compliant ones. His function at the White House was no different. Under his direction "the White House role in the selection and approval of key agency officials would be much stronger. . . . By the end of Richard Nixon's first term, the original strong cabinet model had been fully displaced" (ibid., 50-51).
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Control extended to performance in new ways, as well. Malek took to visiting agencies to assess personally how PASs were doing. He had "points of contact" within many of the agencies to deal with recruiting and serve as liaisons with his office. "Later, to further solidify his grip on the bureaucracy, Nixon loyalists were strategically planted in departments and agencies as overseers of administration policy" (Bonafede 1987a, 40-41).
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At the same time the White House was moving to exert more control over political appointments in the agencies, OMB was being strengthened and politicized, and Ehrlichman's White House counterbureaucracy for domestic affairs was being established. The White House intended to get deeply into the operational workings of the agencies. One result of this centralizing strategy was an overload at the White House. To deal with it, Nixon turned increasingly to his chief of staff, H.R. Haldeman, who operated in the hierarchical manner that further contributed to the president's isolation.
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Then, immediately after his reelection, Nixon turned on his own cabinet. In what Hess calls "perhaps the most remarkable statement ever made by a president who has just been re-elected," Nixon declared that he had lost confidence in the people he had called to serve him and that a major overhaul of the government was imminent. "Having realized the failure of his counter-bureaucracy, he nonetheless did not blame himself or his practice of isolation and remote-control government, but instead chose a strategy of massive restructuring and personnel shuffling" (Hess 1988, 126).
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First, he demanded the pro forma resignation of his entire cabinet. Next, just before Christmas 1972, Nixon "announced 57 resignations and 87 other personnel decisions." As a "technique for prolonging the vitality of political appointees," the reorganization might have made some sense, but many agencies suffered from the loss or transfer of appointees, some of whom had only recently come on board, only to be moved elsewhere. Cabinet tenure also suffered. "From 1933 to 1965 the median length of service for cabinet officials was 40 months; during Nixon's presidency it dropped to 18" (ibid., 126-27). Thus began a trend from which cabinet tenure never recovered.
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At the same time he fired his cabinet, Nixon unveiled a new and-
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