The President's Call: Executive Leadership From FDR to George Bush (19 page)

BOOK: The President's Call: Executive Leadership From FDR to George Bush
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ical standing and the policy credibility of the Reagan presidency. Operating through the back door and around the institutionalized apparatus of government can lead to decisions and illegalities that are truly presidency-threatening. It is hard to imagine that this is in a president's interests. (Ibid., 610)
The presidentialist literature, as represented by Nathan and Moe, urges reform of the political system to make it more amenable to presidential control through politicization of the bureaucracy and centralization of command in the executive. However, when presidents with shortterm vision or goals make maximum use of these administrative tools, they are likely to provoke congressional retaliation and judicial stop signs in the long term.
If swift and sure congressional retaliation were a given in the game, presidents would learn to replace their competitive behavior with norms of cooperative behavior. However, there is scant hope for this eventuality because presidents have incentives to operate with a short time frame, rather than with a longer one, and Congress does not hold them accountable for the latter.
If presidents follow their short-term interests, they are likely to stimulate more and more restrictive congressional bonds on their behavior, thereby giving presidents incentives to engage in the types of behavior exemplified by the Iran-Contra Affair. Yet each individual president is likely to put his short-term interests above the institution's interests. As in many other aspects of American politics, Congress is key here. It will ultimately determine the kind of presidency we get. It must act expeditiously when presidents arrogate for their exclusive use constitutionally shared authority. Otherwise, presidents will take as theirs what Congress by its inaction bestows. (Ibid., 611)
Depoliticization and Debureaucratization: Push and Pull on Appointees
As Mosher observes, the claim that "the government of the United States is run not by career ministers but by amateurs" is something of an exaggeration.
A substantial part of the government is in fact run by career officials and under laws that permit little discretion; and a good many noncareer officials are in fact professionals, not amateurs. Yet the central fact remains:
 
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a relatively small number of political appointees, whose tenure is typically temporary, are presumed to govern the activities of [the 4.25 million, excluding the 600,000 employees of the U.S. Postal system] mostly permanent federal employees in the civil service, the military services, and other career systems. The politically appointed and presumably responsive executives amount to less than one-tenth of one percent of total direct federal employment. (Mosher 1985, 405)
The institution of the federal bureaucracy exists in more-or-less creative tension with the institution of democracy in this country. While career executives might be seen to represent the former, political executives who serve at the pleasure of the democratically elected president represent the latter. It is the interaction of the career professionals with the democratic controls of the political appointees that keeps the political dynamic alive.
There is a careful sense of interplay and interdependence between these two institutions of bureaucracy and democracy as represented by their practitioners, the career and political executives. Bureaucracy thrives on the democratic values of openness, fairness, and achievement. Neutral competence is its highest standard. Democracy depends on the public service ethic and administrative expertise to bring to fruition its commitment to the common good through exercise of responsive competence.
Bureaucracy and democracy are two of the great political forces of the modern age. That [their] growth has been parallel seems paradoxical, as they appear wholly opposed in spirit; the former requires hierarchy, order, and technical expertise, the latter equality, freedom, and participation. While these conflicts should not be minimized, neither should they obscure the common heritage and continuing interdependence of these forces. Both bureaucracy and democracy, as Max Weber, the great German sociologist, observed, rest on the Enlightenment impulse to law and reason, on the rejection of traditional, ascriptively based systems of authority. And more to the point, neither force can survive and prosper without the other. Just as true bureaucracy thrives on the democratic values of achievement, fairness, and unfettered information, so is bureaucracy a fundamental requisite of modern democratic government. Absent the administrative capacity to give them substance, public policies in pursuit of the public good, as articulated by elected representatives, can be no more than feeble and sterile avowals of intent. (Huddleston 1987, 79)

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