The President's Call: Executive Leadership From FDR to George Bush (40 page)

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Authors: Judith E. Michaels

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Page 126
and their commitment to the bureaucracy and its workings. This is not a recent phenomenon. In Eisenhower's administration it was observed that political appointees "tended to stay in Washington for 'a social season and a half and then leave."' A 1967 Brookings study found that from Roosevelt's administration through Johnson's, only 52 percent of PASs stayed in one agency as long as two years, 29 percent stayed more than three years, and a mere 14 percent stayed four or more years (Ingraham 1987, 428).
There are several reasons for the frequency of this movement:
1. lower-level political executives are utilized as generalist managers (much in line with the original intent of SES) by higher-level political appointees; 2. the appointees themselves are anxious to gain as much experience as possible and often have a "preferred" appointment toward which they are progressing; 3. many of the younger political executives view their government service as a job market, one that must be utilized to the maximum extent possible in the short time available. (Ibid., 429)
Regardless of the reasons for the movement of political appointees, longer tenure in position is crucial to good management. Short tenure and the many demands on their time considerably limit PASs' scope and vision for public service.
Just as it does in the private sector, a high turnover rate in government leads to emphasis on short-term results and neglect of long-term planning. Political appointees tend to operate in a "firehouse environment of day-to-day crises and immediate concerns. Decisions have to be made on White House, congressional or industry requests, budget, legislative and regulatory proposals, and other assorted pressing issues related to department management." One can see how agency heads feel they are being, as one DOT official put it, "nickeled and dimed to death." (Thoryn 1983, 78-79)
Tenure in the first half of the modern era (1933-60) fared not much better than in its later years. According to a 1967 Brookings Institution study, assistant secretaries in that period typically averaged 2.7 years in their position. (Brauer 1987, 175)
However, the trend is toward even shorter tenures (see table 5.1). "Significant percentages served far less than the average. . . . thus a third served 1.5 years or less-and 14.3% served 1.5 to 2 years. 41.7% of cabi-
 
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Table 5.1. PAS TenureJohnson to Reagan 1
President's Term
Average PAS Tenure (in years)
Johnson
2.8
Nixon
2.6
Ford
1.9
Carter
2.5
Reagan
2.0
Source:
Carl Brauer, "Tenure, Turnover, and Postgovernment Employment Trends of Presidential Employees." In
The In-and-Outers: Presidential Appointees and Transient Government in Washington,
ed. G. Calvin Mackenzie (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 174-75.
net secretaries served 1.5 years or less and a full 62% of deputy secretaries and 46.3% of undersecretaries had equally short tenures" (ibid., 175).
As noted previously, 85 percent of PASs in the NAPA study had prior government service, 80 percent of them in the federal government, often in the same agencies where they later served as a PAS. These statistics mitigate somewhat tenure and turnover figures, since, presumably, those appointees with government experience require less on-the-job training. Nevertheless, regardless of party change in the White House, total tenure in the agencies, as well as total service in the federal government, has been declining (ibid., 177).
The NAPA study found little correlation of tenure with previous employment, except among those who had worked for state or local governments immediately prior to their PAS service. The tenure of that group was 3.5 years, a full year longer than average. While it found negligible difference between female and male PASs, the study found that younger appointees tended toward shorter tenure (ibid., 175-77).
The study also found that longer tenure correlated positively with the time left in the president's term at the time of the PAS's appointment and the confidence PASs had in career executives, though it is unknown if longer tenure caused greater confidence or vice versa.
Shorter tenure correlated positively with: 1. the difference, not between pregovernment salary and PAS salary, but between the PAS's government salary and the next position she or he held; 2. the level of PASs' interpersonal skills (perhaps because those skills are highly in demand in both the public and private sectors); 3. Republican party affiliation (per-
 
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haps reflecting presidential disdain for government and the bureaucracy as evidenced by Nixon and Reagan); and 4. the number of hours worked weekly (Joyce 1990a, 140-41).
Joyce offers a useful context corrective to any whose angst over PAS turnover would be without qualification:
The primary reason for high turnover and short tenure among these appointees is probably structural rather than motivational. Political executives stay on the job for a relatively short period of time
because they are political.
It is likely that the factor that influences the decision to exit more than any other is the realization that the appointive president's term will soon be over. Pragmatism dictates that the political executive will at this point seek another job. . . . This end-of-term turnover is built into the system. (Ibid., 142)
That perspective addresses end-of-term turnover, but what of earlier departures? They "leave more unexplained than explained. . . . we should not be convinced that we have anything close to a complete understanding of political executive motivations," according to Joyce. His analysis suggests at least four reasons for early departure: "1. salaries are not high enough to keep officials in the public sector; 2. executives are overworked; 3. political executives do not place enough faith in career executives; and 4. executives appointed by presidents lacking in commitment to traditional government service tend toward relatively rapid exit" (ibid., 143).
Why should the public be concerned about PAS turnover? As the NAPA study concludes: "If talented Americans decline the opportunity for public service, if they endure it for only short periods of time and if they are ill-prepared for the challenges they face in the public sector the system will not deliver fully on its promise" (NAPA 1985, 3).
"I Can't Afford It Anymore": Salary and Tenure
Salary constituted a major source of concern among PASs. Of those in the NAPA study, 55 percent reported some or a very significant financial sacrifice immediately upon accepting their appointment.
4
Indeed, as noted above, while low salary may keep many potential appointees out of government service, "the lure of higher salaries after doing without for a time" is what impels PASs to leave it. "This could mean that political appointees come to their jobs for reasons other than salary, but are not willing to do without indefinitely. It also supports the notion that political ap-

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