi antireligiosi in Germania,” 14 luglio 1936.